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FOREWORD 
By HON. LORD WALKER, LL.D. 
President of the Scottish Universities Law Institute 
FOR many years past Scots lawyers whether in practice or in the Uni- 
versities have been gravely handicapped, and the rational development 
of the Scottish legal system has itself been threatened, through lack of 
adequate up-to -date treatises on important branches of the law. There 
is an obvious need for a restatement of Scots Law applying and adapting 
traditional principles to the needs of the twentieth century. Thanks to 
the generosity of the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland and 
to the initiative of the late Lord Normand, it proved possible in Feb- 
ruary 1960 to constitute the Scottish Universities Law Institute, with 
Lord Normand as its Honorary President. The general purpose of the 
Institute is " to encourage, stimulate and advance the scientific study of 
the Law of Scotland." It has approached this formidable task, in which 
judges, practitioners and legal scholars in particular participate, by 
endeavouring to restate the main branches of the Law of Scotland in 
about sixteen separate treatises. To complete the task will take some 
ten years of very hard work. Most of the treatises will be written 
primarily for the practitioner and advanced scholar. However, since for 
teaching purposes no work on Scottish Constitutional Law is available 
at present, Professor J. D. B. Mitchell, in this the first volume of the 
Series, has sought not only to provide in footnotes detailed references 
for the guidance of practitioners and those engaged on research, but 
also to expound his subject in the text so that students may readily 
comprehend. It is appropriate that the first volume in the Institute's 
Series should deal with fundamental issues of public law which have 
never received adequate treatment even by our institutional writers. 
The present volume makes available to the public the fruits of 
years of patient research. But research alone will not achieve the 
object of the Institute. Many years ago Lord Dunedin pointed out, 
in a slightly different connection, that adequate use of authority could 
never be made unless that authority found its place in the private library 
of the practising lawyer. I venture to express the hope that, this and 
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the succeeding volumes may find their place not only in the public 
libraries but also in the private libraries of all who are interested in the 
Law of Scotland whether from a theoretical or a practical point of view. 
JAMES WALKER. 
PREFACE 
THERE are both universal and local aspects of constitutional law. The 
rules may be local, but the problems are universal. The Declaration of 
Arbroath (from which the quotation on the title page is taken) emphasises 
both these aspects. The fact that (as Lord Cooper pointed out) it was not 
entirely original, and the fact of its local significance demonstrate how 
the universal and the local may blend. Similarly there are both ephemeral 
and eternal aspects. Since constitutional law is about power and the 
exercise of power there is some tendency to concentrate upon contempor- 
ary issues, which may be of short -lived interest. The enduring object of 
the rules - liberty -so forcefully emphasised by the Declaration of 
Arbroath should not however be lost to sight. Too great a concentration 
upon what is local and may be ephemeral can be harmful unless other 
elements are borne in mind. 
Nevertheless, there is perhaps no good time at which to write a book 
on constitutional law. Continuous change is a greater force than it is 
often believed to be, and any writer becomes increasingly conscious of 
circumstances equivalent to those which (reputedly) tempted Professor 
Thomas Reed Powell to change the title of his course from Constitutional 
Law to Current Affairs. When this book was in its final stages, the 
Peerage Act, 1963, was enacted, the reform of local government in 
Scotland was projected, and litigation such as the Burmah Oil case, 
capable of casting light on fundamentals, was in train. At the proof stage 
the problem of selecting a Prime Minister once again became prominent. 
Of some of these and similar matters it has been possible to take some 
note, but no proper exploration was practicable. Had the book been 
held back to make a fuller treatment possible other like events would 
doubtless have happened meanwhile. 
In one sense timing does not perhaps matter. The purpose of the book 
is to treat central institutions, central ideas, and their relationships. In 
the interest of clarity much detail has therefore been omitted, and an 
attempt has been made (as the Commissioners of 1707 would have put it) 
not to stir into any matter which was not essential to the primary purpose. 
Within these limits the book is, for the most part, concerned with Great 
Britain. The proper consideration of the position in Northern Ireland, 
the Channel Isles or the Isle of Man would have involved too many 
strands of argument. Within Great Britain the emphasis is upon Scottish 
institutions and rules. Where possible comparison is made where there 
is significance in differences. This pattern was chosen not merely because 
of the provenance of the book, but also in the interests of brevity and 
clarity; an account of both the Scottish and English systems of local 
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government could well be confusing to the student. Nevertheless, since 
the emphasis is upon central institutions and ideas, it is hoped that the 
book will have a general utility. For similar reasons, despite what has 
been said earlier, comparison with other systems beyond the United 
Kingdom has been limited, though it is to be hoped that opportunity will 
arise for the proper development of such comparative aspects. No 
general account has been given of the development of the Commonwealth 
or of the relationship of the United Kingdom to the Commonwealth 
since it is conceived that these matters are appropriate to specialist 
studies. If excuse or justification must be offered for this concentration 
it might be said that our constitutional institutions and ideas are not 
thought to have such perfection that an examination of them alone, 
without further distraction, or complication, is out of place. 
In relation to matters falling within the scope thus designated descrip- 
tive material has been cut down, particularly where there already exists 
adequate literature. References to such literature have been made, and 
the references should be pursued. There is little point in summarising 
familiar printed sources or other men's work (or indeed the fuller state- 
ments of the author's views which have appeared elsewhere). It is better 
that students should resort to originals. Further, since an attempt has 
been made to concentrate upon matters of principle, it will be found that 
on occasion the position is somewhat baldly stated. Again it is hoped 
that the material given in the footnotes is adequate for the reader to be 
able to check and to challenge the propositions which are made. The 
student reader should be urged to resort to original sources, other readers 
will no doubt prefer so to do. This method of treatment means however 
that, on occasion, the footnotes are of more significance than is some- 
times the case in somewhat similar works. 
The book appears in connection with the Law Institute for Scotland, 
endowed by the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland. Thanks 
are due to both those institutions. Mr. W. I. R. Fraser, Q.C. (as he 
then was) read the whole of the manuscript while he was still at the 
Bar, and although he has no responsibility for errors in the text, the 
author's thanks are due to him in particular. Thanks are also due to 
others who read the manuscript, but who, for professional reasons, wish 
to remain anonymous. It is hoped that they will accept this Preface as 
an expression of thanks which, otherwise, would be more explicit. 
Within the University, my thanks are due to Mr. H. McN. Henderson 
and Dr. V. S. MacKinnon, my colleagues in the Department of Constitu- 
tional Law, who have read the whole or part of the text, and to many of 
my other colleagues in the Faculty of Law in the University of Edinburgh 
for their comments and their tolerance of my questions. Particular 
thanks are due to my students who have accepted my lectures with grace- 
ful forbearance, prompted me by questions, and presented a continuous 
if courteous challenge. The publishers have also been called upon to 
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exercise the virtue of forbearance, and for so doing and for their other 
virtues they have earned thanks. I am grateful to several secretaries and, 
in particular, to Miss A. J. Allan, who has borne the brunt of dealing 
with a script which I would not readily accept from students. Above all 
I am grateful to my family, even more for its tolerance during the long 
period of gestation, than for its help in proof reading. While credit must 
rightly be shared among so many, blame must lie upon the author alone. 
In principle, the law is intended to be stated as at early summer 1963. 
J. D. B. MITCHELL. 
January 1964. ' 
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THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Introduction. The primary concern of constitutional law is with the 
creation and regulation of power within the state. That concern must 
have a double aspect. The recognition of the rights, liberties and 
obligations of individuals as against the state is clearly the counterpart 
of the recognition of those of the state and its organs. To describe 
the primary concern of constitutional law in terms of state power is 
not to imply a primacy for the state and its organs, or to deny or minimise 
the importance, in this field, of individual liberties. State power and 
individual liberty cannot be separated. Each reacts upon the other. 
Neither can be regarded in isolation, and the rights and obligations 
of the state on the one hand and of the individual on the other should 
not be regarded as essentially opposed to each other. Indeed, the rights 
of the state are in a sense nothing but the communal rights of the in- 
dividuals who make up the state. Any conflict that there is is between 
two groups of rights both of which are connected with individuals. 
The limits of the one group of rights and obligations as against 
the other are not unchangeably determined, but are constantly being 
adjusted in the interest of a desired end. Thus, the relationship between 
the two groups will clearly differ in war and in peace.1 The chief concern 
of the constitutional lawyer, at least when he is an expositor, is with 
the description of the balance, or limits between the two, and of the 
means by which that balance is preserved, or those limits are maintained. 
He is not concerned with passing judgment upon the desired ends which 
cause that balance to change. As a critic, however, he may well be 
concerned to point out that the attainment of a particular end involves 
an unaccustomed predominance of one group of powers, or a serious 
sacrifice of another group of liberties, or else that the end could better 
be achieved by different means which would not disturb the established 
balance. The choice of ends, however, normally remains a political 
and not a legal choice, although, as will appear, there are circumstances 
in which this distinction cannot be clearly made. 
Concern with the balance of the rights and powers of the state and 
of the individual leads to a concern with the organisation or machinery 
of the state, and the relationship of the various organs of government 
to each other. Although much of the law governing the organisation 
1 Compare, however, the statement of Lord Atkin in Liversidge v. Anderson [1942] A.C. 
206 at 244 with cases such as Smithy. Jeffrey, Jan. 24, 1817, F.C. (particularly the opinion 
of Lord Robertson) or The Case of Saltpetre (1607) 12 Co.Rep. 12 or Burmah Oil Co. 
(Burma Trading) Ltd. v. Lord Advocate, 1963 S.L.T. 261. The balance may not change 
uniformly in respect of all liberties. 
1 
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of the state will be primarily of internal concern to the administration, 
and will thus be of no direct concern to the individual, most of it will, 
even if only indirectly, affect the individual, since it will affect both 
the means by which he can protect and enforce his rights and the security, 
or stability, of the balance which has been established. Indeed, it can 
be asserted that all this body of law is of concern to the individual, 
since he has an interest in the regularity of administration. Although 
this general interest of the individual may be unprotected by law in 
the ordinary courts, being regarded as insufficiently personal to afford 
the foundation of a title to sue,2 the whole of this body of law must be 
treated as falling within constitutional law if a true picture of the in- 
struments of state power is to be given. 
In regard to the United Kingdom the branch of constitutional law 
which concerns the organisation of the state assumes greater importance 
than is sometimes recognised to be the case. Within that Kingdom there 
are not merely problems of the relationship of central to local government, 
but also problems which spring from the fact that its constitution is 
neither federal nor strictly unitary. Further, that Kingdom is itself 
part of a larger whole, the Commonwealth of Nations. The relationship 
of the parts of this whole, and the position of the United Kingdom therein, 
fall properly within the scope of constitutional law, for the reasons 
already given. These latter matters have, however, been largely neglected 
in the present volume, not because they lack importance, but because they 
have been frequently and adequately dealt with elsewhere. Present 
concern is rather with the more narrowly domestic issues of constitutional 
law, and in particular with some which have not, at least in relation 
to Scotland, been fully discussed. Within these limits some selection 
has to be made. While it is impossible, with us, to divide administrative 
law from constitutional law by a satisfactory definition, some division 
is necessary for the purposes of exposition. The only satisfactory division 
is to include within constitutional law major rules and broad principles, 
and to leave the detailed application and discussion of these rules to 
administrative law. The selection of what are to be regarded as major 
rules is a personal one, and cannot always be justified or governed by 
reasons which would command universal acceptance. For present 
purposes this process of selection must also be governed by different 
considerations. Constitutional law is a practical subject. Hence in 
selection the emphasis must be placed upon those parts of the con- 
stitution which appear to the expositor to be of current importance. 
Again the criteria of selection are personal, and objection may well 
be made to the results in particular cases.3 
2 Thus in Scotland the scope of the actin popularis is limited and in England the Attorney - 
General must often be joined before an action against a public authority for the enforce- 
ment of a public duty can be raised, see, e.g., L.C.C. v. Att.-Gen. [1902] A.C. 165 and 
L.P.T.B. v. Moscrop [1942] A.C. 332. 
3 As an extreme example, Cobden's gibe that the British constitution was a great jaggle 
" of monopolies and churchcraft and sinecures, armorial hocus pocus, primogeniture 
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Constitutional law should not however be regarded as solely con- 
cerned with the organisation of the state, and of the relationship of the 
state to the individual. It may also be concerned with the relationship 
of one individual to another. Encroachments upon the liberty of an 
individual may be attributable to state action but this is not necessarily 
so, particularly in the field of individual liberties. Personal freedom must 
be protected against the unreasonable actions of guardians as well as 
those of the state. Freedom of speech is limited not merely by the law 
of sedition but also by the law of defamation. Similarly private con- 
centrations of power may need regulation by law in the public interest. 
Attempts at such regulation of monopolies, for example, are of long 
standing, and the growth of such concentrations of power may raise 
new problems of constitutional law, or accentuate old ones .4 Thus 
constitutional law may overlap or embrace branches of what might be 
regarded as private law. Here, however, our concern can only be with 
the general principles and not with the details. 
The nature of constitutional law. Because of its subject- matter con- 
stitutional law has several peculiarities when compared with other branches 
of law. In this branch law reaches its farthest extreme. This is true 
in the sense that constitutional law is concerned with the establishment 
of mechanisms which are themselves sources of other branches of law 
(as well as of detailed rules of constitutional law itself), such as Parliament 
or the courts. It is also true in the sense that here rules of law tend 
to merge with principles of a different order. It becomes difficult to 
distinguish constitutional principles from political theories, or philo- 
sophical concepts of the state and of the proper position of man in 
society. Thus, theories of kingship may merge into the constitutional 
rules governing the position of the monarch. It is often difficult to 
determine what is political theory and what is constitutional law, since 
in many respects the legal position is undefined. With us, the absence 
of a comprehensive written constitution means that the law concerning 
even central institutions may not always be clear.5 The gaps may be 
filled by deductions as to what are alleged to be rules of law, yet those 
deductions may, despite what has been said above, be no more than 
expressions of political theory. Moreover, in cases of doubt, the choice 
of the appropriate legal rule may be made in the light of political theory. 
The decisions upon prerogative in the seventeenth century both in 
England and in Scotland depended not so much upon legal precedents 
as upon conceptions which in truth belong to the field of political theory 
and pageantry," can of course be justified if there is an undue concentration upon certain 
rules and aspects which could rightly be called constitutional. 
4 See the issues discussed by Lord MacDermott in the later chapters of Protection from 
Power under English Law. 
5 Thus the succession to the Throne where the sovereign died leaving only daughters was 
not clearly determined until 1937 and then only by declarations of the Law Officers, 
which are not in themselves binding. See generally C. d'O. Farran, " The Law of the 
Accession " (1953) 16 M.L.R. 140. 
4 THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
in the broad sense and not to law.6 In the same way questions of the 
limits of the power of Parliament tend to be determined by general 
conceptions of the place and nature of Parliament which are 
formulated as a result of beliefs as to what is a good or desirable con- 
stitution.? To the lawyer these concepts may be fundamental con- 
stitutional principles, and as such to be treated as law; to the political 
philosopher they may have other names and be differently regarded. 
It is thus much more common for principles of constitutional law to 
be determined by reference to extra -legal considerations than is the 
case with the principles of other branches of law.$ 
This becomes obvious when an extreme case is taken. It is difficult 
to speak with any degree of clarity and certainty of legality except of 
legality within a constitutional system. It is hard to speak with certainty 
of the legality or otherwise of that system itself, simply because its law- 
fulness must be judged by principles which do not conform to the type 
of those which underlie, say, the law of reparation. The revolution of 
1688 could be regarded by its supporters not as a revolution but as 
the re- establishment of a pre -existing legal order which had been wrong- 
fully disrupted. The opponents of that revolution could in their turn, 
and perhaps with as much justification, regard it, as a revolution properly 
so called, as a usurpation of power. Both sides could rely upon principles 
which they believed, or professed to believe, to be legal, but which 
belonged as much to the world of politics as of law. The Claim of 
Right asserts that James VII " did invade the fundamental constitution 
and altered it from a legal limited monarchy to an arbitrary despotic 
power." The soundness of this judgment depends inter alia upon the 
relative weight to be given to theories sometimes expressed, or to practices 
which often conflicted with theory. There was a similar diversity of 
theory. George Buchanan could, in De Jure Regni apud Scotos, support 
his views of a limited, or popular, monarchy by suitably selected prece- 
dents.9 Sir George Mackenzie could support, in Jus Regium, the opposite 
views by a different selection. Both authors could invoke long- standing 
precedents, for the banning of De Jure Regni in August 168810 cannot 
be regarded simply as a mark of a sudden temporary " invasion " by 
James VII. The book had first been banned in 1584, and it was again 
G See the introductory essay to the part on Prerogative in Keir and Lawson, Cases in 
Constitutional Law. 
7 Thus the modern development of the legal theory of the sovereignty of Parliament has 
been greatly influenced by the political developments since 1832. 
8 This process operates throughout the whole field of constitutional law, see, e.g., the 
process of reasoning based upon the supposed position of nationalised industries in 
British Oxygen Co. Ltd. v. South West Scotland Electricity Board, 1956 S.L.T. 278, and 
1956 S.C.(H.L.) 112, and see British Oxygen Co. Ltd. v. South of Scotland Electricity 
Board, 1959 S.L.T. 181; 1959 S.C.(H.L.) 17. 
9 See the discussion in the article by W. S. McKechnie in the Glasgow Quatercentenary 
Studies on George Buchanan. 
10 See Wodrow, History of the Sufferings of the Church, App. CXLI (Vol. IV, p. 443, 1880 
ed.), and W. Croft Dickinson's Introduction (p. xlii) to Knox, History of the Reformation 
in Scotland. 
THE NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5 
banned in 1664. The choice between the two views involves a choice 
between two constitutional theories, each of which had from time to 
time been dominant in the law of the land,11 and that choice cannot, 
therefore, be determined by reference to law alone. Indeed, it is, at this 
time, clearly pointless, in any practical sense, to argue the legality of 
1688. Factual developments are on the side of George Buchanan. While 
the dealings of the Cromwellian Commonwealth may be dismissed 
as illegal, 1688 must simply be accepted. Yet the difference may well 
be merely that the revolutionary settlement endured and the Common- 
wealth did not. 
It is not only what would normally be called revolutions that provoke 
such arguments. They can arise, for example, over the consequences 
of the Union of 1707, and are inevitable simply because constitutional 
law deals with the fundamentals of the state. At that level of thought 
there are strict limits to the scope of arguments based upon purely legal 
principles. The stage is reached when justification must be found simply 
in facts, or in the broad acceptance of certain generally formulated 
principles. This circumstance causes many of our basic constitutional 
principles to be subsequent explanations of factual situations. Hence 
our constitutional law is formed for us as a result of the activities of 
men and institutions working towards ends which are often broadly 
conceived and only partially defined, or, indeed, understood by the 
actors. The explanations of the results of their activities may be called 
constitutional principles, yet they may differ from the ideas which in- 
fluenced those activities. In part this difference may be due to the fact 
that the formative event, and its explanation, may not become known 
at the same time.12 In part the difference may also be attributed to 
subsequent events. Thus, immediately after the Statute of Westminster 
there was considerable tendency to regard that statute and the events 
leading up to it as indicating the " separateness " of the Dominions. 
Subsequent events, notably the troubled state of international affairs which 
provoked a much greater interest in unity, tended, at least for a time, to 
impose a new interpretation with a corresponding shift of emphasis.la Thus 
subsequent events may provoke a fresh interpretation of past events, 
11 A choice must be made, for example, between the attitudes which governed the Act 
anent the election of officers, etc., 1641 (A.P.S. V, 354), the Act of 1563 upon taxation, 
war and peace (A.P.S. II, 543), or the Act Anent Peace and War, 1703 (A.P.S. XI, 107) 
on the one hand, and such Acts as that of 1606 Anent the Kingis majesteis prerogative 
(A.P.S. IV, 281) or the somewhat similar Acts of 1661 (A.P.S. VII, 10, 13) on the other. 
Any of these Acts could be explained away by reference to particular political circum- 
stances of the time, but all were for the time the effective constitutional law, and the 
mere addition of precedents upon one side or the other can neither justify nor condemn 
the events of 1688. See too Cosmo Inns' judgment on appearance and realities - 
Scotch Legal Antiquities, p. 144. 
12 Thus the real reasons for the selection of Mr. Baldwin instead of Lord Curzon as Prime 
Minister in 1923 were not publicly known until the publication of Sir Harold Nicolson's 
King George V, and are still debatable -see the later Unknown Prime Minister by Robert 
Blake, Chap. 32. 
13 See S. A. de Smith, " The Royal Style and Titles " (1958) 2 I.C.L.Q. at p. 272. 
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with an emphasis on different principles. While as will be seen, con- 
stitutional practice may, by itself, have something of the effect of precedent 
elsewhere in the common law, these ex post facto explanations may 
also have their own independent effect on the development of major rules 
of constitutional law. This is particularly so when they amount to new 
principles intended to reconcile new constitutional phenomena with 
the existing framework. The explanation which is chosen will be in- 
fluenced by the general ideas of the sort already discussed and will itself 
influence those ideas. In such circumstances the methods of constitu- 
tional law may be more deductive than are those of the common law, 
at least in England. 
The importance of these general ideas is then seen, not only in deter- 
mining the existence of the principles of constitutional law, but also 
in determining their interpretation. It is frequently true that, because 
of their fundamental nature, principles are laid down in general terms. 
Their interpretation in particular instances thus becomes a matter of 
considerable importance, and often of greater practical importance 
than the formulation of the principles themselves. Even when con- 
stitutional principles are embodied in formal documents, or statutes, 
their interpretation cannot be governed exclusively by normal canons, 
but will be guided and informed by general ideas of the same order 
as those that determined the existence of the principles themselves. 
Thus constitutional interpretation tends to enjoy peculiar characteristics, 
and, at times, to lack the consistency of other types of legal interpretation. 
To a great extent the absence of a complete written constitution obscures 
this distinction. It is possible to assert that, with us, there is no funda- 
mental law, and that constitutional law is " part of the ordinary law of 
the land." 14 Formally this is no doubt true. It is also true in the sense 
that, with few possible exceptions, none of our constitutional laws are 
entrenched or specially protected. A constitutional statute is made 
by the same methods and bears the same appearance as any other. 
The Statute of Westminster, 1931, the Electricity Act, 1947, and the 
Protection of Birds Act, 1954, all bear the same form, yet the first, in 
its entirety, and the second, in parts, affect the constitution. Nevertheless 
in substance distinctions may be made. It is evident that of these three 
the Statute of Westminster affects the constitution profoundly. In fact 
it appears that the attitude of the courts to such statutes does differ 
from that adopted to others. The provisions of the Bill of Rights and 
Claim of Right against taxation without parliamentary sanction are 
treated as having such authority that an implied derogation from them 
is not possible.16 In the same way certain cases are regarded as having 
a particular authority,16 though here possible instances are fewer since 
14 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, 11th ed., p. 203. 
15 Att.-Gen. v. Wilts United Dairies (1921) 37 T.L.R. 884 at 886, per Atkin L.J. (affirmed 
(1922) 38 T.L.R. 781); though see Att.-Gen. for Canada v. Hallet and Carey Ltd. [1952] 
A.C. 427, 450 and the cases there referred to. 
15 Notably those concerned with individual liberties. 
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many of what could be regarded as fundamental principles are incor- 
porated into statutes. In Scotland in particular, fundamental liberties 
can more easily be traced to statutory provisions rather than to notable 
cases.17 Nevertheless it would take very clear words to derogate from the 
broad principles of cases such as Knight v. Wedderburn.18 
The statutes and decisions which are treated with this special reverence 
are, however, few. Not everything which has a constitutional bearing 
is to be thus regarded. Within the constitutional field the provisions 
of the Statute of Westminster are of a different order to those of the 
Electricity Act. This special regard is limited to the relatively few statutes 
and cases which establish the framework of the state and the broad 
principles which govern it. Moreover, this special regard should not be 
thought to render principles immutable. There are few basic con- 
stitutional principles which can be reduced to clear and certain formulae. 
No one principle can be regarded as dominant in all circumstances. 
Principles of liberty must on occasion give way before the needs of state 
defence. Principles of the separation of powers, even if acceptable, can 
only be regarded as general rules which may be departed from in par- 
ticular circumstances. In the same way, although the forms in which 
basic constitutional principles are expressed may endure, their substantive 
application will vary according to the conditions of the time, and the 
practical interpretation of one generation will vary greatly from that 
another. The conception of individual liberty may be expanded 
to include new fields, but may also be restricted because of a changed 
emphasis upon other principles, such as that of equality. In this way 
constitutional law may have a greater durability but at the same time 
a greater pliability than other branches of law. This pliability is all the 
greater in those parts of constitutional law which are mainly derived from 
sources which differ from those of the ordinary law. Doctrines, such 
as those which govern the Cabinet, are formed by practice and are rarely 
crystallised either by statutory regulation or judicial decision. Since 
no formal step is then required to alter the rule, shifts may be frequent 
and rapid, and indeed unobserved for some time after their occurrence. 
This pliability tends to accentuate still more the uncertainty which is 
caused by the subject- matter of constitutional law. 
Written and unwritten constitutions. These characteristics of con- 
stitutional law are universal and to a great extent they reduce the im- 
portance of the fact that a constitution happens to be written or unwritten, 
or that constitutional liberties are specifically guaranteed or protected 
in some way. Our own constitution may be said to be unwritten only 
in the sense that there is no one document or series of documents which 
17 The seventeenth- century litigation in England concerning the royal prerogative had 
no real counterpart in Scotland. Hence the Claim of Right which incorporated many 
of the principles which emerged from that litigation is all the more important. 
18 (1778) Mor. 14545. 
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may be pointed to as " The Constitution." It can in another sense 
be regarded as written -in the sense that a great number, and perhaps 
the majority, of our constitutional rules are to be found in statutes.Y9 
But in the narrower sense the contrast between constitutional law under 
written and unwritten constitutions is also not as great as might be 
thought. The same circumstances, which make it difficult for us to 
define our constitutional principles except in very general terms, also 
make it difficult, and probably undesirable, to draft a constitution except 
with a similar generality. To compress the constitution of a country into 
seven articles and twenty -two amendments (as with the U.S.A.) is an 
impossible task unless broad principles only are to be laid down, and 
in that case their real significance can only be appreciated in the light 
of judicial interpretation and of subsequent practical developments.29 
Moreover, the generality of expression also makes it possible for inter- 
pretation to vary greatly from generation to generation.21 While formal 
amendments may be relatively rare, and thus the constitution has the 
appearance of rigidity, amendment by judicial interpretation is a con- 
tinuing and effective process and may in the course of time amount to 
a complete reversal of former doctrines. 
The principal consequence of the existence of a written constitution 
may be the increase in the importance of the courts as a means of con- 
stitutional adjustment. Whatever the form of constitution, whether 
written or unwritten, the pressures in society which necessitate con- 
stitutional change exist and, if the constitution is not to become unsuited 
to contemporary conditions, those pressures will, where the difficulties 
of formal amendment are great, be met by judicial reinterpretation of 
the original constitutional provisions. Where the means of formal 
amendment are easier and quicker to operate it is possible for the courts 
to take a less active role.22 Clearly, however, the degree to which the 
courts will serve as a means of constitutional adjustment depends not 
only on the conception which individual judges have of their functions 
(and is therefore not constant), but also upon the emergence of justiciable 
issues. While therefore the role of the courts may be considerable in 
determining the limits, from time to time, of governmental powers, 
the adjustment of constitutional machinery to changing needs must 
often be carried out by other means, notably by the development of 
administrative practices. Hence convention may play as great a part 
under written as under unwritten constitutions. 
19 By the use of scissors and paste it would be possible to produce out of the Statute Book 
a " constitution " which would be very nearly complete. 
20 The definition of the monarchy as a " constitutional monarchy " in Art. 2 of the Danish 
Constitution of 1953 is, in itself, almost meaningless. 
21 The well-known sentence of Chief Justice Warren in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U.S. 483 (1954) -one of the " Segregation Cases " is a sufficient illustration -" In 
approaching this problem we cannot turn the clock back to 1866 when the Amendment 
[scil. the Fourteenth] was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. 
We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present 
place in American life...." 
22 See generally Federalism and Constitutional Change by W. S. Livingston. 
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The existence of a written constitution does mean that the con- 
stitutional law is more easily distinguished. Not only are its limits 
more obviously fixed but also the peculiarity of some of its methods 
of development is emphasised. Constitutional interpretation is more 
widely recognised as being governed by principles not generally applicable 
to ordinary statutes, and the treatment of judicial decisions (where doctrines 
of precedent are important) tends, for similar reasons, to differ in this 
branch of law from the treatment in other branches. In both these ways 
the influence of the broad general principles which have been already 
discussed is made more apparent. While the existence of a written 
constitution may facilitate the discussion of constitutional law and 
may also emphasise its special characteristics and problems, the sub- 
stantial effect of such a written constitution as importing certainty and 
rigidity can be overemphasised. 
It is even more important to note that the protection given to the 
so -called fundamental liberties by a written constitution can be over- 
emphasised. If obedience is required to special rules for any constitutional 
amendment, or is required for those affecting fundamental rights, direct 
abolition of such rights is obviously difficult. Direct repeal is not, 
however, usually the greatest danger; the attempt at such repeal will 
provoke a sufficient opposition. Much more serious is the erosion of 
liberties, by the gradual extension of legitimate powers, so that, while 
in form liberties may still be protected, in substance they largely cease to 
exist. The maintenance of this substance depends ultimately upon 
general public opinion, but more immediately upon the activities of 
legislatures and especially of courts. In one case arising under a written 
constitution it was said: " The case confronts us again with the duty 
our system places on the courts to say where the individual's freedom 
ends and the State's power begins. Choice on that border, now as 
always delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual presumption support- 
ing legislation is balanced by the preferred place given in our scheme 
to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the 
First Amendment." 23 In other words, the ordinary citizen, whether he 
lives under a written or unwritten constitution, must normally rely for 
his protection on the consciences of those who work that constitution. 
The form of constitution may merely alter the weight of the burden 
which falls on one particular group. In one case the main burden may 
lie upon Parliament, in another upon the courts. 
The mere fact of there being a written constitution does not by itself 
necessarily mean that the courts play any greater role in protecting in- 
dividual rights or policing the constitution. Where there is such a con- 
stitution but the courts do not possess the power to declare legislation 
unconstitutional, the only means by which the courts can protect the 
23 Mr. Justice Rutledge in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) at 529 -530. Whether 
or not the First Amendment freedoms are thus preferred is a matter of dispute; that 
question is not involved here. 
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basic principles of that constitution from encroachment or erosion is by 
the restrictive interpretation of legislation. In such circumstances the 
position of the courts and the protection for fundamental constitutional 
principles do not differ materially from those which exist when there 
is no written constitution. The only difference in such circumstances 
is that by setting out principles the constitution may emphasise their 
existence. It is, of course, arguable whether or not a principle receives 
more emphasis from being incorporated in a formal constitutional 
document than from its enunciation in a leading case. 
The real contrast with our own system is afforded by a system under 
which there is not only a written constitution but also a recognised 
power in the courts to declare legislation invalid as being unconstitutional. 
Under such a system it might appear that the basic principles of the 
constitution are much more surely protected.24 Yet even in such cir- 
cumstances the decision that the legislature has encroached upon forbidden 
territory is one which depends upon the limits which the courts will set 
for that territory and upon the meaning which the courts will give to 
the challenged legislation and upon the deference which the courts have 
for the judgment of the legislature. All these are once again matters 
of interpretation and approach. Hence, at times, the difference between 
this process, and the process, with us, of giving a restricted interpretation 
to apparently unambiguous words in a statute 25 is not great. Although 
the existence of a power of quashing a statute clearly facilitates judicial 
intervention, the process of determining validity does not in such cases 
differ essentially from the judicial treatment of a statute where there 
is neither a written constitution nor the power of judicial review of 
legislation. In any of these situations the courts openly or covertly found 
their opinions upon principles which are not in themselves rules of law. 
While it is true that the power of judicial review may in some circum- 
stances be of major importance, it is nevertheless also true that in large 
areas of constitutional law the existence of the latter power affects only 
the means of protection, and not the extent of protection.26 
It is clear that the existence of the power of judicial review increases 
the importance of the courts in the state. This increase in importance 
when added to that which, as has already been noticed, can come from 
the rigidity of a written constitution, means that, although the security 
of the rights of the individual citizen may not be materially affected 
by the form of his constitution, that form will alter the relative importance 
of the different parts of the state machinery established by the con- 
stitution, and may itself influence general constitutional ideas. The 
importance, with us, of Parliament as a guardian of the constitution is 
24 See the opinion of Chief Justice Centlivres in Minister of Interior v. Harris, 1952 (4) 
S.A. 769 (A.D.). 
25 See Nairn v. University of St. Andrews, 1909 S.C.(H.L.) 10; [1909] A.C. 147, or Viscountess 
Rhondda's Claim [1922] 2 A.C. 339. 
26 See Holmes, Collected Papers, 295. 
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reflected in ideas of ministerial responsibility and perhaps in our con- 
ception of the sovereignty or supremacy of Parliament, whereas the 
much greater part which the Supreme Court has to play under the con- 
stitution of the U.S.A. has been a contributory cause in determining 
the role of, and the general attitude to, Congress. It might almost be 
said that to a British lawyer the legislator is regarded as the typical 
source of law, to the American lawyer that source is the judge. In these 
more oblique ways the form of a constitution may be more important 
than it is in its direct effect upon rights and obligations. 
The place of the courts. One further general characteristic of con- 
stitutional law may here be mentioned, since it bears upon the role 
of the courts. In this branch of law in particular it is necessary to 
remember that there are limits to the judicial enforcement of rules of 
law, and that in constitutional law the existence of rules without apparent 
sanction, or without sanctions of the usual types, is fairly common. 
The exclusion of the courts may be due to a variety of reasons. One 
reason may be a respect for the status of some other constitutional body. 
Thus the courts have precluded themselves from inquiry into the internal 
working of Parliament,27 and a similar limitation has been imposed 
by the Parliament Act, 1911.28 Another may be the reluctance or inability 
of the courts to intervene in disputes which involve too great an element 
of policy: our courts will not control the exercise of the prerogative 
(in the sense of controlling the reasonableness of the exercise of a preroga- 
tive power), but will merely establish its limits or existence.29 Again, 
the courts may deny judicial remedies where administrative ones are 
available.30 In the same way as they will treat the internal affairs of 
Parliament as a matter for Parliament alone, so also, though not so 
broadly, they will regard the internal affairs of the administrative branch 
of government as being outside their scope.31 The administrative control 
of the Crown could exclude even interested parties from bringing suits 
which concerned the administration of the common good of a burgh.32 
27 Bradlaugh v. Gossett (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 271, and see the subsequent discussion of, among 
other things, parliamentary privilege. 
28 s. 3. 
29 Modern cases such as Liversidge v. Anderson [1942] A.C. 206, R. v. Bottrill, ex p. Kuechen- 
meister [1947] K.B. 41 (particularly at p. 52) are really illustrations of this principle. 
See too Pollok School Co. Ltd. v. Glasgow Town Clerk, 1946 S.C. 373 at 384, per Lord 
President Normand, and Chap. 17, post. 
3° See as to burgh funds Ersk. I, 41, 23 ; Conn v. Magistrates of Renfrew (1908) 8 F. 905. The 
alternative remedy may be a strictly administrative one or may be by complaint in another 
form -Fife C.C. v. Railway Executive, 1951 S.C. 499. See also Griffith and Street, 
Principles of Administrative Law, at p. 236, and Chaps. 12 and 17, post. 
31 See the remarks of Lord Sorn in Griffin v. Lord Advocate, 1950 S.C. 448 at 451. On the 
other hand it appears that the real control over ultra vires expenditure may be exercised 
through the Treasury and the Public Accounts Committee. Thus in one case referred 
to in the report of the latter Committee on ultra vires expenditure by the Foreign Office, 
it is difficult to see who could have had a title to raise the matter in the courts (see H.C. 
1956 -57 75 (1) ). 
32 See the discussion of these cases by Lord Dunedin in D. & J. Nicol v. Dundee Harbour 
Trustees, 1915 S.C.(H.L.) 7. 
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Questions of the fulfilment of statutory obligations to provide educational 
facilities may be regarded as being suited only to administrative deter - 
mination.33 The regulation and discipline of members of the adminis- 
trative staffs may be left to rules which are not themselves susceptible 
of enforcement in the ordinary courts, but are enforced by administrative 
action.34 In these cases the jurisdiction of the courts may be excluded 
by their own decisions, but in others the limitation on the powers of 
the courts may be the result of statutes. The exclusion of the courts 
does not, however, mean that the administration has an exclusive juris- 
diction over its own affairs. In many cases the proper forum for the 
enforcement of obligations is Parliament itself, and the doctrine of 
ministerial responsibility may itself be one of the reasons why the courts 
will deny jurisdiction.35 
The student of constitutional law must therefore be prepared to 
find rules of law which differ substantially from rules of private law 
in the manner of their enforcement. Here again he is faced by rules 
which exist at the extremes of law. At times the rules will be said to 
be mere conventions, or to be administrative practices, lacking the 
full force of law. These rules may, however, often be rightly regarded 
as law, but as " internal" law, that is to say law governing the domestic 
affairs of branches of government other than the courts, having, at most, 
only an oblique effect on the rights of the citizen and falling outside the 
province of the ordinary courts.36 The recognition of the possibility 
of the existence of these rules of internal law, differing as they do in 
their sanctions and the forum for their enforcement, may often help to 
resolve difficulties of classification which otherwise arise, particularly in 
regard to conventions and parliamentary privilege. 
It is, however, one of the functions of the courts, in the absence of 
any statutory provision, to determine whether a rule can be judicially 
enforced. The discharge of this function involves not merely a con- 
sideration of the appropriate forum, but also of the appropriate parties, 
for the duties of public law have often different subjects from those 
of private law. It is for that reason that problems of the title to sue 
may be of more general importance in constitutional and administrative 
33 Watt v. Kesteven C.C. [1955] 1 Q.B. 408 at 425, per Denning L.J.; in cases such as M'Leman 
v. Moray & Nairn Joint C.C., 1955 S.L.T. (Sh.Ct.) 14 there was a statutory right of 
appeal to the courts. 
34 See such cases as Rodwell v. Thomas [1944] 1 K.B. 596 and the discussion of the internal 
remedies by L. Blair, " The Civil Servant -Political Reality and Legal Myth " [1958] 
Public Law 32. 
35 See the cases referred to in notes 29 and 31, supra. The Epitome of Reports from 
Committees Of Public Accounts provides a digest of the sort of control which would 
elsewhere appear in the record of the Cour des Comptes. 
36 The difference of view between the two Houses of Parliament as to the " laying " of 
instruments under the Statutory Instruments Act, 1946, makes this point. The details 
of the Act are discussed subsequently, here it is enough to note that while the House 
of Commons originally thought that the whole matter was one of its own concern, and 
could thus be regulated by Standing Order, the House of Lords conceived that in view 
of possible repercussions on private rights the matter should be regulated by or under 
general law, which was subsequently made possible by the Laying of Documents before 
Parliament (Interpretation) Act, 1948. See also Transport Act, 1962, s. 3 (4). 
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law than in pure private law. In constitutional and administrative law 
there is not only the question of whether duties are to be judicially 
enforced, but since the duties are often imposed in favour of the 
public at large, there is also the question of whether any one individual 
is entitled to seek their enforcement. To some extent this problem is 
of greater importance in Scotland than in England. In England it is 
recognised that the Attorney -General is a necessary party in any action 
seeking to enforce duties owed to the public at large, where particular 
injury cannot be shown. The Lord Advocate does not enjoy the same 
position.37 Nevertheless there are limits to the right of the individual 
to challenge public acts. It has been suggested that something akin to 
a proprietary right is necessary to the pursuer in an actio popularis, that 
is to say, that the title of the individual to sue must be founded upon a 
particular injury.38 In the same way the definition of a " person ag- 
grieved " who is entitled to challenge an administrative act will generally 
exclude those who are merely disappointed by, or who merely disapprove 
of, a particular decision. These restrictions do, of course, protect the 
courts from becoming too much involved in questions of policy but they 
also mean, much more frequently than in private law, that in the field 
of constitutional and administrative law duties are, apparently, of im- 
perfect obligation, or at least cannot be readily enforced by the courts. 
These difficulties which may face an individual again emphasise that 
judicial remedies, while they are important, must in this branch of law 
be regarded as only one means of enforcing law. Both in its substance 
and in its methods public law, in the sense of constitutional and adminis- 
trative law, has material differences from private law. 
37 Griffin v. Lord Advocate, 1950 S.C. 448. 
38 D. & J. Nicol v. Dundee Harbour Trustees, 1915 S.C.(H.L.) 7 at 17. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE SOURCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Introduction. The civil law. To a great extent, the sources of con- 
stitutional law are the same as those of other branches of the law. The 
relative importance of particular sources does, however, differ. Custom 
or convention is, for example, a source of much greater importance 
in constitutional law than it is in other branches of law. On the one 
hand, the civil law, which in Scotland, influenced private law greatly 
and continues to have some influence, had much less effect upon public 
law. In that field of law it is probably true to say that at one stage the 
civil law was of considerable importance, but that importance has dim- 
inished greatly. It will often be found that there is a civil law foundation 
for rules which are now expressed in the terminology of the common 
law.' The appeal to Roman law was emphasised by Erskine,2 and the 
influence can be seen in his treatment of highways.3 The early immunities 
of a Commissioner to the Parliament of Scotland were founded upon 
the doctrine that he was absens reipublicae causa,4 a doctrine which 
endured for a short while after the Union.b Thereafter circumstances 
caused a substantial decrease in reliance upon civil law. Gaps were 
filled in by reference rather to English cases,6 and it is now only in cases 
involving the proprietary rights of public authorities that the civil law 
origins are much apparent. In any event, the reliance upon the civil 
law in this branch of law tends to be less than in others. Sir John Nisbet 
remarked : " But as to Questions of State and Government, the Civil 
Law is of no use with us, in respect the Laws of all Nations, concerning 
their State and Government area only Municipal." 7 With the develop- 
ment of modern forms of state it is clear that, in the rules which govern 
political institutions in free societies, native characteristics will tend 
to predominate. Not all rules connected with such institutions (for 
example, those which also affect the rights of individuals) necessarily have 
' See cases such as Phin v. Magistrates of Auchtertnuchty (1827) 5 S. 690 founding upon 
the doctrine of res extra commercium, later overtaken by the doctrine of trust. For a 
modern instance see particularly Burmah Oil Co. (Burma Trading) Ltd. v. Lord Advocate, 
1963 S.L.T. 261. 
2 Inst. I, 1, 4. See earlier Craig, Jus Feudale, particularly Book I, Tits. 15 and 16. Craig 
used the civil law as the justification of many rules of public law -see, e.g., I, 10, 11, 
but contrast, I, 16, 48. Erskine appealed to it for authority even for rules which are 
everywhere accepted, such as the limitation of judicial review to superior courts. 
3 Inst. II, 1, 5 and II, 6, 17. 
4 See Molison v. Clark (1707) Mor. 10398, and Morton v. Fleming (1569) Mor. 7325. 
5 See the cases collected in Morison, Dict., s.v. " Member of Parliament," Tit. I. 
6 See Erskine's treatment of parliamentary privilege or Bankton's treatment of the rules 
governing governmental institutions in Book IV of his Institutes. 
7 Dirleton's Doubts, s.v. " Prerogative," and see University of Glasgow v. Faculty of Physicians. 
and Surgeons (1837) 15 S. 736. 
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this peculiar character. Even in relation to rules affecting the rights 
of individuals, there is after the Union much less reliance upon the civil 
law. Despite this the civil law background may still have to be borne 
in mind, when the extension of an old rule to new circumstances is in 
question. Our present concern is, however, with major modern sources. 
These are statutes, judicial decisions, custom and convention and books 
of authority. 
STATUTES 
It will already have become apparent that many of the statutes which 
are important in constitutional law are not necessarily easily distin- 
guishable as such by their title. They may be chiefly concerned with 
other matters and their constitutional importance may be incidental. 
The Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1887, is general by its title, 
and many of its provisions relate to details of the criminal law, but 
parts of it are of major constitutional importance. Section 43, concern- 
ing the prevention of delay in trials, fulfils some of the purposes of the 
Habeas Corpus Acts.e On the other hand, some statutes are clearly 
and almost exclusively constitutional; the Acts of Union, 1707, the Parlia- 
ment Acts, 1911 and 1949, the Act of Settlement, 1700, or the Act of 
1532 establishing the College of Justice,° are obvious examples of these. 
These examples emphasise two problems concerning statutes as a 
source of constitutional law. The first is whether there are or can be 
any purely constitutional statutes of a different kind from those regulating 
private law. Is it true that, in Dicey's phrase,10 " neither the Act of 
Union with Scotland nor the Dentists Act, 1878, has more claim than 
the other to be considered as supreme law "? This problem involves 
discussion of the sovereignty of Parliament and may be left until later. 
The second problem arises from the existence of the Union. As the 
examples show, the constitutional lawyer is concerned not only with 
the statutes of the United Kingdom Parliament (and with them questions 
arise on the extent of their application) but also with those of the former 
Parliaments of the constituent parts of the Kingdom. The Acts of 
Union, 1707, did not repeal any existing legislation except that which 
was inconsistent with the Acts of Union themselves, nor did they generally 
extend to the other part of the United Kingdom legislation which had 
hitherto applied only to one part.11 The constitutional lawyer is therefore 
still concerned with pre -Union legislation. A complete account of 
8 The writ of habeas corpus was general, applying to all persons in detention. The Act 
of 1679 was concerned with detention in criminal matters, the Act of 1816 extended 
it to other forms of imprisonment. The Scots Act is limited to criminal matters, other 
than treason, and re- enacts with amendments provisions of the Act for preventing 
Wrongous Imprisonment, 1701 (A.P.S. X, 272). See generally Chap. 18, post. 
9 A.P.S. II, 335. 
10 Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., p. 145. 
11 See Arts. XXV and XVIII of the Treaty. The succession to the Throne was regulated 
according to English statutes by Art. II, and other incidental alterations were made 
to existing laws by Arts. XVI, XVII and XVIII, some of which were of enduring im- 
portance, as to which see Chaps. 5 and 9, post. 
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the constitutional law of the Kingdom would involve, for instance, a 
discussion of both the Claim of Right and the Bill of Rights. Such an 
account is beyond the scope of the present book and for a full discussion 
of those statutes which are primarily English, both in origin and present 
significance, the student is referred to standard English textbooks. 
Nowadays little question arises about the extent of operation of 
post -Union statutes. Normally the terms of the statute itself make it 
clear whether it is a United Kingdom statute or not, and in the absence 
of any application clause there is some presumption that the statute 
applies to all parts of the Kingdom.12 The modern relative certainty 
did not always exist," but the position of most of the older statutes has 
been clarified either by judicial decision or by subsequent legislation," 
though questions may still arise over interpretation. In older statutes 
terminology was often inapt for one jurisdiction. The difficulty could 
be surmounted by disregarding the inappropriate words 15 or by giving 
an approximate meaning.16 Again, changes in draftsmanship and in 
legislative techniques have caused this difficulty to arise less often hi 
modern times. 
One problem, however, remains. So long as there exist two separate 
jurisdictions within the one Kingdom it is inevitable that the same words 
in a statute may have different meanings or effects in each jurisdiction.17 
Under the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, proviso (1) to section 47 (ap- 
plicable to Scotland) is identical in form to the proviso to section 28 
(applicable to England), yet the effect of the two provisos differs." It 
12 " The Application of Statutes to Scotland " by A. E. Anton, 1956 S.L.T.(News) 112. 
See too Ryan v. Ross [1963] 1 All E.R. 853. 
13 See, e.g., Duke of Douglas v. Lockhart (1755) 6 Pat.App. 706 in which case the Court 
of Session was itself of two minds, Kames, Sel.Dec. 42; or H.M. Advocate v. Hughes, 
June 24, 1816, F.C.; 19 F.C. App. 5; or, later, Cam v. Magistrates of Renfrew (1906) 
8 F. 905; or as to the continued effectiveness of the Act of 1690, c. 33 (A.P.S. IX, 225), 
regarding forfeiture, despite the Act of 1708 (7 Anne, c. 21) unifying the law of treason, 
see Further Report of Commissioners of Inquiry, 1716 and Gordon v. King's Advocate 
(1750) Mor. 4728. 
14 Thus the question of the disqualifications for membership of the new United Kingdom 
Parliament was dealt with by the Succession to the Crown Act, 1707, ss. 24, 25 and 29. 
Uniformity as to the manner of conducting parliamentary elections was introduced by 
the Reform Act, 1832; see too the Parliamentary Privilege Act, 1770. 
15 e.g., Guthrie v. Cowan, Dec. 10, 1807, F.C. More recently differences in background 
caused much the same effect in Bissett v. Anderson, 1949 J.C. 106. 
16 Gordon v. King's Advocate (1750) Mor. 4728; Murray v. Comptroller- General of Patents, 
1932 S.C. 726. The opinions in Bridges v. Fordyce (1844) 6 D. 968 (affd. (1847) 6 Bell 
App. 1) illustrate the difficulties well. These difficulties could easily arise under a system 
indicated by Lord Jeffrey in the last case. He had been Lord Advocate at the time and 
stated " having given directions that notice of all proposed measures affecting Scotland 
should be given to me, if I had been asked at the time if such an Act had been passed, 
I should have said ' No ' -no notice having been given to the officer whose duty and 
right it was to be advised of any change proposed to be made in the law of this country." 
For the present position see Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs-Minutes of Evidence 
Day 1, Q. 10 and 11 (evidence of Sir David Milne). 
17 As to the interpretation of United Kingdom statutes generally see Earl of Breadalbane 
v. Lord Advocate (1870) 8 M. 835, and I.R.C. v. City of Glasgow Police Athletic Associa- 
tion, 1953 S.C.(H.L.) 13, or earlier, Lord Advocate v. Earl of Saltoun (1860) 3 Macq. 
659, 671. 
18 As a result of Glasgow Corporation v. Central Land Board, 1956 S.C.(H.L.) 1, s. 11 of 
the same Act, although universal, might have a different effect in each jurisdiction. 
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has been said that the decision, even in an English appeal, of the House 
of Lords on a United Kingdom statute is binding on the Scottish courts,19 
but in view of these considerations the proposition appears to be doubtful 
as laying down a universal rule.20 On the other hand, although a statute or 
part of a statute may, in terms, only apply to one jurisdiction, yet those 
provisions and the interpretation placed upon them by the courts of that 
jurisdiction may have considerable weight when different provisions with 
a similar general purpose fall to be interpreted in the other jurisdiction. 
This is particularly true when parallel statutes are enacted 21; in other 
cases the weight to be given to the interpretation in one jurisdiction must 
depend upon the importance to be attached to differences in the cir- 
cumambient rules of law. 
Moreover difficulties can arise as to pre -Union statutes. The attitude 
of the courts to the old Scots Acts is not the same as their attitude to 
modern statutes. In particular the method of interpretation has been 
more liberal (and would remain so where the interpretation has not 
become fixed),22 and the doctrine of desuetude applies.23 It was at 
one time held that this doctrine did not apply to statutes concerning the 
public good of the Kingdom,24 but thereafter the views changed, and it 
came to be accepted that the doctrine applied to such statutes also.23 
Nevertheless some distinction between the two types of statute appears 
19 By implication in Orr Ewing's Trs. v. Orr Ewing (1885) 13 R.(H.L.) 1, and accepted J. C. 
Gardner, Judicial Precedent in Scots Law, p. 47, and T. B. Smith, Judicial Precedent in 
Scots Law, pp. 55, 59 and 62. 
20 The proposition is doubtless true so far as revenue statutes are concerned as a result 
of Art. XVII of the Treaty of Union and the Exchequer Court (Scotland) Act, 1707, 
s. 13; see, e.g., I.R.C. v. City of Glasgow Police Athletic Association, 1953 S.C.(H.L.) 13; 
its general application is doubtless subject to the considerations discussed in Chap. 14. 
21 In a similar situation English practice relating to Crown proceedings had great influence 
in Scotland where the practice differed -Argyll C.C. v. L.A., 1950 S.C. 304. For a 
counterpart in England see De Demko v. Home Secretary [1959] A.C. 654; and Regional 
Properties Ltd. v. Frankenschwerth [1951] 1 K.B. 631 at 637; Daly v. Hargreaves [1961] 
1 All E.R. 552. 
22 Graham v. Irving (1899) 2 F. 29 at 36, per Lord M'Laren. 
23 For a general account of the doctrine see Ersk. I, 1, 45, " Desuetude " by W. C. Smith 
(1895) 7 J.R. 173, and " Some Reflections on Desuetude " by Sir Randall Philip (1931) 
43 J.R. 260. For the distinction between ancient and modern statutes see Governors 
of George Heriot's Trust v. Paton's Trustees, 1912 S.C. 1123, 1134 -1135, per Lord President 
Dunedin, and Johnstone v. Stotts (1802) 4 Pat.App. 274, 285. The application of the 
doctrine is no doubt affected by such statutes as the Statute Law Revision (Scotland) 
Act, 1906. It seems doubtful, however, if the omission in the Act of 1906 to repeal 
the whole of a statute even where part is dealt with can be taken as excluding the operation 
of the doctrine of desuetude as to the remaining parts; consider the Act of 1593 for the 
Puneisement of thame that trublis the Parliament, etc. (A.P.S. IV, 22). The Act of 1585 
Aganis leaguis and bandis (A.P.S. III, 376) is one which, although not referred to in 
the Act of 1906, is likely to be treated as being in desuetude. It is so treated in the Statute 
Law Revision (Scotland) Bill, 1963. 
24 Jack v. Town of Stirling (1681) Mor. 1838 and Bankt. I, 1, 60. 
25 The altered view appears to have been accepted in Anderson v. Magistrates of Wick 
(1749) Mor. 1842, although this view was not always regarded as certain, see Gilchrist 
v. Provost, etc., of Kinghorn (1771) Mor. 7366, it was affirmed in Dunbar v. Macleod 
(1757) Mor. 1855 and in Bute v. More (1870) 9 M. 180, and acted on in M'Ara v. Magis- 
trates of Edinburgh, 1913 S.C. 1059. See too Ersk. I, 1, 45 where Erskine adopts the 
reasoning and words of the argument for the pursuers in Anderson. The Act 1661 
(A.P.S. VII, 12) Anent his Majesties prerogative in making of Leagues and the convention 
of the subjects might be treated in the same way as the legislation there involved. 
M.C.L.-2 
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to remain. The burden of proof that a general statute for the public 
good had fallen into desuetude would be heavy. Isolated or local in- 
stances of non -observance would not suffice; what would be required 
would be such a change of circumstances that the Act could no longer 
be rationally applied.26 
Apart from the application of this doctrine, pre -Union statutes may, 
as has been said, have ceased to have effect because of inconsistency with 
the terms of the Articles of Union. The main provisions in Articles 18 
and 25 of the Treaty of Union are general, and in the absence of detailed 
provisions for repeal this inconsistency must be spelled out as a matter 
of construction. Many of the difficulties which could have arisen have 
been removed by subsequent legislation, and examples of pre -Union 
statutes which have not been specifically repealed but which are in 
direct conflict are difficult to find.E7 The conflict may not be apparent 
on the face of the statute, but may depend upon the method of inter- 
pretation of either the terms of the Act of Union or of the statute in 
question. In the latter case there may be some resemblance to the doctrine 
of desuetude in the line of argument. Such cases may still arise.28 
Today a substantial number of the detailed rules will be found, 
not in statutes themselves, but in orders made under statutory authority, 
and it is becoming increasingly dangerous for the student to neglect this 
material. For the most part these instruments are now published in 
the Statutory Instrument series. The problems of interpretation and 
the like which arise in connection with such instruments are largely 
similar to those connected with statutes and more detailed problems can 
be left until later.29 
CASE LAW 
It has been said that " the general principles of the constitution (as, 
for example, the right to public liberty, or the right of public meeting), 
are with us the result of judicial decisions." 30 That statement may 
26 Bute v. More (1870) 9 M. 180, 190, per Lord Deas. The Act of 1606 regulating meetings, 
which was discussed in M'Ara's Case, 1913 S.C. 1059, illustrates such a change. At 
pp. 1075 -1076 Lord President Dunedin emphasises the altered circumstances of political 
debate since 1832. 
27 Thus much of the pre -Union legislation relating to Parliament would have been in- 
consistent, but the Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act, 1906, has now repealed the 
legislation concerned; and see the 1963 Bill above referred to. 
28 For one example see Macao v. Officers of State (1822) 1 Shaw App. 138 in which the 
majority of the Scottish judges and of the House of Lords was prepared to hold that an Act 
of 1695, making naturalised Scotsmen of all persons who should take shares in the Bank 
of Scotland, was inconsistent with the Act of Union and therefore no longer effective. 
The effect of the Act of Union upon the English pre -Union statute under which Prince 
Ernest of.Hanover successfully claimed British nationality was not argued -see Att: Gen. 
v. Prince Ernest of Hanover [1957] A.C. 436. A majority of the House of Lords reserved 
their opinion on that point. See 1956 S.L.T.(News) 89 and (1957) 30 M.L.R. 270 and 
T. B. Smith, Studies Critical and Comparative. 
29 See Chap. 15, post. Apart from individual instruments, volumes of S.I. are published 
in the same way as, before 1947, roughly equivalent instruments were published as 
Statutory Rules and Orders. In 1948 S.R. & O. and S.I. Revised (Third Edition) was 
published giving the then extant instruments. 
30 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., p. 195. 
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be debatable,3' but it is nevertheless true that judicial precedent is of 
considerable importance, either as an original source of principle 32 
or as a secondary source, when the courts are interpreting a statute.33 
Here again problems arise from the fact that the Union of 1707 was in 
some senses incomplete. Separate systems of courts were then pre- 
served, and thus English decisions (outside revenue matters) are not 
binding upon Scottish courts,34 and it is possible for conflicting decisions 
to be arrived at in the different jurisdictions.36 These conflicts are not 
necessarily resolved by the existence of the House of Lords as a common 
ultimate court of appeal in civil matters. The capacity in which the 
House sits is not entirely clear -it may sit as a United Kingdom court 
or as an English or, as the case may be, a Scottish court.36 Moreover, 
since it is possible for the constitutional rules to differ in the two jurisdic- 
tions, the decisions of the House cannot be taken as being necessarily 
universally binding.37 Allowance must also be made for the fact that 
the treatment of judicial precedent differs in Scots and English law. 
Under the former system the doctrine is less rigid than under the latter, 
and there is machinery for convening a Full Court which can be used 
to overrule older decisions, even of the Inner House.38 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that there is a United Kingdom, and 
none of the component jurisdictions can be looked at in isolation. 
Developments in one have a reaction in the others. There are, too, 
strong pressures the adminis- 
trative convenience.'° In the absence of authority upon a particular 
point in one jurisdiction weight must be given to relevant decisions 
in the other, the exact weight being dependent upon the field of law 
concerned - whether or not it is one in which the differences between 
the systems are strongly marked. Unless this is done there may be 
31 See Chap. 1, as to the influence of statutory law, and as to the significance of this remark, 
even if true. 
32 As in Knight v. Wedderburn (1778) Mor. 14545; Somersett's Case (1772) 20 St.Tr. 1, or 
Smellie v. Struthers, May 12, 1803, F.C., in which the underlying assumption is a funda- 
mental right of property. 
33 As in Att. -Gen. v. Wilts United Dairies (1921) 37 T.L.R. 884. 
34 See Art. XIX of the Act of Union and the Court of Exchequer (Scotland) Act, 1708, s. 6. 
35 Compare Nottingham No. 1 Area Hospital Management Committee v. Owen [1958] 
1 Q.B. 50 holding the hospital premises to be occupied in the public service of the Crown 
(the argument also implying that in litigation the Committee was to be treated as a Crown 
servant), with Adams and Ors. v. Sec. of State for Scotland and South -Eastern Regional 
Hospital Board, 1958 S.L.T. 258, in which an interdict was granted against the Hospital 
Board, which was incompetent were the Board a Crown servant. 
36 In Johnstone v. Stotts (1802) 4 Pat.App. 274 at 282 Lord Eldon roundly declared " I need 
not remind your Lordships that ... we sit here as a Scotch court -a Court of Session," 
and this view appears to be the correct one, yet it has not always been accepted or acted 
on, see, e.g., the cases referred to in T. B. Smith, Judicial Precedent in Scats Law, 49 -50. 
37 Glasgow Corporation v. Central Land Board, 1956 S.C.(H.L.) 1. For a general discussion 
see T. B. Smith, op. cit., pp. 54-66 and 103 -104. 
38 A full discussion would be out of place here, and the reader is referred to T. B. Smith, 
op. cit., and to Gardner, Judicial Precedent in Scots Law. In the older reports it is, 
moreover, often difficult to determine a ratio, only the decision being given, a habit 
which originated with the older Practicks, and died hard. 
39 Lord Advocate v. Argyllshire C.C., 1950 S.C. 304 at 307, and Moffat Hydropathie Co. 
Ltd. v. Lord Advocate, 1919, 1 S.L.T. 82 at 86 and see note 21, supra. 
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certain constitutional topics upon which it is difficult to say that there 
is any law at all or, at least, any modern law. Thus, it is difficult to 
find any modern cases upon parliamentary privilege in Scotland except 
for a few immediately after the Union. These cases do little more than 
demonstrate the then existing uncertainty about the state of the law, though 
they do show that the law was changing not merely in its application 
but in its basis 40 In these circumstances a Scottish constitutional lawyer 
cannot neglect the major English cases on parliamentary privilege, 
particularly those of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Indeed, 
his reliance on English cases must be continuous. The chances of litigation 
mean, for example, that most of the cases on this topic must arise in 
England,41 and, as in other branches of the law, differences in the bulk 
of litigation also cause doctrines to be more fully developed in England 
than in Scotland. While these influences towards uniformity exist, 
the problem of assessment nevertheless remains. The relevant case 
law must be weighed in its particular context, and it may be that in the 
past there has been in some branches of the subject too great a readiness 
to accept into one jurisdiction decisions from the other without adequate 
consideration.42 
BOOKS OF AUTHORITY 
Books of varying types may be either sources of constitutional law, 
or sources of our knowledge of facts and events upon which the law is 
founded or from which it is deduced. In the first group are the books 
on law, such as Blackstone's Commentaries, Chitty, On the Royal Preroga- 
tive and the like. Many more of such books are to be found in England 
than in Scotland, where the great institutional writers tended not to 
discuss public law so fully as private law. Again, there is the familiar 
problem of assessment. While Blackstone has been cited in argument 
and relied on in judgment in Scotland, because of differences in general 
law not all that is contained in English authoritative works can be regarded 
as necessarily having equal authority in Scotland.43 The Institutions of 
Stair contain few titles which refer specifically to constitutional law,44 
those of Erskine (who wrote in more settled times) rather more. 
In both works constitutional law has often to be sought in the interstices 
of private law, and some of their introductory generalities which bear upon 
4° Grant v. Earl of Sutherland (1708) Mor. 8562; Lady Greenock v. Sir John Shaw (1709) 
Mor. 8563. Some cases, such as Mill v. Reid (1723) Rob.App. 452 (Mor.App. 15) were 
decided on grounds which could not now be tenable. This uncertainty is reflected 
in the Lord Advocate's evidence to the Select Committee on Privilege H.C. (1955 -56) 
35 or in, the authorities cited on the subject in works such as Hill Burton's Manual or 
Bankton, Institutes IV, 1, 63. 
41 Thus R. v. Graham- Campbell, ex p. Herbert [1935] 1 K.B. 594 could only have arisen 
in London. 
42 See, e.g., Mitchell, " The Royal Prerogative in Modern Scots Law " [1957] Public Law 
304. 
43 Cf. the remarks of Lord Cooper in MacCormick v. Lord Advocate, 1953 S.C. 396 at 411. 
44 Though in his Apology, which outlines some of his constitutional views, he states that 
he has written on the prerogative, the book (if it was ever completed) does not now exist. 
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the subject do not carry the same weight as do their more precise 
pronouncements in the field of private law. Bankton on the other hand 
t purported to treat fully of public law, but lacks the weight of the 
former writers and, moreover, probably underestimated the differences 
l in public law between England and Scotland. In other cases too, state- 
ments on constitutional law by writers whose work is of high standing 
in relation to other branches of law do not, for a variety of reasons, 
command the same respect. Sir George Mackenzie cannot be relied 
upon as an impartial observer as far as matters affecting the Crown 
are concerned 46 and, at a later date, Baron Hume's views on public 
law were criticised both from the Bench and elsewhere.46 On the 
older law, material is to be found dispersed through Craig's Jus 
Feudale or works such as Balfour's Practicks or Hope's Major Practicks, 
which stand halfway between a collection of precedents and an Institute. 
At a later stage Lord Karnes' writings contain valuable material on 
certain constitutional matters; and other works, which are often, like 
Stuart's Observations Concerning Public Law, mainly historical, are 
also valuable sources. On the whole, it may be said that Scotland has 
not had the specialised treatises on the subject which exist elsewhere, 
and more reference must be made to the general books on law.47 
In modern times a different type of book cannot be neglected by the 
constitutional lawyer. In certain branches of the subject, notably in 
connection with the Cabinet and the central government, the law emerges 
as a result of practice. These practices often only become generally 
known as a result of the publication of biographies, volumes of letters 
and the like, and of accounts of official activities.48 Care must, however, 
be taken in the use of such material, since memory is fallible and knowledge 
may be incomplete. 46 
CONVENTION 
The two types of rule. There remains one further source -custom or 
convention -which assumes particular importance in constitutional 
law. As a source of law custom is not confined to constitutional law, 
45 Thus his remarks upon prerogative in his Vindication or in the Jus Regium (Works, 
Vol. II) must be treated with caution. The fault often lay as much in the times as in 
the man. Other writers avoided dangerous issues -Sir John Nisbet was content to 
dismiss the extent of prerogative as " a point of State and Policy of the highest nature 
and importance and not to be defined by the opinions of Lawyers "- Doubts 138 s.v, 
Prerogative. In quieter times Stuart in his Answers could only add " But to define its 
Extent is too delicate a point to be farther insisted on." In England, Coke, too, was 
content to let some of his more contentious writing wait for publication, and his views 
upon the Crown were not uniform throughout his career. Others both in Scotland and 
England, while discerning unconstitutional acts, would yet connive in them. 
48 See H.M. Advocate v. Grant (1848) Shaw (J.) 17 at 92; and see Campbell Paton's 
Biography of Baron Hume- Hume's Lectures, Vol. VI, 354 et seq. (Stair Society ed.). 
47 As to these, see generally Sources and Literature of Scots Law -(Stair Society, Vol. I) 
and in particular the valuable article on constitutional law by Sir Randall Philip. 
48 Such as the Whitehall and New Whitehall Series. For an indication of the use of the 
other material referred to see, e.g., the notes to Jennings, Cabinet Government; Mackintosh, 
The British Cabinet. 
49 See, e.g., Bassett, 1931 Political Crisis. 
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but in that branch of law it plays a more prominent part and is governed 
by somewhat different rules from those which prevail elsewhere.5° 
The conventions of the constitution have received much emphasis from 
all modern writers on British constitutional law, and from Dicey in 
particular. Speaking of our constitutional rules, Dicey said that there 
were some rules which were laws in the strictest sense, but that there 
was another set of rules and this " other set of rules consist of con- 
ventions, understandings, habits, or practices which, though they may 
regulate the conduct of the several members of the sovereign power, 
of the Ministry, or of other officials, are not in reality laws at all since they 
are not enforced by the courts. This portion of constitutional law may, 
for the sake of distinction, be termed the ` conventions of the constitution,' 
or constitutional morality." 51 Dicey added that the lawyer, as such, 
had no direct concern with these conventions.52 Nevertheless in Part 
III of The Law of the Constitution he did much to underline the importance 
and clarify the nature of these conventions. Their common quality 
or property was, he asserted, that " they are all or at any rate most 
of them, rules for determining the mode in which the discretionary 
powers of the Crown (or of the Ministers as servants of the Crown) ought 
to be exercised." 53 
While the views of Dicey have tended to dominate the discussion 
of conventions, he was not the first to observe the gap between the practical 
working constitution and the constitution which is contained exclusively 
in rules of law.54 But because of their dominance it will be convenient 
to take Dicey's views as the starting point for the present discussion. 
First, however, it must be emphasised that, just as custom or convention 
may be important in other branches of law, so also it is important in 
other constitutional systems. In France under the Third and Fourth 
Republics the role of the President was determined as much by con- 
ventional as by legal rules. In the United States of America the working 
of the Electoral Colleges in a Presidential election is governed by con- 
vention which has also produced rules such as that of Senatorial courtesy.55 
These examples could be multiplied, and the most that can be said is 
that with us (and with constitutions derived from our own) constitutional 
conventions are perhaps more important and more widespread than 
elsewhere. 
J0 Compare the general discussion of custom as a source of law in Sir Carleton Allen's 
Law in the Making. 
51 Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., p. 24. 
52 Op. cit. p. 30. 
53 Op. cit. pp. 422 -423. 
54 Dicey himself refers to Freeman's Growth of the English Constitution; earlier, Alphaeus 
Todd had commented in the general introduction to his Parliamentary Government 
in England on the wide discrepancies between legal rules and modern constitutional 
usage. Similar observations are to be found in most books on the subject. Gilbert 
Stuart, writing in 1779 in his Public Law of Scotland, comments (at p. 61) " Habits 
lead to establish a rule; and custom is often as effectual as law." 
55 For an account see Horwill, The Usages of the American Constitution. 
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Types of convention. In a domestic sense the major conventions still 
operate in the fields indicated by Dicey. It is these conventions which 
have, as he pointed out, been the principal means of transferring effective 
power from a sovereign to ministers responsible to Parliament, and of 
regulating the relationship of Government to Parliament and of the 
Houses of Parliament to each other. Conventions govern the Sovereign's 
choice of Prime Minister, the position of the Prime Minister in relation 
to his colleagues, or the resignation of a government as a result of an 
adverse vote in the House of Commons. While the Parliament Acts 
of 1911 and 1949 regulate the relationship of Lords and Commons 
in some cases of conflict, that relationship is more continuously regulated 
by rules of privilege which can be regarded as conventional. Examples 
of such rules are the Commons' claims in respect of Money Bills and the 
Lords' countervailing claim to a right to object to the " tacking " of 
other matters on to Money Bills. It is impossible here to give a full 
list of such conventions: to do so would be to compress major parts of 
the book into one chapter. Enough has been said to emphasise the 
importance of conventional rules in this part of our constitution. They 
are those which, as Sir Ivor Jennings has said, make the legal constitution 
work by keeping it in touch with the growth of ideas.68 
Conventions are, however, operative in branches of constitutional 
law not covered by Dicey's formulation. Most important of these 
other groups of convention is, no doubt, the group of those which govern 
the relationship inter se of members of the Commonwealth. Some of 
these are the result of practices, others of resolutions of Imperial Con- 
ferences and the like, still others result from a combination of the two. 
This group of conventions may be illustrated by those recited in the 
preamble to the Statute of Westminster, 1931, or by the principles formu- 
lated by the Imperial Conference, 1926.67 While these conventions 
perform the function described by Sir Ivor Jennings, they do so in a 
different sphere, since they regulate the relationships between separate 
and equal governments and not between the different parts of the mach- 
inery of one government. In this field the role of convention has been 
particularly important. Dominion or member status is the child of 
convention, and the Statute of Westminster, 1931, is, in important 
respects, nothing but an enactment of conventions.68 This process of 
conventional development still continues. The initial recognition of a 
republican form of government as being consistent with membership 
of the Commonwealth, even though it substantially altered the previously 
accepted views of the nature of the Commonwealth and of the place of 
66 The Law and the Constitution, 5th ed., p. 82. 
67 Imperial Conference, 1926: Summary of Proceedings (Cmd. 2768), some of these resolu- 
tions simply expressed existing practice; others, although having some foundation in 
practice, were new formulations of principles to be applied in the future. See also Keith, 
Speeches and Documents on the British Dominions 1918 -1931. 
68 Copyright Owners Reproduction Soc. Ltd. v. E.M.I. (Australia) Pty. Ltd. (1958) 100 
C.L.R. 597. 
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the Crown therein, was not granted by any recognised method for the 
formulation of rules of law.b9 
Even within the United Kingdom there are some conventions which 
are not clearly comprised within Dicey's definition. The relationship 
of Government to Opposition is regulated by convention, as is the 
position of Leader of the Opposition.80 Thus, for example, the use 
of Supply Days to debate matters selected by the Opposition 81 is purely 
conventional. Indeed many of the rules falling under the heading " Law 
and custom of Parliament " and regulating the internal working of 
Parliament outside the narrow relationship of Government and Opposition 
may be regarded as conventional. Such, for example, are the rules 
which lay down the commonly understood, though imprecisely defined, 
limits to Private Bill legislation,82 or which, varying the ordinary rules, 
recognise the Second Reading of a Private Bill promoted by a national- 
ised industry as affording an opportunity for a general debate on that 
industry.ß3 Some of this group of rules have become part of the Standing 
Orders of one or other House, others remain as practices or under - 
standings.ß4 In both cases the full import of the rule is only apparent 
after a study of precedents and Speaker's rulings." 
Similarly, within the administrative branch of government much 
is regulated by convention. The position of one of the Joint Permanent 
Secretaries of the Treasury as head of the civil service is the creation 
of convention,86 and the rules governing the methods of selection for 
the most senior appointments in each department have a similar origin.ó7 
The particular position of the Secretary of State as " Scotland's Minister " 
(which gives him influence beyond his sphere of legal responsibility) 
rests upon convention.ó8 The civil service itself is governed by a mass 
59 This recognition was granted in the Final Communiqué of the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers' Meeting 1949 -for the text see Mansergh, Speeches and Documents on British 
Commonwealth Affairs, 1931 -59, Vol. II, p. 846. The India (Consequential Provisions) 
Act, 1949, which made necessary adjustments in British law, assumes the background 
of a changed situation in the position of India in the Commonwealth. 
s° Though the existence of the position is recognised by the Ministers of the Crown Act, 
1937, s. 3. 
61 See Morrison, Government and Parliament from Within (2 Ed.). 
62 See Report of Joint Committee on Private Bill Procedure (1955 -56) H.C. 137 -1, Q. 343 
et seq. and the proceedings on the Kent County Council Bill, 1958 (H.L. 209, 473 -540). 
63 See Report of Joint Committee on Private Bill Procedure (1955 -56) H.C. 137, § 15. 
64 An example of the former type is the convention that Standing Committees should, 
as far as possible, reflect the composition of the House of Commons (S.O. 58). See 
too S.O. 78 (recommendations from the Crown for applications relating to public money). 
The examples given in the text are conventions which have not been incorporated into 
Standing Orders. 
65 See, e.g., the precedents collected in Erskine May, 16th ed., p. 369 et seq. in relation 
to adjournments under S.O. 9 or in relation to the scope of Finance Bills and tacking, 
op. cit. pp. 800 and 812. 
66 The present arrangement was announced by Mr. Macmillan on July 30, 1962, whereby 
in addition to the two Joint Permanent Secretaries to the Treasury (one of whom is 
head of the home civil service) a separate post of Secretary to the Cabinet was created. 
For the superseded situation see 557 H.C. Deb. 639 -642. The position of head of the 
civil service was of gradual growth, see 125 H.L.Deb. 275 et seq. 
67 Morrison, op. cit. 326 -327 (2 Ed.) 
68 Report of Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs 1952 -54 (Cmd. 9212), §§ 177 -179. 
Some of the conventional devolution referred to in Chap. VII of that report has since 
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of regulations, some of them statutory, some contained in Royal Warrants 
or in Treasury Minutes and Instructions. These regulations may, in 
some cases, be regarded as law; in other cases they cannot be so regarded 
within Dicey's scheme, since often these regulations take effect within 
the service only and are not enforceable in ordinary courts of law.89 
They are, however, the effective rules, and must be recognised as con- 
ventions or as the internal law of the civil service 7D 
Conventions are important not only where they regulate the relation- 
ship of different parts of government or operate within one part. In 
formulating legislation any government will consult with outside bodies 
and, indeed, it has been said that any other course would be unthinkable. 
The limits of consultation appropriate to different types of legislation 
are also defined by conventional understandings. It is possible, too, 
that the regulations and attitudes of political parties must, on occasion, 
be regarded as conventional parts of constitutional law. If the rule 
is that the Sovereign must send for the leader of the majority party in 
the House of Commons, then the rules by which the leader is chosen 
cease to be of purely domestic concern to the party. The regulation 
of the relationship of Back Benchers' Committees to the Government 
or to the Opposition Shadow Cabinet, or the place of the party organisa- 
tion in the selection of Cabinet Ministers, may also be said to be con- 
ventional. There is no doubt that in an Australian context the caucus 
system would be thus regarded, and so must be the different rules here 
obtaining.7t Moreover, conventions are recognised which have a " party " 
origin. In the general conduct of government the practices of one govern- 
ment tend to be followed by succeeding governments even of a different 
colour. The unilateral declarations of one party may in the course of 
time come to be generally accepted. Thus the " Ponsonby Rules," while 
in origin nothing more than the declaration of intention of one party,7L 
have come to be accepted, subject to dispute as to their scope, by all 
governments.73 
The origins of convention. It is clear that, partly because of the widely 
different areas in which conventions operate, the origins of conventional 
been made "legal" by Orders made under the Ministers of the Crown (Transfer of 
Functions) Act, 1946. 69 See Rodwell v. Thomas [1944] 1 K.B. 596. 
70 The rules may differ from ordinary law. Thus the standard of probity expected from 
the civil service under its own code is higher than that imposed by ordinary law. (See, 
e.g., the Memorandum on the Acceptance of Business Appointments by Officers of the 
Crown Service (1937) Cmd. 5517.) It is however the higher standard which would be 
enforced, by sanction if necessary, within the service. 
71 See Sawer, " Councils, Ministers and Cabinets in Australia " [1956] Public Law at 118 -120. 
There is nothing surprising about this. In the U.S.A. the party customary devices of 
primary elections, even where they are not formally embodied in the electoral laws, 
are nevertheless recognised by law -see Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
72 The " rules " were contained in a declaration of policy of the first Labour Government 
in 1924. See 171 H.C.Deb. 2001 -2005. 
73 See 577 H.C.Deb. 491, where the " rules " were accepted by the then Conservative 
Foreign Secretary, though there was no agreement on their exact scope. See however 
the rejection of the " rules " 179 H.C.Deb. 565. 
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rules are even more varied than those of ordinary rules of law. While 
it is true that the great majority of conventions have their origin in 
practice and are founded upon precedents, others are founded upon 
declarations which, although they may have some roots in past practice, 
express broader rules than would be justified by past precedents alone. 
It must not, however, be thought that one precedent necessarily makes 
a rule (though it may), since the weight to be given to any precedent 
depends upon the whole surrounding circumstances.74 It is thus often 
difficult to state with certainty the moment at which any convention 
was accepted as such. One common element is, however, that of accep- 
tance, which, backed by precedent or declaration makes a convention; 
but it should be noted that this acceptance need not be general, it may 
be limited to those primarily concerned with the working of a rule. 
Thus, a convention may be accepted and operated within Parliament 
before it has been recognised outside. Acceptance should not, however, 
be confused with agreement. It is, as has been shown, possible for a 
declaration of principle of conduct by one political party to grow into a 
convention. The so -called " Ponsonby Rules " to which reference 
has been made, are an illustration of this.75 
Another common element, which gives to conventions particular 
advantages and disadvantages, is that these rules are formulated by 
those who are concerned with operating the machinery of government. 
In this, conventions may be compared with some rules of mercantile 
or international law. As a result conventions are essentially pragmatic 
in character and, while general theory has influenced the practices upon 
which they are based, the rules themselves look much more to the practice 
than to the theory. There are obvious advantages in this practical 
origin, but it means that to a large extent conventional rules escape the 
various safeguards which are involved in the formation of other sorts 
of constitutional rules. 
While this practical origin must be emphasised, it must also be said 
that not all governmental or parliamentary practices are to be classed 
as conventions. Conventions are those rules which, despite their practical 
origin, seek to attain some constitutional end, as distinct from an end 
of pure convenience. The allocation of certain days for parliamentary 
questions directed at certain ministers has an obvious basis of adminis- 
trative convenience or necessity, but there is no constitutional principle 
74 See Jennings, Cabinet Government, 3rd ed., 6 -8. 
75 Similarly, it seems that some regard must be had to the unilateral declaration of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party on the procedure for the selection of a new Prime Minister 
during the life of a Parliament. See [1957] Public Law 4. Again, while parliamentary 
parties persist in recognising a Deputy Prime Minister, the office is not recognised by 
the Sovereign (see Morrison, Government and Parliament from Within (2 Ed.) 76, and 
Wheeler Bennett, George VI, 797). It is thought likely that adherence to its original 
views by one group of persons " affected," may, in time, force acceptance by another 
group. Compare in connection with the relationship between the choice of Prime 
Minister and the election of a party leader -Robert Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister, 


















underlying that practice, as there is, for example, underlying the practices 
or rules which limit questions on the exercise of the prerogative of mercy. 
The latter may be regarded as conventions, the former cannot be so 
regarded" 
The nature of conventions. From the examples already given it is 
clear that conventions cannot be regarded as less important than rules 
of law. Often the legal rule is the less important. In relation to subject - 
matter the two types of rule overlap: in form they are often not clearly 
distinguishable. The preamble to the Statute of Westminister is as 
precisely phrased as is section 4, and may well have at least as much 
binding force 77; indeed very many conventions are capable of being 
expressed with the precision of a rule of law, or of being incorporated 
into law.78 Precedent is as operative in the formation of convention 
as it is in that of law.78 It cannot be said that a rule of law is necessarily 
more certain than is a convention.80 It may, therefore, be asked whether 
it is right to distinguish law from convention. The distinction drawn by 
Dicey was that, whereas law could be directly enforced in the courts, 
conventions could not.81 The sanction for convention was, he asserted, 
to be found in the fact that a breach of convention would ultimately 
lead to a breach of the law.82 This thesis is open to attack in two ways. 
In the first place not all law, particularly in the realm of constitutional 
law, is capable of enforcement in the courts. Thus, section 3 of the 
Parliament Act, 1911, makes the Speaker's certificate as to what is a 
Money Bill for the purposes of that Act conclusive and unchallengeable 
in any court. Effectively the limiting legal definition of a Money Bill 
contained in the Act is thus made incapable of enforcement in a court 
of law in Dicey's sense.83 On the other hand it is not clear that no 
conventions are enforced in a court of law. The authorities are con - 
flicting,84 and much depends upon what is meant by " enforcement." 
76 Again, this distinction is not a clear one. Practical and constitutional reasons often 
coalesce, or are both operative at the same time, or may change their character. This 
interplay of principle and practical convenience is admirably brought out by M. René 
Massigli, Sur Quelques Maladies de l'Etat. 
77 This depends upon arguments as to the effect of s. 4. As to which, see Chap. 4, post. 
78 This was done, for example, by s. 4 (2) of the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council 
1946. 
79 The form of precedent may differ, there are Speaker's rulings, decisions by a Sovereign, 
etc., but these differences are accounted for by the circumstances in which the principles 
must be formulated. 
89 This is, of course, particularly true when the rule of law depends upon judicial decision, 
but it can also be true where the law is statutory; see, e.g., the uncertainty felt about 
what is a " general direction " under the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, 1946. See 
Report of the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries (Reports and Accounts) [1957 -58] 
H.C. 187 -191, Q. 65. 
81 See the quotation given on p. 22, ante. 82 Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., 446. 
83 There are many other examples: see, e.g., s. 3 (2) of the Iron and Steel Act, 1949, Tran- 
sport Act, 1962, s. 3 (4). Both as to common law rules, and as to statutory rules the 
same position may be reached, because of limitations upon the title to sue, see as a 
modem case Griffin v. L.A., 1950 S.C. 448. For an older one see Stewart v. Bothwell, 
Feb. 26, 1742, F.C., though compare Craigie v. Hepburn, Dec. 22, 1809, F.C. 
84 See Re Minimum Wages Act, 1936, S.C.R. 461 and the other cases discussed by Sir Ivor 
Jennings in his article " The Statute of Westminster and Appeals " in 52 L.Q.R. 173 
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It is certainly true that on occasion courts of law will recognise the 
existence of conventions and derive legal consequences from them.86 
In the context of constitutional law this is often as far as " enforcement " 
could go, and it must be remembered that conventions operate in those 
parts of constitutional law in which litigation is most difficult and often 
impossible to initiate. 
Nor can Dicey's theory of the ultimate sanction of convention be 
accepted. It is a theory which can work in relation to the conventions 
with which he was primarily concerned, but which will not work gen- 
erally.â6 Breaches of convention in the field of Commonwealth relation- 
ships, while they might lead to a disruption of the Commonwealth, 
would not lead to breaches of law, and even in the field of internal affairs 
Dicey's theory is not always true.87 Rejecting Dicey's view, and asserting 
that there is no fundamental distinction between law and convention, 
Sir Ivor Jennings has suggested that Dicey's problem, of why conven- 
tions are obeyed, is solved by recognising that all rules, whether legal 
or conventional, are normally obeyed because of habits of conformity 
and acceptance. Both law and convention are thus founded upon 
acceptance.88 
Even if the substantial truth of this solution be accepted, it may be 
argued that although it explains why conventions are obeyed, it does 
not solve the problem of why they should be obeyed. From what has 
been said it is clear that between the two sets of rules there can be found 
no fundamental distinction in origin, scope, or nature, which is univer- 
sally valid. It is also apparent that Dicey's formulation of his distinction 
was greatly influenced by Austinian theories which linked law with a 
sanction, and thus with courts. As has already been emphasised, in 
the field of constitutional law both the sanctions (where they exist) 
of rules and the forum wherein the rules are to be enforced differ greatly 
from those of private law. If this is accepted, then to a large extent 
the difficulty is removed. If the place of the ordinary courts in the 
definition of law is not given the emphasis which Dicey gave it then 
there remains no real difficulty in regarding " law " and " convention " 
as names for groups of rules which are essentially similar. To a great 
and in Constitutional Law of the Commonwealth and The Law and the Constitution. To 
these may be added R. v. Davenport (1877) 3 App.Cas. 115; Smith v. The Crown (1913) 
17 C.L.R. 356. 
85 Adair v. Hill, 1943 J.C. 9; and Re Bristol S.E. Parliamentary Election [1961] 3 All E.R. 
354 at 370. Other illustrations could be added, most recently and importantly the Copyright 
Owners Case (1958) 100 C.L.R. 597, where (at 612 -613) conventions are described as 
rules which courts would be expected to obey. 
86 In Dicey's narrow field, the theory is supported by cases such as New South Wales v. 
Commonwealth (1931) 46 C.L.R. 155 and (1932) 46 C.L.R. 246. 
S7 See Jennings, Law and the Constitution, 5th ed., 129 et seq. 
88 Op. cit. p. 330 et seq. In Cabinet Government, 3rd ed. at p. 3, Sir Ivor remarks that 
" The distinction between laws and conventions is not really of fundamental import- 
ance." See however Chap. 1, note 36, ante for an instance where regulation in the 
ordinary course of law rather than regulation by the conventional means of Standing 
Orders was thought necessary. 
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extent conventions operate in the field of what has earlier been called 
" internal law." 69 
Thus the effort to distinguish the two by any general definition of 
either, or to distinguish them on the grounds of their substance, or of 
the consequences of the breach of the different sets of rules is bound 
to fail. To say this, does not mean that there is no point in preserv- 
ing the two names. There are good reasons of convenience for so 
doing. The function of convention in all the different circumstances 
which have been discussed remains constant. It is to ensure the smooth 
working of the constitution in changing conditions. In effect, with us, 
convention has been a major instrument of constitutional adjustment 
and reform. Through convention, rules have been devised by those 
who are concerned with the practical working of government and ex- 
periment has been possible in an effort to find the most satisfactory rules. 
This pliability even owes something to the difference in names; changes 
may be made the more readily because of the absence of that formality 
which marks a change in law. The positive step of declaring a new rule 
provokes doubt and hesitation which are absent from a mere change 
of custom. The abandonment of a conventional rule which has ceased 
to serve a sound purpose is facilitated, since the stigma attached to 
unconventionality is less than that attached to illegality. Most im- 
portant, since there are limits to human imagination and draftsman- 
ship, but not to possible combinations of circumstances, convention 
remains necessary to allow the necessary flexibility to meet exceptional 
circumstances. Without any illegality Mr. MacDonald could in 1924 
break the accepted rules of collective responsibility to Parliament, and, 
in effect, declare his own rules which bis government would observe90 
While this departure from rule was required by the special circum- 
stances of the formation of his government, the circumstances (and the 
rules to meet them) could not have been satisfactorily defined in 
advance by law. 
This pliability which is at the same time the mark and result of con- 
vention accounts both for the continuance of conventional rules and 
for their periodic enactment as rules of law. Where an institution is still 
developing it will remain governed, to a large extent, by convention,91 
but when experience has shown that rules can and ought to be form- 
ulated with clarity and certainty convention may well be superseded by 
law.92 In this sense law may be regarded as convention which has 
89 That is to say they operate in areas in which courts are in any event most disinclined 
to operate, and might well decline jurisdiction even in relation to rules of law. 
9° 169 H.C.Deb. 749 -750. 
91 Thus there is only a bare minimum of legislation relating to the Cabinet. While salaries 
are provided for by law, composition is not, subject to some limiting rules which are 
accepted as necessary. House of Commons Disqualification Act, 1957, Sched. II; Ministers 
of the Crown Act, 1937. 
92 The Imperial Conference of 1926, the Conference on the Operation of Dominion Legisla- 
tion and the resulting Statute of Westminster, 1931, provide a clear example of this 
process. 
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crystallised. Such crystallising may be a consequence of a variety of 
causes. A political crisis may prompt clarification, or it may be felt 
that a particular stage in development has been reached which should 
be marked in some signal way.93 In both cases the fact that while 
convention may modify the operation of law, it cannot directly 
contradict law may be important.94 The result may be the repeal of a 
law which is no longer desired. Although what has just been said may 
appear to recognise a greater certainty and durability in law than there 
is in convention, this is not necessarily so, and the choice of the form for 
the declaration of the rules is governed by other general considerations. 
In order, however, that conventions may be regarded in this way, 
as being of the same nature as law, it is necessary that conventions 
should be distinguished from mere practices. In any organisation a 
pattern of activity develops and is continued out of habit or simply for 
the sake of convenience. Such patterns exist in constitutional matters, 
There are, for example, limits to parliamentary debate dictated by nothing 
more than the limits of physical endurance. On the other hand there 
are patterns which persist because a constitutional principle extending 
beyond mere practical convenience underlies them. It is these latter 
patterns which may be regarded as " conventional." Thus the rejection 
of Lord Curzon as Prime Minister in 1924 may be taken as marking or 
establishing a convention because the decision was governed by the 
considerations dependent upon the constitutional relationship of the 
two Houses of Parliament. While the distinction between practices 
and conventions cannot always be clearly and conclusively drawn it 
is nevertheless sufficiently precise to have value and to be of considerable 
importance when the nature of conventions is analysed. 
93 The rules determined in 1926 relating to the position of a Governor General were the 
result of the earlier dispute between Lord Byng and Mr. Mackenzie King. The clari- 
fication was achieved while leaving the rules conventional. On the other hand the 
Statute of Westminster, 1931, served not only to repeal (as far as the then Dominions 
desired) the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, but also as a landmark. Thus a con- 
venient way of marking the emergence of a new Dominion was simply to bring it within 
the scope of the Statute of Westminster. 
94 This is particularly true of statute law. It is, however, arguable that the declaration of 
1949 (see note 59, supra) did affect the legal foundation of the Commonwealth. 
CHAPTER 3 
GENERAL DOCTRINES OF THE CONSTITUTION 
IN any discussion of constitutional law certain general doctrines are 
prominent. The doctrines of separation of powers and of the rule of 
law are among these, and to them must be added in the discussion of 
the British Constitution the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament. 
It is these doctrines which form the subject- matter of this and the following 
chapters. 
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
This doctrine is commonly associated with Montesquieu's L'Esprit des 
Lois,'in which, in Book XI, Chapter VI, the author distinguished three 
sorts of power -the legislative power, the power exercising matters 
falling within the law of nations (which he called the executive power), 
and the power exercising matters falling within the civil law (which 
he called the judicial power). If, said Montesquieu, any two, or more, 
of these powers were combined in the same person or body of persons, 
there could be no liberty. After considering the nature of the person 
or body in which each power should be vested, Montesquieu concluded 
that the then existing law of England conformed to this ideal pattern 
and provided the necessary framework for liberty. At first sight Montes- 
quieu's division does not correspond to what is now generally understood 
by the phrase separation of powers, namely the separation of legislative, 
executive and judicial powers. Montesquieu's second power is essentially 
and almost exclusively connected with foreign affairs, his third power 
extends beyond what is generally accepted as being the scope of the 
judicial power. It should be noted that, on the one hand, in the eighteenth 
century, the administrative functions of the central government were 
almost limited to foreign affairs and related matters, and, on the other, 
in Montesquieu's development of his theme, his executive branch becomes 
somewhat broader, being also concerned with the execution of the law 
within the kingdom. There is thus some foundation here, for the modern 
doctrine of the separation of powers. 
It must be emphasised that there is a considerable background to 
this chapter by Montesquieu. Somewhat similar ideas are to be found 
in Aristotle's Politics,' and, closer to Montesquieu's time, and perhaps 
to his work, in Locke. The latter, having distinguished 2 the legislative 
and judicial powers, further discussed an executive power (concerned 
with the execution of the municipal laws) and a federative power (con- 
cerned with foreign affairs), these last two powers, being intimately 
connected, were, he said, almost always united. The three powers which 
1 Book IV, § 14. 2 Second Treatise on Civil Government, Chap. XII. 
31 
32 GENERAL DOCTRINES OF 'l'E CONSTITUTION 
thus resulted from his analysis should, he argued, be separated both 
for practical and theoretical reasons. Somewhat earlier than Locke, 
in the same stream of thought, George Buchanan had, in his De Jure 
Regni apud Scotos, distinguished the three elements of government, 
and had emphasised the necessity for some separation.3 In later years 
the doctrine has had a varied career. It has been incorporated, explicitly 
or impliedly, in a variety of constitutions,¢ but it has also undergone 
something of a modification by way of explanation. Thus Madison 
asserted 5 that it was only when the whole of one power was exercised 
by a body which also exercised another power that there was danger to 
liberty. Hence, in one form, the doctrine became one " of mutual 
restraints or checks and balances." s Others have asserted that what 
merit there is in the theory is to be found simply in the resultant dispersal 
of power among many hands? 
It is possible to raise objections to all of these theories or variants. 
In relation to our own constitution it is obvious that in earlier times 
it would be difficult to maintain any theory of separation. The story 
of the development of institutions is one of increasing specialisation of 
function, and thus of the separation of bodies which at one stage were 
united in a single body with multifarious functions. " In the administra- 
tion of civil justice during the fifteenth century the most marked feature 
is the gradual differentiation within the curia regis, creating a distinction 
between the executive and the judicial functions of the Council, and in 
the sixteenth century gradually delimiting the spheres without com- 
pletely separating the personnel of Privy Council and Council and 
Session," wrote Professor Hannay.8 On the other side the Lords Auditors 
appointed by Parliament also form part of the background of the Court 
of Session. The process of specialisation or separation was, however, 
3 Thus Buchanan asserts -" When you allow the King to interpret the laws you afford 
him an opening to make the law say what its author intended, not what is just and good 
for the community but what is to the interest of the interpreter ": De Jure Regni (trans. 
R. Macfarlan), p. 252. A passage which finds an echo in Montesqueiu's assertion that 
if the executive and judicial powers are joined " the judge would have the strength of 
an oppressor." Similarly Buchanan separates the legislative function, entrusting it in 
the first place to a council. The executive functions are to remain with the King advised 
by counsellors. This dispersal of power being according to his argument a necessary 
protection against tyranny. 
4 It was regarded as fundamental to the existence of a constitution in the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man, 1789 (Art. 16), and was explicitly incorporated, for example in 
the original constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, by implication, at 
least at first glance, in such constitutions as that of the U.S.A. or of Australia. In the 
latter it can, on occasion, still be an effective force, see, e.g., Att.-Gen. for Australia v. 
The Queen and the Boilermakers Society of Australia [1957] À.C. 288. 
6 The Federalist No. 47. 
s See Sir Carleton Allen, Law and Orders. For an account of the development of the 
idea upon the Continent see Esmein, Eléments de Droit Constitutionnel, Chap. 3. 
7 Griffith and Street, Principles of Administrative Law, Chap. I. 
s Judicial Administration in Session and Justiciary, Stair Soc., Vol. I, 398; See too his 
College of Justice (particularly Chaps. III and V) and A. A. M. Duncan's The Central 
Courts before 1532 in Stair Soc., Vol. XX. A like process of specialisation was of course 
operative in England, see, e.g., Plucknett- Concise History of the Common Law, Chap. 3, 
and Richardson and Sayles, Parliaments and Great Councils in Medieval England, and 
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book V, Chap. I, Pt. II. 
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th never complete throughout the history of Scotland as an independent 
e, state. Any of the volumes of the Acts of the Parliament of Scotland 
re will show that body acting in judicial, administrative, or legislative 
it, capacities.9 In modern times it is equally easy to point to departures 
rs from the doctrine. At one extreme our doctrine of cabinet government 
ly is founded upon the intermingling of Parliament and executive. At the 
le other extreme the sheriff has a mass of administrative functions; and 
m work which at times is entrusted to a court, for example that of the 
Dean of Guild, is at other times entrusted to an administrative body - 
to a local authority committee in the landward areas of a county.19 At 
al one time the Court of Session acted in ways which can be regarded as 
at administrative or legislative. Acts of Sederunt might regulate branches 
al of law, being in time replaced by statutes,11 and the court might be 
called upon to draft or consider legislation.12 Similarly by Act of Sederunt 
s. the Lords were prepared to regulate the price of wine or direct brewers 
s to continue their trade,13 and in the form of judicial decisions were 
-y equally prepared to undertake administrative acts,14 to amplify statutes,15 
)f or indeed to accept or create new heads of jurisdiction without statutory 
-e authority.18 While Sir George Mackenzie and Sir Ilay Campbell might 
1- protest that such activities of courts were due merely to the difficulty 
-e of the times, it remains possible to find modern examples not entirely 
n dissimilar.17 If one looks at other branches of government a 
n 9 In its latter years as part of the struggle against the Crown or as part of the legislative 
skirmishing which preceded the Union of 1707 that Parliament was claiming to control 
specific administrative acts, see Act anent Peace and War, 1703 (A.P.S. XI, 107), and 
d earlier see Act anent the election of officers 1641 (A.P.S. V, 354), repealed 1661 (A.P.S. 
S 
VII, 10); and, on the judicial side see e.g., " Judicial Proceedings in the Parliaments of 
Scotland 1660 -1688 " (1924) 36 J.R. 135. 
rt 10 See Report of the Committee on Building Legislation in Scotland (1957) Cmnd. 269. 
r 11 The Act of Sederunt of 1620 against unlawful dispositions made by bankrupts, replaced 
, 
by the Act of 1621 (A.P.S. IV, 615), is perhaps the best known example. Others are 
to be found in the Report by the Lords of Session to the House of Lords on Feb. 27, 
rd 1810, upon Acts of Sederunt (Ilay Campbell, Acts of Sederunt, II, 52). See too Sir George 
Mackenzie's comments on the legislative powers of the Court of Session in his Observations 
Ls. on the Act of 1621 (Works, Vol. II) and those of Sir Ilay Campbell in his preface to his 
at collection of Acts of Sederunt. 
of 12 See, e.g., Act of Sederunt, Jan. 24, 1754, approving a draft of the Act for preventing 
in clandestine marriages and forwarding it to the Lord Chancellor (Ilay Campbell, Acts 
of Sederunt, II, 476). 
13 July 6, 1692 (Ilay Campbell, I, 201) and July 31, 1725 (Ilay Campbell, I, 283). At other 
times the court was directly charged by statute with specifically administrative functions, 
e.g., under the Act of 1686 for cleaning the streets of Edinburgh (A.P.S. VIII, 595). 
in 14 See, e.g., Moderator of the Presbytery of Caithness v. Heritors of Reay (1773) Mor. 7449, 
at or Paterson v. Magistrates of Linlithgow, Feb. 28, 1783, F.C. Indeed in his preface 
le to the Acts of Sederunt Sir Ilay Campbell considers the nobile officium to be an encroach- 
v. ment upon the executive power of government, and often its exercise is essentially ad- 
ministrative, see, e.g., Lord Advocate, Petitioner (1885) 12 R. 925. 
15 Duke of Gordon v. Sir James Grant (1776) Mor.App.Juris. 3 and see the remarks of 
se Lord Chancellor Eldon in Johnstone v. Stotts (1802) 4 Pat.App. 274, 283. 
16 Kames, Historical Law Tracts, 228 and see the comments of Lord Cockburn upon Pryde 
v. Heritors of the Kirk Session of Ceres (1843) 5 D. 552, in his Journal, Vol. II, pp. 1 
Lis and 257. 
al 17 The power to make such Acts of Sederunt may be granted by statute -see, e.g., Act of 
se Sederunt (Adoption of Children) 1959 (S.I. 763 (33)) but it is not always so. Thus, in 
3, England, the Probate Registrar's Direction of April 23, 1953 in relation to the place 
id of signature of a will has a quasi -legislative effect. Similarly the Act of Sederunt, Dec. 
4, 1850 (Alexander's Abridgement, 2nd Supp. 68) constituting one body of solicitors 
M.C.L. -3 
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similar admixture of functions can be found, both in individuals and 
institutions 18 
For this admixture of functions in any one body there are a variety 
of reasons. In the first place it appears to be impossible to formulate 
any satisfactory definition of legislative, executive or administrative 
acts which will in all cases clearly distinguish one from the other. It 
is possible to distinguish such acts by definitions which depend upon 
the form of the act rather than its nature, but such definitions are clearly 
unsatisfactory for present purposes.19 Thus, even if a continuous attempt 
to carry out the separation of powers were made, this gradual merging of 
one form of act into another form means that it will never be possible 
to say with certainty that a true separation has been achieved. Moreover 
the fact that constitutional machinery has been evolved rather than 
been made, increases the likelihood of this admixture of functions. Once 
a function has been entrusted to a body it may remain with that body 
even though, on grounds of pure principle, it would not (or should not) 
be there placed. In Scotland, the Lord Advocate, in addition to those 
functions which would naturally fall to him as a Law Officer still retains 
others of a somewhat different type which to a large extent adhere to the 
office because of what it once was. In England the fact that local govern- 
ment was once predominantly the affair of the justices in quarter session 
still has its consequences.20 Nor is the machinery of government created 
with a tidiness which would permit a neat separation. The Lord Chan- 
cellor is intended to be in part an administrative officer, but, because for 
many purposes the Lord President of the Court of Session is to be regarded 
as his equivalent in Scotland, administrative functions fall to the Lord 
President, even though that office was not in intention an administrative 
before the court and regulating their qualification and admission can only be regarded 
as a legislative act. 
18 To overcome difficulties arising from this fact there have been occasions when Lords 
of Appeal in Ordinary have expressed the view that they should not enter into debates 
on legislation lest they should in another capacity have to interpret it, see Bromhead, 
The House of Lords in Contemporary Politics, Chap. IV. This principle is certainly not 
universally observed or accepted. See Bonnybridge Roman Catholic School v. Stirling - 
shire Education Authority, 1928 S.C. 855, 875, where Lord Alness's phrase " Whatever 
source of information may be open to one; that policy [scil. of the Act] must be 
ascertained from the provisions of the Act, and from those alone "-- covers a somewhat 
similar situation. Lord Alness, who as Secretary for Scotland had been responsible for 
piloting the Education (Scotland) Act, 1918, through Parliament, was in a minority in the 
Second Division on a question of interpreting the Act, though his views were ultimately 
accepted in the House of Lords. See too Gardner v. Beresford's Trustees (1875) 
5 R.(H.L.) 105, 118, per Lord Gordon. 
19 Definitions such as that of Lord Atkin in R. v. Electricity Commissioners [1924] 1 K.B. 
171 of what is judicial are circular. The distinctions drawn in the Report of the Committee 
on Ministers' Powers (1932) Cmd. 4060, are unsatisfactory, since on closer examination 
the characteristics which are there isolated and seen in a judicial decision exist to a 
greater or lesser degree in an administrative one. It is noticeable that more recently 
the Report of the Committee on Tribunals and Inquiries (1957) Cmnd. 218 (commonly 
called the Franks Committee and Franks Report), did not venture upon definitions, 
urging an empirical approach (§ 30). See the discussion of the distinction between 
judicial and administrative acts in de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 
Chap. II, Paton, Jurisprudence, § 73, and Robson, Justice and Administrative Law, Chap. I. 
20 In Scotland the Report of the Committee on Building Legislation (1957) Cmnd. 269, makes 
this point. 
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one.21 To these considerations must be added another major one. The 
whole process of government must be one of collaborative effort towards 
a desired end. Any rigid separation of the departments of government 
would frustrate this collaboration. For the same reason any rigid 
adoption of a system of checks and balances, or of the dispersal of power, 
could be dangerous, leading to inertia in government when movement 
and vitality is required, or, equally dangerously, to the blurring of 
lines of responsibility. 
In any of its forms an extreme application of the doctrine is likely 
to be undesirable. Nevertheless the doctrine is a significant one. Often, 
in law, phrases which are incapable of precise definition are useful, 
hence the difficulties of so defining words such as " legislative " can 
be overemphasised.22 Moreover, there are few, if any, absolute principles 
in constitutional law; all are matters of degree, and certainly the diffi- 
culties with this doctrine arise mainly if an attempt is made to regard 
it as absolute.23 Certainly the doctrine continues to shape constitutional 
arrangements,24 and influences decisions,26 and in some limited form 
is necessary both for efficiency and liberty. Sometimes, as with the 
separation of the investigating and prosecuting functions in the criminal 
law, it is the conception of the dispersal of power which is important.26 
21 This equivalence is not always drawn, see, e.g., the Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs 
(1954) Cmd. 9212, § 144. Generally it must be borne in mind that in the course of 
time offices may change their character substantially without losing all their old character- 
istics; compare, e.g., the development of the offices of Master of the Rolls and of Lord 
Justice -Clerk -Lord Evershed, The Office of Master of the Rolls, Hannay's " The 
Office of the Justice -Clerk " (1935) 47 J.R. 311 and Malcolm, " The Lord Justice - 
Clerk of Scotland " (1915) 27 J.R. 342, 375. 
22 Even if the words are incapable of precise definition a minimum content of meaning 
may be accepted and be used effectively by the courts, Tuker v. Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food [1960] 2 All E.R. 834, in which the Court of Appeal founded upon 
such a minimum content of the word " legislation." 
23 Compare, on the difficulties of striking a balance between checking administrative action 
in the interest of liberty and allowing activity in the same interest, the majority and 
minority views in Liversidge v. Anderson [1942] A.C. 206, or in Youngstown Steel & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 574 (1952). The warnings of, for example, Mr. Justice Holmes 
against the Supreme Court carrying its function of " checking " too far were numerous. 
24 See, e.g., The Franks Report (1957) Cmnd. 218 and the resultant Tribunals and Inquiries 
Act, 1958. On a larger scale the doctrine has played a part in determining the powers 
of the courts and of Parliament in relation to the privileges of the latter. 
25 On the one hand there are the rules of the House of Commons that a matter which is 
sub judice should not be there debated; see Report of Select Committee on Procedure 
(1962 -3) H.C. 156. On the other hand decisions such as Duncan v. Crighton (1892) 
19 R. 594, or, more recently, Land Realisation Co. v. Postmaster General [1950] 
Ch. 435 are clearly affected by the doctrine, as (in relation to the separation between 
judicial and legislative activities) were such decisions as that in The Sheriff Clerks, 
Petitioners (1783) Mor. 7393. Indeed the modem increased insistence on principles 
of natural justice has often an element of substantial reliance upon the doctrine; com- 
pare the readiness with which formerly the Court of Session dealt with the immunity 
of the College of Justice from taxation (Fount. I 440) (and the whole history of this matter 
in Ross, Privileges of the College of Justice) with the doubts and difficulties expressed 
in some of the opinions in Carron Co. v. Hislop, 1930 S.C. 1050, as to the review of the 
validity of an Act of Sederunt. Such cases emphasise equally the difficulty of applying 
the doctrine absolutely and the sort of difficulty which can arise from an admixture of 
functions. 
26 As it is also in relation to warrants, arrest or to search, though again the principle is 
departed from when other interests become dominant. See Chap. 18, post. This principle 
has wide applications. The existence of what may be called institutional checks is 
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At other times it is the classical doctrine which matters. The Ordinance 
of James V in 1526 communicating to the Lords of Council that " his 
heines promittis that he sall gif na lettres to stop justice " 27 was founded 
on sound doctrine of which Montesquieu would have approved. The 
frequent repetition in one form or another of the substance of this promise, 
and its prominence in the settlement of 1688,28 is an indication of its 
importance. Indeed, it is perhaps true that the greatest importance of 
the doctrine is to be found in this sphere as securing the independence 
of the judiciary, though other aspects are important. Thus, in relation 
to legislation, it is necessary in a modern society that some legislative 
functions should be conferred upon the administration. It is also necessary 
that limits should be set to this admixture of power. These limits may 
be found through an application of the traditional doctrine of the separa- 
tion of powers in the interest of preventing a possible abuse of power, 
and also of promoting the efficient discharge of one function." 
It is also true that some apparent departures from the doctrine 
may be necessary if the aims desired by those who advance the doctrine 
are to be attained. In relation to the administration it may be said 
that the principle of ministerial responsibility, while on the face of it 
denying the traditional doctrine of the separation of powers, does much, 
in its operation, to preserve the essence of that doctrine. The separation 
between the politically responsible minister and the politically neutral 
administrator is preserved by that system, and is assisted by other devices." 
The maintenance of that separation, which assists the attainment of 
Montesquieu's aim while at the same time being made possible by a con- 
tradiction of his principle, has become of even greater importance in 
important. These may be administrative, e.g., the size of the Cabinet Secretariat and 
the place of the Treasury in the general scheme of government, or they may be difficult 
to classify, such as the Select Committee on Statutory Instruments, but nevertheless bodies 
whose existence and potential activities are significant. 
27 A.D.C. I11,256. Compare the insistence on an independent court by Chief Justice 
Centlivres in Harris v. Donges, 1952 (2) S.A. 428 (A.D.). 
28 " That the Sending letters to the courts of Justice, Ordaining the Judges to stop or desist 
from determining causes, or ordaining how to proceed in cases depending befor them, 
and the changing of the nature of the Judges gifts ad vitam aut culpam into Commissions 
durante bene placito are contrary to law ": the Claim of Right, 1689. It is to be noticed 
that there was also the habit of nominating the King's Advocate as a member of the 
Court of Session (Sir John Nisbet (1664) being the last so appointed), and the Advocate 
had to be specially served in any matter affecting the King's interest. 
29 Thus on the one side in Yakus v. U.S., 321 U.S. 414 (1944) there is an insistence on 
Congress determining standards, because that is the essential part of the legislative 
process, and thus cannot be entrusted to an administrative body. On the other side 
there are assertions such as that of Lord Thring in his Practical Legislation that Parlia- 
ment should only concern itself with principle, delegating the power to legislate in 
detail, since only thus can Parliament discharge its legislative function effectively. There 
is a reflection of this attitude also in the Yakus case, but the twofold purposes which 
the doctrine of the separation of powers can serve is well shown by the two viewpoints. 
See too note 22, supra, and Chap. 15, post. 
29 Thus, the limitations in the terms of reference of Committees of the House of Commons 
(such as the Select Committees on Statutory Instruments, or on Estimates) which are 
likely to take evidence from individual civil servants are to be noted. In general they 
exclude matters of policy which are the proper responsibility of the Minister; see too 
Special Report of the Select Committee on the House of Commons Disqualification Bill 
(1955 -56) H.C. 349, Q. 147 -Q. 153 for an illustration of the sort of difficulties which 
may arise. 
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altered circumstances.31 This particular separation of functions is 
desirable on the purely practical grounds that it tends to produce more 
acceptable decisions,S2 as well as on the more general grounds of con- 
stitutional theory. 
The doctrine has therefore both a functional and a theoretical basis, 
and both remain important. The benefits to be derived from a process 
of specialisation can be as great in government as they are in industry. 
The ends intended to be achieved by the adoption of the doctrine are 
as important today as they were at any time in its development, and 
the doctrine still points to a satisfactory method of achieving those ends. 
Both the functional and theoretical approach have been important in 
the evolution of institutions. Perhaps the history of the development 
and gradual separation of institutions is, with us, to be attributed even 
more to practical considerations than to any striving after an ideal state 
of affairs in the interest of liberty. Nevertheless while the classical 
doctrine of the separation of powers may be important, it must not 
be regarded as a principle to be applied universally. Just as other theories 
about what structure is appropriate for a part of the governmental 
machine if certain desired ends are to be achieved may, in particular 
circumstances, assume greater importance than the theory of the separa- 
tion of powers; so also other practical considerations influence any 
decision of whether the classical theory of separation or one of its variants 
different doctrine is to be given effect in designing 
that structure. 
Economic or industrial analogies on the benefits of specialisation can 
be pressed too hard. The concept of efficiency in government does 
not necessarily mean that decisions should be taken or put into effect 
as rapidly as may be. Though such matters are important, efficiency 
must also be judged by the extent to which the willing collaboration 
of those affected can be secured.33 This problem is of increasing im- 
portance in a modern society and its solution must often involve an 
attempt to ensure that decisions are taken by a body appropriate to 
the decision in question irrespective of whether the solution can be 
reconciled with any doctrine of the separation of powers. At extremes, 
it is obvious that broad questions of policy should be decided by a 
different sort of body from that which should decide a disputed inter- 
pretation of a will or ownership of a particular piece of land. If weight 
is given to such considerations then the doctrine of the separation of 
powers (in any of its forms) tends to be submerged, or be affected by 
31 See Massigli, Sur Quelques Maladies de l'Etat, Chap. IV. 
32 See Lord Strang, Home and Abroad, Chap. XII. This too is illustrated by the House 
of Commons Disqualification Act, 1957. Some of the disqualifications contained therein 
are partly explicable on the basis of the traditional doctrine of separation, others on 
more functional grounds. 
33 Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries (1957) Cmnd. 218, 
§ 21; similarly many of the conventional rules are intended, in their own spheres, to 
achieve this end. 
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doctrines more properly grouped under the title of the distribution of 
power. 
This last doctrine is not well developed with us, because of the form 
of our state, and yet it is significant and does affect the application of 
any doctrine of the separation of powers. The desire that a decision 
should be taken locally may conflict with, and overcome, a desire to 
observe the doctrine of the separation of powers.34 More generally the 
conception of the distribution of power may control the shape of govern- 
ment machinery,35 and with the growing complexity of that machinery 
this matter may be of increasing importance, even though at this stage 
it is difficult to define the governing conceptions with precision. The 
distribution of power cannot today be conceived of simply as a distri- 
bution between central and local government (though there are many 
serious problems in that field). It must also be considered in relation 
to public corporations of all types and the regulatory devices that surround 
them. In that field much remains to be discovered about the arrange- 
ments of power which are most conducive to the general well- being. 
All that is certain is that neither in relation to the distribution nor the 
separation of powers, can any one version or interpretation of the doctrine 
be accepted as being universally or necessarily applicable. Past events 
and the influence of other ideas must in any context determine the weight 
to be given to the doctrine. While either may provide a yardstick for 
measuring the merits of an institution or rule (and the doctrine of the 
separation of powers in some form is more likely to do so), neither can 
ever be the sole yardstick and, in particular cases, neither may be the 
most important. 
THE RULE OF LAW 
" Dispositions maid to the King for just fear ar null et datur restitutio, 
and the king's successor (being minor) must answer notwithstanding 
his minoritie." 36 Such propositions emphasise the obvious and elemen- 
tary meaning of the phrase " The Rule of Law " -that affairs should 
be regulated by law and not by brute force. In this simple form the 
principle of the rule of law is common to all civilised societies,37 applies 
to rulers and subjects alike, and, despite its elementary nature, still 
34 See post, Chap. 16 for the discussion of administrative tribunals. 
S5 See Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs (1954) Cmd. 9212, § 12 et seq. (cf. The Council 
for Wales and Monmouthshire (Fourth Memorandum and the Reply of the Prime Minister) 
(1959) Cmnd. 631); or the White Papers on Local Government and Local Government 
Finance.. (1955) Cmd. 9831, and (1956) Cmnd. 208 and 209. 
36 Hope, Major Practicks, VI, 38, § 26, a proposition founded upon Gray v. Earl of Lauderdale 
(1685) Mor. 16497. The actions of the Earl of Lauderdale are, perhaps, a good illustration 
of the necessity for this principle of the rule of law. As George Buchanan put it, " many 
causes might induce a king (or indeed anyone in authority) to deviate from rectitude, 
where the powers of making and interpreting the law are united ": De Jure Regni (trans. 
Macfarlan) at 247. Sir George Mackenzie's views were very different, see his Vindication. 
37 Various manifestations of the rule in differing national and legal contexts are shown 
in Government Under Law (ed. Arthur E. Sutherland), and for a comparison see " The 
Rule of Law as Understood in France " by M. Letourneur and R. Drago, American 
Journal of Comparative Law (1958) Vol. 7, 148. 
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continues to have importance.38 In relation to the operation of the 
principle between subjects little difficulty arises here. Questions about 
the proper limits of self -help are best dealt with in other branches of 
the law, and, while the principle has obviously shaped doctrines such 
as those relating to mobbing and rioting,39 the real importance of the 
principle in constitutional law is to be found in its application to the 
regulation of activities of the state. 
In that context there are both theoretical and practical difficulties 
springing from the fact that the state through various organs both makes 
and enforces the law.40 If the state makes law, how, it may be asked, 
can it also be subject to law? Apart from the jurisprudential issues 
(which are not of present concern), the arguments about this question 
relate both to detailed rules,4' and to general principles of law. The 
general principles underlay the seventeenth -century constitutional litigation 
in England, and also, to some degree in Scotland; that litigation, itself, 
was not conclusive. The actual decision in the Case of Ship Money, 
for example, had to be reversed by statute,42 and, while the litigation 
may have had constitutional importance in leading to the final assertion 
of the rule of law, constitutional motives were not the only ones which 
inspired it 43 Nevertheless theories which could be broadly summed 
up in contrasting maxims, the one, derived from Bodin, Princeps Legibus 
Solutus, and the other (that of Knox, Buchanan, Coke and Bracton, 
among others) Rex non debet esse sub homine sed sub Deo et lege,44 were 
38 See such cases as H.M. Advocate v. Gollan (1882) 5 Coup. 317, per Lord Justice -Clerk 
Moncrieff, or Clark v. Syme, 1957 J.C. 1, 5, per Lord President Clyde. 
39 See Lord Cowan's charge to the jury in H.M. Advocate v. Wild (1854) 1 Irv. 552, 558. 
40 There are glossed over here many problems about the nature of the state or of organs 
of the state. As an introduction to these see Paton, Jurisprudence, Chap. XIV, § 75, 
or Friedman, Legal Theory, Part VII, Chap. 28, or G. Sawer's essay " Government 
as a Personalised LegaLEntity " in Legal Personality and Political Pluralism (ed. Leicester 
C. Webb); Kelsen, General Theory of Law and the State, Part II, Chap. I; The Law 
and the State particularly at 182 and 197 et seq. 
41 Thus there is the difficulty in relation to a narrow field posed by Hamilton in The Federalist 
saying " it is in theory impossible to reconcile the idea of a promise which obliges with 
a power to make a law which can vary the effect of it." (See, too, Mr. Justice Holmes 
in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907) 353, posing the issue more generally.) 
In the broader field the arguments turn upon such matters as the nature and control 
of the prerogative or the relationship of courts to other branches of government. 
42 16 Car. 1, c. 14. 
43 Fountainhall's comment upon Gray v. Lauderdale (Fount. I, 388) is revealing -" The 
preparative of thir processes may be very useful for the common people to be some 
check to deter great men from oppressing them grossly; but the processes are only created 
and fomented by interest, malice and passion, to ruine some fallen courtier, or to in- 
capacitate him from ever rising to avenge himself again; so that I dare say that thir 
processes against concussion are never designed mainly to repair the injured parties; 
tho' it be some pleasure to the populace and mobile to see their oppressors repaid in 
their own coin, albeit no material advantage redound to them from thence." Lauder- 
dale's actions in themselves point sufficiently to the need. 
44 Thus John Knox reports one of his interviews with Mary Queen of Scots: " Queen Mary: 
Think ye that subjects having power may resist their princes. John Knox: if their princes 
exceed their bounds, Madam, no doubt they should be resisted even by power "; this 
argument in a slightly different shape he carried into the more general field of politics 
in his debate with Lethington: 
"Lethington: Then ye will make subjects control their princes and rulers. Knox: And 
what harm should the commonwealth receive, if the corrupt affections of ignorant rulers 
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debated both in the courts and in battle, and the eventual victory of 
the second maxim is indicated by the declaration in the Claim of Right 
that James VII had altered the fundamental constitution of the kingdom 
" from a legal limited monarchy, to an arbitrary Despotick Power " 
and the reassertion of the former basis. Such declarations 46 can be 
regarded as subjecting governments to the rule of law. 
That subjection, in so far as it was achieved in 1688, was not complete, 
permanent, nor necessarily advantageous to Fountainhall's populace 
and mobile. It was not complete in the sense that the whole of govern- 
ment activity cannot be regulated by law and by law alone. A government 
must have substantial discretionary powers, the degree of discretion 
varying according to the nature of the power; it may, for example, be 
much greater in the field of foreign, than of home, affairs. Law can 
govern the existence of such powers. It cannot, save within narrow 
limits, control the exercise of many of them. Thus the control of law 
must be supplemented by other controls (which with us have been found 
in responsible government) if the aim of preventing the abuse of power 
is to be attained.46 In this sense the Revolutionary Settlement of 1688 
was as much the beginning as the end of a story. The subjection of 
government to law was not permanent in the sense that thereafter no 
question could arise. If the price of liberty is eternal vigilance, the 
courts have had to continue to pay part of that price, even in what may 
be regarded as the traditional areas of operation of the rule.47 
Further, even if the rule may be taken as established at the Revolution, 
it nevertheless requires to be maintained in changing circumstances. 
In relation to both individuals or private organisations and to govern- 
ments, altered conditions raise new problems of the application of legal 
controls48 Such statements assume that the establishment of the rule 
of law is advantageous. That belief underlies most assertions on the 
subject. When George Buchanan wrote that " They [the people] were 
taught by many experiences that it was better to trust their liberty to 
laws than to Kings " 49 or when, in modern times, it is said that " The 
were moderated and so bridled by the wisdom and discretion of godly subjects that 
they should do no wrong nor violence to no man." History of the Reformation (ed. 
Dickinson), Vol. II, pp. 16 -17 and Vol. II, p. 120. 
46 And the provision to the Bill of Rights, such as those curtailing the suspending and dis- 
pensing powers. 
48 Compare Boyesen v. Nixon, Jan. 16, 1813, F.C., with Smith v. Jeffrey and Ors., Jan. 24, 
1817, F.C., and consider the weight given to government policy in the context of recog- 
nition of foreign states and contrast the attitude in relation to domestic affairs. Monkland 
v. Jack Barclay Ltd. [1951] 2 K.B. 252, 265. See too Chandler v. D.P.P. [1962] 
3 W.L.R. 694 and Chap. 9, post. 
47 See Kuechenmeister v. Home Office [1958] 1 Q.B. 496 and Report of the Committee of 
Privy Councillors to inquire into the interception of communications (1957) Cmnd. 283. 
49 See such cases as Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [1949] 1 All E.R. 109; Bonsor v. Musicians' 
Union [1956] A.C. 104, or the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, as to the first group, 
and Blackpool Corporation v. Locker [1948] 1 K.B. 349, or British Oxygen Co. Ltd. 
v. S. of Scotland Electricity Board, 1959 S.C.(H.L.) 1, or the Franks Report (1957) Cmnd. 
218 as to governmental bodies, and the Privy Councillors' Report (Cmnd. 283) referred 
to above, as to the second group. 
49 De Jure Regni (trans. Macfarlan), 247. 
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Rule of Law stands for the view that decisions should be made by the 
application of known principles or laws," b° it is clear that the authors 
of such phrases have in mind laws which are designed to achieve certain 
desired ends, individual liberty and the like, or laws which are consonant 
with certain moral or political ideals.61 If the law is such that all who 
act upon His Majesty's commission are protected against " all pursutes 
or complaints that can be raised against them," or that " the King is 
sovereign monarch, absolute prince, judge and governor over all persons, 
estates and causes both spiritual and temporal " b2 so that, as Sir George 
Mackenzie put it -" He is only a tyrant who has no right to reign," 63 
there is clearly no advantage in living under a rule of law, for that rule 
will do nothing to protect from oppression. The legality of tyranny is a 
conception fundamentally opposed to the general ideas underlying the 
normal use of the phrase " rule of law." 
A moral or political content to the rule of law was clearly assumed 
by Dicey, whose formulation of the rule in his Law of the Constitution s} 
has tended to govern modern discussions of the subject in this country. 
For Dicey the rule of law had three particular meanings : (1) " The 
absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the 
influence of arbitrary power ... Englishmen are ruled by the law, and by 
the law alone "; (2) " the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary 
law of the land administered by the ordinary law courts; the ` rule of law' 
in this sense excludes the idea of any exemption of officials or others 
from the duty of obedience to the law which governs other citizens or 
from the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals "; (3) " that with us the 
law of the constitution, the rules which in foreign countries naturally 
form part of a constitutional code, are not the source but the consequence 
of the rights of individuals, as defined and enforced by the courts; .. . 
the constitution is the result of the ordinary law of the land." 
Dicey's formulation may be criticised on many grounds. That there 
is no antithesis between the rule of law and arbitrary power unless assump- 
tions are made about the substance of law has already been demonstrated. 
6° Franks Report (1957) Cmnd. 218, § 29. 
61 Thus some of the grievances recited in the Claim of Right as contrary to the fundamental 
laws of the Kingdom and thus inconsistent with the rule of law, were nevertheless con- 
sistent, at the time, with particular statutes, see, e.g., the Act obliging Husbands to be 
lyable for their wyves fynes, 1685 (A.P.S. VIII, 461). 
52 See the Act for Security of Officers of State, 1685 (A.P.S. VIII, 484), the Acknowledg- 
ment of H.M. Prerogative, 1661 (A.P.S. VII, 45) and the Act anent restitution of bishops, 
1606 (A.P.S. IV, 282) ,wherein these and similar provisions are commonplace. 
53 Jus Regium (Works, Vol. II, 451). Sir George Mackenzie also there argued that it was 
necessary for the King to be above the law " for strict and rigid law is a greater tyrant 
than absolute Monarchy ": ibid. 450. 
64 See particularly Chap. IV. Dicey's views as there expressed are more fully grasped 
against the background of his Law and Opinion. They must be read together with Sir 
Ivor Jennings' comment and criticism in his Law and the Constitution, and see Lawson, 
" Dicey Revisited " (1959) 7 Political Studies, and Arndt, " The Origin of Dicey's 
Concept of the Rule of Law" (1957) 31 A.L.J. 117. So far as Dicey wrote of general 
institutions the adjective " English " is inapt. So far as he wrote upon particular rules, 
the general principles of which he wrote may be applicable throughout the Kingdom, 
but some of the rules are accurately described as English, having counterparts but not 
copies in Scotland. 
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Dicey's third point also has its difficulties. If it is to be accepted, then 
documents such as the Bill of Rights or the Claim of Right must be 
regarded as " not so much ` declaration of rights ' in the foreign sense 
of the term, as judicial condemnations of claims or practices on the 
part of the Crown which are thereby pronounced illegal." 55 That 
view can only with difficulty be reconciled either with the contemporary 
views of such documents or with their subsequent treatment in the 
courts 56 The dependence of constitutional law upon the hazards of 
ordinary litigation has many disadvantages which may outweigh gains,57 
and the role of the courts in establishing many fundamental rules in 
constitutional law can be greatly exaggerated, as can the strength of the 
maxim ubi jus ibi remedium upon which Dicey relies. In the field of 
public law in England, particularly in relation to judicial review, the 
converse, ubi remedium ibi jus, is far more true. Modem experience 
elsewhere also suggests that the value of general declarations may be 
underrated by Dicey; what matters is an attitude of mind particularly 
among members of governments, courts and legislatures, and that 
attitude may be better strengthened, according to circumstances by 
tradition or by general declarations. Further, developments in society, 
which were only starting in Dicey's day, have reached such proportions 
that today any strict application of his principles is in many respects 
quite impracticable.68 These detailed criticisms can be so important that 
Sir Ivor Jennings is inclined to dismiss the rule of law as an unruly horse, 
either being merely synonymous with law and order, or else " apt to 
express the political views of the theorists and not to be an analysis of 
the practice of government " or to be merely a phrase distinguishing 
democratic or constitutional government from dictatorship.59 
Nevertheless, even at risk of merely demonstrating the truth of the 
first of Sir Ivor Jennings' possibilities, further discussion of the rule of 
law as it is commonly understood since Dicey's day appears necessary. 
His whole exposition is marked by an insistence upon the ordinary law 
(and of equality before it), upon the role of the ordinary courts, and 
upon the need to limit discretions. As makers of law the courts have 
s5 Though, later, Dicey writing of the development of particular liberties expresses views 
which are not entirely consistent with this, see, e.g., Chap. VI, on the Right to Freedom 
of Discussion. 
56 It is impossible, for example, to consider measures such as the Act for Security of the 
Church of Scotland as being accurately thus described, and even in the particular context 
of which Dicey wrote, consider the treatment of the Bill of Rights in such cases as Att.-Gen. 
v. Wilts United Dairies Ltd. (1921) 37 T.L.R. 884 and Re the Parliamentary Privilege Act, 
1770 [1958] A.C. 331, 350. 
67 On the one hand, major constitutional issues, while relevant, may not, for a variety of 
reasons be dealt with, see, e.g., Att. -Gen. v. Ernest Augustus (Prince) of Hanover [1957] 
A.C. 436, on the other, pronouncements upon constitutional issues may be made in 
cases where they are not strictly necessary for the decision or have not been properly 
argued, e.g., Ellen Street Estates Ltd. v. Minister of Health [1934] 1 K.B. 590. 
58 Especially the development of administrative tribunals which is both a sign and a conse- 
quence of other developments of which Dicey elsewhere took account, see " The Develop- 
ment of Administrative Law in England " (1915) 21 L.Q.R. 148. 
b9 Law and the Constitution, 5th ed., p. 60. 
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declined in importance. In part this is the obvious result of the develop- 
ment of Parliament, in part it is the result of changes in ideas about 
the functions of a state. The development of the " Welfare State " (or, 
as Dicey would have called it, the " Collectivist State ") has meant that 
rights with which individuals are increasingly concerned, protections 
or hedges against poverty, ill health, and the like, cannot be the creation 
of judge -made law as could be the rights of free speech, etc., with which 
Dicey was concerned. These newer rights can only be the result of 
complex legislation. Moreover the same development has involved 
a movement from a law of obligation to a law of standards. The eternal 
questions of the type -What do I owe? or What am I owed ?-persist, 
but steadily other questions -What is consistent with good husbandry, 
good architecture, good town planning ?-affect individuals more and 
more. For a variety of reasons such questions are not suitable to the 
ordinary courts, in the first instance at any rate. Nor are many of the 
modern questions of obligation. The procedure of the ordinary courts 
is not well fitted to the determination of questions of entitlement to 
pensions, etc. Thus, of necessity, there has grown up another system 
of courts -administrative tribunals -apart from the ordinary or traditional 
courts with which Dicey was concerned and increasingly it is these 
newer courts which must concern ordinary individuals.ß0 Nevertheless 
the virtues which were associated with the ordinary courts remain im- 
portant, and one of the problems of modern constitutional law is to 
ensure the maintenance of those virtues (such as regularity and im- 
partiality) and at the same time to meet the requirements of these new 
forms of adjudication. The importance of the ordinary courts may 
today be as supervisors and as the ultimate guardians of essentials, 
and not as creators or as places of first resort.81 
The limitation of discretion equally retains importance. Clearly 
since human foresight is limited, discretionary powers must exist; their 
abuse may be checked either by limitations upon their extent or upon 
the mode of their exercise.ß2 As has been seen the latter is one function 
of the doctrine of the separation of powers or of the distribution of 
power.83 The limitation of discretionary power has a long history in 
80 See Chap. 16, post, and as an instance of this development, " Some Constitutional 
Features of the Scottish Land Court," 1956 S.L.T.(News) 65. 
61 Kennedy v. Johnstone, 1956 S.L.T. 73, 82, and earlier the insistence in such cases as 
Jeffray v. Angus, 1909 S.C. 400, upon the powers of supreme courts to correct injustices. 
62 See, e.g., Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, s. 11; Supplies and Services (Transitional 
Powers) Act, 1945, and the Supplies and Services (Extended Purposes) Act, 1947, and 
for the attitude to this legislation see Wheeler Bennett, King George VI and Morrison, 
Government and Parliament, 2nd ed., 194 et seq. 
63 p. 35, ante, and see A. v. B. (1538) Mor. 7854 or Balfour v. Balfour (1569) Mor. 7855. 
Both are early cases of the subjection of the King to the rule of law, and both show how 
the objectives of the law may, at times, be attained by the separation or dispersal of 
power, see, e.g., Act remitting the interpretation of the Act of Oblivion to the Lords of 
Session, 1587 (A.P.S. III, 448). Indeed formality, if not carried to excess, was early found 
to be a check upon the abuse of power, and may still be so: L.C.C. v. Farren [1956] 
1 W.L.R. 1297; Becker v. Crosby Corporation [1952] 1 All E.R. 1350; Commissioners 
of Customs and Excise v. Cure & Deeley Ltd. [1962] 1 Q.B. 340. 
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which both courts and Parliament have played a part, and, within limits, 
was rightly insisted upon by Dicey. The principle is however somewhat 
broader than Dicey suggested. He was concerned with the limitation 
of the power of the executive.84 While it is necessary to limit or control 
such power, wide discretions conferred on other bodies may well be 
equally injurious to the interests of individuals. Regularity has its 
place in the courts also,85 and there the limitations have been largely 
self- imposed.66 The great exception which apparently exists, is the 
unlimited discretion of the legislature. In fact that exception may not 
be as great as it appears. As has been suggested, it is a mistake in con- 
sidering constitutional mechanisms designed to control or limit to .con- 
centrate exclusively on the courts. Particularly in relation to legislation 
judicial controls are often either ineffective or inappropriate 67 and other 
devices either legal or conventional must be considered. Conventions, 
understandings, or mere habits of thought, which are the products of 
parliamentary life, impose limits upon the legislative activities of the 
central government 88; the broad discretionary power to legislate for 
good rule and government conferred upon local authorities is limited 
in law by the requirement of confirmation 68 and, in practice, by 
administrative pressures, and in both cases such checks as are provided 
by the electoral process are also present. Unless allowance is made 
for such matters a false impression is gained. If allowance is made 
for them it will be seen that these apparently wide discretionary legisla- 
tive powers are not as wide as they appear at first sight. 
64 Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., in particular Chap. XII and p. 188. The attitude 
persists, " State power is the great antagonist against which the rule of law must forever 
be addressed ": Jones, " The Rule of Law and the Welfare State," 58 Col.L.R. at 144. 
66 It has been said over and over again that the greatest restraint and discretion should 
be used by the court in dealing with contempt of court, lest a process, the purpose of 
which is to prevent interference with the administration of justice, should degenerate 
into an oppressive or vindictive abuse of the courts' powers ": Milburn, 1946 S.C. 301 
at 315, per Lord President Normand. Similar warnings have been issued about parlia- 
mentary powers to commit for contempt. 
66 Compare the attitude of the court in relation to the nobile officium in Duke of Gordon 
v. Grant (1776) Mor.App.Juris. 3, and commented upon by Lord Eldon in Johnstone 
v. Stotts (1802) 4 Pat.App. 274 at 282 -283 with that of the court in Crichton -Stewart's 
Tutrix, 1921 S.C. 840. See too on the evolution of rules fettering discretionary powers 
Milne v. M'Nicol, 1944 J.C. 151; W. A. Elliott, " Nulla Poena Sine Lege," 1956 J.R. 22, 
and Blackstone's comments upon the " Liberty of considering all cases in an equitable 
light "- Commentaries, I, 62. Cf. as to the scope of the declaratory order in England 
the remarks of Denning L.J. in Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board [1953] 2 Q.B. 
18, 41 and see Pyx Granite Co. Ltd. v. Min. of Housing and Local Government [1960] 
A.C. 260. In administrative law the equivalent of the length of the Chancellor's foot 
may still exist as a criterion of jurisdiction. 
67 Consider the dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) 
and the-subsequent history of the majority opinions. 
68 Apart from limitations in the field of general legislation consider such proceedings 
as those on the Wedgwood Benn (Renunciation) Bill, 1955, and the precedents cited 
there (1955; H.L. 23), as shedding light upon the attitude taken to the exercise of admitted 
powers. That a power exists does not necessarily mean that its exercise will be regarded 
as proper. 
69 See Local Government (Scotland) Act, 1947, s. 300; Local Government Act, 1933, 
s. 249. These other checks are recognised by the courts as affecting their powers: Glasgow 
Insurance Committee v. Scottish Insurance Commissioners, 1915 S.C. 504; Aldred v. 
Miller, 1925 J.C. 21. 
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Thus there remains importance in a principle which is opposed to 
the existence of wide or uncontrolled discretionary powers, though 
the principle must be wider in its application than appears from Dicey's 
formulation, and the principle may be nothing more than an alternative 
expression of the results of the application of other principles, such 
as that of the separation of powers. On the other hand Dicey's insistence 
upon the subjection of all, whether officials or otherwise, to the ordinary 
law of the land may not be sound or useful, and unfortunately it is this 
aspect to which much attention has been given. A confusion of thought 
underlies the principle. While the subjection of officials to law is desirable, 
it does not follow that this should in all cases, or generally, be a sub- 
jection to the law which is applicable to the ordinary citizen. Dicey's 
proposition has become more true in some ways than it was when he 
wrote. Thus, in his time, in England, the Crown Would not be sued in 
tort and the only remedy available in contract was the somewhat 
unsatisfactory one by way of a Petition of Right. In Scotland the law 
was somewhat more benevolent to the subject?° In both jurisdictions 
the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, in general, increased the remedies 
available to the subject, and brought litigation by an individual against 
the Crown more into line with litigation between individuals.7' This 
could be read as an indication of the acceptance and general desirability 
of Dicey's views. Yet it is to be noticed that some provisions of the 
same Act carefully preserved privileges of the Crown,72 and the question 
remains whether these provisions or the more general ones are to be 
taken as indicating the nature of the underlying principle. 
The difficulty is that it is clear that the powers of government cannot 
be those of an ordinary citizen. At common law extraordinary powers 
to act for the common good have long been recognised,72 and with the 
development of society, the need of governmental bodies for special 
powers grows. Revenue authorities must be able to require information, 
public authorities must be able to acquire land and other rights com- 
pulsorily. The list of such abnormal but necessary powers is lengthy, 
and it is clear that as far as rights are concerned public bodies and public 
officials cannot be governed by the ordinary law.74 On the side of 
70 An action lay in contract, and while the maxim that " The King can do no wrong " had 
been applied in delict, Macgregor v. Lord Advocate, 1921 S.C. 847, this application of 
the maxim was a late development. See Sir Randall Philip, " The Crown as Litigant in 
Scotland " (1928) 40 J.R. 238, and Mitchell, " The Royal Prerogative in Modem Scots 
Law " [1957] Public Law 304. 
71 See post, Chap. 17. S. 2 (2) of the Act enacts in a particular context Dicey's principle 
in so many words. Similarly the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, has been 
repealed. 
72 Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, ss. 28 and 47. 
73 See, e.g., Hume's Lectures (The Stair Society), Vol. III, 205 -206, and The Case of Saltpetre 
(1607) 12 Co.Rep. 12; the lawfulness of the Act was not in question in Burmah Oil Co. 
(Burma Trading) Ltd. v. Lord Advocate, 1963 S.L.T. 261. What was in dispute was the 
liability to compensate for an admittedly lawful act. 
74 The extent of the special rights may depend upon the degree of public interest or urgency. 
Consider the regulation of police rights to search or arrest without warrant, or on a 
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obligation or duties, Dicey claimed that " with us every official ... is 
under the same responsibility for every act done without legal justification 
as any other citizen." 75 This proposition cannot be supported as his- 
torically true, nor, it is thought, can it be urged as theoretically desirable, 
as a general proposition. Officials and public authorities have long 
been protected, in the absence of malice, from the consequences of 
acts where a private individual would not be,76 particular rules have long 
been applied to public officers,77 and to public property,78 and important 
variations have long been made to general law because of the circum- 
stances of public bodies" Those circumstances may operate either 
to relieve of liability which would otherwise attach, as in many of the 
cases already mentioned, or to impose additional liability. Powers 
conferred for public ends can be abused and put to private purposes. 
Thus special rules have long been aimed at public officers who abuse or 
neglect their offices 86 (albeit that at some of the times when they were 
most needed these rules were least enforced) and the imposition of 
additional liabilities as a guard against abuse of powers continues.81 
This general issue does not arise only in relation to obligations or liabilities 
in the narrow sense of contractual or delictual ones. As has already 
been pointed out, the relationship of public authorities inter se, even 
in such matters as agency, may not be governed by ordinary rules, the 
duties of public authorities may be enforceable by means other than 
those appropriate to the normal enforcement of duties. Other liabilities 
such as fiscal ones may differ because of the character of the body which 
lower plane the provisions of the Rights of Entry (Gas and Electricity Boards) Act, 
1954. 
75 Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., p. 193. 
76 Beaton v. Ivory (1887) 14 R. 1057; Macaulay v. N. Uist School Board (1887) 15 R. 99. 
The justification of this rule in Henderson v. Scott (1793) Mor. 17072 remains sound. The 
special protections afforded to persons acting in a public capacity were re- emphasised 
in Robertson v. Keith, 1936 S.C. 29 (argued before a court of seven judges), in which 
Shields v. Shearer, 1914 S.C.(H.L.) 33, which might have been taken to affect the older 
law, was explained. 
77 Thus in Magistrates of Montrose v. Strachan (1710) Mor. 13118 limitations were imposed 
upon the ability of the magistrates to dismiss a schoolmaster because of the public character 
of his employment. Generally the public character of an office has imposed limitations 
upon tenure. See too Hume's reasons for limiting or excluding the liability of a public 
officer for the acts of his subordinates: Lectures, III, 193. Similarly special rules are 
applied because of the office held. See as to the Attorney- General Att.-Gen. v. Harris 
[1960] 1 Q.B. 74; Hester v. Macdonald and Others, 1961 S.L.T. 414; it is to be questioned 
whether this last case does not go too far. 
78 Craig, Jus Feudale, I, 15, 16 and 17. Many of the rules governing rights falling inter 
regalia and the common good of burghs, while too often disregarded in practice, neverthe- 
less, in legal theory, point in the same direction. For more modern cases, see, e.g., Paterson 
v. Magistrates of St. Andrews (1879) 7 R. 712. 
79 Stair, II, 4, 2, and II, 12, 27, and as more modern examples see Hall v. Beckenham Cor- 
poration [1949] 1 K.B. 716, or Plank v. Magistrates of Stirling, 1956 S.C. 92; cf. McPhail 
v. Lanark C.C., 1951 S.C. 301. Though subsequent legislation has affected the detailed 
rules involved in these cases, they remain apt illustrations in this context. 
80 See Hume's definition of oppression, Criminal Law, Vol. I, Chap. IX and his remarks 
on the neglect of duty in public officers op. cit. Vol. I, Chap. XV, and on the prosecution 
of Sir John Carnegie and John Arbuthnot (1709) op. cit., Vol. II, Chap. I, and H.M. 
Advocate v. Jeffrey (1840) 2 Swin. 479. 
81 See Clean Air Act, 1956, s. 26. Civil and criminal liability need not be determined by 
the same rules, Gaynor v. Allen [1959] 2 Q.B. 403. 
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is liable or of the service which it provides.82 This differentiation is 
not however uniform, but it is arguable that in some cases where it is 
not made the results would be more satisfactory if it were.83 
The subjection of public authorities and officials to the ordinary 
law has not always been attempted nor, despite the modem legislation 
to which reference has been made, is it now complete. The desirability 
of that subjection as a general rule appears to be doubtful because of 
the different powers and purposes of public authorities. Indeed that 
subjection when it is achieved may, as a necessary concession to the 
requirements of government, be followed by a limitation of remedies, 
and thus the purposes of justice which it was intended to serve by that 
subjection are in the end frustrated. Yet, once again the doctrine cannot 
be entirely rejected. Its historical background includes the Star Chamber, 
a " special " court remembered for the evils of its latter days rather 
than for any good it earlier did. It could include the Privy Council 
(and its offshoots) in Scotland which also exercised a supervisory juris- 
diction over the administration.84 Courts other than the ordinary courts 
have in the past given good grounds for distrust, and even in more 
modern times have had to be watched.8b Similarly claims to procedural 
advantages,86 or to the benefits of substantive privileges,87 need to 
be scrutinised, and at times rejected lest they be advanced farther than 
is necessary. Constantly there is a conflict between the desires and 
82 See, e.g., Glasgow Corporation v. I.R.C., 1959 S.C. 203, and the cases there referred to, 
where for tax purposes a distinction is drawn between non -profit -making activities 
of a local authority and similar activities of other bodies. 
ß3 Consider Glasgow Corporation v. I.R.C., 1959 S.C. 203 where it was held that no action 
would lie for repetition of money paid under a misinterpretation of a statute in settlement 
of tax claimed. In the converse case where the Revenue authorities have underclaimed 
on a taxpayer for a like reason they may later claim the additional sums, Lord Advocate 
v. Duke of Hamilton (1891) 29 S.L.R. 213; Lord Advocate v. Mirrielees' Trs., 1943 S.C. 
587, 594, per Lord Keith (the subsequent proceedings in this case are not here relevant). 
In the former situation a very good case can be made for saying that, while as between 
individuals money paid under a mistake of law should not be recoverable, a public 
authority should be expected to act according to higher standards and forgo such un- 
intended benefits. In the fields of ordinary law consider the result in McPhail v. Lanark 
C.C., 1951 S.C. 301. The rule referred to by Lord Keith has a long history, running 
back to the Act of 1600, c. 14 (A.P.S. IV, 231) on which see " Some Aspects of the Royal 
Prerogative " (1923) 25 J.R. 49. 
84 Though formerly the jurisdiction of the Council extended to " matters of state, and 
preserving of the public peace, and determining and punishing all riots and encroach- 
ments upon lawful possession " (Stair, IV, 1, 58) it was, at times, widely and oppressively 
extended. 
85 See William Reid, Suppliant (1765) Mor. 7361, where the only purpose in seeking to 
maintain the jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer could have been the hope of more 
benevolent treatment of official misconduct. Compare Ramsay v. Adderton (1774) 
Mor. 7590 where the jurisdiction of the Exchequer was upheld, no irregularity being 
alleged against the revenue officer concerned. 
S6 Ramsay v. M'Laren, 1936 S.L.T. 35. 
87 Robert Baird Ltd. v. Glasgow Corporation, 1934 S.C. 359 at 361, per the Lord President 
(Clyde); and see such cases as Hayward v. Edinburgh Board of Management, 1954 S.C. 
453, M'Ginty v. Board of Management Glasgow Victoria Hospitals, 1951 S.C. 200 and 
compare as to the liability of a board for its own acts, Davis v. Glasgow Victoria Hospitals 
Board, 1950 S.C. 382 and Bullard v. Croydon Hospital Group Management Committee 
[1953] 1 Q.B. 511. Much of the former complexity in interpreting the Public Authorities 
Protection Act, 1893, was due to a desire to restrict the operation of that Act within 
narrow bounds. 
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needs of the individual and the desires and needs of governmental bodies.88 
Sometimes it is the interests of one group which must prevail, sometimes 
those of the other. A proper balance in the law is unlikely to be achieved 
if a starting point is taken which overlooks the peculiar position and 
purposes of governmental bodies. It is, indeed difficult to formulate any 
general principle beyond asserting that the law must have regard to 
that position and those purposes, a regard which is inconsistent with 
Dicey's formulation as it is generally interpreted. Such a general 
formulation is all that can be expected since on the one hand (as has been 
suggested) that regard will not always mean that there must be any 
departure from the general rules of law as applied between individuals; 
and on the other hand the peculiar attributes of governmental bodies 
do not mark all their activities. While contracts for the production 
of defence equipment may require special regulation," contracts for 
the supply of stationery may not be similarly marked by any special 
considerations." Further just as activities of public bodies may be 
stamped to a greater or lesser degree, so also may the character of bodies 
themselves. Public corporations form a spectrum from those which 
are indistinguishable from other government agencies as instruments 
for carrying out government policy to those which are to all intents and 
purposes indistinguishable from private organisations.91 
In such circumstances any general rule purporting to govern all 
relationships of governmental bodies is likely to be either misleading 
or to be so hedged with qualifications that its usefulness is restricted. 
As a principle of general validity this branch of Dicey's formulation 
of the rule of law must be rejected. It must also be rejected as an ex- 
pression of an approach which is generally likely to produce the most 
desirable results. It can only be accepted as an indication that govern- 
mental bodies should be subject to law. Often that subjection may be 
facilitated by a recognition of their special characteristics, where those 
are significant. Without that recognition there is a tendency to withdraw 
important matters from regulation by law to regulation according to 
administrative convenience)) 2 
88 Compare Glasgow Corporation v. Central Land Board, 1956 S.C.(H.L.) i and Duncan v. 
Cammell, Laird & Co. Ltd. [1942] A.C. 624. 
89 See, inter alla, the Defence Contracts Act, 1958. 
99 The separation of these activities is not an easy process. See Mitchell, The Contracts 
of Public Authorities, Chap. V and the references there given. See also note 76, supra 
and - Racecourse Betting Control Board v. Young [1959] 3 All E.R. 215. 
91 Compare the operations of the Bank of England, which in effect shares certain essentially 
governmental responsibilities in relation to the national economy with the Treasury 
(see the Radcliffe Report (1959) Cmnd. 827) with the Crown Estates Commissioners 
under the Crown Estate Act, 1956, which, although a public corporation is intended 
to act as much as possible like any ordinary private land owner (see Report of Committee 
on Crown Lands (1955) Cmd. 9483). 
92 The result in Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co. Ltd. [1942] A.C. 624 and subsequent develop- 
ments such as the statement of the Lord Chancellor in the House of Lords 197 H.L.Deb. 
741 -748 (1569) exemplifies that tendency. See too Nottingham Area No. 1 Hospital 
Management Committee v. Owen [1958] 1 Q.B. 50 and Clean Air Act, 1956, s. 22. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE SOVEREIGNTY OR SUPREMACY OF PARLIAMENT 
Introduction. Constitutions and constitutional doctrines are the result 
of history. In the United Kingdom our overt revolutions occurred 
relatively early in the history of the modem state, and at times when 
the writing of a full constitution to crown the revolution had not become 
customary. These factors affect particularly strongly the doctrines 
relating to Parliament. While its position and powers have, in some 
respects, been hedged about with protections, there are few specific attri- 
butions of power to it.1 In this Parliament is no different from many 
of our other institutions, but this circumstance is, perhaps, particularly 
important in relation to Parliament, since it is an institution peculiarly 
liable to growth and change as a result of a changing climate of opinion. 
This background must be borne in mind when considering the doctrine 
of the sovereignty of Parliament, for some of the precedents, some of 
the authoritative writings, must be considered (to an extent at least) 
in the light of the Parliament which existed contemporaneously with them, 
and which may be materially different from that which now exists, 
either in itself or in general acceptance.2 
This varying background is also important since, on the whole, no 
theory about the sovereignty of Parliament can be proved, in the way 
that other legal concepts can be, by a chain of elucidatory decisions. 
This peculiarity of proof is partly due to the fact that cases must be 
rare in which the issue could be raised both properly and inescapably.3 
Such precedents as do exist may also be inappropriate today, since, 
inevitably, they reflect the then current political facts. This difficulty 
of proof is concerned with one of the fundamentals of the constitution. 
To such matters a different attitude must be adopted to that which is 
appropriate when dealing with subsidiary or derivative rules of law. 
The one set of rules creates or is the legal foundation of the state, the 
other is built upon that foundation. Because of these differences, too, 
1 Some of the provisions of the Claim of Right or Bill of Rights serve both purposes. 
2 The sequence of events starting in 1832 has substantially affected modern ideas of Parlia- 
ment, and to take two authors at random, Coke wrote at the close of the Middle Ages, 
Karnes at a period when natural law theories were at their height. Both circumstances 
were important in relation to the authors; neither now exists. See generally for such 
influences, Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History. 
3 Thus in MacCormick v. Lord Advocate, 1953 S.C. 396, which in recent times came nearest 
to this issue the decision rested upon questions of relevance and title to sue. What 
was said upon the fundamental question, by, e.g., Lord President Cooper (at 411 et 
seq.) is strictly obiter. Other cases, such as Vauxhall Estates Ltd. v. Liverpool Corporation 
[1932] 1 K.B. 733, were often susceptible of decision upon very narrow grounds, and 
were so decided; see p. 61, post. This attitude of the courts is common, cf. Dowling 
and Edwards, American Constitutional Law, 88 et seq. 
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uncertainty about the doctrine as it exists at any one moment of time 
is increased. 
The meaning of the doctrine. By the sovereignty of Parliament is 
generally meant the absence of any legal restraint upon the legislative 
power of the United Kingdom Parliament 4 This absence of legal 
restraint has two aspects. The positive one would mean that Parliament 
is competent to legislate upon any subject- matter, and the negative aspect 
implies that once Parliament has legislated no court or other body can 
pass upon the validity of the legislation. These two aspects are obviously 
related, but must, for some purposes, be distinguished. Even if it were 
said that the legislative competence of Parliament is limited it does 
not follow that any court has power to review the validity of legislation.b 
Both aspects were most unequivocally asserted by Dicey,6 but events and 
argument since Dicey's time have made necessary further discussion 
before his views can be accepted or rejected. 
The doctrine has an initial attraction. Parliament has had such 
an outstanding part in the development of the modern constitution, 
and today remains apparently outstanding in the legislative field. The 
Revolution of 1688 was, in both jurisdictions, a parliamentary revolution, 
the Union of 1707 was likewise a parliamentary Union, the title to the 
Crown is a parliamentary one.7 This pre -eminence of Parliament is 
emphasised both by its position as virtually the sole source, either directly 
or indirectly, of legislation, and by its freedom from the restraints of 
any other system of law. Prerogative powers of legislation, in an internal 
sense, have disappeared,8 and within the United Kingdom subordinate 
legislative bodies derive their significant legislative powers from Parlia- 
ment.9 It is clear that legislation cannot be confined by international 
4 It can be argued whether " sovereignty," " supremacy," or some other words such as 
" legislative omnipotence " are apt -see Jennings, Law and the Constitution, 5th ed., 
152 et seq. It is true that the use of the word " sovereignty " can lead to such difficulties 
as Dicey's separation of legal and political sovereignty, and that the word " sovereignty " 
lacks any one universally accepted meaning. Nevertheless it is the word most often 
used in this context and will be here used in the general sense indicated. 
8 Waline asserts (Droit Administrat(, 8th ed., 427) that no court in France will accept 
this jurisdiction. For an explanation of the curious and limited jurisdiction of the 
Conseil Constitutionnel see Prélot, Institutions Politiques, 789. Earlier the con- 
clusions of Chief Justice Marshall did not follow of necessity from his premisses. 
8 Law of the Constitution, Chap. I. Others who had earlier made somewhat similar asser- 
tions had also put forward elsewhere views difficult to reconcile with the general propo- 
sition, see Jennings, op. cit. App. III, Was Lord Coke also a Heretic? 
7 Consider the terms of the English and Scottish Acts, 1705, authorising the appointment 
of Commissioners to treat for the Union (A.P.S. XI, 292). By British theory His Majesty's 
Declaration of Abdication Act, 1936, was necessary to enable Edward VIII's declaration 
of abdication to be effective in law. 
8 Grieve v. Edinburgh and District Water Trustees, 1918 S.C. 700 at 713, per the Lord 
Justice -Clerk (Scott Dickson). The Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co.Rep. 74 and 
Mackenzie, Inst. I, 1, incorporating the effect of this decision. Matters formerly falling 
within the prerogative such as the regulation of the entry of aliens have also been taken 
over by statute. Much earlier Balfour laid down in his Practicks " na jugeis within 
the realme has power to mak any lawes or statutes save the Parliament allanerlie "- 
Tit. of Law. To a limited extent prerogative powers of legislation may continue to 
exist in relation to some colonies, Sammut v. Strickland [1938] A.C. 678. 
While common law corporations, such as Royal Burghs might have extensive internal 
legislative powers (see University of Glasgow v. Faculty of Physicians and Surgeons of 
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law,10 or by morality or natural law," and, indeed, may abolish any 
legal significance of physical differences between distinct things, and 
to that extent be freed from physical laws. It is also clear that legislation 
is not limited in time,12 nor space 13 nor in relation to persons.14 
The apparent absence of limitations. Because of these factors there 
has thus grown up a belief in the legal ability of Parliament to pass 
any legislation at all. It is generally admitted that this apparent omni- 
competence may be limited by factual considerations, such as the ability 
to enforce obedience, by rules of interpretation which may operate, 
in the absence of very clear wording, to restrict the operation of a statute, 
and by conventional rules governing the preparation of legislation. 
For the most part what were formerly asserted to be limitations upon 
the legislative capacity of Parliament have become presumptions of 
interpretation. So, a statute is presumed, in the absence of clear words 
to the contrary, not to take away property without compensation, not 
to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts, not to be retrospective, not to 
impose taxation 16 These presumptions may be more or less strong 
Glasgow (1837) 15 S. 736, and the instances there cited) the important powers today 
are those conferred by statute, and conferment of powers by statute may have a restricting 
effect on common law powers ; Graham v. Glasgow Corporation, 1936 S.C. 108; Att.-Gen. 
v. Leicester Corporation [1943] Ch. 86. 
10 Mortensen v. Peters (1906) 8 F.(J.) 93, 100, per Lord Dunedin, though the rules of inter- 
national law may where that is possible by the terms of the Act influence interpretation; 
Co- operative Committee on Japanese Canadians v. Att. -Gen. for Canada [1947] A.C. 
87, 104, per Lord Wright; and LR.C. v. Colico Dealings Ltd. [1960] Ch. 592 (affirmed 
[1962] A.C. 1). 
11 Many earlier assertions to the contrary can be found; see in England Day v. Savage 
(1615) Hob. 85, per Hobart C.J.; Dr. Bonham's Case (1610) 8 Co.Rep. 113b, 118a, per 
Coke C.J. ; and, in Scotland, Ersk. Inst. I, 1, 20 " What the law of nature hath commanded 
cannot be forbidden or even dispensed with by positive law "; Kames, Equity, Book II, 
Ch. 3, writing that the " trust " upon which Parliament holds its power will not include 
the power to do injustice or to oppress. Stair (Inst. I, 1, 15) goes no further than saying 
that nations are happiest when the laws come nearest to natural equity. The stronger 
assertions could no longer be supported; compare Lord Wright in Liversidge v. Anderson 
[1942] A.C. 206, 261, " Parliament is supreme. It can enact extraordinary powers of 
interfering with personal liberty." These survivals of natural law theories have now 
been translated into presumptions in statutory interpretation (see below) and for 
a general account of them see Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History, 
and the authorities there referred to. There are many assertions particularly in Coke on 
the equation of natural, or moral, law with the common law, and in this respect Stair may 
be noticed. He comments (I, 1, 16) on the superiority of the common law as against 
statute law on the ground that desuetude does not affect the former, and then demon- 
strates that certain statutes were held inoperative because of the superior moral principles 
of the common law with which they conflicted. 
12 Again formerly different views found expression Ersk. Inst. I, 1, 23 (against retrospective 
legislation), and compare Mackenzie, Inst. I, 1, on the difference between declaratory 
and other laws in this context. 
13 For a strong case see Boissevain v. Weil [1950] A.C. 327, in which it is possible that 
neither party to the transaction in question was aware of the legislation; and consider 
the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, s. 31, in conjunction with the Criminal Justice (Scotland) 
Act, 1949, s. 29. See too R. v. Martin [1956] 2 Q.B. 272; R. v. Naylor [1962] 2 Q.B. 527. 
14 Again Erskine (I, 1, 22) excluded laws affecting individuals from " proper law " on 
the principle that legislation must be general; today one must accept such Acts as the 
Niall Macpherson Indemnity Act, 1954, as law. It remains true that private Acts may 
be somewhat differently regarded: Scottish Drainage and Improvement Co. v. Campbell 
(1889) 16 R.(H.L.) 16. 
13 Att.-Gen. v. Wilts United Dairies Ltd. (1922) 91 L.J.K.B. 897. 
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in particular circumstances, and while they do not impose any restriction 
upon Parliament they indicate the broad acceptance in normal times 
of general and fundamental constitutional ideas, which were once trans- 
lated in theory, but not in practice, into restrictions upon Parliament 
in the name of natural law, or other names. The conventional limitations 
are currently more important. They include rules relating to the con- 
sultation of interests in the preparation of legislation and doctrines 
of mandate. It is accepted that convention (as well as practical con- 
siderations) requires a government to consult interests likely to be affected 
by general legislation.1° For obvious reasons much financial legislation 
falls outside this rule, and it must be emphasised that at most it is con- 
sultation and not agreement which is required. 
Of broader importance in the present context is the doctrine of 
mandate. That doctrine can have several meanings. It may mean 
that a government should not introduce major changes by legislation 
unless they have been an issue in a general election, and that, corres- 
pondingly, or that a government which has lost general support in the 
country should not force major legislation through Parliament shortly 
before an election, even though that legislation may have been in its 
electoral programme. It may also, at times, be given the meaning that 
a government has an obligation to carry on to the Statute Book the 
main heads of its electoral programme. At first sight this doctrine, 
in any of its forms fits easily into theories of representative government, 
and, while it is true that instances can be given in which it has been 
disregarded, there are notable instances, such as the events leading up 
to the Parliament Act, 1911, which tend to support it. There are certainly 
many more instances where the doctrine has been invoked on behalf of 
or against proposed actions. This support may be more apparent than 
real. Recent evidence suggests that what may be thought to be a deter- 
mining factor in an election (and thus the necessary foundation for a 
mandate) may in fact play a much less significant part in determining 
the result of the election than was once thought to be the case.17 Again, 
it is clear that if the doctrine is not restricted to constitutional changes, 
but is extended, as is often the case, to major legislation generally, its 
force is greatly weakened by the fact that any government must determine 
policy (including legislative policy) in the light of current facts which 
may be materially different from those which were known to party leaders 
or which existed at the time of an election. Further, on a proper examina- 
tion, there are implications in the doctrine of theories of direct government 
16 Generally see, e.g. (1944) Cmd. 6502. One specialised instance, both of this and of 
the conventional relationship of Government and Opposition is to be seen, in the methods 
of preparation of measures of electoral reform, through Speaker's Conferences, etc., 
though again the limits are not clear -see 595 H.C.Deb. 1030. 
17 H. G. Nicholas, The British General Election of 1950; The General Election in Glasgow, 
February 1950, ed. S. B. Chrimes. 
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which may be inconsistent with other constitutional doctrines.18 It 
may also assume a level of factual knowledge, political wisdom and 
rational assessment higher than that which always exists in the electorate 
at large. The doctrine then is not one which is clear cut or which has 
a clear foundation, and, even if difficulties of the classification of con- 
ventions are neglected, it cannot therefore be said to amount to any 
substantial limitation upon Parliament beyond those which already result 
from the general democratic theory as practised in this country. 
The apparent impossibility of challenging a statute. There is thus the 
appearance of unlimited legislative competence, which is little touched 
by the conventional limitations. The most significant of the latter - 
the doctrine of mandate -is of doubtful validity. Other conventional 
limitations, which are of greater validity, operate " behind the curtain " 
and thus do not detract from the appearance. Thus a predisposition to 
accept the " positive " aspect of the sovereignty of Parliament is built 
up. A like predisposition to accept the " negative " aspect arises since any 
possibility of challenging the validity of legislation is, at best, so extremely 
rare that there has grown up a belief that any such challenge is impossible, 
and, indeed even were some of the so- called conventional limitations 
more precisely formulated and accepted as limitations, the possibilities 
would probably not be increased.18 The view that any such challenge 
is impossible is strengthened by citation from writers of authority,2o 
so that Lord Shaw could dismiss the whole doctrine as being the " merest 
platitude." 21 Such views have also been partly dependent on, partly 
productive of, the view that there are in law no limitations upon Parlia- 
ment and that Parliament is incapable of imposing any such limitations 
upon itself. It will be convenient to examine these latter views before 
returning to the question of the possibility of challenge, for, as has 
already been said, the two questions are severable, even though 
interlocking. 
The apparent freedom from statutory limitations. Again there is 
strong support among writers of authority for the proposition that 
Parliament cannot bind itself,22 and instances abound where one Parlia- 
ment has overthrown the work of another.23 Equally there can be 
18 Matters such as the relationship of a Member of Parliament to his constituency, or 
whether that whole theory of government (whether that of Bagehot or Barker) of a 
pyramidal structure ending with the Cabinet as a committee of Parliament is to be 
accepted or not, are, for example, involved. 
is Compare Thorneloe & Clarkson Ltd. v. Board of Trade [1950] 2 All E.R. 245. 
20 Coke, 4 Inst. 36, Blackstone, 1 Comm. 91. See too Officers of State v. Cowtie & Ors. 
(1611) Mor. 7327. 21 Legislature and Judiciary. 
22 " Whatever a Parliament can do at one time, in making of law, or determining of causes 
may be at their pleasure abrogate or derogate ": Stair, Inst. IV, 1, 61. See too Erskine, 
Inst. I, 1, 19, Blackstone, 1 Comm. 160, Coke, 4 Inst. 25. 
23 To the instance of the statute of Henry VIII (28 Hen. 8, c. 17; repealed during the minority 
of Edward VI, I Edw. 6, c. 11) commonly cited, can be added references to the statutes 
restoring episcopacy in Scotland which others had abolished in all time coming; and 
those dealing with the Crown in Scotland. What in 1681 (A.P.S. VIII, 238) Parliament 
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found judicial support for the same principle.24 To it there has been 
admitted from time to time the possible exception that Parliament 
could abdicate its power to another. 25 More recently, some reconsidera- 
tion of the principle was prompted by litigation in South Africa, and 
subsequently doubts found expression here in MacCormick v. Lord 
Advocate," particularly in the opinion of Lord President Cooper. In 
discussing the general proposition it seems necessary to distinguish, 
though this has not always been done, different types of limitation. 
There is first the limitation which may exist in a constituent document, 
there is secondly the limitation which Parliament, once created, may 
subsequently impose upon itself. This second form of limitation could 
again take various forms, the abdication or denial of legislative power, 
or the imposition of restrictions as to time, form, or content of legisla- 
tion, or any combination of these last limitations. Different principles 
may apply in each case. 
WAS PARLIAMENT BORN UNFREE 
The Acts of Union. Taking first the point of a constituent document, 
if it be accepted (as it seems it must be because of their terms and origin) 
that the Acts of Union of 1707 were intended to be, and were, con- 
stituent Acts, then 1707 forms a fresh starting point. Logical difficulties 
about the transfer of legislative power from a sovereign non 
body need not be too heavily stressed.27 Moreover, it is not clear that in 
1707 either that the English Parliament was accepted as " sovereign " 
in the sense in which the word is now used 28 or that, alternatively, the 
Scottish Parliament could not, in legal theory, be said to be as " sovereign " 
declared to be beyond legislative competence was achieved by Parliament in 1689 and 
accepted. Sir George Mackenzie asserted that Parliament was bound by certain funda- 
mentals, influenced no doubt by the fear of just such happenings as later occurred in 
1707 (see his Observations on the Acts, 17th Parliament of James VI). Consider also the 
development since 1592 (briefly recited in the Act Ratifying the Confession of Faith, 
1690, A.P.S. IX, 133) in the light of the phraseology of the Act for abolisheing of the 
actis contrair to the trew religion, 1592 (A.P.S. III, 541); and see Duke of Douglas and 
Ors. v. The King's Advocate (1748) Mor. 7695, wherein grants ratified in Parliament were 
upheld even though the procedure which Parliament itself had imposed had not been 
followed. It is, though, arguable whether such cases do not rather reflect a situation 
of power more than they reflect any constitutional theory. It will be noted that these 
precedents relate to both pre -Union and post -Union times, which may affect the weight 
of some. For the moment it will be convenient to leave on one side the changes in the 
Acts of Union with Scotland and with Ireland. 
24 British Coal Corporation v. The King [1935] A.C. 500 at 520, per Lord Sankey L.C.; 
Vauxhall Estates Co. Ltd. v. Liverpool Corporation [1932] 1 K.B. 733; Ellen Street Estates 
Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Health [1934] 1 K.B. 590; Godden v. Hales (1686) 11 St.Tr. 1166, 
1697. 
26 Anson, " Government of Ireland Bill and the Sovereignty of Parliament " (1886) 2 
L.Q.R. 427, 437 -438; Dicey, Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., 69n., though this may 
be inconsistent with one reading of the views, referred to above, of Lord Sankey in 
the British Coal Corporation case. 
26 1953 S.C. 396. 
27 Though this supposed difficulty is emphasised by Lord Cooper, 1953 S.C. at 411. 
28 Consider the doubts expressed about the validity of the Septennial Act, 1715. 
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then as was the English one.29 It is more probable that, in the modern 
acceptance of that term, the doctrine, if it exists, is a post -Union develop- 
ment closely linked with the ideas underlying the reforms of 1832.30 
It is certainly possible that as constituent documents the Acts of Union 
could have imposed limitations, and it is equally clear that some of 
those responsible for them hoped so to do.31 This possibility is en- 
hanced by the terminology of the Acts. Too much cannot be built 
upon such phrases as " in all time coming " or " for ever " which were 
of common occurrence in the Acts of the Parliament of Scotland, never- 
theless, the insistence upon the protection of the church, of the courts, 
and of equality, marks out such provisions, and they have equally been 
emphasised in decisions which isolate them as of particular importance.32 
29 The very rapid growth of the Parliament of Scotland between 1688 and 1707 is often 
overlooked, and see note 23, supra. The argument based upon the existence of the 
doctrine of desuetude is weak, and the operation of that doctrine was itself at the mercy 
of Parliament. 
so Apart from the uncertainties which were expressed in the early part of the 18th century, 
e.g., as to the validity of the Septennial Act, 1715, or the possibility of the repeal of 
the Acts of Union in 1713 (see Hist. and Proceedings of the House of Lords (1742) ii, 
394 -397). The doctrine is dependent upon the development of the political power of 
Parliament. So long as it can be maintained that it is dangerous for a Parliament to 
continue after the death of a King " for then a Parliament called by a King might continue 
without the consent of the King that succeeds and make Acts prejudicial to him " (Fount. 
I, 339), it is clearly difficult to maintain, as accepted theory, the principle of the sover- 
eignty of Parliament. Parliament is on that basis to be subservient. Legal theory feeds 
upon political fact, and the growth of the theory of the sovereignty of Parliament depends 
on the growth of Parliament. Such remarks as that of Lord Hardwicke in the debate 
upon the Bill for the abolition of the Heritable Jurisdictions that " In all countries the 
legislative power must to a general extent be absolute " (Campbell, Lives of the Chancellors, 
Vol. X, 122) assume a different position of Parliament in the state (though it may be 
noted in passing that Lord Hardwicke asserts that the United Kingdom Parliament 
inherited the sovereign position of the Parliament of Scotland (toe. cit.) ). That assump- 
tion is equally apparent elsewhere, see, e.g., Brodie's annotations to Stair, I, 1, 16; see 
Ersk. I, 1, 45 for the ideas underlying his doctrine that the posterior statute may always 
derogate from the anterior one. 
31 Lang Mathieson in his Scotland and the Union at p. 213 recognises the intention to create 
fundamental provisions, though denying the possibility in law of so doing. Taylor 
Innes, in his Law of Creeds in Scotland, puts it that " the royal sanction on the 6th March, 
1707, consummated the Union on the basis of fundamental conditions not to be altered 
or derogated from in any sort for ever " (p. 58). The understanding of the church is 
shown by the Memorial of 1712 against the restoration of lay patronage, and continued 
in protests until the Claim of Right of the Church of Scotland Assembly, 1842, which 
argued that the Act for Securing the Protestant Religion had removed from the " cog- 
nisance and power of the federal legislature created by " the Union all matters dealt 
with in that Act. 
32 See particularly Minister of Prestonkirk v. The Heritors, Feb. 3, 1808, F.C. (the opinions 
are fully set out from the Session Papers in Connell, On Tithes, Vol. III). " Our Ancestors, 
at the Union, provided that the regulations applicable to our national church, should 
be absolutely irrevocable, and that the Parliament of Great Britain should have no 
power to alter or repeal those provisions ": per the Lord Justice -Clerk (Hope) at p. 321. 
" The people of Scotland, at the period of the Union, were most careful to preserve 
unalterably all the rights of their Presbyterian Church as by law established ": per the 
Lord President (Blair) at p. 376.1 See too, Duke of Queensberry v. Officers of State, Dec. 
15, 1807, F.C. (Mor. Jurisdict. App. No. 19). Contrast The Strathbogie Case (1840) 2 D. 
585 at 594, where Lord Gillies accepts Blackstone's proposition that Parliament can 
alter the established religion. In contrast there are to be found in both the majority and 
minority decisions in the " Disruption Cases " assertions of the fundamental nature 
of the Act for Security, though these declarations are more frequent in the minority 
opinions. Thus Lord Moncrieff in the Auchterarder Case (Robertson's Report, Vol. ii, 
333) asserted that the Act for Security had rendered the law "definite and unalterable," 
and (at p. 329) treated the Act as " fundamental and essential " to the state. See too in 
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The scope of entrenchment. The degree and consequences of entrench- 
ment are not so clear. In the first place, if it be conceded that the Acts 
of Union are to be regarded as constituent, then it follows that they 
should be interpreted in the flexible manner normally used in consti- 
tutional interpretation. Thus, the meaning of the phrases " public right " 
or " private right " cannot be taken to have been fixed in 1707.33 In the 
next place allowance must be made for other changes in ideas. Ideas of 
the nature and purposes of education change, and these changes are 
reflected in the way in which certain provisions in the Act for Securing 
the Protestant Religion are to be regarded.34 On a wider scale ideas 
about the relationship of church and state fluctuate. The conception 
of Parliament as the temporal head of the church which could be advanced 
in 1843,36 is rejected by Parliament itself in the Church of Scotland 
Act, 1921.36 This shift of opinion on the relationship of church and 
state cannot be without effect upon the interpretation of and attitude 
to the Union legislation, as, indeed, the contrasts between the majority 
and minority opinions in the Disruption litigation show clearly. Thus 
the thing which is " entrenched " is not, for a variety of reasons, anything 
which is absolutely constant. 
Even if these external matters are disregarded, and the Act for Securing 
the Protestant Religion is looked at in isolation, parts of it must be 
read as ancillary to the primary purpose of securing a Presbyterian 
Church. It is true that the Act itself declares that its terms shall be 
the Auchterarder Case (Robertson's Report, Vol. ii) at 381, per Lord Jeffrey and at 
148, per Lord Medwyn (Lord Medwyn's " compact theory " necessarily involved this 
idea). In Cruickshank v. Gordon (1843) 5 D. 909 at 1000 Lord President Boyle would, 
it seems, regard the Act as binding upon both church and state. See too per Lord Fullerton 
in the Culsalmond Case (1842) 4 D. 957. The Act for Securing the Protestant Religion 
is also recognised by the Regency Act, 1937, s. 4 (2) as having a special position, though 
that particular section is ambiguous; while recognising that special position it impliedly 
contemplates the possibility of repeal in circumstances outside the scope of the Regency 
Act. 
33 It is difficult to imagine that today a customs duty granted to a town could be regarded, 
as a private, as distinct from public, right as it was in Reid & Kerr v. Magistrates of 
Edinburgh (1712) 2 Fount. 696. 
34 The provisions imposing the test upon those who taught in universities and schools 
might well have been regarded as fundamental by the draftsman, and they continued 
to be so regarded by some at a much later period (see The Protest, Declaration and Testi- 
mony, 1849, of the Church of Scotland, which regarded the control by the church of 
schools as being as important as the establishment of Presbyterianism itself). Nevertheless 
changed attitudes to education, and the Disruption itself, meant that this view was no 
longer generally held. The Universities (Scotland) Act, 1853, limiting the test was, 
in effect, put forward by the church itself, and few would have considered the Education 
Act, 1872 (creating school boards), as being in conflict with the Union legislation. More- 
over, the history of the church's attitude to tests, and the whole of the legislative history 
in this matter, tend to the conclusion that what was intended to be entrenched was 
general. See particularly " Doctrinal Subscription in the Church of Scotland" by Lord 
Sands (1905) 17 J.R. 221. See also (1900) 12 J.R. 194. For the modern formula 
for the admission of a minister see Cox, Practice and Procedure of the Church of Scotland. 
36 The Auchterarder Case (Robertson's Report, Vol. ii, 10). At p. 13, the Lord President 
refers to the Act of 1690 as " an admission on the part of the Church, of its dependence 
on the Legislature, and of the necessity of the authority of Parliament to render even 
its doctrines and creed valid in law." See too Lord Gillies in the Strathbogie Case 
(1840) 2 D. 585, 594. 
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fundamental and essential conditions of the Union, without any alteration 
or derogation, and thus, all its terms are, on the surface, of absolute and 
equal authority. Yet some Acts, notably that of 1690, are picked out 
" more especially," other provisions are added " for greater security," 
above all the Confession of Faith, ratified in 1690 and incorporated by 
reference in the Act of 1707, contains both machinery for alteration 
and an admission that it may incorporate error. Chapter XXXI states 
that " it belongeth to Synods and Councills.... to set down rules for 
the better ordering the publick worship of God and government of his 
Church " and also that " All Synods or Councills since the Apostles 
time whether general or particular may err and many have erred, there- 
fore they are not to be made the rule of faith or practise but to be used 
as a help in both." Thus too rigid an interpretation of this Act might 
conflict with the expressed intentions of those for whose benefit entrench- 
ment was contemplated. A looser interpretation, that is to say, that 
the Act intended to protect a protestant presbyterian church in general 
rather than in detail, accords with opinions later expressed.37 It equally 
is the interpretation which reconciles the Church of Scotland Act, 1921, 
and the Act for Securing the Protestant Religion, to which the 1921 
Act makes express reference.38 
The same type of construction is, it seems, applicable to Article XIX 
of the Act of Union, relating to the Court of Session. That provision 
is on the face of it less rigid than the provisions relating to the church 
since it contemplates regulation " for the better administration of justice." 
Nevertheless it seems that the essential point of a distinct court may 
be regarded as fundamental. In MacCormick v. Lord Advocate 39 Lord 
Russell expressly reserved his opinion on this matter, and in 1807 the 
Memorial to the House of Lords from the Senators of the College of 
Justice clearly envisaged limits to the power of regulation such as would 
be imposed by such an interpretation 40 
t 
f Suggested effects of the Acts of Union. Thus it seems that hypothetic- 
ally the Acts of Union could have imposed limitations upon the Union 
Parliament, being antecedent to it, and that those limitations could 
be valid. It also appears that such was the intention of the framers 
37 See Report as to the Subscription of Tests of the Scottish Universities Commission, 1892 
(C. 6790). Apart from the doubts expressed by some Professors of Divinity on the 
Confession of Faith as a doctrinal test, the Church of Scotland itself proposed arrange- 
ments which, while consistent with the interpretation suggested above, were inconsistent 
with a more rigid interpretation (see particularly Report, pp. xvii and xix). See too Lord 
Sands' article referred to in note 34 above. 
1 38 Consider particularly s. 2 and Arts. II and V of the Schedule to the Act of 1921. The 
treatment of Art. I is in accord with the interpretation here suggested. 
39 1953 S.C. 396, 417. 
40 " We are of opinion that on fair bona fide construction, as between two independent 
nations, it cannot be held to have been in the contemplation of either, that any law 
should, in future times, be considered as merely a regulation for the better administration 
of justice which goes to subvert the supreme jurisdiction of the Court of Session, and 
to render it subordinate to a new court, unknown to our ancestors." This protest and 
others like it had its effect upon the shape of the reforms then made. 
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and that this intention has been recognised, indirectly at least, in some 
of the decisions. The limitations are however few and imposed in such 
a way that any infringement of them is improbable. Direct proof of 
such propositions is difficult. It depends upon the attempted breach of 
an entrenched provision and a challenge to that breach. It is doubtful 
if there has as yet been any breach, and in the case coming nearest to 
a breach (the sequence of legislation starting with the Universities 
(Scotland) Act, 1853) that " breach," if it be one, was in effect carried 
out at the request and with the consent of the body most able to express 
national opinion upon the topic 41 Should the breach involve parlia- 
mentary legislation, proof would also depend upon the acceptance by 
the courts of jurisdiction to listen to a challenge to the validity of the 
later Act, a matter which is treated hereafter. 
The Irish Union. The somewhat similar position which existed in 
relation to Ireland should be noticed. The Union between Ireland 
and Great Britain brought about by the Union with Ireland Act, 1800, 
was stated to be " for ever after " January 1, 1801, and the Churches 
of England and Ireland were, at the same time, united, the continuance 
of the United Church being said to be an essential and fundamental 
part of the Union of the Kingdoms. Yet, in 1869, by the Irish Church 
Act, the Union of the Churches was broken and the Irish Church dis- 
established and in 1922 the Union of the Kingdom was broken. The 
situations appear to be parallel, yet perhaps they are not. As has already 
been said, too much cannot be built upon the words " for ever "; strong 
and enduring nationalist movements cannot ultimately be confined by 
words upon the Statute Book, and law must eventually come into step 
with reality, as it did to some extent in 1922. As to the Churches, the 
Church of Ireland was not in 1800 or in 1869 a national Church in the 
same way as the Church of Scotland was in 1707 and remains. By 1869 
it had become clear that the Union and the supposed fundamental 
provision would not both endure, though it was not yet clear that neither 
could. Historically the Irish Church Act, 1869, must be regarded as 
part of the process of dissolution of the Union. Looked at in that light 
the Irish precedent, even in so far as it can be relevant, does not there- 
fore necessarily conflict with what has been said. 
The attitude to constituent documents. Nevertheless the dependence 
of law on political fact which it re- emphasises remains important. Words 
like " ever " or " never " in such contexts must be read in a relative 
sense, and it is impossible, in any absolute sense, to confine the evolution 
41 See particularly the speech of the Duke of Argyll introducing the Bill for the 1853 Act 
into Parliament. It is noticeable that in the patronage cases the direct issue of the validity 
of the Patronage Act, 1712, was evaded, perhaps necessarily so in view of the very 
uncertain position of the law on that matter in the years preceding the Union. As to 
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of societies by the Statute Book. That certainly is not done by a written 
constitution, and when the process of formal constitutional amendment 
is too slow, or is for other reasons inappropriate or ineffective, other 
means are found of keeping constitutional words in touch with life. 
It may be that those words are " illumined " in different ways from 
time to time, as Lord Wright put ií,42 or the process of changing inter- 
pretation may be more open.43 A constitution which attempted to 
protect too much, and which contained no method of adjustment would 
prove unworkable. Just as on a smaller scale it has been found necessary 
to restrict the ability of testators and settlors to plan for future genera- 
tions, so on a larger scale succeeding generations must have or will 
find opportunities of development according to their ideals. Granted 
then the shape of the Union legislation, which contains no machinery 
for constitutional amendment, the looser interpretation of the " en- 
trenching " provisions suggested above is the one which in practice 
is most likely to fulfil the needs of the societies for which it was intended. 
Nevertheless it must be emphasised that although the suggested inter- 
pretation can have practical advantages it does not rely on them for 
justification. It can, it is thought, be justified by ordinary methods 
of interpreting the documents and other materials alone. 
CAN PARLIAMENT BIND ITSELF 7 
The background. The second question relating to the sovereignty of 
Parliament is whether a Parliament can fetter its successors. There 
is a substantial body of authority which denies that this can be done, 
and for good reason. When Stair asserts that " Parliament can never 
exclude the full liberty of themselves, or their successors, no more than 
persons can by one resolution secure that they cannot resolve the 
contrary, and therefore the same Session of Parliament may judge that 
to be unjust, that it judged to be just, and contrarywise, as oft as they 
will; and much more may different Parliaments: for, whatever a Parlia- 
ment can do at one time, in making laws, or determining of causes, may 
be at their pleasure abrogate or derogate," 44 he may have been thinking 
mainly of Parliament as a court, but he specifically includes Parliament as 
a legislature. The considerations which underlie, in the judicial field, 
arguments in favour of a loose doctrine of precedent, or of devices, such 
as that of convening a Full Court, to remove obsolete or inconvenient 
decisions, are just as important in the legislative field. At lowest this 
is but a necessary concession to the fallibility of human reasoning, under- 
standing, and foresight, and to the freedom of successive generations 
42 James v. The Commonwealth [1936] A.C. 578. 
43 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
44 Inst. IV, 1, 61, and Erskine, Inst. I, 1, 19, where he relies on Justinian for authority. 
This is not merely a question of power. It may also be a question of necessity. To the 
objection " Who then should punish and coerce the Parliament in case of exorbitance? " 
Samuel Rutherford answered " Posterior Parliaments," and when it was urged that 
they too might err he gave the ultimate cure: " God must remedy that ": Rex lex, Question 
38. 
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to mould the law to their liking or to the requirements of their age, a 
freedom which in any event they will take even if they are not given it 45 
The precedents. Before the Union the Parliament of Scotland demon- 
strated, as has been shown, a willingness to repeal or amend statutes 
which earlier Parliaments had attempted, at least by the appearance 
of the statute, to make binding upon their successors, and to disobey 
formal limitations 46 In post -Union times there has equally been accep- 
tance of the general proposition that what one Parliament makes another 
can unmake, either expressly or by implication.47 Again however the 
question whether Parliament can bind its successors requires more 
precise phrasing before an adequate answer can be given. Limitations 
upon future legislative activity may be of several kinds, they may be as 
to the form or method of legislation, or as to subject- matter, or as to 
time or space. Some of these kinds of limitations may more correctly 
provoke a different question - whether Parliament may redefine itself.48 
It does not follow that the same answer would be given to all types 
of limitation as is given to one particular type, nor, if the question is 
put in a different form, that the usual answer to the usual form of question 
would be as readily given. The fact that the question is posed with 
greater precision may provoke doubt or hesitation. Thus, for example, 
the case for the martyrdom of which Lord Mackenzie spoke in the 
Culsalmond case,49 when he said that judges must obey Parliament or 
resign does not arise until he has satisfied himself that the question 
Has Parliament Spoken? must be answered in the affirmative. 
If examined, the cases, with few possible exceptions, go very little 
way to answering, in an authoritative manner, the question when it is 
put in any of these more detailed ways instead of putting it in the custom- 
ary more generalised way, simply because the real point of the question 
was not an issue in the cases. The cases of implied repeal prove little. 
45 Taylor Innes in his Law of Creeds in Scotland, at p. 63, applies this reasoning to the 
Union legislation itself, yet it seems that, granted the interpretation given above, it is 
possible to accept a view that some portions of that are fundamental and at the same 
time allow adequate freedom to future generations. 
46 Ante, p. 54. Erskine founds this (Inst. I, 1, 45) on will or consent and thus equates this 
to desuetude, which he regarded as a revocation of consent. Some statutes went far 
in an attempt to bind Parliament; see Hope, Major Practicks, I, 1, 15. For a clear 
illustration of such disobedience which was upheld by the courts see Duke of Douglas 
v. King's Advocate (1748) Mor. 7695. 
47 The courts may not readily concede a repeal by implication, see Bain v. Mackay (1875) 
2 R.(J.) 32, 36, and in applying the doctrine the courts may apply a doctrine very close 
to that of " Occupying the field " common in constitutions where there is a distribution 
of legislative power: Arthur v. Lord Advocate (1895) 22 R. 382. The English authorities, 
Vauxhall Estates Ltd. v. Liverpool Corporation [1932] 1 K.B. 733 and Ellen Street 
Estates Ltd. v. Minister of Health [1934] 1 K.B. 590, are familiar enough in this area 
of law. 
48 See Marshall, " What is Parliament? " (1954) Political Studies, 193 and " Parliamentary 
Supremacy and the Language of Constitutional Limitation " (1955) 67 J.R. 62. Sover- 
eignty in Theory and Practice by Sheriff K. W. B. Middleton (1952) 64 J.R. 134, 144 and 
see his " New Thoughts on the Union " (1954) 66 J.R. 37. 
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First because the repealed statute did not attempt to limit future legisla- 
tion, and secondly because the rule is treated as having the same founda- 
tion as the rule of interpretation which decrees that the latter part of 
a statute shall prevail over an earlier part,50 a rule which is equally applic- 
able to private documents. Even where phraseology is found which 
might be construed as a limitation, such as the reference in the Acquisition 
of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919, to " any statute 
whether passed before or after the passing of this Act," 51 upon proper 
examination and construction the words have a much more limited 
significance, hardly more than the such older phrases as " in all time 
coming " as used in the Acts of the Parliament of Scotland, which did 
not even prevent a statute in which they were used from falling into 
desuetude.b2 Neither the Vauxhall Estates case 53 nor the Ellen Street 
Estates case 54 go very far, despite some dicta contained in the judgments. 
In the first, of three judges only one, Avory J., was prepared to construe 
section 7, and he held that it only applied to statutes existing in 1919. 
In the Ellen Street Estates case, Talbot J. inclined to that view. Scrutton 
L.J. found, in effect a direct amendment of the Act of 1919 by a later 
Act and it was conceded that a direct repeal was effective. Maugham L.J. 
held that one Parliament could not bind another as to form, but it was 
not demonstrated that in 1919 Parliament had attempted to do so.55 
Certainly there are other strong judicial assertions that no Parliament 
can bind another. Notable among them is that of Lord Sankey L.C. 
in British Coal Corporation v. The King.56 Speaking of section 4 of 
the Statute of Westminster, 1931, he said " indeed, the Imperial Parlia- 
ment could, as a matter of abstract law, repeal or disregard section 4 of 
the Statute. But that is theory and has no relation to realities." 57 On 
the other hand, Parliament persists in putting purported limitations 
on the Statute Book. Apart from section 4 of the Statute of Westminster, 
1931, there is section 4 (2) of the Regency Act, 1937,58 and section 1 (2) 
5° Compare Bain v. Mackay (1875) 2 R.(J.) 32, and Moss' Empires Ltd. v. Assessor for 
Glasgow, 1917 S.C.(H.L.) 1. 
51 S. 1 (dealing with the appointment of official arbitrators). S. 7, which was involved in 
both the Vauxhall Estates case and the Ellen Street Estates case, was not so strong, and 
it is not clear, though it was argued, that that section was bound up with s. 1. For 
another view on these cases H. W. R. Wade, " The Basis of Legal Sovereignty " [1955] 
C.L.J. 172 at 174 and compare Jennings, Law and the Constitution, 5th ed., at 162 -163. 
52 The wording of the Act of 1592 (A.P.S. III, 579), prohibiting the exercise of crafts in 
the suburbs of burghs, so held in Paterson v. Just, Dec. 6, 1810, F.C. 
53 [1932] 1 K.B. 733. 
b4 [1934] 1 K.B. 590. 
55 But compare H. W. R. Wade, " The Basis of Legal Sovereignty " [1955] C.L.J. 172 
at 175 -176. 
55 [1935] A.C. 500. S. 4 runs, " No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed 
after the commencement of this Act shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion 
as part of the law of that Dominion, unless it is expressly declared in that Act that that 
Dominion has requested, and consented to, the enactment thereof." 
57 At p. 520. 
58 " The Regent shall not have power to assent to any Bill for changing the order of succession 
to the Crown or for repealing or altering an Act of the fifth year of the reign of Queen 
Anne made in Scotland entitled ` An Act for Securing the Protestant Religion and 
Presbyterian Church Government '." 
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of the Ireland Act, 1949.69 There remain, then, several possibilities; 
either, for example, Parliament believes that there is some force in these 
provisions, or else it is content to enact what is in effect a sham, or again, 
it may be that there is a greater connection between theory and reality 
than Lord Sankey suggested. 
The objections in principle. The real objection, in principle, is to the 
total renunciation of legislative competence in any field in a manner which 
leaves a vacuum. Proponents of the classical view of the sovereignty 
of Parliament have asserted that Parliament can abdicate its power to 
another legislature,60 and this is acceptable since a legislative vacuum 
does not then arise. On somewhat similar arguments there does not, 
subject to qualifications, appear to be any objection in principle to a 
limitation in time or form. A parliament which must, for certain purposes, 
observe particular forms, or procedures, but which has nevertheless a full 
competence as to subject- matter, may, nevertheless be regarded as 
" sovereign." 61 It has here been accepted that Parliament may make 
rules governing the legislative process, so that primary legislation may 
be made in several ways. This is done by the Parliament Act, 1911, which 
means that, in effect in certain circumstances, Parliament means the 
Sovereign and the Commons to the exclusion of the House of Lords." 
It is equally clear that Parliament can, as by the Life Peerages Act, 1958, 
alter its own composition. It is true that neither of the measures cited are 
69 " It is hereby affirmed that in no event will Northern Ireland or any part thereof cease 
to be part of His Majesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom without the consent 
of the Parliament of Northern Ireland." The phraseology of this part of the subsection 
presents difficulties of interpretation. It is phrased as an "affirmation" and could there- 
fore be construed as being merely a declaration of intent included in a statute as distinct 
from an enactment. The whole circumstances seem however to point to greater force 
than that being intended. 
69 Anson, " The Government of Ireland Bill and the Sovereignty of Parliament " (1886) 
2 L.Q.R. 426, 440; Dicey, Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., 68 -69; and see Cowen, 
" Legislature and Judiciary " (1953) 15 M.L.R. 282 and 16 M.L.R. 273 but compare 
Wade, op. cit. [1955] C.L.J. 192 et seq. On any other assumption, granted that either 
the English or Scottish Parliament or both was, or were, sovereign in 1706 the Union 
of 1707 could not have come about. Those who deny this proposition tend to do so 
because of fear of a particular consequence of admitting it. Compare Sir George Macken- 
zie arguing, in the Jus Regium, against the power of the King to abdicate (which, on his 
hypothesis, is the same argument) when he says " nor could [the King] in law consent 
to an Act of Parliament declaring that he should be the last King. And if such consents 
and Acts had been sufficient to bind Successors, many silly Kings in several parts of 
Europe had long since been prevailed upon to alter the Monarchy from hereditary to 
elective " (Works, Vol. II, 474). 
61 Harris v. Donges, 1952 (2) S.A. 428 (A.D.). It is true that the limitations were imposed 
by the statute creating the Parliament, and thus the case is not exactly in point. Never- 
theless the propositions on the topic of limitations and sovereignty are general and do 
reflect on the weight to be attached to considerations of whether a Parliament is sovereign 
or subordinate which affect the weight to be given to Att.-Gen. for N.S.W. v. Trethowan 
(1931) 44 C.L.R. 394. In fact the principle may be a quite general one aimed against 
the creation of impotence, see Mitchell, The Contracts of Public Authorities, Chap. I. 
62 The Parliament Act, 1911 (as amended by the Act of 1949), must, it seems, be regarded 
as a statute laying down rules for the legislative process, or alternatively as a redefinition 
of Parliament for particular purposes. Legislation resulting from it, such as the Parlia- 
ment Act, 1949, cannot be regarded as a form of delegated legislation, though see H. W. R. 
Wade, op. cit. Consider, inter alfa, s. 4 of the 1911 Act and see generally, Marshall, 
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expressed to be eternal, but for the time being they are accepted as 
effective law. 
The types of limitation 
(a) The Statute of Westminster. If against this background we turn 
once again to the purported self -limitations of Parliament we see that 
they present various problems. Section 4 of the Statute of Westminster 
is the most complex. It can be construed as imposing a limitation upon 
Parliament. It can be construed not as a restriction upon legislative 
competence, but as a rule of construction directed to the courts ß3 Further, 
its effect may differ if looked at from the point of view of the law of 
the United Kingdom, or from that of the law of one of the members of 
the Commonwealth. Neglecting this last possibility, the first two raise 
issues here relevant. If it be regarded as a rule of construction, then, 
at first sight, no difficulties arise,84 there has been no limitation upon 
Parliament. Nevertheless the issue of an implied repeal could arise in 
relation to a subsequent statute and thus the problem of a formal limitation 
would be provoked. On the other construction there is quite clearly a 
purported limitation of the United Kingdom Parliament. If however the 
whole statute is looked at section 4 does not create the abhorrent vacuum, 
since by other parts of the statute full powers of ordinary legislation 
are given.fi5 Thus it seems that section 4 can be regarded as part of a 
whole scheme of transference of legal power, intended to make law 
and fact coincide, and as such capable of being effective, even on the 
classical theory. The same conclusion may be reached even on the 
alternative construction. The rules governing the legislative process 
are, in the main, customary. This results simply from the course of 
history, and does not give to those rules any particular sanctity. It is 
clear that they may be altered by legislation passed in the ordinary way, 
and that that legislation is valid until repealed. It is true that the only 
example of such legislation at present is an Act which excludes a certain 
stage. If this can be done there seems to be no reason why, subject 
to limitations which will appear, an additional stage should not be 
added as a prerequisite for validity. This, on the alternative construction, 
section 4 may be regarded as doing -by adding an extraparliamentary 
stage. No question of implied repeal here arises. If the prerequisites of 
legislation are laid down, material which does not comply with them 
is not legislation.86 It would however remain true that on the wording 
63 Wheare, The Statute of Westminster, 5th ed., 153. Support for this view may be found 
in Copyright Owners' Reproduction Society Ltd. v. E.M.I. (Australia) Pty. Ltd. (1958) 
100 C.L.R. 597, at 612 and 613. 
64 It is upon such a theory that the Canadian Bill of Rights appears to have been drafted, 
which is much more clearly directed to the courts. 
65 See ss. 2 (2) and 3; the limitations upon legislative competence of the then Dominions 
related to constitutional legislation. 
66 The suggestion in argument in the E.M.I. case (supra) that a United Kingdom Act of 1956, 
could, without compliance with s. 4, be treated as operative in Australia was said by Menzies 
J. " to attribute an impossible intent to the Imperial Parliament " (italics supplied) and see 
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of section 4 alone that section 4 could be repealed exclusively vis -à -vis 
the United Kingdom courts by ordinary legislation which did not comply 
with the terms of that section. That statement however is itself to be 
understood as being subject to the " conventional " rules set out in 
the preamble to the statute.87 A full discussion of their impact would 
involve the arguments on the nature of conventions which have already 
been rehearsed and need not be repeated. 
Thus, in the absence of any such repeal it seems that, on either inter- 
pretation, section 4 could be regarded as effective. As a redefinition of 
Parliament for certain purposes it may effectively operate upon the 
activities of a body which, while for other purposes it is a parliament, is 
not one for those certain purposes. As imposing a rule of construction, 
the whole circumstances give to that rule such force that recognition by 
the courts of a chance repeal by implication is, to use Lord Sankey's 
words (though not in his sense), unthinkable. A direct or explicit repeal 
involves the matters which have already been discussed. 
(b) The Ireland Act. In a similar way section 1 (2) of the Ireland Act, 
1949, may be regarded, if it be taken as legislative in effect and not 
merely declaratory of an intent, as redefining Parliament to make it a 
more widely based body, or as requiring an additional stage for certain 
legislation. It would follow from the preceding argument that a case 
can be made for the validity and effectiveness of such legislation, and 
that that case is not destroyed by any existing authority in whichever way 
the section be construed. 
(c) The Regency Act. There remain the provisions of the Regency 
Act. These undoubtedly exclude the possibility of legislation on certain 
topics. Again, however, if rightly regarded they do not create the 
legislative vacuum. That part of the subsection dealing with the Act 
for Securing the Protestant Religion may be left on one side.68 Properly 
that part must be looked at in the light of the earlier argument upon the 
Union legislation, at least so far as repeal of the 1707 Act is concerned. 
So far as the subsection deals with " alteration " of the Act of Anne it 
must either be treated on the same footing or else it falls to be dealt with 
in the same way as the other limitations upon the Regent. So far as the 
Dixon J. in Trethowan's Case (1931) 44 C.L.R. 394 at 426, where he suggests that in 
such a case " the courts might be called upon to consider whether the supreme legislative 
power in respect of the matter had in truth been exercised in the manner required for 
its authentic expression, and by the elements in which it had come to reside." See also 
-Rand, " Some aspects of Canadian Constitutionalism " (1960) 38 Can.B.R. 135. 
67 In the E.M.I. case (supra) these conventional rules as they existed before incorporation 
in the preamble were referred to as " strong and unbending " (at p. 612), and as " a 
rule of construction which this court would be expected to apply " (at p. 613). 
68 The insertion of this provision is curious and ambiguous. The fact that the Scottish 
Act is thus protected and not the English one is consistent with the history of both. The 
Scottish Act was the result of deep -felt emotions, the English was rather an afterthought, 
the product of political and ecclesiastical " me- tooism." The provision in relation 
to the Scottish Act is however ambiguous, in that while it prefers that Act above all 
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succession to the Crown is concerned the limitation is one in time. There 
is no total exclusion of legislative competence, and there are conceivable 
circumstances in which such a limitation would be desirable. It seems 
therefore that arguments of principle should lead to the conclusion that 
this too must be treated like a formal limitation and thus to be rated, 
as potentially valid. 
The possible state of the law. The distinction which, it is suggested, 
must be made is one between Parliament incapacitating itself and Parlia- 
ment imposing limitations which do not incapacitate. The first is clearly 
obnoxious in principle, and is opposed by the authoritative writers. The 
second is not obnoxious in principle and may well, in particular circum- 
stances, be desirable. The possibility that Parliament may effectively 
limit itself is thus consistent with Parliamentary practice, is consistent 
with relevant, but not binding, modem authority elsewhere,89 and is 
not precluded by any domestic authority. Indeed support can be found 
in parliamentary practice for the view that at one stage Parliament 
conceived itself to be bound by formal limitations which it had imposed 
upon itself.70 Thus, on balance, since the law is not clear, it seems at 
present possible to assert that Parliament may thus effectively limit itself. 
The distinction between the two types of limitation may be easier to write 
than to discern in particular cases. A limitation in form could be so 
phrased that, in substance, it amounted to a deprivation of power. 
Such a limitation would it seems be invalid,71 but none of the instances 
at present upon the Statute Book amount to a deprivation; they go no 
further than imposing limited conditions. 
THE COURTS AND THE VALIDITY OF STATUTES 
The problems hitherto discussed might have no more than a theoretical 
interest. Whether the interest is greater depends to a large extent upon the 
answer to the question whether or not judicial review of the validity of 
statutes is possible with us. If it is not that conflict between academic 
69 It seems to be the principle upon which the Canadian Bill of Rights was drafted, see 
particularly s. 2, which is addressed to both Parliament and to the courts imposing rules 
of draftsmanship on the former and rules of construction on the latter. 
70 By 1 Geo. 1, Stat. 2, c. 4, any naturalisation Bill had to have a clause excluding the person 
concerned from Parliament when it was desired to provide particular exemption from 
this that Act was first rep6aled and then the conflicting measure was introduced, see 
the illustration in Hatsell, Precedents, relating to the Prince of Brunswick, Vol. II, p. 6. 
71 See the doubts of Lord Haldane in Re The Initiative and Referendum Act [1919] A.C. 
935 at 945, and compare the limitations upon the power of the states to refer matters 
to the Commonwealth in Australia under s. 51, placitum, xxxviii, which were envisaged in 
Graham v. Paterson (1950) 81 C.L.R. 1 at 37 and in the Uniform Tax Case (1942) 65 C.L.R. 
373 at 416. In this last instance the problem is complicated by the necessity of maintaining 
a federal structure, which introduces other considerations. On a much lower plane the 
same sort of considerations are operative, see The Magistrates of Crail, Petitioners, 
1947 S.L.T.(Sh.Ct.) 81. The principle that a body cannot disable itself from performing 
public functions is close to that which insists that the body must itself perform those 
functions. This or cognate problems arise in several forms, see Laskin, Canadian Con- 
stitutional Law, 2nd ed., 41, and Jaffé, " Delegation of the Legislative Power " (1947) 
47 Col.L.R. 359, 561. 
M.C.L.-5 
)/ 
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logic and political reality to which (in a slightly different sense) Lord 
President Cooper drew attention 72 remains. Again the traditional answer 
is that no such review is possible. " We sit here as a Court created by 
Parliament, the organ of Parliament, and must judge according to what 
appears to be the will of Parliament, or resign our office. I have felt no 
call to any such martyrdom and shall certainly adhere to my duty of 
obedience to Parliament " said Lord Mackenzie in 1842.73 Once again 
support for this view can be, or has been, found both in the cases and 
in the writers.74 
Yet once again the authorities are not all on one side, or consistent 
with themselves. Coke, in Bonham's Case 75 spoke with a different voice, 
and in The Prince's Case 76 the validity of a statute was examined. There 
are suggestions of judicial review in Queensberry v. Officers of State,77 
and in Mackenzie v. Stewart 78 a private statute was set aside on grounds 
of fraud. It must be remembered that the Scottish background is here 
72 MacCormick v. Lord Advocate, 1953 S.C. 396, 412. Lord Cooper was there referring 
to the " academic logic " which denied any validity to s. 4 of the Statute of Westminster 
and the political realism which so clearly recognised the validity of the same section. 
73 Middleton v. Anderson (1842) 4 D. 957 (The Culsalmond Case) at 1010. The statement 
ante -dates the equally forceful question of Willes J. as to whether the courts were to 
sit as regents over what is done in Parliament, see Lee v. Bude and Torrington Junction 
Ry. (1871) L.R. 6 C.P. 576 at 582. Lord Cooper in MacCormick's case was at first 
sight of the same opinion when he said " This at least is plain, that there is neither precedent 
nor authority of any kind for the view that the domestic courts of either Scotland or 
England have jurisdiction to determine whether a governmental act of the type here 
in controversy is or is not conform to the provisions of a treaty." But his declaration 
is less plain on examination. The " governmental act " could bear reference to the 
Royal Proclamation and thus be irrelevant to the present purpose. Moreover he added, 
with careful specification, that " I am constrained to hold that the action as laid is in- 
competent in respect that it has not been shown that the Court of Session has authority 
to entertain the issue sought to be raised." The narrowness of this formulation makes 
it difficult to construe the whole passage as a general denial of possibility of judicial 
review, particularly if regard is had to some of the authorities cited. Lord Guthrie in 
the Outer House was more explicit: see p. 403. Lord Russell in the Inner House expressly 
reserved his opinion on this point (see p. 417). 
74 Edinburgh and Dalkeith Ry. v. Wauchope (1842) 1 Bell's App.Cas. 252, 279, per Lord 
Campbell; Mortensen v. Peters (1906) 8 F.(J.) 93, 100, per Lord Dunedin; Hoani Te 
Heuheu Tukino v. Aotea District Maori Land Board [1941] A.C. 308, 322, per Lord Simon, 
citing Labrador Co. v. The Queen [1893] A.C. 104. Among the older Scottish authorities 
see Mags. of Dumbarton v. Mags. of Glasgow, Nov. 19, 1771, F.C., where a statute was 
challenged, but the Lords held " though they could explain an act of the legislature, they 
had no power to supply or correct it; and could even give it no other interpretation than 
the precise terms used naturally and positively authorised." Yet earlier in Stuart v. 
Wedderburn (1627) Dude 301 it is said, "The said Act of Parliament could not be drawn 
in dispute before the Session, if it was formally or well done or not, they not being judges 
thereto." Among the writers see Dicey, Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., 40; Blackstone, 
1 Comm. 160 refers to the uncontrollable power of Parliament; Sir George Mackenzie 
based this upon an idea of a hierarchy of institutions, Jus Regium (Works, Vol. II, 472 -473), 
see too his Criminal Law, Tit. III. The sense of Bankton I, 1, 66 would deny any possibility 
of judicial review. 
75 (1610) 8 Co.Rep. 113b, 118; and see Plucknett, " Bonham's Case and Judicial Review " 
(1926) 40 H.L.R. 30. 
76 (1606) 8 Co.Rep. la. 
97 (1807) Mor.App.Juris. 19. 
76 (1754) 1 Pat.App. 578, where it was argued that an Act of Parliament obtained upon a 
recital of fictitious debts barred the setting up of the true state of affairs but this argument 
was rejected in the House of Lords (reversing the Inner House), Lord Karnes (Sel.Dec. 13) 
was strongly of opinion that the courts must afford a remedy even against an Act of 
Parliament in such a case. See too Donald v. Mags. of Anderston (1832) 11 S. 119, but 
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somewhat different. So far as public general statutes were concerned 
the doctrine of desuetude, while it did not amount to judicial review of 
the initial validity of a statute (which is here in question), did amount 
to a judicial review of the continuing validity of statutes. So far as 
private Acts were concerned (and Wauchope's case involved such a 
statute), the Court of Session was given specific jurisdiction to reduce 
them,79 and the effect of the various Acts salvo jure cujuslibet was to 
re- emphasise this jurisdiction, and also to emphasise the uncertain status 
of such private Acts and ratifications.80 This difference of background 
makes understandable both the decision of the Scottish courts and the 
surprise and dismay of the House of Lords in Wauchope. 
The contrast between jurisdictions should not be overemphasised. 
An appeal in some form ran from Session to Parliament and had its 
influence; " and in case the Lords had decided against the Act of Parlia- 
ment, which no man will suppose, yet their decision would not take 
away the force from the Act of Parliament but that decreet might be 
reduced in Parliament " runs the report in Officers of State v. Cowtie.8' 
Such statements are echoed in England,S2 so also are there statements 
in both jurisdictions emphasising the inferiority of judges -cases of 
difficulty are not to be settled by them but by Parliament.83 Sir George 
Mackenzie based a like view on a hierarchical idea of law, and when 
he says " And then, if the Judges of England should publish Edicts contrary 
to the Acts of Parliament, or if a Justice of the Peace should ranverse a 
decree of the Judges of Westminster, these their Endeavours would 
be void and ineffectual," S4 he would doubtless have said the same of 
Scotland. These older statements do something more. They show the 
interplay of political ideas and political facts in the creation of ideas or 
rules of law. The proclamation of the subservience of courts to Parlia- 
ment after 1688 was necessary since in the years immediately before 
the parliamentary revolution the courts had not proved themselves 
strong bulwarks against prerogative claims. This interplay persists,ss 
73 Act of 1567, A.P.S. III, 29. 
B0 See Ersk. I, 1, 39; Hope, Major Practicks V, 4, 14; Dirleton, Doubts, Tit. Salvo Jure. 
Steuart in his Answers indicates sufficiently clearly, though, that if Parliament specifically 
excluded the courts the exclusion was effective because of the mastery of Parliament. 
For an example of challenge see Inglis v. Balfour (1668) 1 Stair Dec. 544 (Mor. Supp.) II, 
142. The Duke of Douglas v. King's Advocate (1748) Mor. 7695 is really in this tradition 
though not expressly so. 
81 (1611) Mor. 7327, a case of the conflicts of later and earlier statutes. See too Murray 
v. Bailie of Torwoodhead (1683) Harc. 13, holding that decreets of Parliament are not 
to be quarrelled by inferior judges, and Mackenzie, Criminal Law, Tit. III. 
32 See, e.g., Petty, Jurisdiction of Parliament, Chaps. III and IV. 
33 Balfour, Practicks -Of Law -" na jugeis within this realme has power to mak any 
lawis or statutis except the Parliament allanerlie," and see Petty, op. cit. Chap. V. At 
times steps were taken to re- emphasise this inferiority; see Dirleton's Doubts and Steuart's 
Answers thereto s.v. Impugning Parliament, and Kennedy v. M'Lellan (1534) Mor. 7320. 
64 Jus Regium and see note 74, supra. 
3' Thus Hume bases his idea of the overwhelming power of Parliament upon a concept of 
representative government, Criminal Law, Chap. XVIII. Speaking of the making of 
an Act of Indemnity against civil as well as criminal consequences he says " and this 
though beyond the power of royal pardon is however lawful to be done in Parliament, 
because all the lieges are represented there." 
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and, in a slightly different way, again creates (as will appear) a feeling 
of subservience. 
The strength of the authorities. Just as it is necessary to look at some 
of the declarations (including those of Coke and Blackstone) against 
their political background, so also is it necessary to look at some of the 
more modern declarations more closely if their proper meaning is to 
be appreciated. Their generality should often be limited by the par- 
ticularity of the circumstances of each of the cases. Some turn upon 
other general principles, such as that international law is not the system 
administered by domestic courts, and thus treaties cannot there be 
debated.86 Most of the others turn simply upon a general need for 
finality, which operates in law far outside the narrow confines of the 
debate on the sovereignty of Parliament. Both Wauchope's case and 
the Bude and Torrington Railway case are concerned with private legisla- 
tion and a procedure which approximates to a trial. What is there 
conceded is that Parliament is master of its own procedure, a concession 
which would be made to the judgment of any supreme court,87 and is 
consistent with the treatment of other aspects of parliamentary life.88 
Equally the general common -sense principle, which appears elsewhere 
in rules relating to the finality of judgments, here appears in the rule that 
the factual or legal assumptions upon which legislation is founded cannot 
subsequently be challenged in a court of law.89 It is as true under our 
system as it is elsewhere that, upon general political principles, the 
courts cannot set themselves up as judges of the appropriateness or 
expediency of legislative action. The matter is put into its proper per- 
spective by Lord Wright in Co- operative Committee on Japanese Canadians 
v. Att. -Gen. for Canada.90 Thus, if these cases are looked at in their 
context, either the generality of particular passages contained in the 
judgments tends to disappear, or else those passages point to a general 
principle which has no necessary connection with any doctrine of the 
sovereignty of Parliament. 
Something more must be said of the latest of these cases, MacCormick 
v. Lord Advocate,91 in which the most deliberate attempt so far was 
86 Mortensen v. Peters (1906) 8 F.(J.) 93, 100 -101; The Aotea Case [1941] A.C. 308, 327; 
I.R.C. v. Colico Dealings Ltd. [1959] 3 All E.R. 351, 355 (affirmed [1960] 2 All E.R. 44). 
87 Compare the discussion in Cheshire, Private International Law, 5th ed., 629 et seq. 
88 Bradlaugh v. Gossett (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 271; and Lord Jeffrey in the Auchterarder Case, 
Robertson's Report, Vol. II, 374. 
89 Mags. of Dumbarton v. Mags. of Glasgow, Nov. 19, 1771. F.C. Labrador Co. v. The 
Queen [1893] A.C. 104, 123; The Aotea Case [1941] A.C. 308, 322. 
99 [1947] A.C. 87, 102. It must be remembered that even where judicial review of legislation 
is generally operative this same principle is continually reiterated, though the line between 
legality and expediency is often not easily drawn. The point is most clearly made by 
the type of problem which is regarded in the U.S.A. as being non - justiciable because 
it is a " political question "-see the references in Corwin, The Constitution and What 
it Means Today, 11th ed., 138 et seq. and particularly the opinions in Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186 (1961). With us the deference of the courts in matters of foreign affairs 
has a somewhat similar origin to these American rules and to the domestic rules now 
under discussion, see, e.g., R. v. Bottrill, ex p. Kuechenmeister [1947] K.B. 41. 
91 1953 S.C. 396. 
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made to secure judicial review of a statute. It must be said at the outset 
that the greater part of the opinions there given consists of obiter dicta. 
The statutes possibly involved were the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, 
and the Royal Titles Act, 1953. The challenge to the first (in so far as 
it removed the possibility of obtaining an interdict against the Crown), 
as being inconsistent with Article 19 of the Act of Union, was not pressed. 
Any challenge to the second disappeared once it was held that that 
statute was quite irrelevant to the question of the Royal numeral.92 
Nevertheless the issue of judicial review was fully dealt with in the opinions, 
and Lord Cooper said " This at least is plain, that there is neither prece- 
dent nor authority of any kind for the view that the domestic courts 
of either Scotland or England have jurisdiction to determine whether 
governmental acts of the type here in controversy is or is not conform 
to the provisions of a Treaty ... and I am constrained to hold that the 
action as laid is incompetent in that it has not been shown that the Court 
of Session has authority to entertain the issue sought to be raised." 93 
Lord Russell added, however, " On the hypothetical question as to 
the power that might be exercised by this Court in relation to an Act 
passed which infringed such provisions as Article 19 or Article 25 of the 
Treaty of Union I desire to reserve my opinion." 94 This echoed a similar 
reservation by Lord Cooper " I reserve my opinion with regard to the 
provisions relating expressly to this Court, and to the laws which concern 
' private right ' which are administered here." 95 The opinions, then, 
speak with a double voice, while rejecting judicial review in a particular 
case, they deliberately express reservations about possible future and 
different cases. 
Possible solutions. Perhaps this ambiguity itself suggests solutions. 
First the question of title to sue is of great importance. Here the pursuer 
was seeking general political redress. It is clear that in modem times 
the courts are not the appropriate forum for the ventilation of general 
political grievances, and that fact alone may impose a substantial limita- 
tion upon any general judicial review.96 Second, there is an emphasis 
on the fact that the traditional answer denying judicial review was to 
a large extent dependent on the traditional view of the sovereignty of 
Parliament. If that view of sovereignty be not accepted, views on judicial 
92 See Lord President Cooper at p. 410, he added that had he had to construe that statute 
its form made that task impossible. 
93 At p. 413. It may be noted that none of the earlier Scottish authorities, such as they 
are (and which have been referred to above), appear to have been cited in argument. 
94 At p. 417. It may be noted that immediately before this passage Lord Russell had 
referred to the process of denationalising what had shortly before been nationalised as 
illustrating the supremacy of Parliament. With respect the illustration was inapt, the 
nationalising statutes having no purported fetters upon their repeal, and a proved ability 
to puff down a house of cards does not demonstrate an ability to blow down a brick wall. 
9s At p. 412. 
98 Compare Minister of Interior v. Harris, 1952 (4) S.A. 769 (A.D.) and Collins v. Minister 
of Interior, 1957 (1) S.A. 552 (A.D.). 
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review are affected.97 Thus if it is accepted that the Acts of Union are 
constituent documents containing some, if few, fundamental provisions 
the argument for possible judicial review is greatly strengthened. The 
foundation of the distinction drawn in Trethowan v. Att. -Gen. for N.S.W. "6 
then disappears. Similarly attention must be paid to what Sir Owen 
Dixon describes as " the identification of the source of a purported 
enactment with the body established by law as the supreme legislature, 
and the fulfilment of the conditions prescribed by the law for the time 
being in force for the authentic expression of the supreme will." 99 
If those matters are looked at and it is assumed, or accepted, that the 
definition of that source and the prescription of those conditions are 
matters of law (which appear to be the case) then again the argument for 
some form of judicial examination or review is strong. In that form 
" review " amounts to no more than ascertaining that an instrument 
said to be a statute is one. 
In considering this second possibility it must be remembered that 
courts have in the past considered such an issue,' and Parliament itself 
has taken steps to validate " Acts " which suffered from any substantial 
procedural defect 2; moreover presence on or absence from the Parlia- 
ment Roll has been said to be inconclusive as to the existence of a statute.3 
The cases and the statutes are however old, and it may well be that if 
it appears on the face of the statute that all necessary steps, such as 
obtaining the normal threefold consent, have been taken, then the courts 
would not inquire further. There seems, however, to be no authority 
for the proposition that if it appeared from the statute that it had not 
been passed according to the appropriate forms of law, or that in some 
other way a rule of law had been broken, the courts would be powerless 
to question the validity. The arguments which lead to acceptance of 
the record do not carry this further proposition, and it must be remem- 
bered that preambles have not been treated as unchallengeable.4 More- 
over, the supposed " untouchability " of parliamentary activities must 
97 Here notice Lord Cooper's reference to Harris v. Minister of Interior, 1952 (2) S.A. 428 
(A.D.), where, granted the existence of entrenched clauses, judicial review was held to 
follow. " To hold otherwise would mean that courts of law would be powerless to 
protect the rights of individuals which were specially protected in the constitution of 
this country ": per Centlivres C.J. at p. 470. There is here an echo of the principle upon 
which Marshall C.J. wrote judicial review into the constitution of the U.S.A., Marbury 
v. Madison (1803) 1 Cranch 137. The conclusion does not necessarily follow, see Min. 
of Interior v. Harris, 1952 (4) S.A. 769 (A.D.) at 780, but seems to do so logically in the 
absence of any express provision. The matter is admirably ventilated in an address, 
which reasonably stopped short of firm conclusions, by Sir Owen Dixon, " The Common 
Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation " (1957) 31 A.L.J. 240. 
98 (1932) 44 C.L.R. 394. 
99 (1957) 31 A.L.J. at 245. 
' The Prince's Case (1605) 8 Co.Rep. 13b; the old Scottish doctrine of desuetude went 
even further by inquiring whether an admitted statute was still valid. The strength of 
these cases is however affected by the arguments above set forth. 
ß May, Parliamentary Practice, 16th ed., 600 -601, and see Cowen, " Legislature and 
Judiciary " (1953) 16 M.L.R. at 275. 
3 Craies' Statutes, 5th ed., 34 and 50; Heuston, Essays in Constitutional Law, 20. 
4 Mackenzie v. Stewart (1754) 1 Pat. 578 and the cases cited in Craies' Statutes, 5th ed., 
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be scrutinised. Sometimes this quality in this context is overemphasised 
and is regarded as peculiar, when it is not,5 and in every case the quality 
of the defect would require careful analysis. The dichotomy of " formal " 
and " substantive " limitations is probably too rough and ready. Even 
the supposed rule that the internal actions of either House are no concern 
of the courts may be too broadly phrased.° Finally other factors must 
be taken into consideration. Two questions are involved, the validity 
of a statute and, if invalidity, or the possibility of invalidity be conceded, 
the existence of a remedy. As Lord Cooper emphasised, these questions 
are separate.' 
The issue of remedy. The problems of remedy are varied. Some 
remedies, interdict or injunction for example, may involve a direct 
interference with the internal operations of Parliament, and there is 
a growing reluctance to grant such remedies, which, being discretionary, 
are much affected by subtle changes of attitude. Thus, success in Trethowan 
v. Att. -Gen. for N.S. W.8 does not necessarily indicate a certainty of 
success elsewhere. Account must be taken in assessing probabilities not 
merely of the deference of one court for another, but also of the possibility 
of any post- enactment remedy. If that may exist the court may be 
much less ready to interfere in earlier stages, and vice versa.9 Above 
all, account must be taken of the background of general theory against 
which judges must now work. The place of Parliament in legal thinking 
cannot be divorced from the place of Parliament in current political 
thinking. Political decisions are as far as possible to be taken in Parlia- 
ment, and the growth of the democratic process since 1832 has obviously 
affected the attitude of the courts.10 It equally must be remembered that 
6 The modern rules about how obviously inappropriate words in a statute are to be dealt 
with in the courts scarcely differ from similar rules governing the construction of wills. 
6 In effect a conflict of opinion between the two Houses on this question underlies the 
Laying of Documents Before Parliament (Interpretation) Act, 1948, and the Act assumes 
limits to the proposition that courts cannot consider procedure in Parliament. 
7 1953 S.C. at 412 -413. 
8 The ebb and flow in opinion in cases such as Glasgow Insurance Committee v. Scottish 
Insurance Commissioners, 1915 S.C. 504; Russell v. Mags. of Hamilton (1897) 25 R. 350; 
Bell v. S. of S: for Scotland, 1933 S.L.T. 519 indicates how variable opinion can be. 
See too Harper v. Home Secretary [1955] Ch. 238; Merricks v. Heathcoat Amory [1955] 
Ch. 567 at 576; and Bilston Corporation v. Wolverhampton Corporation [1942] Ch. 391, 
and the cases referred to there and in (1943) 59 L.Q.R. 4; and also Sawer, " Injunction, 
Parliamentary Process and the Restriction of Parliamentary Competence " (1944) 60 
L.Q.R. 83, and Cowen, " The Injunction and Parliamentary Process " (1955) 71 L.Q.R. 
336. Compare with Trethowan's case, MacDonald v. Cain [1953] V.L.R. 411 and Hughes 
and Vale Pty. Co., Ltd. v. Gair (1954) 90 C.L.R. 203. In the former the principle of respect 
of one court for another in this parliamentary context is evident in the opinion of Gavan 
Duffy J. The questions are further refined in Clayton v. Heffron (1960) 105 C.L.R. 214, 
where among other matters emphasis is placed on the importance of the concept of 
matters internal to Parliament. 
9 Glasgow Insurance Committee v. Scottish Insurance Commissioners, 1915 S.C. 504 at 
511; Hughes and Vale Pty. Co., Ltd. v. Gair (1954) 90 C.L.R. 203 and Clayton v. Heffron 
(1960) 105 C.L.R. 214. 
1° This is clearly reflected in such opinions as that of Lord Normand in Pollok School v. 
Glasgow Town Clerk, 1946 S.C. 373 at 386, and, though, in the same litigation, Lord 
Cooper thought that some of the earlier expressions might have gone too far (1947 
S.C. 605 at 620) it is evident that such general constitutional changes have a pervasive 
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the Acts of Union date from a different period, when natural law elements 
or the primacy of the common law were much stronger. Thus, despite 
what is said in MacCormick's case,'" it seems highly doubtful whether 
the courts today either could or should set themselves up as an appellate 
court from Parliament to judge whether any alteration of the laws which 
concern private right is for the evident utility of the subjects within 
Scotland. Whether for good or ill modern constitutional thinking would 
regard such decisions as appropriate to a political arena. That was one 
of the difficulties facing the pursuer in MacCormick's case, and it is 
reflected in the argument about a title to sue. Where review at large 
of " governmental " statutes is concerned, as in a hypothetical case 
of a disregard of the provisions of the Ireland Act, 1949, these difficulties 
may well be so great as to prevent any review. Where, however, challenge 
is more specific and individual 12 the authorities do not, when viewed 
in the light of modern trends, conclusively rule out any possibility of 
review. The possibility is perhaps stronger when the challenge is oblique, 
e.g., it arises in an attempt to enforce upon an individual an Act which 
may be claimed to offend against some fundamental or limiting provision. 
Such a conflict of statutes is not inconceivable in relation, for example, 
to any future measure which might conflict with the Act for Securing 
the Protestant Religion in the limited sphere in which, it has been suggested, 
that Act is to be treated as fundamental. 
Summary. The argument may, then, be summarised thus. A con- 
junction of influences produced at one time the concept of an unlimited 
Parliament, incapable of limiting itself. Since that time events and 
ideas have caused a reconsideration of this concept and of the authorities 
upon which it was based. These latter do not perhaps go as far as was 
at one time thought. Similarly close examination of the problem of 
limitation has emphasised distinctions between the Acts of Union and 
subsequent Acts of the Union Parliament. Events elsewhere, notably in 
Australia, Canada and South Africa, have also prompted reconsideration 
of the issues raised by both initial and subsequent limitations upon 
Parliament. These considerations coupled with continuing parliamentary 
practices make it impossible to adhere with certainty to the older prin- 
ciples in their simple form. 
influence on the law, and clearly influenced such writers as Hearn (who in turn 
affected Dicey). See his Government in England, particularly the first and last chapters. 
Earlier still this attitude is reflected in Brodie's note to Stair, I, 1, 16 on Desuetude, " It 
just amounts to this that though the Lords of Session derive all their authority from 
the legislature as the supreme power, they are entitled at their discretion to give effect to 
or disregard the very statutes devised by the power whence their own authority proceeds 
... at this rate the legislature is an absolute mockery " (italics supplied). 
11 1953 S.C. 396 at 412. 
12 An individual interest was present, e.g., in MacDonald v. Cain [1953] V.L.R. 411 but was 
closely scrutinised. In the Senate Case (Collins v. Minister of Interior, 1957 (1) S.A. 
552 (A.D.)) the most general of the South African cases, an individual interest was 
present since the challenge to the Senate Act was linked inseparably with the challenge 
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Correspondingly and consequentially the problem of judicial review 
has been reopened. It has been reopened because any shift in theory 
on the question of limitation necessarily requires a reconsideration of 
the problem of judicial review. That reconsideration is also prompted 
by changes in general thought on the place of parliamentary checks and 
on the role of judicial checks in the system of government. The system 
of government has grown so complex that parliamentary cfiecks may 
not in a modem state have the perfection which was once attributed to 
them. Further it has been shown in other countries that those checks 
alone may not, even leaving the complexity of the state aside, have the 
strength that was at one time thought. So again much more tentative 
answers must be given on judicial review, though it is believed that, 
if earlier authorities are examined critically, the possibility of such review 
is much stronger than would formerly have been allowed. In view of 
the lack of modem authority and of the shifts of opinion no concluded 
answer can be given. Such uncertainty need not excite surprise in this 
area of constitutional law since a like uncertainty exists in relation to 
many other of our central rules and institutions. Somewhat similar 
uncertainty exists, for example, about the position of the Cabinet, or 
the doctrines affecting it. Moreover, it appears that the accepted doctrines 
in relation to Parliament have, essentially, grown up as beliefs founded 
upon assertion rather more than upon proof. At lowest, therefore, they 
require reconsideration from time to time. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE LEGAL SETTING 
WHAT has been discussed hitherto is the framework of general ideas. 
Before turning to the main institutions something must be said of the 
legal framework within which they operate. Two subjects fall under 
that head, the Acts of Union and the question of nationality. 
THE ACTS OF UNION 
It must be emphasised at the outset that the Union was a parliamentary 
one. The foundation consists of the two Acts of Union, the first passed 
by the Parliament of Scotland,1 the second passed by the Parliament of 
England. The Parliament of Scotland had amended the Articles of Union 
as they had been agreed on by the Commissioners in minor ways and had 
added, as a fundamental part, the Act for Securing the Protestant Religion 
(since the question of the church was excluded from the remit of the 
Parliamentary Commissioners who negotiated the Union). The Scottish 
Act was not of itself operative, it only became so when the same terms 
were agreed to by the Parliament of England. That agreement followed 
without any amendment to the Scottish Act, save the addition of the 
Act for Securing the Church of England, the addition of which had 
been foreseen by the Parliament of Scotland. Thus the Union ultimately 
took effect on May 1, 1707. The process of inaugurating the new Kingdom 
was completed by the Act of the Parliament of Scotland settling the 
manner of electing the representative peers and the forty -five members 
of the new House of Commons in the Parliament of Great Britain,2 
and in England by the proclamation continuing the existing members 
for the new Parliament. 
For the purposes of law it is these Acts which must be looked at. 
Not merely 'were the Articles of Union amended, but those Articles were 
of no effect unless absorbed in this legislative compact.3 This is more- 
over consistent with a general treatment of treaties in our law. As has 
already been indicated, it is conceived that these Acts must be regarded 
as constituent documents, and that attitude is consistent both with 
1 A.P.S. XI, 414. For the history of these events see Dicey and Rait, Thoughts on the 
Scottish Union; Matheson, Scotland and the Union; Pryde, The Treaty of Union. The 
Minutes of the Proceedings of the Commissioners were separately printed by order 
of the House of Commons together with the original Articles of Union, and the Scottish 
Act which approved them as amended. 
2 A.P.S. XI, 425. 
3 See, however, T. B. Smith, " The Union of 1707 as Fundamental Law " [1957] Public 
Law 99 and his Short Commentary on the Laws of Scotland, where he treats this aspect 
of the agreement as a treaty, and see Sheriff K. W. B. Middleton, " New Thoughts on 
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their terminology, and with contemporaneous ideas. The constitutional 
framework which was thus established was, however, skeletal. This was 
inevitable. The art of drawing constitutions was still young, and indeed 
scarcely born. The circumstances of the Union made it desirable that 
the Commissioners should thus limit themselves. They confessed, when 
presenting their labours to the Queen that " In these we have come to 
an agreement on every point we judged necessary to effect and complete 
a lasting Union, and we have endeavoured not to stir into any matter 
we had reason to think was not so." It was the intention that thereafter 
the Union should develop. 
For the moment it must suffice to indicate the main parts of that 
skeleton. To a considerable extent the importance of the Union and 
its consequences must be judged in the non -legal worlds of economics, 
politics and sociology, and the present concern is not with them. Within 
the realm of law, many of the effects of the Union are incidental to 
the development which followed the Union. Those effects are to be 
seen in the fields of private as well as public law, and again the effects 
upon private law do not fall to be discussed here.4 In the field of public 
law the consequences of the Union have been many and detailed, and 
a full examination of them would be out of place at this point, and 
confusing.5 These effects, coupled with the problem of how united is 
the United Kingdom established in 1707 can only be studied as they 
arise over the whole field of law. 
The Union. What must here be looked at is the framework which 
was established in 1707. The Acts established (Articles I and II) the new 
Kingdom by the name of Great Britain with one Crown to descend 
according to the rules of the Act of Settlement and by Article III estab- 
lished the one Parliament. By Article IV there was conferred upon 
all subjects full freedom of trade and equal privileges throughout the 
whole Kingdom and annexed dominions. Just as the political union 
in Articles I to III was regarded as of the utmost importance by the 
English Commissioners, so was the free trade provision of Article IV 
similarly regarded by the Scots. That general provision was supplemented 
by others. Article VI provided that for ever after all parts of the Kingdom 
should have the same allowances, encouragements and drawbacks, and 
be under the same prohibitions, restrictions and regulations of trade 
4 Frequent references to these effects are to be found in T. B. Smith, Short Commentary 
on the Laws of Scotland and in the same author's Hamlyn Lectures, British Justice: 
the Scottish Contribution, and his Studies Critical and Comparative. It must, however, 
be remembered that the effects are not all on one side. Few English lawyers remember 
that (in these references) Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562 or Institute of Patent 
Agents v. Lockwood [1894] A.C. 347 were Scottish cases. See too, e.g., Abbott v. Philbin 
[1960] Ch. 27; [1961] A.C. 352; and 76 L.Q.R. 182. 
6 See, as one example only, Mitchell, " The Royal Prerogative in Modern Scots Law " 
[1957] Public Law 304. The influence of the Union working through the new Court 
of Exchequer (which was itself a consequence of the Union) had, it is believed, a marked 
effect upon prerogative rules. 
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and liable to the same customs and duties, as well as (Article VII) the 
same excises. Thus the free trade provisions were backed by provisions 
for equal treatment in trading matters.° One provision in particular 
had curious effects. Article XVIII provided that the laws concerning 
the regulation of trade, customs and such excises to which Scotland was 
by virtue of the treaty to be liable should be the same in Scotland from 
and after the Union, as in England. This provision led to the uniformity 
of patent law, and some expressions in the cases imply that it was intended 
to make uniform all mercantile law.' It is now clear that such an inter- 
pretation is no longer possible. 
This group of provisions did provoke some litigation, particularly in 
the context of the rights of royal burghs,8 but it is on the whole surprising 
that more was not provoked, since they contain the germs of such litiga- 
tion as has flourished upon like provisions in the constitutions of either 
Australia or the United States. One reason may be the ambiguities of 
drafting. Despite the provision for uniformity of " encouragements 
and drawbacks " and regulation in Article VI, a lack of uniformity was 
elsewhere either provided for or contemplated as a possibility. In some 
cases the provisions were temporary, notably the transitional provisions 
as to various duties.° Similarly Article XV dealing with the Equivalent 
(essentially the sum due to Scotland by reason of the fact that from the 
Union Scotland would assume the burden of servicing a " united " 
national debt of which proportionately the much greater part would 
be attributable to the former English national debt) provided for special 
investment in Scotland. That Article provided that a portion of the 
Equivalent should be used for the encouragement of the manufacture of 
coarse wool and for encouraging and promoting fisheries and such other 
manufactures in Scotland as would be conducive to the general good. 
However, subsequent legislation starting with the Fisheries (Scotland) 
Act, 1726, establishing Commissioners to manage those funds provided 
too that they should also manage any other sums which might there- 
after be provided, thus contemplating further payments for the benefit 
of Scotland10 Moreover Article XIV (dealing with the issue of exemp- 
tions from duties) runs " Seeing it cannot be supposed that the Parliament 
of Great Britain will ever lay any sorts of burthens upon the United 
Kingdom, but what they shall find of necessity at that time for the preser- 
vation and good of the whole, and with due regard to the circumstances 
6 These provisions, which endure, were supported by other transitional provisions, e.g., 
as to the taxes upon meat and salt, and other matters in Arts. X -XIV. Some of these 
provisions were of immediate consequence, e.g., as to the Malt Tax; see Dicey and Rait, 
op. cit. 284 et seq. 
' Nielson v. Househill Coal and Iron Co. (1842) 4 D. 470. 
8 Smith v. Guildry of Inverness (1757) Mor. 1952; Aboyne v. Magistrates of Edinburgh 
(1774) Mor. 1972; Morison v. Connell, June 24, 1801, F.C.; but see Incorporated Trades of 
Aberdeen v. Magistrates of Aberdeen, May 28, 1793, F.C., in which it is said that the 
Articles of Union were not intended to affect the rights of private parties. 
° e.g., Arts. IX, X, XI. 
10 For an outline of the development of these Commissioners embracing fish and fine 
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and abilities of every part of the United Kingdom," and thus appears 
to contemplate a differentiation according to need of parts considered 
as parts of the whole Kingdom. This attitude is reflected in the Manu- 
factures Improvement Fund (Scotland) Act, 1847. What appears to 
be ruled out is differentiation based simply upon the fact that a preference 
is given for or against a particular area as being Scotland or England. 
It would thus be difficult to challenge, e.g., the element of subsidy in 
dealing with the air services in the Highlands and Islands, since this 
is dictated by the peculiarities of the region and not by the fact that 
those areas are Scottish. On this basis any challenge to economic legisla- 
tion as being discriminatory, while not impossible, is difficult to conceive.11 
These economic provisions were backed by revenue provisions 
designed to produce a uniformity in revenue law, and (Article XIX) 
a uniform system of enforcement. That Article contemplated the estab- 
lishment of a new Court of Exchequer in Scotland having the same 
power and authority as the same court in England. The intent of this 
Article was carried out by the Exchequer Court (Scotland) Act, 1707, 
creating the new court and directing it (with certain exceptions) to proceed 
upon the basis of the Court of Exchequer in England.12 These pro- 
visions, particularly when coupled with measures to increase the efficiency 
of the collection of the revenue, inevitably produced unrest, and yet 
they were the necessary complement of the " free trade " provisions.13 
The institutional provisions. Apart from establishing the common 
institutions to which reference has already been made, the Acts provided 
(Article XXIV) for a Great Seal of the United Kingdom and a Seal 
of Scotland for use in connection with private rights or grants applicable 
within Scotland. More importantly Article XIX provided that the 
Court of Session, and the Court of Justiciary should remain in all time 
coming within Scotland with their existing authority and privileges, 
subject to regulation by Parliament for the better administration of 
justice. The Court of Admiralty was preserved for the time being,14 
as were other courts in Scotland. By Article XX heritable offices and 
jurisdictions were preserved in the same manner as they were then enjoyed, 
and (Article XXI) the rights and privileges of the royal burghs were 
to remain notwithstanding the treaty. These latter privileges have 
been greatly abbreviated, and, in any important sense, abolished. The 
heritable jurisdictions were abolished (by means of purchase) in 1746. 
These last two provisions lack the eternal element that is to be seen in 
11 The general economic consequences of the Union cannot here be discussed, see Pryde, 
A New History of Scotland, Vol. II and Report on Scottish Financial and Trade Statistics 
(1952) Cmd. 8609. 
12 A provision still capable of producing uncertainty, Barrs v. I.R.C., 1961 S.C.(H.L.) 22. 
13 See too Art. XVII standardising weights and measures, and Art. XVI standardising coinage; 
as to banknotes, see Holden, History of Negotiable Instruments and 461 H.C.Deb. 178 -179. 
14 See Walker, Introduction to the Scottish Legal System. 
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Article XIX, and it was inevitable that the changing patterns of govern- 
ment should be reflected in their amendment or repeal, just as changing 
conditions have been reflected in reforms of the Court of Session and 
Court of Justiciary. The preservation of these courts, which implied 
the preservation of a system of law, was further protected by the provision 
in Article XIX that no causes in Scotland should be cognoscible by the 
Courts of Chancery, Queen's Bench, Common Pleas or any other court 
in Westminster Hall and that those English courts should have no power 
to review the sentences of any judicatures within Scotland. It is in 
these provisions that the federal desires of the Scottish Commissioners 
appear and survive. The protection of this system of courts was un- 
doubtedly essential to the approval of the Union Agreement in the 
Parliament of Scotland and as has been seen that protection (in principle 
though not in detail) has been treated as of particular significance.15 
The provisions relating to the new Parliament are significant in that 
Article XXII ensured a bicameral legislature, in which Scottish representa- 
tion was fixed in both Houses. The number of members of the House 
of Commons was one of the matters which caused most dispute between 
the Commissioners and after a conference the Scottish proposal of 
forty -five was accepted. The number of representative peers was fixed 
as a proportion of the number of members of the Commons 16 Other 
stipulations were included in Articles XXII and XXIII governing the 
privileges of both the representative peers and other peers of Scotland 
but the manner of election was left to be regulated by the Parliament of 
Scotland. It appears therefore that the essential element in these Articles 
is merely the principle of adequate representation. The number of 
representatives in the House of Commons has been increased, and 
under the House of Commons (Redistribution of Seats) Acts, 1949 -58, 
is not to be less than seventy -one. Nor does it appear that the machinery 
for the election of the representative peers is to be regarded as essential 
to the Union Agreement, so that the proposal contained in the Report 
of the Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform, that all peers of 
Scotland be admitted to the House of Lords, could not be objected 
to on such constitutional grounds.' The provisions as to the Church 
were marked out in a particular way in the Acts, and may properly be 
regarded as fundamental to the Union scheme at least in so far as the 
Church of Scotland is concerned, and the sense in which this entrench- 
ment should, it is thought, be read has already been discussed.18 
The provision as to law. The Scottish Commissioners had insisted 
upon the maintenance of a distinct system of law, and, although (as 
15 See, e.g., the reservations of Lord Russell in MacCormick v. Lord Advocate, 1953 S.C. 
396, 417, and Chap. 4, ante. As to the evolution of the courts, see Chap. 14, post. 
16 See proceedings on June 15, 1706. 
17 See (1962 -63) H.C. 38 H.L. 23, but see the opinion of the Lord Lyon in App. 14. The 
details of the electoral machinery were amended, and the proposal has now become law 
by the Peerage Act, 1963, s. 4. 
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has been seen) provision was made for the uniformity of the laws con- 
cerning the regulation of trade, the laws contemplated by that provision 
do not comprise the whole of mercantile law, but are rather those con- 
cerning the regulation of exports and imports. All other laws of either 
Kingdom were by Article XVIII to remain in force, save such as were 
inconsistent with the Treaty, but they were to be alterable by the new 
Parliament. Some of the difficulties of this provision have already 
been noted in the context of the sources of law. It should here be again 
noted that this attribution of legislative competence is modified by the 
provisions in Article XVIII which contemplated the possibility of the 
unification of the laws concerning " publick right policy and civil govern- 
ment," but which provided that " no alteration be made in the laws 
which concern private right, except for evident utility of the subjects 
within Scotland." The definitions of what is public right and what is 
private right, must it seems be taken to be those which would be acceptable 
today (such an interpretation follows from the acceptance of the Acts 
as constituent documents). It is to be doubted whether the issue of 
" evident utility " can be debated anywhere outside Parliament. Such 
a question would fall within the category of " political issues " with 
which courts have an almost overwhelming reluctance to meddle.10 
Later legislative history. The Acts of Union have not remained 
untouched by Parliament.20 Immediately after the Union, a series of 
measures, notably the Toleration Act, 1711,21 the Yule Vacance Act 
1711, the Patronage Act, 1711, the imposition of the Malt Tax, the 
introduction of the English law of treason, and the abolition of the 
Scottish Privy Council all combined to create a dislike of the Union, 
and some went near to conflicting with the terms (as well as the spirit) 
of the Union compact, but it is doubtful if any can legally be regarded 
as a breach. For reasons given earlier, it is doubtful if the abolition of 
the tests prescribed in the Act for Securing the Protestant Religion can 
be regarded as a breach. 
Those provisions which have been repealed consist of the transitional 
provisions, mainly of a fiscal nature, those which are spent such as the 
greater part of Article XXII dealing with the first meeting of the new 
Parliament, and others such as that part of Article XVI dealing with 
19 See, however, T. B. Smith, Studies Critical and Comparative, at p. 18. The machinery 
for dealing with Scottish legislation in the House of Commons to be discussed later 
should be borne in mind. 
20 A current text taken from the Statutes Revised is presented in the Appendix to T. B. 
Smith, Short Commentary. The process of amendment has been inelegant to say the 
least. With the exception of the Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act, 1906, the Statute 
Law Revision Acts have referred to the English Act, and not to the Scots Act. This 
process has produced minor variations in the provisions of the respective Acts which are 
still extant, but these variations do not appear to be constitutionally significant. The 
Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Bill, 1963, will produce uniformity. 
21 For views on this see Burleìgh, A Church History of Scotland, 277 -279; and see Pryde, 
The Treaty of Union, Chap. IV, and A New History of Scotland, Vol. II, Chap. V and 
Dicey and Rait, Thoughts on the Union, Chap. VII. 
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the maintenance of the Mint in Scotland which were caused by changed 
circumstances. Alteration of the effect of some of those provisions 
which remain is contemplated as with Article XXIII (the privileges of 
peers) or Article XXIV (the Seals). Other provisions such as those 
providing for the uniformity of coinage or excise in no way inhibit altera- 
tions of the law, and in other cases such as the preservation of the rights 
of royal burghs or of heritable offices it is clear from a reading of the 
negotiations that the provisions were not intended to be unalterable. 
What remains are the provisions relating to the courts and the Church 
and the counterbalancing provisions relating to the unitary institutions 
of Crown and Parliament and those relating to freedom and equality of 
trade. In relation to the former group the element of entrenchment is 
apparent.22 In relation to the second group it is clear from a reading 
of the Union compact and its negotiations that they form the foundation 
of the new Kingdom proposed in 1706, and that consequently any altera- 
tion in respect of them would amount to the substitution of a new 
constitutional foundation. 
NATIONALITY 23 
The Acts of Union did not themselves deal with the issue of nationality, 
speaking simply of the subjects of the United Kingdom, since the new 
Kingdom necessarily involved a new nationality. Under the Union of 
the Crowns from 1603 to 1707 the position of those born owing allegiance 
to the common sovereign was that they were not to be treated as aliens 
in either Kingdom.24 After the Union of 1707 the citizens of each of 
the former Kingdoms were citizens of the new United Kingdom. Diffi- 
culties however arose from the existence of pre -Union statutes which 
opened up possibilities of limited or more general naturalisation of 
foreigners. The effect of Article XXV of the Acts of Union upon these 
is not clear. On the one hand it was held in a Scottish case that Acts 
such as that which naturalised partners in the Bank of Scotland were 
repealed as inconsistent with the Act of Union.25 On the other it was 
held in Att. -Gen. v. Ernest Augustus Prince of Hanover 26 that the Act 
of 1705 naturalising the descendants of the Electress Sophia (which 
was not expressly repealed until 1948) had the effect of making the 
respondent a British subject, even though the Act, being a pre -Union 
statute, was couched in terms of English nationality. The Act of 1705 
22 Thus in relation to the courts some matters are marked off as capable of alteration, and 
the implication as to other parts has been accepted. See Chap. 4, ante. 
23 See, generally, Clive Parry, Nationality and Citizenship Laws. What follows here is 
merely an outline, the detailed complexities may be pursued in that exhaustive work. 
24 Calvin's Case (1608) 7 Co.Rep. la; and A.P.S. IV, 366. 
25 Macao v. Officers of State (1822) 1 Shaw App. 138. On this and the following case see 
T. B. Smith, Studies Critical and Comparative, p. 21 et seq. and the authorities there 
cited. 


































had certain peculiarities not shared by the other legislation, and may, 
in any event, be regarded as exceptional.27 
After the Union, the concept of a universal nationality based upon 
allegiance to a common sovereign continued to operate in the expanding 
Empire and Commonwealth until the development of the Commonwealth 
showed that that concept without further addition could cause incon- 
venience and was inconsistent with the idea of member states in the 
Commonwealth. It was reasonable that the new member states of 
the Commonwealth should control their own citizenship laws.2S In 
1947 a Commonwealth conference recommended 29 that each member 
state should have the right of defining its own citizens, but that an element 
of universality should be preserved by means of the concept of a British 
subject or Commonwealth citizen. The status of British subject or 
Commonwealth citizenship would follow automatically from the grant 
of local citizenship, and would confer advantages in each state, in that 
the citizen of another Commonwealth state would have a higher status 
than an alien. 
This plan was only partially implemented because of subsequent 
events, notably the departure of the Republic of Ireland from the Common- 
wealth. As a result of that and of other events there emerged the concept 
of reciprocal citizenship, which appealed more strongly than did the 
1947 scheme to some members of the Commonwealth, particularly to 
the new republics. Any discussion of the citizenship laws of the in- 
dividual states of the Commonwealth would be out of place here. What 
follows is an outline of the law as it operates in the United Kingdom. 
The basis of that law is the British Nationality Act, 1948.2° That 
Act created the citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies,31 
which is at the same time the local citizenship of the United Kingdom 
and the residual citizenship in the Commonwealth, that is to say it is a 
citizenship possessed by those British subjects who do not have another 
" local " citizenship. Such citizenship may under the terms of the 
1948 Act be acquired by birth, by descent, by naturalisation or by 
registration. Registration was a new procedure to enable citizens of a 
Commonwealth country or of the Republic of Ireland to acquire this 
local citizenship, and (in the great majority of cases) such registration is 
a matter of right, not of discretion as is naturalisation. The original 
conditions for the acquisition of citizenship by registration contained 
in the 1948 Act (section 6) were increased and made somewhat more 
onerous by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962 (section 12), and 
27 It should, however, be noted that, in the House of Lords, it was made clear that no 
opinion was there expressed on the effect of the Acts of Union on the Act of 1705: see 
pp. 464 and 472. 
28 This had already been recognised by the Imperial Conference of 1930; see Cmd. 3479. 
29 Cmd. 7326. 
39 Which is amended by the British Nationality Act, 1958, to take account of further develop- 
ments in the Commonwealth. 
31 In the case of Channel Islanders and Manxmen the term Citizens of the United Kingdom 
Islands and Colonies may be used. 
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in one case a discretionary element was introduced by that Act.32 
Similarly the grounds for the revocation of registration are much more 
limited than those for the revocation of naturalisation. 
The detailed conditions governing the acquisition and loss of citizen- 
ship should be sought in the Acts, but it may be noted that the Act of 
1948 aided the acquisition of double nationality. Naturalisation in a 
foreign country does not of itself cause loss of United Kingdom citizenship 
or British nationality. That effect only follows if a declaration of renuncia- 
tion is made under section 19. Similarly a woman on marriage to an 
alien does not lose her British nationality, but may renounce it. 
So far as our constitutional law is concerned British nationality (or 
Commonwealth citizenship) is a concept of greater importance than 
citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies. Under Part I of the 
1948 Act all citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies together with 
the citizens of all countries mentioned in section 1 (3) of the Act (i.e., the 
member states of the Commonwealth) are British subjects. That list 
of countries serves a double purpose. It carries out the 1947 scheme for 
those Commonwealth countries which adhered to it and carries out 
the reciprocal scheme as far as the United Kingdom is concerned in 
relation to appropriate countries. As new members of the Common- 
wealth emerge the list is amended.33 Our own important legislation 
is drawn in terms of British nationality and not of United Kingdom 
citizenship. Thus section 1 of the Representation of the People Act, 
1949, confers the right to vote (subject to the qualifications of the general 
electoral scheme) upon British subjects, and the same qualification 
applies to Members of Parliament. The surviving limitations in the 
Aliens Act, 1914, and the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1919, 
have of course no application.34 Hence a British subject as defined in 
the 1948 Act has all the civic rights of a citizen of the United Kingdom. 
The civic rights are somewhat further extended. Although the 
Republic of Ireland has left the Commonwealth, neither history nor 
current feelings made that break easy to achieve. The break occurred 
after the 1948 Act (which had continued certain citizens of Eire as British 
subjects and for the rest had provided that other citizens of Eire should 
not be treated as aliens) and the Ireland Act, 1949, attempted to regulate 
the situation as far as this country is concerned; section 5 of the Ireland 
Act contains particular provisions as to the operation of the British 
Nationality Act. These were however inadequate to deal with the 
complex situation which was made yet more complex by the 1949 Act. 
On the one hand it provided that that part of Ireland formerly known as 
32 See note 41 below. 
33 See, e.g., s. 2 of the Uganda Independence Act, 1962, and s. 1 of the South Africa Act, 
1962, to delete the mention of South Africa by reason of that country leaving the Common- 
wealth. 
34 The limitations on the civil employment under the Crown of aliens contained in that 












































Eire was no longer part of Her Majesty's dominions, but on the other 
it was also declared by section 2 that the Republic of Ireland was not 
a foreign country. Thus, citizens of that Republic are in a twilight world, 
being neither aliens 35 nor British subjects, and they may acquire citizen- 
ship of the United Kingdom by registration. The Ireland Act continued 
existing legislation in force as if the Act had not been passed, and so 
citizens of the Irish Republic were held to fall under the National Service 
legislation.36 Continuing this somewhat ambiguous but convenient 
legislative policy section 1 of the Representation of the People Act, 1949, 
gives the right to vote to citizens of the Republic of Ireland who, since 
they are not aliens, may also be elected to the House of Commons and 
be members of the House of Lords if they hold a peerage other than an 
Irish one. S7 
The Commonwealth Immigrants Act. One result of the adherence of 
the United Kingdom to the theory of universal nationality in the Common- 
wealth 38 was that no British subject could be refused admission to, or 
deported from, the United Kingdom 39 even though that was not his 
country of origin. This situation was altered by the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act, 1962. Part I which (in the first instance is to continue 
in force only until December 31, 1963, unless extended) rendered possible 
the exclusion of Commonwealth citizens other than those born in the 
United Kingdom or those holding a United Kingdom passport and 
who are citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, or who hold 
such a passport issued in the United Kingdom or Republic of Ireland. 
The power to refuse admission is further limited in the case of those 
who are ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom, or have been so 
resident in the past two years, or those who hold an employment voucher 
or wish to enter for the purpose of study.40 Thus although citizenship 
of the United Kingdom and Colonies becomes an important factor, it 
does not become the exclusive governing factor. Part II of the Act 
(which is permanent) authorises the deportation of Commonwealth citizens 
who have been convicted of criminal offences punishable by imprisonment 
and who are recommended for deportation by a court.41 The power 
35 See the definition of Aliens, s. 32 of the British Nationality Act, 1948, which is continued 
in force by the Ireland Act, 1949. 
36 Bicknell v. Brosnan [1953] 2 Q.B. 77. 
37 The story is made more complicated by the fact that the Republic does not recognise 
the division of Ireland, and by reason of the relationship of Northern Ireland to the 
Republic special rules are made by the Ireland Act, 1949, s. 6, as to the qualifications 
of electors in constituencies in Northern Ireland. Such matters should be pursued in 
Clive Parry, op. cit. 
33 This adherence was much firmer than it was elsewhere in the Commonwealth. 
39 Certain accused persons can be dealt with under the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, 
which has today certain inconveniences, as against extradition, see 674 H.C.Deb. 581 
et seq. 
40 See s. 2. The Act is supplemented by the instructions to Immigration Officers published 
as (1962) Cmnd. 1716. 
41 It may be noted that this question of deportation is decided by the Home Secretary who 
has general control over aliens and over immigration. The conditions under which 
a recommendation or deportation order may be made are given in ss. 7 -10. Where a 
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does not apply to a person born in the United Kingdom, or whose father 
was so born or whose parents were ordinarily resident in the United 
Kingdom at the time of his birth. Nor does it apply to a citizen of 
the United Kingdom who becomes such by naturalisation here, by 
being adopted, or by registration, or is the wife of any such person.42 
General principles have been enunciated (at any rate as far as England 
is concerned) by the Court of Criminal Appeal on the application of 
the Act.43 
Protected persons. There is one further group which should be noted 
of those who are, in strictness, neither aliens nor British subjects. By 
section 32 of the British Nationality Act, 1948, British protected persons 
are declared not to be aliens for the purpose of the Act. The British 
Protectorates, Protected States, and Protected Persons Order, 1949,44 
defines those who, by reason of their connection with protectorates or 
protected states or trust territory, are British protected persons. Such 
persons are by the Aliens Employment Act, 1955, exempted from the 
limitation in civil employment under the Crown contained in the Aliens 
Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1919. Under the British Nationality 
Act, 1948, protected persons may apply for naturalisation if they comply 
with the conditions applicable to registration by Commonwealth citizens,45 
and to that extent they are preferred to aliens, but their position resembles 
that of aliens in that naturalisation remains discretionary. Under the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962, both Part I and Part II (dealing 
with immigrants and deportation) apply to British protected persons, 
as they do to Commonwealth citizens. British protected persons do 
not however have the right to vote in United Kingdom elections. In 
that they are farther from being British subjects than citizens of the 
Republic of Ireland. 
recommendation for deportation or a deportation order is in force the right of a Common- 
wealth citizen to be registered as a citizen of the United Kingdom is suspended though 
the Secretary of State may nevertheless so register. See generally Rogerson, "Deportation" 
[1963] Public Law 305, and (1962 -63) H.C. 293. 
42 s. 6. 
43 R. v. Edgehill [1963] 1 Q.B. 593. 
44 S.I. 1949 No. 140. 


































PARLIAMENT -THE STRUCTURE 
Introduction. It is reasonable to take 1707 as the starting point, since 
it is evident that the authors of the Union settlement conceived of the 
first Union Parliament as something new and distinct, a view which 
was shared by those concerned with its working.1 In its working it was 
natural that, for many reasons, the new Parliament should inherit much 
from the English Parliament. Most obviously the locality of the new 
Parliament and the fact that the majority of its members were familiar 
with the ways of the old English Parliament were strong inducements.2 
There were other reasons. While the Parliament of Scotland had grown 
in stature very rapidly between 1688 and 1707 and the practices of the 
two Parliaments had tended to grow alike,3 it was true that privileges of 
Parliament vis -à -vis both Crown and courts were stronger and more 
deeply rooted in England than in Scotland. It was, then, natural that 
the more extensive should be taken as the basis of the new,4 just as it 
was natural that the more highly developed procedure of the English 
Parliament should continue.' The bicameral nature of the new Parlia- 
ment (which was envisaged by the Acts of Union), as compared with 
the unicameral character of the Parliament of Scotland, made the break 
clear to the Scottish members, but held no novelty for the English. 
The result was that to a large extent Parliament in its internal aspects 
presented an appearance of continuity with the English Parliaments.' 
Outside the House there were of course differences. The elections of the 
1 See Hatsell, Precedents, 3rd ed., II, 41, the case of Asgill, and the tenor of the Royal 
Proclamation relating to the new Parliament, and the terms of the Acts of Union 
themselves. 
2 This was strengthened by the fact that the members of the last pre -Union English Parlia- 
ment were continued as members of the first post -Union Parliament. Thus, on the 
first day, reference was made to earlier English precedents, see House of Commons 
Journal, Oct. 23, 1707, in relation to the election of the Speaker. 
3 See, e.g., on the methods of determining disputed elections Rait, Parliaments of Scotland, 
309 -312; Terry, The Scottish Parliament, 125. 
4 The wider extent was apparent in two ways. The individual member was in England 
better protected from his creditors, see Molison v. Clarke (1707) Mor. 10398, Stair III, 
1, 37, and members were better protected against the Crown, Rait, op. cit. 525; Lockhart, 
Disquisition upon Peerage, p. 12. Both extensions might be welcome to members. 
Livingston v. Morison (1710) 2 Fount. 526; and Lady Greenock v. Shaw (1709) Mor. 8563. ' These procedural points were important. The relative lack of procedural development 
had been one of the great causes of weakness in the Parliament of Scotland. 
8 Aided by statutes which extended older English rules to the new Parliament such as 
the Succession to the Crown Act, 1707, s. 29 (membership) and s. 7 extending to the 
United Kingdom the Triennial Act, 1695 (6 & 7 Will. 3, c. 2). These extensions were 
liberally treated, see Connell on Elections, 287, which takes the former provision as 
including the English pre -Union legislation on bribery. These first provisions have 
not always been noticed by the House of Commons: Report of Select Committee on 
Elections (1955) H.C.P. 35. 
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Scottish representative peers distinguished them from their fellows, and 
the old Scottish electoral system continued until 1832 for the Commons. 
Slowly a degree of uniformity has been established, partly as a result of 
legislation, but also as a result of judicial action. This change is not 
solely attributable to the Union. In the years immediately before the 
Union the Parliament of Scotland had greatly developed. It had used 
effectively such weapons as the denial of supply' in an assertion of its 
independence, and by other means had sought to increase its power 
over the executive. Equally it had asserted stronger claims to the control 
of its own privileges. It was then natural to adopt the habits of a Parlia- 
ment in which these matters had been pushed still further and in so 
doing there was a continuity with the later years of the Parliament of 
Scotland. It is thus understandable that the law of the United Kingdom 
Parliament should draw heavily on English pre -Union precedents, though 
the scope of application of some may have to be examined. 
It will be convenient if Parliament is discussed under the headings 
of Composition, Privileges, Functions and that thereafter its relationship 
to the executive be examined. 
THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
The House of Lords now consists of five groups: (1) peers of the United 
Kingdom; (2) the peers of Scotland; (3) peers spiritual; (4) Lords of 
Appeal in Ordinary; (5) life peers. Formerly there were also repre- 
sentative peers of Ireland, but after 1922 there was no machinery for the 
election of such representatives. Since formerly they had been elected 
for life the then members of the House continued, the last, Lord 
Kilmorey, dying in 1961, and the report in 1962 on reform of the House 
did not recommend the admission of peers of Ireland and the Peerage 
Act, 1963, does not alter their situation. 
Peers of the United Kingdom. The largest group is that of peers 
of the United Kingdom (including peeresses in their own right), 
under which title may be comprised the holders of peerages of England 
(whose rights to sit in the House of Lords of the Parliament of Great 
Britain were continued by Article XXII of the Acts of Union, 1707) 
of peerages of Great Britain created between 1707 and the Union 
with Ireland in 1800, and of peerages of the United Kingdom created 
thereafter, all of whom are entitled to a writ of summons unless dis- 
qualified. The modem method of creating a peer is by letters patent, 
but ' the most ancient peerages may owe their origin to a writ of 
summons. Provided that the summons was to a full Parliament 8 and 
that the seat was taken thereunder,9 it came to be accepted that there 
7 It was thus that the Act for Security of the Kingdom (A.P.S. XI, 130, 136) was forced 
through. 
8 St. John Peerage Case [1915] A.C. 282. 
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was a hereditary right to receive such a writ vested in the heirs at common 
law of the original recipient. Under the more modern form of creation 
by letters patent, the critical date is the endorsement of the Lord Chancel - 
lor.10 The letters patent, in the normal form, equally create an inheritable 
right to a writ of summons, but they may designate a particular line of 
succession, e.g., including heirs female, provided that the designation would 
be valid as a limitation of real property in England at common law " 
The modern cases in which this proposition is asserted have however 
involved English pre -Union peerages, and the effect of the Union is not 
entirely clear. The rules for the descent of Scottish peerages are many 
and varied,12 and differ substantially from the English ones, and limita- 
tions exist which would be invalid by the latter rules.13 It is not clear 
whether the pre -Union English rules have now become universal or 
whether a grant in appropriate terms of art to a person domiciled in 
Scotland (or where for other reasons there are particular Scottish con- 
nections), might not be valid if it would be good by Scots law. If so the 
rule in the Buckhurst case may be of a more limited application than 
appears at first sight.l4 
Whilst, in origin, peerage was linked with tenure, peerage by tenure 
was rejected from fairly early times.15 Moreover, while at one time 
the Crown, as the fountain of honour, had full liberty in the grant of 
peerages, it is now recognised that " by a firmly based constitutional 
convention " letters patent may only issue to a consenting party.18 Once 
created, however, a peerage by English law could not be surrendered 17 
(though Scottish peerages were capable of surrender, either in favorem 
or ad rema?IIentiam) and it seems that this doctrine applies to peerages 
of Great Bntain or of the United Kingdom.18 Now, by the Peerage Act, 
1963, anyone inheriting a peerage may disclaim it within twelve months 
of inheritance or of attaining full age (or one month if he is a member 
of the Commons or a parliamentary candidate). Such disclaimer divests 
that person (and his wife) of all rights, and relieves from any disabilities, 
1° Hatsell, Precedents, II, 392 et seq. 
11 Buckhurst Peerage Case (1876) 2 App.Cas. 1; Wiltes Peerage Case (1869) L.R. 4 H.L. 126. 
12 See post, p. 90. 
13 e.g., those relating to the Earldom of Selkirk or in modem times the grant in 1861 of 
the dignity of Countess of Cromarty to the Duchess of Sutherland. See, too, Lord 
Colonsay in the Wiltes Peerage Case (1869) L.R. 4 H.L. at 169, and Riddell's Peerage 
Law, I, 184 et seq., 561 et seq. 
14 It must be remembered that the Committee for Privileges tendering advice is not bound 
by precedent in the way in which the House is when sitting as a court: (1869) L.R. 4 H.L. 
at 147, per Lord Chelmsford. 
15 The Berkeley Peerage Case (1861) 8 H.L.Cas. 21, 83; the Fitzwalter Peerage Case (1669) 
Collins' Claims 268. In Scotland elements of the concept of peerage by tenure endured, 
for a variety of reasons, rather longer and more strongly than was the case in England, 
see Rait, Parliaments of Scotland, 177. 
16 Re Bristol S.E. Election [1961] 3 All E.R. 354, 370. 
17 The Berkeley Peerage Case (1861) 8 H.L.Cas. 21, 81. 
18 It was accepted as the basis for putting forward the Wedgwood Benn (Renunciation) 
Bill, H.L. Papers (1954 -55) 23; as to Scottish peerages see note 43 below, and the Report 
on House of Lords Reform (1962 -63) H.L.P. 23, upon which the Peerage Act, 1963, 
was based. The report doubted if the surrender of Scottish peerages was still possible. 
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flowing from peerage; but it does not affect the right of his heir to inherit 
in due time. 
Issues of peerage are determined by the Committee for Privileges 
of the House of Lords upon a reference by the Crown. It is that body 
which will in effect determine (though the " decision " will take the 
form of advice) a claim by any individual to a peerage. Such claims, 
it should be noticed, are not barred by any lapse of time.19 This type 
of claim should be distinguished from the claim that the abeyance affecting 
a peerage should be terminated, for in such a case it has been resolved 
that abeyance should not be terminated after the lapse of a hundred 
years.20 A distinction must also be drawn between peerage and lordship 
of Parliament, the latter need not follow as a necessary consequence of 
the former, but both issues are tried by the same body, which thus deter- 
mined that peeresses in their own right were not entitled to a seat in Parlia- 
ment,21 or that one to whom letters of patent had been issued specifically 
granting him a peerage for life -was not entitled to a seat, under the law 
as it then was.22 It may here be mentioned that after the Union this 
jurisdiction of the House of Lords was extended to the determination 
of entitlement to a peerage of Scotland or to the right to vote at the 
election of the representative peers of Scotland. Formerly this jurisdiction 
was exercised by the Court of Session,28 but it has been assumed in both 
respects by the House of Lords, and now appears to be unchallengeable.24 
It has from time to time been asserted that the House of Lords alone 
could determine any peerage issue. This statement goes too far. It is 
clear that the House has a right to determine its own composition, but 
where a question of peerage arises incidentally in other litigation the 
appropriate court has power to determine this matter for its own 
purposes.25 
There are legal disqualifications, apart from those which have been 
mentioned, which will debar a peer from taking his seat, these are 
19 Hastings Peerage Case (1841) 8 Cl. & F. 144. 
20 Report on Peerages in Abeyance, 1927. Abeyance means that a peerage goes into suspense 
when there is a co- heirship. This can arise under English law; it does not, in relation 
to a peerage, under Scots law; Stair III, 5, 11; Ersk. III, 8, 13, and see the Herries Peerage 
Claim (1858) 3 Macq. 585. Its effect on United Kingdom peerages might depend on 
the argument above at note 14 and related text. 
21 Lady Rhondda's Case [1922] 2 A.C. 339; but see now Peerage Act, 1963, (s. 6) which 
confers a right to a seat. 
22 The Wensleydale Peerage Case (1856) 5 H.L.C. 958. In this case the House seized itself 
of the matter on its own motion, and here it is most clearly dealing, as a House, with 
its own composition. 
23 This was done even after the Union, see the cases referred to in Riddell, Peerage Law, 
285 -292. This jurisdiction was attacked by Lord Kames' Historical Law Tracts, Tit. 
" Courts " and by Lord Hailes (as he became); see Lockhart, Disquisition on the Right 
of Jurisdiction in Peerage Successions. 
24 See the speech of Lord St. Leonards in the Montrose Peerage Case (1853) 1 Macq. 401, 
439 -441 and Barclay -Allardice v. Duke of Montrose (1872) 10 M. 774, 777; the situation 
which resulted was not, in the past, an entirely happy one, because of differences in 
peerage law which were not always fully appreciated. 
25 Alexander v. Officers of State (1868) 6 M.(H.L.) 54; Dunbar v. Sinclair, Feb. 2, 1790, 
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minority,26 bankruptcy,27 and conviction for treason or felony.28 Apart 
from these there are conventional limitations. Civil servants are 
restrained from taking part in the political activities of the House,29 there 
are conventional restraints upon the participation of the judicial members 
of the House,30 and it seems that those peers who are involved in the 
running of nationalised industries do not take part in the relevant 
debates.3 r 
The Scottish representative peers. The sixteen representative peers 
of Scotland were elected under the provisions of the Act of 1707 (as 
amended) until the Peerage Act, 1963 (s. 4) admitted all Scottish peers 
(not otherwise disqualified) to the House.32 The election meeting, 
normally held at the Palace of Holyrood House, was called by a 
proclamation under the Great Seal before each new Parliament, and 
in case of any by- election, was presided over by the Lord Clerk 
Register. Voting was open, and provision was made for voting by 
proxy or by list in the case of absent peers. It is clear today that 
lists were to a large extent concerted. The Act was careful to confine 
the functions of this meeting, providing that peers should attend with 
their ordinary attendants only and should discuss no matter except the 
election.33 The electorate consisted of the peers of Scotland 34 who 
were not disqualified on the grounds given above.35 At one stage those 
who were also peers of Great Britain were excluded,36 as, on the other 
26 Standing Order of 1685, and the Act of Parliament of Scotland, 1707, governing election 
of representative peers. 
27 Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 32; Bankruptcy Disqualification Act, 1871; Bankruptcy (Scot- 
land) Act, 1913. The disqualification terminates if the bankruptcy is annulled or if, in 
England, he is discharged with a certificate that bankruptcy was due to misfortune 
not misconduct, and see Goudy, Bankruptcy, 4th ed., 361. 
28 Under conditions set out in the Forfeiture Act, 1870 (as amended), this Act does not 
apply to Scotland, but it seems likely that the House has at common law a power to 
deal similarly with persons who are convicted of equivalent offences in Scotland. See 
Lord Herschell, 334 H.L.Deb. 3 s., col. 357. Presumably the lunatic would be dealt 
with under a similar power. 
so By Treasury Circular of 1928. 
30 Bromhead, The House of Lords and Contemporary Politics, 67 -72. 
31 See, e.g., the debates on the Air Corporations Bill, 1960, 220 H.L.Deb. and the solitary 
intervention of Lord Douglas of Kirtleside at col. 1202. This is necessary to avoid 
the creation of another form of responsibility to the House. 
32 The oaths required by the original Act (as to which see Robertson, Peerage Proceedings) 
were amended by the Promissory Oaths Act, 1868, which made it possible for Roman 
Catholic peers to participate. The procedure under the Act was modified by the Repre- 
sentative Peers (Scotland) Act, 1851. By- elections were rare in modem times, vacancies 
being allowed to stay unfilled. It is most doubtful if this procedure could be regarded as 
fundamental to the Union compact, though see App. 14 to (1962 -63) H.L.P. 23. 
33 Any infraction to be punished by the penalty of praemunire, one unknown to Scots 
law. The provisions were aimed at preventing a re- emergence of a Parliament of Scotland. 
34 The number of titles on the roll is 115. Allowing for those who hold more than one 
title the number entitled to vote was in 1963 about 76, of whom some 31 also hold 
English or United Kingdom titles. For a general account of the proceedings see 
Fergusson, The Sixteen Peers of Scotland, and (1962 -63) H.L.P. 23. 
35 See p. 88, supra. The exclusion of peeresses in their own right was implied in s. 9 (5) 
of the Representation of the People Act, 1918, giving them a right to vote for the House 
of Commons: that right is taken away by the Act of 1963 unless the peerage is disclaimed. 
36 The Duke of Hamilton's protest against the Duke of Queensberry. 
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hand, peers of Scotland who were made peers of Great Britain after 
the Union were excluded from sitting in the House by that title.37 The 
second ruling was reversed in 1782, and the first was, in effect, reversed 
in 1793, so that from getting the worst of both worlds such peers 
had, if they so wished, the best of both. A roll of peers at the Union 
was compiled in 1708, and in 1740 the House of Lords asked the Court 
of Session for a complete list together with an explanation of the Scottish 
rules of descent. A list was supplied, but in place of the explanation 
the Senators could only present their excuses for failure to supply it 
because of uncertainty and the range of possibilities.38 The number of 
peers entitled to vote might be affected by two Acts of the last century. 
Under the first 39 a title in respect of which a vote has not been called/ 
since 1800 will not, subject to a direction of the House, be called, afid 
under the second40 the Lord Clerk Register was, after each election, to 
transmit to the House a list of those titles in respect of which a vote has 
not been cast for fifty years, so that the House might delete such titles 
from the roll. 
As has already been noticed questions of entitlement to vote and 
all questions relating to elections were determined by the House. The 
roll is capable of expansion by the House accepting a claim to an old 
pre -Union peerage, but it seems that this peerage is otherwise incapable 
of enlargement. While the Act of Union did not in terms make it im- 
possible to create new peers of Scotland,41 the general tenor of the Act 
when coupled with the general viewpoint of the times (there was a con- 
temporary desire to close the ranks of the peerage) makes it probable 
that that was the intention of the framers. That view has also judicial 
support,42 and must, it seems, be now accepted. 
Apart from questions which related to the representative peers of 
Scotland there are now few constitutional issues which arise in connection 
with the peerage of Scotland. The Act of Union (Article XXIII) settled 
matters of precedence and conferred upon that peerage all privileges 
(save those dependent upon membership of the House) which might 
be enjoyed by the Peers of Scotland or of Great Britain, but from the 
point of view of the working constitution these have ceased to be 
important 43 
37 The case of the Duke of Hamilton and Brandon, 1709. For this episode and that referred 
to in the preceding note, see Robertson, op. cit. 
38 See Ilay Campbell, Acts of Sederunt. 
39 Representative Peers (Scotland) Act, 1847, under which one title was deleted. 
40 Representative Peers (Scotland) Act, 1851, under which the House does not appear to 
have taken action. 
41 Riddell's Peerage Law, 269 -270; cf. Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution, Vol. I, 
211. It may be noted that the Act of Union with Ireland contained provisions for the 
limited creation in the future of peers of Ireland. 
42 Walker Trustees v. Lord Advocate, 1912 S.C.(H.L.) 12; 1910 S.C. 1037, in which case, 
however, the Lord Advocate argued that a Scottish peerage could still be granted. It is 
arguable whether the point was essential to the decision. The Report H.L.P. 23 (1962 -63) 
recommends legislation to put this beyond doubt. 
43 Questions of the trial of peers ceased to be important after the Criminal Justice Act, 
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The peers spiritual. The origin of the bishops in the House of Lords 
is imprecise. The position of some as tenants in chief had its influence, 
as did their spiritual capacity.44 They consist of bishops of the Church 
of England only, bishops of the Church of Ireland and the Church in 
Wales being excluded by the Acts disestablishing those Churches. From 
1847, at the time of the creation of the bishopric of Manchester, the 
number of lords spiritual has been fixed and that bench now consists 
of the two Archbishops of Canterbury and York, the Bishops of London, 
Durham and Winchester and twenty -one others according to their seniority 
of appointment. At one time both the appointment of bishops and the 
part played by them in the House had considerable political importance, 
but the first has ceased to have any such significance, and the part played 
by the bishops in the activities of the House even in non -political matters 
has now very greatly diminished.4s 
A claim was advanced in 1953 on behalf of the Church of Scotland 
for representation in the House by analogy with this representation of 
the Church of England 48 Apart from doctrinal difficulties, it is difficult 
to see how such representation could be arranged, though it is to be 
noted that among the appointments to life peerages there has been one 
distinguished elder of the Church. 
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary. There was difficulty in securing the 
services of a sufficient number of persons to discharge the judicial functions 
of the House, and there was the more serious difficulty of ensuring that 
such persons were properly qualified. After the failure to solve these 
difficulties by means of life peerages as a result of the Wensleydale Case,47 
some relief was found in elevations to the peerage, such as that of Lord 
Colonsay, but the real reform came with the Appellate Jurisdiction 
Act, 1876, authorising the appointment of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary 
with life peerages and a seat in the House. Their judicial office is held 
upon the normal terms of judicial tenure, but their membership of the 
House continues after retirement from that office.48 
Life peers. Most proposals for the reform of the House of Lords 
have involved suggestions of life peerages in one form or another which 
voting (as to which see Daer v. Stewart, Jan. 24, 1792, F.C.) ceased to be important 
after 1832. Other matters, which were argued after the Union, have ceased to be im- 
portant, such as the form of oath of a peer in the ordinary courts, see, e.g., Duke of 
Montrose v. M'Auley (1711) Mor. 10029. Doubtless the old incidents of Scottish peerages 
such as the possibility of surrender (see Lady Mary Bruce v. Earl of Kincardine (1707) 
Fount. II, 367 and More's Stair, cclxiv, and Riddell's Peerage Law, 34) continue. 
44 See Pollard, Evolution of Parliament; Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution, Vol. 
I, 236 -237. 
45 Their votes were important in relation to the passage of the Parliament Act, 1911, for 
the modern position see Bromhead, op. cit. 53 et seq. 
48 Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs (Cmd. 9212), § 106. 
47 (1856) 5 H.L.C. 958. 
48 Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1887, Judicial Pensions Act, 1959. Thus they may, even 
after retirement, sit for the purposes of hearing appeals in a different capacity, as peers 
who have held high judicial office -see post, p. 113. 
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would carry the right to a seat in the House of Lords. Under the Life 
Peerages Act, 1958, it became possible to confer a life peerage which would 
also (subject to the disqualifications of general law) carry the right to 
receive a writ of summons. Such peerages may be conferred upon 
women, though the disabilities affecting peeresses in their own right 
remained until 1963.49 The number of appointments under this head has 
been limited and is almost insignificant in relationship to the total number 
of the House. It is not, however, insignificant in relation to the normal 
" working " membership. Appointments have been varied, a relatively 
high number have been made among those who have followed a political 
career,b0 but there have also been appointments from among men of 
distinction in other walks of life. The first list and that in 1962 contained 
names of persons designated as being appointed after consultation with 
the Leader of the Opposition. While members of the opposition party 
have at other times been appointed this phrase has not been used, and 
it is probable that the Leader of the Opposition was not consulted. 
It is clear from the separation of these lists from the ordinary Honours 
Lists, that elevations to the peerage under this head are, at present, 
somewhat differently regarded from those under the traditional heads. 
In particular some attempt is made by this method to " balance " the 
composition of the House in a variety of ways.b1 It is as yet too early 
to say much of the constitutional significance of this device. 
Some general characteristics of the House. The composition of the 
House is varied. Members have expertise in a wide range of subjects. 
Others have the invaluable quality (in a legislative assembly) of ordinari- 
ness, but the size and general political bias of the House present difficulties. 
While the number of " working " members may be relatively small, 
the threat of the " backwoodsman " exists, at least on paper.b2 On 
the other hand neither wealth nor leisure necessarily accompanies nobility 
today. Hence, in this century there have been many proposals for 
reform, these have involved modifications of the hereditary principle, 
life peerages, indirect elections and arrangements to ensure a representa- 
tion of non -political bodies.b3 Fresh conversations have been announced 
in November 1961 between the major parties. The difficulty in the 
49 Peerage Act, 1963, s. 6. 
50 Nearly two -thirds of the first 36 nominations might be classed as " political." 
b1 These lists are normally kept apart from the " Honours List " and appointments to 
achieve the similar objects to those desired at the time of the elevation of the first Lord 
._Stansgate (see The Times, Dec. 23, 1941) are now made by this means. It must be remem- 
bered that heirship to a peerage can substantially limit or injure a career in the House 
of Commons, and the use of a life peerage as an honour should not be precluded, though 
such consequences are lessened by the Peerage Act, 1963. 
52 The largest number voting in a division in modern times is 333 in 1956 on the issue of 
the abolition of capital punishment. See Bromhead, op. cit., Chap. III. 
53 Apart from the two Command Papers (1918) Cd. 9038, and (1948) Cmd. 7380, see the 
summaries in Bailey, The Future of the House of Lords (Hansard Society), and Parliamentary 
Reform 1933 -58 issued by that Society; Bromhead, op. cit. and Jennings, Parliament, 
Chap. XI; Morrison, Government and Parliament from Within, Chap. IX; Lord Chorley, 












































THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 93 
past has been that whereas there was broad agreement on the elements 
of the reform of composition such agreement has been lacking on the 
question of function. Hence the reforms promised in the preamble to 
the Parliament Act, 1911, have only taken shape in the Act of 1958 
(which was not an agreed measure) and the Peerage Act, 1963, and in 
certain modifications in the practice of the House.b4 Under resolutions of 
the House, peers are entitled to claim the cost of railway fares between 
their homes and London incurred in performing their parliamentary 
duties and to recover expenses similarly incurred up to a maximum of 
three guineas a day and a total of £315 in any one year.ó5 The modifi- 
cation of greater constitutional significance is the Standing Order relating 
to leave of absence.b8 Under this members are invited at the beginning 
of each Parliament to apply for leave of absence, and any peer who 
does not reply and does not attend within the first month is deemed to 
have so applied. Members who are granted leave of absence on either 
ground are not expected to attend, unless they terminate that leave by 
notice. This attempt to control any sudden emergence of the back- 
woodsmen depends for its force on purely moral sanctions, the House 
having concluded that it had no power to deprive a member of his right 
to attend, a deprivation which would amount to an interference with 
general legal rights. The shape of the rule thus indicates a clear view of 
the limits of the privilege of the House in controlling its own composition. 
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 
Constituencies. A convenient starting point is to be found in the con- 
stituencies now regulated by the House of Commons (Redistribution 
of Seats) Acts, 1949 and 1958. The combined effect of this legislation 
is that the Boundary Commissioners, set up by those Acts, are directed 
to aim at achieving a House of approximately 613 members not less 
than seventy -one of whom shall come from Scottish constituencies and 
not less than thirty -five from Welsh ones, and twelve from Northern 
Ireland.b7 Under the Acts there are four commissions, for England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, each with the Speaker as Chairman 
and a judge as Deputy Chairman,58 which are to report on each con- 
stituency at intervals of not less than ten and not more than fifteen 
years. Their object is to achieve rough uniformity of constituencies 
by finding the appropriate electoral quota for an " average " constituency 
54 Further reforms of composition are forecast as a result of (1962 -63) H.L.P. 23. 
66 178 Lords Journal 282, and 189 Lords Journal 244. 
66 S.O. 21. For the report leading up to the adoption of this, see Report on the Powers 
of the House in Relation to the Attendance of its Members (1956) H.L.P. 66-1 and the 
debate in H.L.Deb. 206. 
67 The present house numbers 630. Monmouthshire is here part of Wales. For an account 
of the Acts see Craig, " Parliament and the Boundary Commission " [1959] Public Law, 
and generally Jennings, Party Politics, Vol. I, Appeal to the People. 
58 There are two other members of each with the appropriate Registrar General and the 
Director of Ordnance Survey as Assessors. 
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by dividing the electorate of that part of the United Kingdom by the 
number of constituencies therein.ó9 Provisions are made to ensure a degree 
of unity in constituencies, or rather to avoid too sharp a disunity, and 
the whole rules are a compromise between cold analysis and community 
sentiments. Thus the interval of review was extended by the 1958 Act 
to preserve continuity of feeling in a constituency, even though mathe- 
matical equality may suffer, and the discretion conferred upon the Com- 
missions by section 2 (2) of the 1958 Act emphasises this compromise.6o 
It is to be noted that the starting point is number of electors; this factor 
combined with the absence of any residence rule for candidates emphasises 
the fact that members represent national parties much more than localities. 
The franchise. The basis of the franchise is now " one man, one 
vote " which is the result of a long period of reform and simplification,ß1 
and which adds importance to the equalisation of constituencies. Those 
entitled to vote at any election are British subjects (or citizens of the 
Republic of Ireland) who are of full age, not subject to any legal dis- 
qualification, and are upon the operative register.ó2 Registration depends 
upon residence in a particular constituency, on the qualifying date, 
which is now October 10 in any year.ó3 The fact that residence is the 
test, makes it possible to be on the register for one or more constituencies, 
but a vote can be cast in only one. The register, which is created by a 
canvass, is the responsibility of the registration officer 64 who determines 
in the first instance claims and objections to registration, and similarly 
decides on claims to vote by post or by proxy, or to be registered as 
a service voter.ß5 From this decision appeal lies in Scotland to the sheriff 
and thence to a special court of three judges of the Court of Session.66 
The disqualifications from voting (which will apply even though an 
individual's name is on the register) are infancy, alienage, peerage 
(unless the peerage has been disclaimed), conviction for felony, or corrupt 
or illegal practices,87 insanity. 
59 The detailed rules are to be found in the Schedules to the 1949 Act as amended by the 
Act of 1958. 
so The original rules had proved too rigid in practice, see Harper v. S. of S. for Home 
Department [1955] Ch. 238, a case which, in substance, demonstrates the modem reluc- 
tance of courts to interfere in what might be looked upon as Parliamentary matters. 
61 Keir, Constitutional History of Modern Britain, Chap. VIII, and Butler, The Electoral 
System in Britain since 1918. 62 Representation of the People Act, 1949, s. 1. 
63 Electoral Registers Act, 1953, s. 1. The date is September 15 for Northern Ireland. 
The economy measure which reduced a six- monthly register to an annual register has 
become permanent. 
64 The assessor of a county or large burgh in Scotland, the clerk of an appropriate authority 
elsewhere: Representation of the People Act, 1949, s. 6. 
65 See Representation of the People Act, 1949, ss. 12 and 13 and, as an illustration, Daly 
v. Watson, 1960 S.C. 216. 
66 In England appeal lies to the county court (see, e.g., R. v. Hurst, ex p. Smith [1960] 2 
Q.B. 133) and thence to the Court of Appeal, and see generally for detailed rules Schofield, 
Parliamentary Elections. 
67 Representation of the People Act, 1949, s. 40. This includes disqualification under 
the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, 1889, s. 2, arising from corruption not connected 
with elections. It should be noted that the Forfeiture Act, 1870, disqualifying convicted 













































THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 95 
Voting and the conduct of an election. The basic rule is of course 
the secrecy of the ballot which was established in 1872, and is now 
protected by detailed rules.88 Provision is made for voting by proxy 
(mainly for servicemen and Crown servants abroad), and by post (for 
those unable to get to the poll) in exceptional cases.e" There is equally a 
large body of legislation aimed against corrupt and illegal practice at 
elections,70 which hits at the more obvious forms of corruption, but 
which, by rigid rules as to expenses and as to who may authorise expen- 
diture, also goes much further. Some provisions should be noted as 
affecting the general conduct of an election. The aim is not merely to 
keep the election clean, but within limits to keep it calm. Thus, the 
use of bands, banners and torches is prohibited, as is the use of wireless 
broadcasts from abroad, domestic broadcasting being regulated by 
conventional rules to maintain a rough balance among parties. Moreover 
a deliberate attempt is made to " close the ring " and keep election 
activity to the contestants and their authorised supporters. No one 
other than the candidate's agent may lawfully incur expenditure on 
certain major things with a view to promoting the election of a candidate.71 
These provisions may, as they stand, be difficult of enforcement,72 and 
perhaps of interpretation.73 These latter difficulties are inherent in the 
subject- matter and in some cases their existence enhances the deterrent 
effect of legislation rather than detracting from it. 
The character of an election is also strongly influenced by the electoral 
timetable. The proclamation dissolving the old Parliament directs 
an election for the new. Nominations must be made not later than the 
eighth day after the proclamation summoning a new Parliament and 
polling is on the ninth day thereafter.74 When it is remembered that it is 
extremely rare for a Parliament to run its full course, and that the date 
of dissolution is at the choice of a Prime Minister, it is clear that intense 
political activity is concentrated into a relatively short period, which 
cannot be predicted long in advance with any degree of accuracy. This 
concentration is probably desirable. 
The conduct of the election is the responsibility of the returning 
fis See the election rules scheduled to the Representation of the People Act, 1949. 
69 See Representation of the People Act, 1949, s. 13. 
79 It has been said that " A corrupt practice is a thing which the mind goes along with. 
An illegal practice is a thing the legislature is determined to prevent whether it is done 
honestly or dishonestly ": Barrow in Furness (1886) 4 O'M. & H. 76. The main body 
of law is now contained in the Representation of the People Act, 1949. For its evolution 
see O'Leary, The Elimination of Corrupt Practices in British Elections, 1868 -1911. 
71 Representation of the People Act, 1949, s. 63. 
72 R. v. Tronoh Mines Ltd. [1952] 1 All E.R. 697, which shows that generalised intervention 
will be outside the Act; for other examples see Butler, The British General Election of 
1951, pp. 31 -34, and Gwyn, Democracy and the Cost of Politics. 
73 e.g., the period covered by s. 48 limiting expenses is not entirely certain. It is in fact 
rare for the allowed amount to be expended, see the figures in Butler, op. cit. 139. 
74 Representation of the People Act, 1949, Sched. II. By Representation of the People 
Act, 1918, s. 21 (3), the interval between the proclamation and the meeting of the new 
Parliament must not be less than 20 days. 
96 PARLIAMENT -THE STRUCTURE 
officer (who, in Scotland, is the sheriff 76), who will decide by lot in 
case of equality of votes. Candidates must be nominated by a proposer 
and seconder supported by eight other electors. Nomination must be 
accompanied by a deposit of £150 to be forfeited if the candidate does not 
poll one -eighth of the votes cast, and the candidatás consent (incorporating 
a declaration of his belief that he is not disqualified). It may be noticed 
that neither on the nomination paper nor on the polling paper may 
there be any reference to a political party. The result of an election 
may be challenged by an election petition,78 heard by an election court 
consisting of two judges of the Court of Session (or of the High Court 
elsewhere). The trial may occur in the constituency. The petition in 
modern times is most commonly a challenge to the capacity of the elected 
candidate, but it may refer to any matter which could affect the validity 
of an election.77 The court reports to the House of Commons, and, in 
cases where there have been malpractices, to the appropriate authority 
with a view to prosecution. In particular the court may, where the 
first candidate has been found to be disqualified and the disqualification 
was well known at the time of the election, declare the second candidate 
(even though he received fewer votes) elected on the grounds that votes 
cast for his rival were thrown away.78 The report to the House of the 
result of the election must it seems be accepted without debate.79 This 
procedure is a mark of the claim of the House to regulate its own com- 
position. The trial of election petitions, having been in the past of 
considerable political importance, and being often formerly determined 
in the House on political grounds, the matter was eventually, after a 
series of attempts to secure neutrality in the House,60 handed over to 
the courts. The place of the House is preserved by the reporting pro- 
cedure, and by the fact that the House retains power to determine questions 
of qualification, where, for example, the time for presenting a petition 
has expired.81 
Candidates and members. By law all that is required is that a candidate 
shall be a British subject of full age not suffering from any legal disability. 
Neither by law nor convention is there any requirement of residence, so 
that the " locality " of the member's interest may again be limited. The 
disabilities are similar to those discussed in relation to peers, subject 
to the addition of peerage, and of those arising from having been 
76 The sheriff (in the different, non - judicial sense) is the returning officer in an English 
county constituency; in boroughs, etc., the returning officer is the mayor or chairman. 
78 See generally the Representation of the People Act, 1949, Part III. Allegations of corrup- 
tion, etc., may be investigated under the alternative procedure of the Election Com- 
missioners Act, 1949. Reports of such Commissioners under earlier legislation led, 
even in the 19th century, to the temporary disfranchisement of constituencies. 
77 See, e.g., Re Kensington North Parliamentary Election [1960] 2 All E.R. 150. 
78 Beresford -Hope v. Lady Sandhurst (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 79; Re Bristol S.E. Election [1961] 
3 All E.R. 354. 
79 Representation of the People Act, 1949, s. 124 (3) and 545 H.C.Deb. 41. 
80 See post, p. 104. 
81 See, e.g., the proceedings in 1955 in the constituencies of Fermanagh and S. Tyrone and 
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convicted of corrupt or illegal practices. Further there are the rules of 
disqualification from membership of the House which will be discussed 
below. It is to be noted, however, that the returning officer is not entitled 
to reject a nomination on the ground that the candidate is disqualified. 
Such matters are, as has been indicated, to be tried either by election 
petition or by the House itself. 
The main disqualifications of constitutional importance are now 
contained in the House of Commons Disqualification Act, 1957. The 
history of disqualifications indicates both the evolution of our constitu- 
tional institutions and the varied purposes that the rules are designed 
to serve. In Scotland the Officers of State had long (though not without 
interruption) been present in Parliament ex officio, and indeed for long 
played a dominant role in the Committee of Articles which itself often 
ruled Parliament 82 In the years before the Union, however, the growing 
strength of Parliament was reflected in practices affecting their position. 
A commissioner appointed to one of the great offices lost his seat as 
commissioner, though retaining his place as officer.83 In England events 
went further. The Act of Settlement of 1701 would, by excluding all 
placemen, had that provision come into force, have excluded all office 
holders, and thus frustrated any development of cabinet government. 
Underlying this were theories of the separation of powers, discontent 
with the attempt at a diarchical system under the earlier Stuarts, and 
a desire for the independence of Parliament from the executive.84 That 
provision was repealed by the Regency Act, 1705,85 which substituted a 
distinction between " old " (pre -1705) and new offices, a distinction 
which in time was translated into one between political and other offices. 
The process of change was slow and accompanied by many inconven- 
iences 88- particularly those arising from the necessity of re- election 
on nomination to an old office, a requirement that was first modified 
and then repealed.87 There were not only inconveniences, but also 
uncertainties in the working of the system. It was doubtful how ancient 
offices in Scotland fitted into the scheme,88 it was often doubtful what 
was an office of profit since the profit could be purely hypothetical. 
Moreover as time passed provisions became inappropriate; the develop- 
ment of corporate firms had that effect upon the exclusion of Crown 
contractors.B9 Other matters became important in relation to the House 
82 Though in 1689 Parliament excluded the Officers from all Committees unless elected 
thereto (A.P.S. IX, App. 128), by an Act of 1690 their power was substantially restored 
(A.P.S. IX, 113). 
83 A.P.S. X, 11. 
84 See Dodd, The Growth of Responsible Government from James I to Victoria, for a general 
account. 
85 Which was extended to the United Kingdom by the Succession to the Crown Act, 1707. 
88 See Alphaeus Todd, Parliamentary Government in England, H, 27. 
87 Re- Election of Ministers Acts, 1919 and 1926. 
88 The Case of Maitland, Wight, Election Laws 298; Bell, Election Laws 452. 
89 It was only those who contracted personally who were excluded, and with the evolution 
of government contracts made by individuals which were quite insignificant could dis- 
qualify. 
M.C.L.-7 
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such as the isolation of the boards of nationalised industries. The 
process of piecemeal reform continued,90 but after a flurry of validation 
and indemnity legislation in 1955 -56 an attempt was made by the House 
of Commons Disqualification Act, 1957, to reform and consolidate the 
law. 
This Act incorporates several principles. There is first the traditional 
one of the independence of the House from the Crown or, in modern 
times, the Government. A Government today may have close on 130 
ministers of varying grades, if Parliamentary Private Secretaries are 
included. If to that number is added a number of would -be ministers 
their influence in a House of 630 could be substantial. There is also, 
granted a bicameral Parliament, the necessity of having the Government 
represented in both Houses. So section 2 (1) of the Act limits the number 
of holders of ministerial office who may have seats in the House to seventy 
in all, with not more than twenty -seven holders of the offices listed in 
Part I of the Second Schedule (which includes all the senior ministers 
with the exception of the Law Ofpicers).91 For different reasons, those 
of neutrality, there are excluded civil servants,92 members of the regular 
forces and the holders of judicial offices strictly defined,93 as well as 
members of various tribunals in which neutrality is particularly im- 
portant.94 Equally full-time police are excluded in the same interest. 
Outside these large groups there are set out in Parts II and III of the 
First Schedule a large list of disqualifying offices. Some of the dis- 
qualifications, like membership of the board of a nationalised industry, 
are intended to keep lines of constitutional responsibility clear, others, 
such as the disqualification of town clerks exist because of the incompati- 
bility of the two offices. Again, however, principles interlock. Advocates 
depute are not excluded, from the House, probably on the grounds 
that parliamentary experience is desirable for some who might become 
Lord Advocate. Further, where suspicion of local influence might arise, 
holders of particular offices are excluded by Part IV of that Schedule from 
the constituencies likely to be affected by such influences. Finally there 
is a provision against combining membership of the House and member- 
ship of any legislature outside the Commonwealth, to prevent double 
membership of the parliaments at Westminster and Dublin which would 
99 Including the House of Commons Disqualification (Declaration of Law) Acts, 1931 
and 1935, Ministers of the Crown Act, 1937, Ministers of the Crown (Parliamentary 
Secretaries) Act, 1951. So far as these Acts, as amended, regulate numbers, e.g., of 
Secretaries of State they must be read with the 1957 Act. 
91 Part II of that Schedule has already been amended by the addition of a further office 
-Ministers of the Crown (Parliamentary Secretaries) Act, 1960. In the debates pre- 
ceding that Act the problem of governmental influence was raised: 630 H.C.Deb. 700. 
92 S. 1 (i) (b). In addition civil servants are restricted from standing for Parliament without 
resigning. 
93 See Part I of First Schedule which covers all normal judicial offices, but it may be noticed 
that honorary sheriff substitutes are not included. The origin of the exclusion of Senators 
of the College of Justice by the Act of 1733 had a strong political background. See 
1957 S.L.T.(News) 134. 













































THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 99 
otherwise be possible, since, as has already been seen Citizens of the 
Republic of Ireland are eligible to stand. 
It is clear that some provisions are inserted with an eye to the interest 
of the House, some to the world outside. The Act is not, however, com- 
plete. It repealed (section 9) the disqualification of Crown pensioners 
and Crown contractors. The former had become insignificant, the 
position of the latter, it was concluded, was best regulated by the House 
itself in the form of privilege.95 Control of the House over its own 
membership, is to an extent increased, since amendments to the First 
Schedule may be made by Order in Council," and the House has, under 
section 6 (2), power to waive a disqualification where the grounds for 
it have ceased, but without prejudice to any election petition. Such a 
waiver will however prevent a petition (under section 7) to Her Majesty 
in Council, to be referred to the Judicial Committee, claiming that a 
person is disqualified from membership under the Act.97 Traditional 
disqualifying offices such as the Stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds 
are preserved to make it possible for members to resign, but it is specifi- 
cally provided (section 8) that no member or candidate can be required 
to accept a disqualifying office.98 
95 See [1957] Public Law 340 et seq. Privilege may well afford a more flexible method of 
regulating the matter. 
98 See, e.g., S.I. 1960 No. 2468 adding among other disqualifying offices the government 
director of MacBraynes Ltd. 
97 Such a petition, while serving the same purpose as an election petition, could be presented 
after time for the latter had expired. 
98 At one time such devices were used to get rid of inconvenient members. The section 
is to be confined to its proper context: Re Bristol S.E. Parliamentary Election Petition 
[1961] 3 All E.R. 354. 
CHAPTER 7 
PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES 
Introduction. Before turning to the functions of Parliament something 
should be said of Parliamentary privilege. The basic concept of privilege 
is a very common one, which appears under different names. Prerogative 
is in this sense a variant of privilege, and essentially the word covers 
those special rules which enable a public body to perform its proper 
task. Redlich's definition of the privileges of the Commons -" The 
sum of the fundamental rights of the House and of its individual members 
as against the prerogatives of the Crown, the authority of the ordinary 
Courts of Law, and the special rights of the House of Lords," 1 while 
being in a sense accurate, is deficient unless allowance is made for this 
element of purpose, and also for the rights which one House claims against 
the other.2 It is this element of purpose which gives both historical and 
continuing importance to the topic, but it must be remembered that, 
while the general purpose of maintaining the independence of Parliament 
has been constant, the particular purposes have varied from time to 
time, and thus inconsistency may appear in the authorities. Privilege 
fed upon, and was fed by, the general growth of Parliament.3 At one 
period the struggle in relation to privilege was with the Crown, at another 
with the courts, today the struggle is sometimes with various private or 
unofficial bodies outside Parliament, but at no time has any particular 
conflict ceased to be important. 
Further, the whole discussion of privilege is important in a more 
general way. The doctrines upon which claims to privilege are founded, 
and upon which the jurisdiction of the courts is admitted or restricted 
have much in common with those which underlie other issues, such as 
the sovereignty of Parliament.4 Underlying all these disputes is the 
argument whether or not the law and custom of Parliament is something 
distinct from the general law of the land. Because of the fundamental 
nature of privilege such questions cannot, with us, often be answered 
with precision, but they must be borne in mind in any reading upon 
the subject. 
1 Redlich and Ilbert, Procedure of the House of Commons, I, 46. 
2 These, such as the Commons privileges in finance, are most conveniently dealt with under 
the powers or function of the House. 
s In Scotland the rise of Parliament is marked by the growth of its control over its own 
privileges in relation to the elections: see Rait, Parliaments of Scotland, 309 et seg. In 
England this double growth is reflected in the attitude of the courts, which, once Parlia- 
ment had established its place, watched more closely the claims to privilege. 
4 In particular there is a resemblance between such cases as Wauchope's Case (1842) 






































THE PRIVILEGES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 101 
To a great extent the particular origins of many of the rules may 
be said to be English. For this there are two main reasons. The fact 
that the Union Parliament met in London meant that there was a natural 
tendency to refer to precedents which were there familiar. Secondly, 
in 1707, doctrines of parliamentary privilege were more fully developed 
in England, and it was, therefore, natural that the greater should be 
accepted as the basis since the major rules which had been established 
were those strengthening Parliament against the Crown. Nevertheless, 
privilege had been developing in Scotland in much the same way as in 
England. The Act of 1701 6 had declared that members were not to 
be imprisoned on any account whatever during the session of Parliament 
without a warrant from Parliament; the Claim of Right claimed freedom 
of speech and debate (though the terms of the Claim of Right and other 
instances can be used to show that privilege was not yet firmly established).° 
The differences of origin were not therefore generally important since 
the aims in England and Scotland were identical. Moreover to a large 
extent the principles of privilege may be universal,8 and thus the assign- 
ment of particular local origin may on the most general level be unimpor- 
tant. From 1707 the process of unification continued as a result both of 
legislation and of decision ° and as a general rule the law must be taken 
as uniform, though in particular cases where procedural rules of general 
law are important there may still be differences. There is, however, little 
modem authority in Scotland, and the weight of English authority as 
forming a pattern of thought must be regarded as substantial. 
THE PRIVILEGES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 
The traditional claim. It will be convenient to deal in the first place with 
the privileges of the House of Commons. By custom the Speaker claims 
certain privileges at the beginning of each Parliament 10 These cover 
freedom of the person of members, liberty of speech, access to the 
5 Act for preventing wrongous Imprisonment, etc., A.P.S. X, 272. 
6 See the case of Lord Belhaven, 1702, A.P.S. XI, 65b, 66a; and earlier see A.P.S. VIII, 
247a. Parliamentary privilege was not a new found thing in Scotland. In 1587 the 
King had promised to do nothing to prejudice free voting and reasoning of the Estates 
(A.P.S. III, 443), but the history of the country had prevented any steady evolution; 
compare, e.g., the case in 1663, A.P.S. VII, App. 101b, though see as to England the 
Case of Sir William Williams (1684) 13 St.Tr. 1370. 
7 Though the claim that the member was absens reipublicae causa, which was the basis 
of some privileges in Scotland, made some consequences of " privilege " somewhat 
broader in scope and less peculiar to Parliament than did the basis in England. Moreover 
the Scottish basis left no doubt that the rules of privilege were part of the ordinary law 
of the land. On occasion the Scottish courts would concede greater privilege than would 
be allowed in England, see Mackintosh v. Dempster (1767) Macl.Rem.Cas. 383 (No. 79). 
Such cases indicate the uncertainties about privilege in Scotland. 
8 Compare Methodist Federation for Social Action v. Eastland (1957) 141 F.Supp. 729, 
where a result which could here be reached on grounds of privilege was reached by way 
of the doctrine of the separation of powers. 
° The Parliamentary Privilege Act, 1770, extended the Act 12 & 13 Will. 3 to Scotland; 
and more generally see Hume, Criminal Law, Vol. II, Chap. I. Uncertainty can arise 
even in modern times, see (1955) H.C.P. 35, though in that particular case there need 
have been no uncertainty. 
10 For the form in which they are claimed see Erskine May, 16th ed., p. 45. 
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Sovereign, and the claim that the proceedings of the Commons shall 
receive the most favourable construction. The last, which has reference 
to early struggles of the House and to early forms of legislation, is now 
of little importance. The right of access is a corporate right exercised 
through the Speaker, and again was at one time important in relation 
to petitions for the redress of grievances, and important for the evolution 
of the House, as under Speaker Lenthall in his passage with Charles I, 
but it is now mainly used for formal purposes only. Nevertheless it is 
of some continuing importance since the right is a one -way right. It thus 
excludes the Sovereign from taking current official interest in matters 
pending in the House. Hence, officially, the Queen receives only decisions 
of the House as a whole," and in this respect that traditional claim 
could have a continuing importance. 
The first of the privileges thus claimed is, in its present form, much 
more limited than was once the case. At one stage it covered members, 
their goods and their servants, but the extent of the privilege thus defined, 
having provoked protests,12 was whittled away 13 so that it now only 
confers immunity from civil arrest for forty days before and forty days 
after the meeting of Parliament, and, with the diminution in the signifi- 
cance of imprisonment as a means of enforcing a debt,14 this aspect of 
the privilege has lost much importance. The privilege does not extend 
to arrest in respect of criminal offences,'5 and the House in the case of 
Wilkes declared that it did not extend to imprisonment for seditious 
libel. Generally the privilege does not affect imprisonment for contempt 
of court, at least where that contempt has a quasi -criminal aspect, but 
it seems that it will protect where the contempt is civil.18 It seems, 
however, that the House can insist on release in a suitable case. 
This privilege is based upon the theory that the House has a prior 
claim upon its members' services, and on that basis no citation or subpoena 
can be issued to a member to appear as a witness without leave of the 
House, and members are immune from jury service.17 It was at one 
11 Mr. Baldwin, in a not very serious matter, seriously reminded George V of the con- 
stitutional position. Nicholson, George V, 428 -429. 
12 Livingston v. Morison (1710) Fount. II, 526. In Scotland this privilege rests on the Act 
for preventing wrongous imprisonment, 1701 (A.P.S. X, 272). 
13 Parliamentary Privilege Act, 1770. 
14 The Debtors Act, 1880, and the Civil Imprisonment Act, 1882, and as to England the 
Debtors Act, 1869. Members were subject to the Act of 1772 in relation to sequestration, 
and to the modern form of bankruptcy under the Act of 1856. As to England see now 
the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, s. 128. For the protection under the old law see Molison 
v. Clark (1707) Mor. 10398 and A.P.S. V, 614a. 
15 The Act of 1701 for preventing wrongous imprisonment provided that if a member 
committed a capital crime or a manifest breach of the peace he was to be secured and 
delivered to the High Constable until Parliament decide what should be done, and that 
provision remains in force. In general the House is informed of the arrest of any member. 
It may be noted that in Mackintosh v. Dempster (1767) Macl.Rem.Cas. 383, the Court 
of Justiciary was prepared to allow a plea of privilege in some criminal matters. Detention 
under Defence Regulations is not prevented by this privilege (1939 -40), H.C. 164. 
16 The Case of Long Wellesley (1831) 2 Russ. & M. 639 (C.J. (1830 -31) 701); compare on 
the civil side Stourton v. Stourton [1963] 1 All E.R. 606, and see Goudy, Bankruptcy, 
4th ed., 71. 
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stage maintained that this privilege created an immunity from being 
impleaded, but the Parliamentary Privilege Act, 1770, excludes the 
claim of privilege as a bar to the prosecution of an action.18 
Freedom of speech. In practice the most important of these traditional 
privileges today is that of freedom of speech. Originally this privilege 
was of the greatest importance in establishing the position of the House 
as against the Crown. It was with this aspect that many of the great 
cases, such as Haxey's Case 12 or The Case of Hollis, Valentine and Elliot,2o 
were concerned, as also were the Commons Protest of 1621 and the 
claims to freedom of speech in both the Bill of Rights and Claim of 
Right.21 The right as against the Crown was effectively established at 
the Revolution. Freedom of speech as against others outside Parliament 
is equally important, and must be taken to be similarly established. The 
Bill of Rights is much more specific than is the Claim of Right, providing 
that " Freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought 
not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parlia- 
ment." 22 Thus no action will lie for defamatory words spoken in 
Parliament, but the privilege related to internal proceedings, and a 
report ordered to be published by the House was held not to be privileged. 23 
Legislation was accordingly passed conferring absolute privilege in 
relation to papers published by order of either House, and qualified 
privilege upon those who print extracts from or abstracts of such papers.24 
Unofficial reports in newspapers of either House receive the limited 
protection of qualified privilege under the Defamation Act, 1952, s. 7.25 
In modern times yet another aspect of this freedom has become 
apparent. It is common for members to owe some form of allegiance 
to associations of various types outside Parliament. The House will 
regard as a breach of privilege any case where such allegiance improperly 
18 As to the scope of this Act see Re Parliamentary Privilege Act, 1770 [1958] A.C. 331 
to be discussed subsequently. In Scotland the effect on actions was not clear, see Lady 
Greenock v. Sir John Shaw (1709) Mor. 8563 and Middleton -Suppliant (1713) Mor. 
8569, where the court would allow the action to continue but suspended diligence, and 
see A.P.S. VII, App. 101b and R.P.C. (2S) III, 623. The service of process within the 
confines of the House still probably amounts to contempt, see (1950 -51), H.C. 244. 
is (1397) Rot.Parl. iii, 434. 
20 (1629) 3 St.Tr. 294. The proceedings in relation to Lord Belhaven in 1681 demonstrate 
the importance of this aspect of privilege; A.P.S. VIII, 242a, 247b, and see A.P.S. XI, 
App. 139a. 
21 The motion for a protest against an adjournment in 1703 (A.P.S. XI, App. 65, 66) related 
to a more generalised freedom of debate. 
22 The Act of 1770 had no effect upon this provision, see Re Parliamentary Privilege Act, 
1770 [1958] A.C. 331. 
23 Stockdale v. Hansard (1839) 9 A. & E. 1. For a discussion of the other points in this 
case see post, p. 107. 
24 Parliamentary Papers Act, 1840, the relevant provisions of which are by the Defamation 
Act, 1952, s. 9, extended to broadcasting. 
25 In England the law formerly depended upon Wason v. Walter (1868) L.R. 4 Q.B. 73, and 
the Law of Libel Amendment Act, 1888. This Act did not apply to Scotland. It seems 
that qualified privilege would, in Scotland, attach by common law, see Shaw v. Morgan 
(1888) 15 R. 865. Now it would seem that newspapers in Scotland are protected by 
Part II (para. 8) of the Schedule and s: 7 of the Defamation Act, 1952. However the 
Act of 1888 as amended by the Act of 1952 still does not apply to Scotland. 
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influences a member in speaking or voting, but the point at which im- 
propriety begins is by no means clear.26 This freedom is circumscribed. 
The Bill of Rights runs " That the freedom of speech and debates or 
proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in 
any court." It is therefore fundamental to know what is a proceeding 
in Parliament. Clearly speeches in the House are covered.27 That phrase 
was at one stage treated as covering anything which a member " might 
say or do within the scope of his duties in the course of Parliamentary 
duties." 28 But this seems too broad. When Mr. Strauss raised in a 
letter to a Minister the methods by which the London Electricity Board 
disposed of scrap (a matter which he might have ventilated in the House, 
but for which the Minister was probably not responsible) it was held 
by the House that sending this letter did not amount to a " proceeding 
in Parliament," 29 and thus the House rejected the report of the Com- 
mittee of Privileges.30 The limits of the term are thus uncertain, and 
there is the possibility that the courts and Parliament might take different 
views upon this matter,31 but that issue must be discussed, together with 
others, in the context of the whole relationship of the courts to Parliament 
over privilege. 
Control over membership and strangers. Apart from these major 
privileges there are others of less practical importance today. The 
House claims control over its own membership and, even though, as has 
been seen, disputed elections are normally determined outside the House 
by way of election petitions, the form of privilege is preserved in these 
cases. Nevertheless the House still retains power to exclude a member 
who is disqualified,32 or to expel or otherwise discipline a member for 
offences against the House. It is on this foundation that the power of 
the House to direct the issue of writs for by- elections rests. The House, 
too, claims the right to exclude strangers, and to restrain the publication 
of debates. The former (now embodied in S.O. No. 105) may be used 
as a tactic in party warfare, and may also be used to secure a secret 
session, though the secrecy of the latter was, in wartime, substantially 
reinforced by Defence Regulations.33 The latter privilege was used 
to restrain partial reporting but, from the time of Wilkes, has not been 
insisted on save in the interests of secrecy. From 1908 Hansard, the official 
26 See particularly (1946 -47) H.C. 118 and (1943 -44) H.C. 85. It is clear that the machinery 
of the party Whips, being parliamentary, is outside these rules. 
27 See, e.g., Dillon v. Balfour (1887) 20 L.R.(I.R.) 600, but not everything which occurs 
in the precincts of Westminster is privileged. Rivlin v. Bilainkin [1953] 1 Q.B. 485. 
28 (1939) H.C. 101. 
29 (1957 -58) 570 H.C.Deb. 208 -346. 
30 (1956 -57) H.C. 305. For a discussion of these events see Thomson, " Letters to Ministers 
and Parliamentary Privilege " [1958] Public Law 10, and de Smith, " Parliamentary Privi- 
lege and the Bill of Rights" (1958) 21 M.L.R. 465. It may be noted that such letters 
would in any event be covered by qualified privilege. 
31 [1958] A.C. at pp. 353 -354. 
32 See, too, House of Commons Disqualification Act, 1957, ss. 6 and 7. 
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report of debates, has been under the control of the House.34 One 
element of this privilege remains important: leave of the House is necessary 
before evidence may be given of proceedings therein.35 
Exclusive jurisdiction and contempt. Further the House makes two 
important claims. First, it claims exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings 
within its walls. This claim has many aspects, some of which affect 
the privileges already mentioned, but above all this claim affects relation- 
ships with the courts, and it will be there discussed. Second, the House 
claims the right to punish both members and non -members for contempt. 
Contempt is a concept somewhat broader than privilege. While a 
breach of privilege may be punished by the House as contempt, not all 
contempts can be assigned to any specific head of privilege. Generally 
it suffices to say that this power will be used to protect the dignity and 
effectiveness of the House. Thus, interfering with witnesses before 
Committees of the House, or obstructing members, or abusing or pillory- 
ing them will be regarded as contempt.36 It is this power which can 
be used to protect growing institutions, such as the meetings of the 
parliamentary parties, and to protect the dignity and probity of the 
House against modern attacks upon it.S7 So broad a power is un- 
doubtedly necessary, but it can also be dangerous to the rest of the 
community, and as a result the Committee of Privileges has frequently 
urged restraint upon members.38 When, however, issue is joined with 
the courts the House is not so diffident in advancing its claims. 
The punishments which the House can inflict for breach of privilege 
are varied. So far as members are concerned the House can expel, 
suspend, reprimand or admonish; so far as others are concerned the 
House can imprison (as presumably it could in an extreme case of a 
member) or reprimand or admonish. Imprisonment is during the 
pleasure of the House and prorogation causes the release of the contemnor, 
who could, however, be rearrested if the House saw fit. At one time 
the House claimed the right to fine for contempt but this claim must 
now be regarded as abandoned.39 The fit punishment in any particular 
case is determined by the House as a whole, which does not always 
follow the recommendations of the Committee of Privileges 40 
The courts and privilege. Historically privilege has tended to grow, 
indeed the nature of privilege requires that it should both grow and 
34 See for the history of this matter Trewin, Printer to the House. 
35 See, e.g., 486 H.C.Deb. 1973, and Dingle v. Assoc. Newspapers Ltd. [1960] 2 Q.B. 405; 
the subsequent proceedings [1961] 2 Q.B. 162 are not here relevant. 
30 See, e.g., the instances given in Erskine May, 16th ed., 109 et seq. 
37 See (1946 -47) H.C. 138 and the debate thereon 443 H.C.Deb. 1096 -1200; see too the 
resolution passed in 1947, 445 H.C.Deb. 1095 -1159. 
38 e.g. (1950 -51) H.C. 244. 
as The last case when a fine was imposed was in 1666, and the power was denied by Lord 
Mansfield in the course of argument in R. v. Pitt (1762) 3 Burr. 1335. 
40 See, e.g., 443 H.C.Deb. 1096 -1200. For the procedure where contempt is alleged see 
Erskine May, Parliamentary Practice, Chap. VIII. 
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change, to meet changing circumstances. The extended role of Parliament 
and the emergence of new forces of many kinds, from broadcasting or 
nationalised industries to trade unions, require at least a reinterpretation 
of traditional rules. Thus the struggles in relation to privilege are not 
concluded, the more so since past conflicts have often ended in an in- 
conclusive manner and there thus remains an uncertainty even in funda- 
mentals.41 So far as conclusions have been reached they are often 
couched in terms which conceal rather than solve the real difficulties. 
Some of the oldest pronouncements upon the relationship of the courts 
to privilege must be rejected as based upon a confusion between one 
House, and the whole of Parliament acting in a legislative capacity.42 
At other times the attitude of the Commons to the courts was affected 
by the fact that, in England, the House of Lords was the ultimate court 
of appeal, and to that extent an admission of the jurisdiction of the 
courts could mean a subjection of one House to another.43 In Scotland 
political evolution had not created the same stress,44 though similar issues 
were emerging at the time of the Union. In consequence, the beginning 
of the eighteenth century may be taken as the starting point for the 
modern law of privilege, and for the reasons already discussed the Union 
did not substantially affect the development of doctrines. 
Ashby v. White, and its sequel the Case of the Men of Aylesbury (or 
Paty's Case),45 are the real starting point. The first involved the action 
of a burgess against a returning officer who had refused his vote. The 
Court of Queen's Bench held (Holt C.J. dissenting) that the action 
could not be maintained. Holt C.J., while recognising a jurisdiction in 
the Commons, maintained that here was an issue of property fit to be 
tried in the courts. It was his view which was upheld by the Lords on an 
appeal by writ of error. When others sued, they were imprisoned for 
contempt by the Commons, and their efforts to secure release produced 
the second case. Again Holt C.J. dissented. The majority of judges 
would not examine claims to privilege but, in the view of the Chief 
Justice, privilege being a matter of law, the courts must decide upon 
claims to it when the issue was properly raised. Again there was an 
appeal to the Lords, but this time, despite conferences between the 
Houses, no agreed solution was reached, so that no final answer was 
then given on the fundamental matters raised by Holt C.J. His views 
later received support in Burdett v. Abbott,4ó though the course which 
41 Re Parliamentary Privilege Act, 1770 [1958] A.C. at p. 354, per Lord Simonds. 
42 In particular Thorpe's Case (1452) 5 Rot.Parl. 240, per Fortescue C.J. The fallacy was 
often exposed, notably in Stockdale v. Hansard (1839) 9 A. & E. 1, yet it persists -see 
Bowles v. Bank of England [1913] 1 Ch. 57. 
43 This is apparent in the account of the proceedings in the Case of the Men of Aylesbury, 
Hatsell, Precedents, Vol. III. The jealousy on the part of the Commons of any inter- 
ference by a peer in an election, and of the Lords in matters of finance must be remembered. 
44 Compare A.P.S. VII, App. 101b. 
45 (1703) 2 Ld.Raym. 938; (1704) 3 Ld.Raym. 320; Paty's Case (1705) 2 Ld.Raym. 1105. 
46 (1811) 14 East 1. 
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ament that case took provoked no crisis. That crisis came with the Stockdale v. 
ing or Hansard complex of litigation. The House having ordered a report to 
tction be printed and Stockdale having thought himself libelled in it, Stockdale 
re not raised an action. In that Hansard pleaded the defence of justification 
an in- with success. In a second action,47 on the direction of the Commons, 
unda- the defence rested upon the order of the House for publication, and 
often upon the plea of privilege. As to the first plea the answer was short, 
ulties. the resolution of one House cannot alter the law. To a certain extent 
courts that point also arose on the second plea for, said Patteson J., the House 
n one could not by simple declaration give to itself new privileges. Privilege was 
city.42 a matter of law, and there was nothing mysterious in the laws and customs 
fected of Parliament. Thus, applying the law, the courts would determine 
court whether or no a privilege existed. Subject to this, so far as the internal 
)f the regulation and proceedings of either House were concerned the courts 
Aland would not inquire further. 
issues What is noticeable, apart from this insistence that privilege was a 
nning matter of law, is the analogy drawn with other courts -this is particularly 
lr the clear in the passages wherein Patteson J. dealt with commitment for 
Jnion contempt, but it runs through all the cases from Holt C.J. in Ashby v. 
White to Lord Ellenborough in Burdett v. Abbott. This aspect of privilege 
is common to both jurisdictions and was strongly emphasised by Lord 
ry (or Jeffrey.48 Equally the Court of Session showed a readiness to determine 
tction within these limits the scope of privilege 49 In Scotland as in England 
The the courts regarded privilege as a matter of law, and indeed the supposed 
tction basis of some privileges -that the member was absens reipublicae causa, 
on in or alternatively held a munus publicum, reinforces this.5° Yet this equation, 
to be in dealing with the exercise of privilege by the Commons, with the exercise 
on an of jurisdiction by another superior court, had a consequence in England 
d for which could, in practice, take away much of the protection conferred 
luced in Stockdale v. Hansard. When Stockdale brought yet another action 
udges (which was allowed to go by default) and the Sheriff of Middlesex 
Chief attempted to levy execution, the latter was committed by the House for 
upon contempt. When he sought his liberty by habeas corpus proceedings, 
is an the return to the writ was simply that he was held for contempt of the 
1 the House. Such a return was in the Case of the Sheriff of Middlesex 61 
was held to be sufficient. Had a particular ground of contempt been specified 
views the court could have looked at that and judged its validity. As it was, 
vhich since the return to the writ merely stated that those concerned were 
held under warrant from the Speaker for contempt of the House, and 
°y 
was 
47 (1839) 9 A. & E. 1; the whole background is related in Trewin, Printer to the House. 
s -see 48 The Auchterarder Case (Robertson's Report, Vol. II, 374), and see Lord Gillies at p. 34 
et seq., fully accepting the authority of Stockdale v. Hansard. ubury, 46 Lady Greenock v. Sir John Shaw (1709) Mor. 8563 and 9166; Livingston v. Morison (1709) inter- Mor. 8565; (1710) Fount. II, 526; Lord Lyon's Case (1753) Elch. sub. tit. Member No. 59, tiered. see also the High Court, Mackintosh v. Dempster (1767) Macl.Rem.Cas. 383. 
6° See Stair, III, 1, 37, and Molison v. Clark (1707) Mor. 10398, and Lady Greenock y. Sir 
05. John Shaw (1709) Mor. 8563. 
61 (1840) 11 A. & E. 273. 
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such was a good ground for detention if true, the court would go no 
further into the matter. To some extent the case may turn upon proce- 
dural peculiarities relating to that writ. If that were so the case might 
be of limited authority where, as in Scotland, habeas corpus does not, 
for these purposes, exist. Essentially however the opinions turn upon the 
deference which one superior court owes to another which is acting 
within its jurisdiction 52 This fact makes the general acceptance of 
the principle of the case more likely.53 Once it is conceded that any 
court must have power to commit for contempt for its own protection,54 
then, if it be also accepted, as it seems it must be, that in the case of a 
superior court or its equivalent another court will not normally inquire 
into justification,55 the same answer will be given in Scotland as was 
given in England, despite the fact that procedure by petition (which is 
necessary in Scotland) might at first sight seem to open up a wider possi- 
bility of debate on facts than does the English procedure. This result is 
all the more likely when allowance is made for the deference customarily 
paid by courts to Parliament or either of its Houses.56 Therefore, although 
the courts might appear to have given away in practice in the Case of the 
Sheriff' of Middlesex all that they had claimed in Stockdale v. Hansard, in 
truth the two cases go upon the same theory, and both are equally con- 
sistent with the doctrine upheld in the courts that privileges are part 
of the law of the land. 
The generalities of that complex of litigation do not, however, conclude 
the matter without further possibility of dispute. " When," said Lord 
Denman C.J. in Stockdale v. Hansard, " the subject matter falls within 
their jurisdiction, no doubt we cannot question their judgment," but 
he would question whether a particular matter did so fall or not. This 
is the question which harks back to Ashby v. White and is echoed in later 
cases such as Bradlaugh v. Gossett.57 There the distinction, inherent in 
all the cases, which is drawn between a right to be exercised within the 
House itself, such as a right of sitting, and a right to be exercised out of 
and independently, of the House. On the former the judgment of the 
52 Though in Gosset v. Howard (1845) 10 Q.B. 411 at p. 456 Parke B. put the House somewhat 
higher. 
53 See the summary of the case in Middleton v. Anderson (1842) 4 D. 957 at p. 1016, per Lord 
Mackenzie, and Lord Jeffrey in the Auchterarder Case (Robertson's Report, Vol. II, 
374). 
b4 Hamilton v. Anderson (1858) 3 MacQ. 368. 
55 Macleod v. Spiers (1884) 11 R.(J.) 26 at p. 32. In other cases, such as Milburn, 1946 S.C. 
301, where justification for committal was inquired into the circumstances were upon 
the record and, because of the form of procedure, were properly debated. 
56 Without going to the extreme of Lord Coalston in Mackintosh v. Dempster (1767) Macl. 
Rem.Cas. 383, where he said " for how would it look, if our judgement this day shall 
differ from that of the House of Commons," it is clear that such bodies must be normally 
allowed to be masters of their own affairs. 
57 (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 271, see particularly Stephen J. at 278 " I think the House of Commons 
is not subject to the control of Her Majesty's Courts in its administration of that part 
of the statute law which has relation to its own internal proceedings." For a general 
account of the background to all the Bradlaugh litigation see Armstein " Gladstone 












































PRIVILEGE IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS 109 
House would be final. On the latter the courts would judge for them- 
selves independently of what the House might say.58 The exact scope of 
what is an internal proceeding or a proceeding in Parliament is by no 
means clear. The House may, as it did in the proceedings relating to 
Mr. Strauss, change its mind, and its view need not coincide with that 
of the courts.69 It is on the whole likely that the courts today will concede 
rather more, as being the " internal " affairs of Parliament, than was 
at one time the case,80 and to that extent the possibility of conflict may 
be diminished. While it may be that, in effect, privilege is now recognised 
as a matter of general law, and to that extent the duality which provoked 
Stockdale v. Hansard is no longer strongly felt, the possibility of conflict 
nevertheless exists by reason of this room for divergent interpretations 
of certain important phrases. 
This whole story and the underlying theory has an importance which 
goes beyond the confines of privilege. As has been emphasised, privilege 
was important in the general growth of Parliament, and on the other 
side claims to privilege are affected by that growth.ß1 Even more broadly, 
these cases should be borne in mind in any discussion of the sovereignty 
of Parliament and judicial review. These cases make clear both the 
grounds for, and the limits of, the deference of courts to Parliament. 
The same sort of reasoning is applicable in cases such as Edinburgh 
and Dalkeith Ry. v. Wauchope.82 These are essentially concerned with 
the internal proceedings of Parliament, which the courts refuse to examine. 
To the extent, however, that their basis is not peculiar to legislation 
it may be that their weight in the argument about the sovereignty of 
Parliament is correspondingly reduced. Certainly the two lines of 
authority should be considered together. 
PRIVILEGE IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
The main controversies about privilege have centred upon the Commons, 
and to a large extent the privileges of the two Houses are similar, hence 
only the major points of difference will be here noted. At the outset 
privileges of Parliament must be distinguished from privileges of peerage. 
ss Cf. Bradlaugh v. Clarke (1883) 8 App.Cas. 354, and see Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort 
(1831) 2 Russ. & M. 639 at 660. 
59 In Re Parliamentary Privilege Act, 1770 [1958] A.C. 331 at 353 the court studiously 
avoided interpreting that phrase in the particular context in question. Compare however 
Riviin v. Bilainkin [1953] 1 Q.B. 485. 
6o Compare the general tenor of Harper v. Home Secretary [1955] Ch. 238, though it must 
be noted that the treatment of the validity of the Boundary Commissioners' Report 
as being for Parliament alone was in that case arrived at on the basis of statutory con- 
struction, not of privilege. See too Dingle v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. [1960] 2 Q.B. 
405, where possible difficulties were avoided. 
61 In a different way the general growth in the status and significance of Parliament perhaps 
affected the court in Harper v. Home Secretary [1955] Ch. 238, and because on that 
score more was accorded to Parliament than would once have been the case, the issue 
of privilege did not arise for decision. 
62 (1842) 1 Bell's App.Cas. 252. In contrast the House of Lords was not certain how far 
a somewhat similar principle would go in relation to delegated legislation. See 153 
H.L.Deb. 331 -352, the debate preceding the Laying of Documents before Parliament 
(Interpretation) Act, 1948. 
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The latter inhere in a peer whether he be a peer of Parliament or not. 
All peers are immune from jury service,6S or from arrest in civil process.64 
In judicial proceedings they take the oath in ordinary form.65 At the 
Union all the privileges of the peers of England were communicated to 
the peers of Scotland under Article XXIII. The privilege most emphasised, 
in that Article, trial by peers, was abolished by the Criminal Justice 
Act, 1948, s. 30. The privileges of peers of Parliament were communicated 
and made uniform by the same Article at the Union. The House of Lords 
claims freedom from arrest for its members as peers of Parliament, 
though the claim is limited,ó° and in regard to that House the claim 
of a right of access to the Sovereign is an individual right, not a corporate 
one. Freedom of speech, and in one sense of opinion, is insisted on 87 
Like the House of Commons the House claims a right to regulate its 
own composition, and it has gone so far, in the Wensleydale Peerage 
case, as determining whether or not a particular form of peerage entitles 
the holder to a seat in Parliament. 
The position with regard to suspension or disqualification of a member 
is not clear. It seems that the House could not impose any disqualification 
upon its members which did not exist in the general law for itself or other 
similar bodies. Thus the House could exclude on the ground of convic- 
tion in Scotland for offences where such convictions would in England 
disqualify from membership by statute. Suspension presents different 
issues, and, on the analogy of the outcome of the Wilkes case, it seems 
likely that such a power exists, a likelihood which is increased by reason 
of the admitted ability of the House to imprison a member of it. Never- 
theless the House, and a committee of it, has recently expressed doubt 
whether even such a limited power exists.66 The difficulty arises from 
the fact that the " external " right of standing and the " internal " right of 
membership, which were distinct in the Wilkes case, are rolled together 
in the case of a peer. Like the House of Commons the House has also 
a generalised power to commit for contempt, though it has been much 
more rarely used, and the House may punish by fine, or by imprisonment 
for a fixed time, in addition to other methods. The power of the House 
to summon by writs of assistance the judges and the Law Officers may 
also be ranked among its privileges,fi9 but it is one which has substantially 
declined in importance, at least so far as the judges are concerned. 
63 Jurors (Scotland) Act, 1825, s. 2; Juries Act, 1870, s. 9. 
64 Stourton v. Stourton [1963] 1 All E.R. 606; but see Young v. Earl of Bute (1716) Mor. 
10030 for alternative remedies. 
65 Brysson v. Duke of Athol (1710) Mor 10028, which is concerned with the position 
immediately after the Union, and Campbell v. Countess of Fife (1772) Mor. 9404. 
66 By S.O. 71, 72. 
87 See S.O. 74. 
68 See Report on the Powers of the House in relation to the attendance of its members 
(1955 -56) H.L. (7) (66-1) (67) and the debate thereon, 206 H.L.Deb. 987 and see 209 
H.L.Deb. 891 -950. 
69 See 206 H.L.Deb. 377 -382. This related to the Common Law Judges in England. 
The Scottish judges were, for obvious historical reasons, differently treated, but after 
the Union the House adopted the practice of requiring their attendance or advice on 











































THE FUNCTIONING OF PARLIAMENT 
THE FRAMEWORK 
ANY Parliament has now a maximum life of five years from the day 
on which it was appointed to meet by the writ of summons, though 
its life may be prolonged by a statute passed in the ordinary way,' and 
it may be cut short at any time by an earlier dissolution. The statutory 
maximum life of a Parliament has some important practical consequences, 
but the ability of the executive to cause an earlier dissolution is of far 
greater importance, being fundamental to the relationship of the govern- 
ment to Parliament. It is upon that that the predominance of the 
government greatly depends. A session of any Parliament is brought 
to an end by prorogation, a prerogative act done upon ministerial advice. 
In law there is no necessary duration for a session, and, while for practical 
reasons annual meetings of Parliament are now necessary, the only 
requirement in the Bill of Rights and the Claim of Right is that Parliament 
should meet frequently. Prorogation puts an end to all uncompleted 
business then before Parliament. Within a session each House controls 
adjournments for appropriate recesses, the major ones in fact coinciding.2 
The duration of Parliament is now independent of the life of the Sovereign, 
and if the Sovereign should die after a dissolution and before the date 
of a new Parliament then the old Parliament revives for a maximum 
period of six months.3 Arrangements are made for the earlier recall 
of Parliament when it stands adjourned or prorogued, should circum- 
stances so require.4 
The principal officers are, in the House of Commons, the Speaker 
elected by the House and approved by the Sovereign,5 and the Chairman 
of Ways and Means who presides over the committees of the whole 
1 The Septennial Act, 1715, as amended by the Parliament Act, 1911. The Parliament 
which was elected in 1935 was continued until 1945. 
2 Exceptionally the House of Lords has resumed sitting before the House of Commons, 
e.g., in September 1947, though it is symptomatic of the standing of the two Houses that 
the government refused to make any statement since the Commons was not sitting, 151 
H.L.Deb. 1410. 
3 Representation of the People Act, 1867, s. 51; Succession to the Crown Act, 1707, ss. 4 
and 5. 
4 By the Standing Orders of the House of Commons and a resolution of the House of 
Lords; and see Meeting of Parliament Acts, 1797, 1799, 1870, and the Parliament (Elec- 
tions and Meeting) Act, 1943. In certain circumstances in an emergency Parliament 
must be recalled, see e.g., Emergency Powers Act, 1920, s. 1. See, too, the Prorogation 
Act, 1867. 
6 By custom, the Speaker once elected, is normally not opposed in his constituency, nor in 
successive Parliaments. His actions cannot be challenged except on a substantive motion. 
In contrast the Chairman of Ways and Means (in effect the Deputy Speaker) is likely to 
change with the government. 
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House and is Deputy Speaker. The choice of these officers is, so far 
as is possible, made by agreement between the parties, though failing 
such agreement the issue is decided in the House. In the Lords the 
presiding officer is the Lord Chancellor (with, as his first deputy the 
Lord Chairman of Committees) but the burden and the nature of his 
duties is very different from those of the Speaker. He is a member of 
the Cabinet, speaks for (and changes with) the government, and thus 
is no neutral figure as is the Speaker. The Leader of the House is, in 
each case, a member of the Cabinet, but while he has, with the aid of 
the Whips, the control of government business in the House, he is, 
particularly in the Commons, a guardian of the rights of the House 
as a whole, and as such has distinct obligations.6 
JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS 
The judicial functions of Parliament are now primarily the concern 
of the House of Lords. The Commons try their own issues of contempt, 
have nominally the right to impeach, but any claims to any general 
jurisdictions would not now be advanced.' 
The House of Lords has, as a result of the Criminal Justice Act, 
1948, lost any original criminal jurisdiction, and claims, earlier advanced, 
to original civil jurisdiction 8 have now been abandoned. Any original 
jurisdiction is now limited to peerage claims. It has appellate jurisdiction 
in civil matters from England, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and in 
criminal matters from England and Northern Ireland.9 The civil appellate 
jurisdiction is founded upon the right to petition Parliament or the 
King in Council,10 and will hereafter be discussed in the context of the 
courts?' It may, however, here be noted that the character of the House 
as a court of appeal may differ from its character in other respects. 
To some extent when acting as such a court it must, in strict law, be 
regarded as an extension of the jurisdiction whence comes the appeal 
in question.12 When dealing with United Kingdom statutes, particularly 
in the field of taxation, the United Kingdom character is more obvious 
6 See Morrison, Government and Parliament, 2nd ed., 116 et seq.; and see p. 116, post. 
7 The last case when the House stretched out in this way was in 1721. 
8 Skinner v. E. India Co. (1666) 6 St.Tr. 710. 
8 The limited nature of this appeal was broadened by the Administration of Justice Act, 
1960, which now regulates the matter. Appeal lies on a point of law of general public 
importance at the instance of the defence or prosecution. A like appeal lies from the 
Courts -Martial Appeal Court, a United Kingdom court. Any criminal appellate jurisdic- 
tion from Scotland was rejected in Mackintosh v. L.A. (1876) 3 R.(H.L.) 34. 
10 See Richardson and Sayles, Parliaments and Great Councils in Mediaeval England and 
see Introduction to Scottish Legal History (the Stair Society), Chap. XXIII. 
11 See p. 220, post. 
12 Thus, while Lord Brougham in Att.-Gen. v. Lord Advocate (1834) 2 Cl. & F. 481 refers 
to it as an Imperial court, he also refers to it as a court of Scotch and English appeals, 
and compare Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co. Ltd. [1942] A.C. 624 and Glasgow Corpora- 
tion v. Central Land Board, 1956 S.C.(H.L.) 1; though see I.R.C. v. City of Glasgow 
Police Athletic Association, 1953 S.C.(H.L.) 13; and generally on the point see T. B. 
Smith, Judicial Precedent in Scots Law, and for an account of the consequences of the 









































LEGISLATIVE BUSINESS 113 
and in any event practice may on this matter give a somewhat different 
answer to that given by legal theory. 
The obviously technical nature of its work as a court presented 
difficulties over membership. The first patent for Lord Wensleydale, 
which the House rejected," was one attempt at a solution, as was the 
elevation of Lord Colonsay. After the inoperative attempt to abolish 
all appeals to the House, the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, confirmed 
the jurisdiction and authorised the appointment of Lords of Appeal 
in Ordinary who, together with peers who have held high judicial office,14 
make up the House when it sits as a court. Since lay peers are effectively 
excluded from participation in judicial proceedings 15 the House has a 
distinct character when sitting as a court. Though this exclusion of lay 
peers may be regarded as conventional it has certainly been recognised 
in law 18 This distinctiveness has been further emphasised since as a 
result of temporary measures taken during and after the war, which 
appear to have become permanent, an Appellate Committee 17 was 
established on a sessional basis. It consists of peers qualified by statute 
and its function is to hear appeals and to report to the House. Thus 
legislative business need not interrupt judicial business.1B 
LEGISLATIVE BUSINESS 
Legislative business has become mainly, but no means exclusively, 
the concern of the Commons as a result of general constitutional changes 
which were confirmed in certain aspects by the Parliament Act, 1911, 
and as a result of the Commons' claims to privilege in relation to finance, 
which, granted the content of modern legislation, limits the possibility 
of introducing many Bills in the House of Lords, despite various devices 
which soften the effect of the Commons' claims.19 Attention will therefore 
be given in the first place to legislative procedure in the Commons. 
13 The Wensleydale Peerage Case (1856) 5 H.L.Cas. 958. 
14 Normally a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary who has retired would be able to sit in this 
second capacity, though exceptional cases appear possible where this would not be 
so. Subsequent legislation has increased the number authorised of Lords of Appeal 
to nine: Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1947. 
15 O'Connell v. The Queen (1844) 11 Cl. & F. 155; Bradlaugh v. Clarke (1883) 8 App.Cas. 
354, although in the past it seems that lay peers have been used to make up a quorum; 
see 63 L.Q.R. 151 and 65 L.Q.R. 22. 
16 Re Lord Kinross (1905) 7 F.(H.L.) 138. 
17 To distinguish from the older Appeal Committee which considers questions of leave 
to appeal and interlocutory matters, as to which see Johnston v. Johnston (1859) 3 Macq. 
619, 640. 
18 Distinctiveness in a different sense had earlier established that English judges should not 
be consulted on Scots appeals, Edinburgh and Glasgow Ry. v. Mags. of Linlithgow (1861) 
3 Macq. 691. 
19 The Commons' claims are based on resolutions of 1671 and 1678 and reaffirmed in 
1860. See Erskine May, Parliamentary Practice, Chap. XXIX. Bills may be introduced 
into the Lords with the financial clauses sidelined, so that they do not formally form part 
of the Bill, or with bogus clauses that the measure imposes no charge. There are limits 
to the use of these devices, and a procedural proposal which would have let the House 
of Lords debate a Bill, but not as a Bill, was rejected in relation to the Legal Aid Bill, 
1963; see 248 H.L.Deb. 663 and 801. 
M.C.L.-8 
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The classification of Bills. Different types of legislation must first 
be distinguished. Public Bills are those affecting the community at large, 
and may be introduced by the government or by private members. 
Private Bills, initiated by petition, are for the benefit of particular persons 20 
or bodies. A third category- Hybrid Bills -must be distinguished. 
These are either Bills which could otherwise be Private, but which are 
desired by a government department, and, on the argument that the 
Crown cannot petition, are introduced as public bills: or they are Bills 
with a substantial public interest which nevertheless affect particular 
bodies.21 The lines between each type cannot be drawn with precision, 
and in any particular case a decision is taken by officials of the House. 
Public Bills must be further distinguished. The annual financial legislation 
(and particularly the Appropriation Bill) though public in form is distinct 
in character, and money Bills,22 which are public Bills whose main 
object is to authorise expenditure or impose taxation, are again specially 
treated. Formerly they were required to be founded upon a resolution 
of a Committee of the Whole, but since 1938, when presented by a 
minister, they may be treated as a Bill, the financial provisions of which 
are subsidiary, and the necessary financial resolutions may be obtained 
before the committee stage of the Bill. One rule of major importance 
is that the House insists that any charge upon moneys to be provided 
by Parliament must be recommended by the Crown -that is to say 
the government. This rule has had a great influence upon the evolution 
of the House, and today continues to restrict the scope of legislative 
proposals by private members, except those supported by the government. 
It thus contributes to the control of the House by the government. 
Public legislation 
The legislative stages. Public Bills are now introduced either upon 
an order of the House, a method applicable to financial legislation or 
to Bills introduced under the so called " Ten Minute Rule " (S.O. 12), 
by which a private member may sometimes successfully launch a non - 
contentious Bill, or by presentation after notice, a method which covers 
the great majority of Bills. After a formal first reading the stages are, 
Second Reading, Committee, Report and Third Reading. Each stage 
has a particular purpose, and although there is room for repetition in 
debate, this specialisation is important to the efficiency of a legislature.23 
The Second Reading is a debate in principle. Rejection is moved 
by proposing that the motion read " That the Bill be read upon this day 
six months " or by a reasoned amendment, which at, one time had not 
L0 Personal Bills are introduced in the House of Lords. 
21 The Bank of England and the Cable and Wireless Bills, 1946, are examples. For a 
typical reference to a Committee of such Bills see 631 H.C.Deb. 1397. 
22 The same term is used in the Parliament Act with a somewhat different meaning, post, 
p. 123. 
23 The resolution of 1696 (A.P.S. X, 35) imposing delays on the passing of legislation was 
















































































LEGISLATIVE BUSINESS 115 
the finality of the more usual form, but is, it seems, acquiring it. The 
Committee Stage may be taken in a Committee of the Whole, in a Stand- 
ing Committee, or in a Select Committee or under the procedure appro- 
priate to Welsh or Scottish Bills. Normally a Bill will be referred to a 
Standing Committee unless it is of major constitutional importance 24 
and a resolution is passed for consideration to be given in a Committee 
of the Whole. There are, however, no absolute rules, and practice may 
depend upon the state of the House and of the legislative programme. 
There is now no limit to the number of Standing Committees, which 
are a relatively modern device, dating from 1882. Each now consists of 
a minimum of twenty members, and a maximum of fifty, and will more 
or less reflect the composition of the House. The Committees, although 
membership will vary according to the subject- matter of the Bill under 
consideration, are in effect not specialised, and they examine the Bill 
in detail upon the basis of information available to the members of the 
Committee for the time being. If the Bill is referred to a Select Com- 
mittee,25 then evidence may be heard. In the case of Scotland special 
arrangements are made by Standing Orders 59 -61A. Bills relating 
exclusively to Scotland are referred to the Scottish Standing Committee 
consisting of thirty members from Scottish constituencies to whom 
additions may be made of up to twenty members. This Committee must 
be distinguished from the Scottish Grand Committee which consists 
of all the Scottish members and ten to fifteen others. The Grand 
Committee may consider a Bill as to principle at what would otherwise be 
the Second Reading stage unless ten or more members object, and there- 
after unless six members object, the House will not consider the Bill for 
the purposes of that stage.26 Under new arrangements adopted in 
November 1961 a Welsh Grand Committee was created with more 
limited powers,27 and additionally any Bill relating exclusively to Wales 
is to be considered by a Committee which includes all the members from 
Welsh constituencies. 
The Report stage follows, at which amendments similar to those 
which could be put in Committee may be moved, but there can be no 
wrecking amendments. The last stage -Third Reading -permits only 
verbal amendments, so /an intervening stage of recommittal is possible 
to enable substantial amendments to be made. 
Thereafter the Bill goes, in the case of one starting in the Commons, 
to the Lords where the same stages occur, though in that House the 
substance of each stage may be somewhat different. There is a greater 
24 A term of imprecise content. The Immigration Bill, 1961, was, for example, thus treated. 
25 As was the Defamation Bill, 1952. 
26 The Scottish Grand Committee may also deal with the Scottish Estimates, and any 
specific matter concerning Scotland, which is referred to it. Originally there was only 
one Scottish Standing Committee. A second was created in March 1963 for the remainder 
of the then current session, see 674 H.C.Deb. 1657. 
27 The Committee consists of the Welsh members and not more than 25 others. It has 
no powers over the Second Reading stage of a Bill, or over estimates. See 650 H.C. 
Deb. 197. 
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degree of informality, there are no Standing Committees, and little use 
is made of select Committees. There is, moreover, substantially greater 
possibility of consultation with outside experts.28 The amendments 
made by one House to a Bill starting in the other have then to be con- 
sidered by the original House. This process may involve a series of refer- 
ences between the Houses,29 as a result of which either agreement is 
reached, or disagreement remains, and if there is no agreement either 
the Bill must be dropped or the Parliament Act procedure must be invoked. 
It is clear, that to a great extent the House of Lords is now concerned 
mainly with revising, and improving legislation sent up by the Commons, 
and to its work in that respect tribute has been paid. The bicameral 
nature of Parliament has also certain technical advantages in the mechanics 
of legislation.3° The Lords may, as with the Criminal Justice Bill, 1948, 
go considerably beyond revision, but as a result of the Parliament Acts, 
to be discussed later, their opposition can be surmounted if that is desired. 
Public Bills introduced by private members go through the same 
stages. While these are a valuable source of minor changes in the law, 
limitations on the time available for such Bills, and the difficulty facing a 
member of " managing " such a Bill through the House, mean that they 
produce only a minor part of legislation as a whole.31 There is, moreover, 
the limitation that if the Bill involves a charge, government backing is 
essential. This situation is consistent with constitutional theory, for it 
has become recognised that legislation is the affair of government. 
The legislative process. It would be a mistake to assume that the 
procedure once a Bill has been introduced is the whole of what could 
properly be called the legislative process. Debates upon White Papers, 
are often significant in affecting both the time of introducing measures 
and their shape. These debates are to some extent a substitute for the 
older debates upon the resolutions to bring in a Bill. Apart from such 
preliminaries, legislation owes much to Reports of Royal Commissions 
and other bodies and to the consultative process which follows such 
reports before a Bill is produced. The parliamentary stages will only 
be seen in the right perspective if set against this background.32 Pressures 
arising from the nature of a modern state have not merely forced the 
government to assume responsibility for the great bulk of legislation, 
so that we have, in effect, returned to the position that the King makes 
the laws in Parliament (with the substitution of responsible ministers 
28 See Lord Chorley, " The House of Lords Controversy " (1958) Public Law, 216. 
29 See Erskine May, Parliamentary Practice, Chap. XXIX. 
39 As to both points see, e.g., Morrison, Government and Parliament, Chap. IX. 
31 See Bromhead, Private Members Bills, and A. P. Herbert, The Ayes Have It. 
32 See Griffith, " The Place of Parliament in the Legislative Process " (1951) 14 M.L.R. 
279 and 425. It must be remembered that Maitland said of the 18th century Parliament 
that " It seems afraid to rise to the dignity of a general proposition." See also Jennings, 
Parliament, Thring, Practical Legislation and Ilbert, Legislative Methods and Forms. 
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LEGISLATIVE BUSINESS 117 
for a personal King), but these pressures have also caused a great growth 
in the amount of legislation. The emergence of standing committees 
is one mark of this growth, but other devices now play an important 
part in meeting that pressure. Some, such as the Consolidation of Enact- 
ments (Procedure) Act, 1949, attempt to simplify procedure. Other 
devices are aimed at shortening and concentrating debates. The earliest 
of these, the Closure, originated by Speaker Brand in 1881, enables the 
debate to be ended if, in his discretion, the Speaker will accept a motion 
to that effect, and provided that, in the House, at least 100 members vote 
in its favour.33 Another -the Kangaroo -enables (S.O. 31) the Speaker 
or Chairman of Ways and Means, in order to avoid repetition, to select 
amendments to be discussed.34 The most important of these devices is 
probably the Guillotine, an Allocation of Time Order, under which, 
by order of the House, a timetable is set for the progress of a Bill.36 Such 
an order, by ensuring a proper distribution of time may in fact assist 
parliamentary scrutiny of legislation, though proposals to make such 
orders common form have been rejected, perhaps because the process 
of obstruction which may lead to such orders have a legitimate place in 
other aspects of parliamentary life. 
The whole flow of legislation is regulated by two Cabinet Committees, 
the Future Legislation Committee and the Legislation Committee, which 
determine the content of the legislative programme for any session and 
survey progress during the session.S6 It is only when legislation has 
found a place in the programme that the parliamentary draftsmen (who 
are under the Treasury or, for Scotland, in the Lord Advocate's Office) 
can start work upon the Bill. Thus, at times, pressure upon them is 
extreme. All these factors, coupled with the fact that growing inter- 
national organisation in trade or transport and the continuing evolution 
of the Commonwealth produce a quantity of inescapable legislation, 
must be borne in mind when such matters as delegated legislation are 
considered. 
Two other considerations must also be borne in mind in considering 
that part of the legislative process which occurs in Parliament. The 
first is that increasingly law is technical and made for technicians. The 
techniques involved may be those relating to radioactive substances, 
food and drugs in their chemical aspects, town planning, company law, 
or indeed any branch of the complexities of modern life. Detailed criticism 
of legislative proposals requires an expert knowledge, and essentially 
the House 'of Commons is not an expert House. The member is chosen 
to stand not so much because of any expertise he may have, but because 
33 The device has been extended to Standing Committees, the relevant figure being reduced 
to the quorum for the Committee fixed under S.O. 57. 
34 This power was extended in 1934 to Chairmen of Committees (S.O. 57). 
36 Sample Allocation of Time Orders are set out in Morrison, Government and Parliament, 
App. B. The details of orders are as far as possible worked out between the Party Whips. 
36 See Morrison, Government and Parliament, 2nd ed., Chap. XI and Sir Granville Ram, 
"The Improvement of the Statute Book" (1951) J.S.P.T.L. 442. 
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he will be a good candidate. Moreover, so far as there is any particular 
expertise in the House it tends to be maldistributed between the parties. 8 
These factors, no matter how well briefed members may be, affect the a 
detailed criticism to which a measure may be subjected. The second f 
consideration, which affects the same matter is that the House is above r 
all (and properly so) a political arena, and that, since legislation (in r 
so far as it is not purely technical) is a reflection of government policy, t 
the House will tend to debate it (especially in those proceedings which 
are in the whole House) in political terms. Thus the effective criticism in 
the House must be limited by the relationship of government to Parliament 
which will be discussed later. Such considerations may enhance the 1 
importance of the non -parliamentary stages of legislation, of the revising t 
functions of the House of Lords (where the political battle is not of such s 
significance) and of other forms of legislation. They do not, however, 
diminish the importance of parliamentary criticism from the point of r 
view of the struggle between government and alternative government. 
Private legislation 
In regard to private legislation Parliament is as much concerned f 
with the protection of individual rights, as with conferring new powers. 
In both jurisdictions this form of legislation has a long history.37 Its t 
importance may have declined for a variety of reasons. More general 
empowering Acts are now passed and Divorce and Naturalisation Bills, 
which at one time were numerous, are now superseded by other means 
to the same ends, but local Acts continue to be important as a source I 
of power and, particularly in Scotland, as regulating the lives of citizens 
of particular areas. This form of legislation also remains important t 
since it gives Parliament an immediate contact with local administration t 
and affords a method of experimenting with new forms of public services. N 
It seems likely, however, that this second aspect has declined. It is 
being increasingly expected that much of what was once done by private 
legislation should now be done by public Acts. To a certain extent such 
an attitude is a reflection of changes which have been noted under public 1 
legislation, but it is arguable how far such an attitude should prevail, 1 
in the context.38 In modern times disadvantages have been found in 
the procedure for private legislation. Its adversary character, although t 
valuable, has limiting effects, since a choice has to be made between alter- 
natives, neither of which may on examination offer the best solution. 
3 
37 See Clifford, History of Private Bill Legislation, Williams, History of Private Bill Procedure, 
and Terry, The Scottish Parliament. In 1645 a special committee was appointed by 
the Parliament of Scotland for this purpose (A.P.S. VI, 288) and later particular times 
were set aside for such legislation in Parliament as a whole. 
38 Some of the arguments are discussed in the Report of the Joint Committee on Promotion 
of Private Bills (1958 -59) H.C.P. 262. There are also procedural factors which required 4 
that the Pipe Lines Act, 1962, should be public, rather than that the same objects be 











































LEGISLATIVE BUSINESS 119 
General procedure. Two forms must be distinguished, the one applic- 
able to England and Wales, and occasionally to Scotland, the other 
applicable to Scotland. Bills are initiated by petition, and the general 
form requires the deposit and advertisement of the Bill, and that individual 
notice should be given to those particularly affected. Opponents of the 
measure may petition against it. The promoters' petition is considered 
by Examiners (one appointed by the Lords and one by the Speaker) to 
ensure that standing orders have been complied with, and any non- 
compliance is further considered by the Standing Orders Committee. 
Thereafter it is determined in which House the Bill shall originate, this 
being purely a matter of convenience. At that stage petitions against 
the measure are considered by the Court of Referees where the locus 
standi of the petitioners may be objected to. It is only where he has 
a particular interest that an opponent will be heard. Thus, individual 
ratepayers will not be heard as such, though representative organisations 
of interests may óe.39 
The stages of a private Bill are similar in name to those of a public 
Bill, but differ in substance. The Bill is deemed to have been read a 
first time once it is laid on the table. The Second Reading is normally 
also a formality unless objection is raised, which is infrequent. " Instruc- 
tions " to the Committee to deal with particular matters in a particular 
way may be moved at this stage. In the case of Bills promoted by 
nationalised industries it has however come to be recognised that the 
debate may be more general upon that industry.40 Thus the Second 
Reading is not, as in the case of public and hybrid Bills, taken as establish- 
ing the principle of the Bill, and at the Committee stage the promoters 
will be put to proof of the need for the proposed Bill.41 If that be proved 
then the Bill is considered in detail. Throughout, the proceedings at 
the Committee stage are judicial in character. Counsel are heard, and 
witnesses examined for both promoters and opponents and the views 
of government departments are considered. Thereafter the Report and 
Third Reading stages follow in the original House and a like procedure 
will be followed in the other House. There may be thus two " hearings " 
before Committees, but frequently adjustment and compromise is made 
before the first House so that the second hearing may be less contentious.42 
This requirement of proof of need means that even unopposed Bills must 
be referred to a committee, though in this case one which is especially 
composed. 
39 See, e.g., the cases reported in the various series of Locus Standi Reports. A convenient 
summary is to be found in the supplement to the Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland, 
Tit. Private Legislation. In the case of urban authorities in England ratepayers may, 
but often do not, express their views in town meetings under the Local Government 
Act, 1933, s. 255. 
49 Report of Joint Committee on Private Bill Procedure (1955 -56) H.C. 139, § 15. 
41 See for a good account of the procedure Hanson, " The Leeds Private Bill " (1957) 
35 Public Administration 45. 
42 A Bill may in the first instance be referred to a joint committee. 
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Scottish procedure. It is evident that the procedure may be lengthy 
and expensive particularly if two full hearings are involved. It is one of 
the advantages of the Scottish procedure that expense is mitigated. 
That procedure originated in the Act of 1899 is now governed by the 
Private Legislation (Scotland) Act, 1936. Under that Act, with the 
exception of estate Bills, all matters which would otherwise be dealt with 
by private Bill must, in relation to Scotland, be dealt with by the Pro- 
visional Order procedure. Objection was taken to the original proposals 
on the grounds that this excluded the citizen's right to petition Parliament. 
The procedure has however, in its present form, similarities to the proced- 
ure by way of Bill. Petitions are made to the Secretary of State to make 
a Provisional Order in the terms of a draft 4S Preliminary advertisement 
and notice are equally necessary. The petition is considered by the 
Chairman of Ways and Means and the Chairman of Committees of 
the Lords, who report to the Secretary of State. If they report that the 
measure relates to matters outside Scotland to such an extent, or raises 
questions of public policy of such novelty and importance " that they 
should be dealt with by Bill," then the Secretary of State must refuse 
the order.44 Similarly if a promoter with diverse interests wishes to 
promote a measure having affect inside and outside Scotland the 1936 
Act provides a method by which procedure by Bill may be substituted, in 
whole or part, for procedure by Provisional Order and under modem 
practice a fairly wide use has been made of this power. Compliance 
with General Orders is examined, and if there is opposition to the Order 
the Secretary of State directs an inquiry before Commissioners. The 
latter are chosen from panels, two parliamentary panels being made up 
from members of each House, and one panel being non -parliamentary. 
Normally two Commissioners are chosen from each parliamentary 
panel, but all may be chosen from one. If four members cannot be 
obtained from the parliamentary panels resort is had to the non- parlia- 
mentary panel, which is made up of citizens of distinction. Such a 
situation is relatively uncommon. These Commissioners hold the 
inquiry into the order, normally in Edinburgh or Glasgow, but it may 
be held anywhere that is convenient in Scotland. The procedure before 
the Commissioners is similar to that before a committee at Westminster, 
save that the Commissioners determine questions of locus standi as part 
of the inquiry. 
The report of the Commissioners is final if it is against the order, 
for the Secretary of State may not make it in the face of an adverse report. 
If, however, the Commissioners report that the Order should be made, 
with or without modifications, this report does not bind him. He may 
43 Such petitions may be made twice a year, and not once only as with Bills. 
44 The proposal to remove the ex officio members from the Glasgow Town Council was 
thus taken and the proposal to alter the status of Grangemouth was regarded as requiring 
a Bill. In one case, the Church of Scotland (Property and Endowments) Act, 1933, 



















































































LEGISLATIVE BUSINESS 121 
issue the order with such modifications as appear to him to be necessary, 
having regard to the report and to the recommendations of the chairman 
or of government departments. To be valid the Order still requires 
confirmation by a Bill. If at this stage there is still opposition and 
petitions have been lodged against the Confirmation Bill a member may 
move that it be referred to a Joint Committee of both Houses which 
will operate as in other private legislation. If such a motion is not 
carried the Bill is deemed to have passed all stages up to and including 
the Committee stage. Only one measure has been thus referred, and it 
is clear that great weight is given in Parliament to the Commissioners' 
report. Thus in practice, there is, under this system, only one inquiry, 
which, being local, involves a substantial saving. Some saving is certain 
even if there are two hearings since one will be local before the Com- 
missioners 45 
Where there is no opposition in the first place, the Secretary of State 
may, and at times does, order a local inquiry (which will be held as 
above) and in any event he may himself modify the Order in the light 
of any comments of the chairman or government departments. Again 
the submission of a Confirmation Bill to Parliament is required. 
Other legislative forms. Although the Scottish procedure has not 
been extended, Provisional Order procedure, which contains an element 
of parliamentary control, has to a certain extent displaced private legisla- 
tion. The latest form, under the Statutory Orders (Special Procedure) 
Act, 1945, was intended to produce a unified system, but has not had 
that effect. Under that Act, the Order after inquiry is laid before Parlia- 
ment. At that stage an attempt is made to divide petitions against the 
Order into those of amendment, and those of general objection. The 
former are always referred to a Joint Committee of both Houses, the 
latter are not unless one House so directs. If the Committee reports 
the Order with amendments which are not acceptable to the minister 
he may either withdraw it, or schedule the original Order to a Bill, which 
is treated as a public Bill which has passed the Committee stage. On 
the whole this amalgam of procedures has not proved successfu146 
It is thus evident that there is a spectrum of private legislation both as 
to degree of parliamentary control and as to content. At times such 
legislation is particular, at times it resembles public legislation. This 
ambiguity of character is reflected in the uncertainty of the attitude of 
the courts. As has been indicated such legislation was, even apart from 
the Acts salvo jure cujuslibet, treated as distinct from public legislation," 
and private Acts were, until the Interpretation Act, 1850, required to 
45 Despite the advantages of locality and of reducing expense suggestions to make the 
procedure more generally applicable have been rejected (1955 -56) H.C. 139. 
46 See (1950) 3 Parliamentary Affairs 458. 
47 Ersk. I, 1, 39. This attitude was common to both jurisdictions. Craies' Statute Law, 
Part I, Chap. I. 
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be specially pleaded,48 and today the construction of private Acts still 
differs from that of public Acts 4° Moreover the courts have in this 
context indicated an ability to interfere. The courts have claimed a 
jurisdiction to restrain a party from petitioning against a Bill,50 even 
though more recently the jurisdiction has been doubted.b1 It must 
be remarked that a like jurisdiction exists, and has been exercised, where 
a parliamentary stage is the final stage in making an Order.52 It seems 
likely therefore that the jurisdiction exists, but that in so far as the remedy 
sought is a discretionary one, the courts will normally not interfere since 
the substantial matter at issue is one of general public interest and thus 
one which in principle should be ventilated in Parliament. Where that 
element of public interest is not present there seems to be no sound 
reason why the courts should not intervene. The argument that they 
cannot appears to deny to the courts their proper function, and also 
to involve an improper extension of any doctrine of the sovereignty of 
Parliament. It is however now clear that once a Bill or Confirmation 
Bill has received the Royal Assent the courts will not investigate the 
preliminary procedure to ensure that all proper steps have been taken.5S 
The distinction is a rational one since such an investigation as would 
be involved in the latter case would be inconsistent with the normal 
attitude of one superior court to another. Procedure must properly 
be regarded as internal to Parliament, and thus the concern of Parliament. 
Petitioning for or against Bills is external and thus is a proper matter for 
consideration in the courts. 
THE LORDS AND COMMONS IN CONFLICT 
Introduction. Legislation is not the only field in which the two Houses 
might come into conflict, but it is the main one, and the matter is most 
conveniently discussed here. Throughout the nineteenth century the 
increasing reliance of a government upon the Commons had its effect 
on the place of the Lords in relation to general legislation. Earlier, 
claims of the Commons to a monopoly of power as to taxation had been 
advanced in 1671 and 1678, and had, to some extent, been conceded 
by the Lords in 1702. The claims of the Commons in this matter were 
vigorously reaffirmed in 1860, after the House of Lords had rejected 
the Paper Duties Bill. Friction over general legislation existed between 
the two Houses throughout the nineteenth century, and became 
48 See now the Interpretation Act, 1889, s. 9. 
49 See Craies, op. cit. 
58 Stockton and Hartlepool Ry. v. Leeds and Thirsk, etc. Ry. (1848) 2 Ph. 669; Heathcote 
v. North Staffordshire Ry (1850) Mac. & G. 100. 
61 Bilston Corporation v. Wolverhampton Corporation [1942] Ch. 391, and see (1943) 59 
L.Q.R. 2. Agreements of the type here in question have been condemned as undesirable 
in Parliament. 
62 Bell v. S. of S. for Scotland, 1933 S.L.T. 519; R. v. Electricity Commissioners [1924] 1 K.B. 
171, 192; Russell v. Mags. of Hamilton (1897) 25 R. 350; though contrast Harper v. Home 
Secretary [1955] Ch. 238, 251. 
63 Edinburgh and Dalkeith Ry. v. Wauchope (1842) 8 Cl. & F. 710. 
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evident in relation to particular measures. Once, however, it had become 
clear and accepted that legislation was the business of the government, 
and that the government was dependent for its existence on the good 
will of the Commons (but could treat with contempt a vote of no confidence 
in the Lords) then some regulation of the role of the House of Lords in 
the legislative process became necessary. The full impact of these con- 
siderations was felt only towards the end of the nineteenth century. 
The necessary regulation could have come about by conventional means, 
as in the case of the financial privileges of the Commons, but a com- 
bination of events and personalities made more formal regulation 
inevitable. 
A fresh crisis arose in 1909, with the rejection of the Finance Bill 
by the Lords. This in itself was the culmination of disputes between 
the Houses which had continued since 1906. After an intervening election 
the Finance Bill was passed by the Lords, but as a result of past events 
attention was centred on the Parliament Bill, intended to reduce the 
powers of the House of Lords, which was founded upon Resolutions 
passed in the new House of Commons. That Bill eventually reached the 
Statute Book as the Parliament Act, 1911, which, subject to amendment 
by the Act of 1949, still regulates in law the relationship between the 
Houses in the legislative field.54 The Act, while at the time being a 
matter of great controversy, probably only codified what would have 
been, in normal times, acceptable doctrine, as being consonant with 
the principles, mentioned above, which had emerged as a result of 
developments starting with the Reform Act, 1832. 
The Parliament Act procedure. Under the ordinary legislative pro- 
cedure, assuming a Bill to have started in the Commons, the Lords 
amendments are considered in the Commons, and either accepted or, 
if they be not accepted, they are returned to the Lords with a message 
indicating reasons for the disagreement. If the Lords insist upon their 
amendments the process of the exchange of reasons can continue. 
Normally a compromise is sought and obtained, but this method provides 
no solution if the Lords will neither agree nor give way. The possibility 
of a solution is provided by the Parliament Acts. The Act of 1911 
divided Bills with which it was concerned into Money Bills and others. 
The definition of Money Bills in section 1 (2) is narrow; in effect they are 
those which deal exclusively with fiscal matters. A Bill which establishes 
an important new scheme or machinery, even though it is of great financial 
importance, could not thus be certified by the Speaker under the Act 
as a Money Bill.55 If a Money Bill is passed by the Commons and sent 
54 For an outline of these events see Anson, Constitutional Law, Vol. I, Chap. VI; and 
see Nicholson, George V, Chap. X. 
55 The definition runs: " A Money Bill means a Public Bill which in the opinion of the 
Speaker of the House of Commons contains only provisions dealing with all or any 
of the following subjects, namely, the imposition, repeal, remission, alteration, or regula- 
tion of taxation; the imposition for the payment of debt or other financial purposes 
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up to the Lords at least one month before the end of a session, then, 
if it is not passed by the Lords without amendment within one month, 
it may be presented for the Royal Assent without passing the House 
of Lords, unless the House of Commons otherwise direct. Other Bills 
might, under the 1911 Act, be similarly presented if passed in three 
successive sessions in the House of Commons, and rejected by the House 
of Lords in each of those sessions, provided that two years had elapsed 
between the Second Reading in the first session and the date of passing 
the Commons in the third. A Bill is treated as rejected if not passed 
without amendment, or with such amendments only as are agreed by 
both Houses. This two -year period was thought to be too long, and so 
the Parliament Act, 1949, reduced the number of sessions to two, and 
the period of delay to one year,56 but apart from this the provisions 
of the 1911 Act remain in force. 
These provisions require the Speaker to certify a Money Bill, and to 
certify that the only amendments to the Bill finally presented to the 
Lords are those made necessary by the passage of time, or are amendments 
proposed by the Lords and agreed to by the Commons. No such certifi- 
cates can, under section 3, be challenged in any court, so that such matters 
of parliamentary procedure are reserved for decision by parliamentary 
machinery.57 It is possible for the Commons when sending a Bill to 
the Lords for the second time to suggest amendments, without inserting 
them in the Bill, and if they are accepted by the Lords they may be 
incorporated in the Bill as presented for the Royal Assent. 
The Parliament Act procedure applies only to public Bills.58 Moreover 
it cannot (section 7) be used to extend the life of Parliament beyond 
five years. The Acts appear to be regarded as intended to protect govern- 
ment legislation, as much as to protect the House of Commons. This 
view is supported by the genesis of the Acts, the general position of 
the government in relation to legislation today, and practice under the 
Acts 59 The procedure does not avoid all possibilities of con$ict between 
of charges on the Consolidated Fund, or on money provided by Parliament, or the 
variation or repeal of any such charges; supply; the appropriation, receipt, custody, 
issue or audit of accounts of public money; the raising or guarantee of any loan or the 
repayment thereof; or subordinate matters incidental to those subjects or any of them. 
In this subsection the expressions ` taxation', ` public money', and ' loan' respectively 
do not include any taxation, money, or loan raised by local authorities or bodies for 
local purposes." It is doubtful if the Finance Bill of 1909 could have been so certified, 
and relatively frequently the Finance Bill is not so certified; see Jennings, Parliament, 
Chap. XI. 
58 This Act, which was passed under the procedure of the 1911 Act, contained a provision 
for a retrospective application, which was not in fact used. For the preliminary con- 
sultation between the parties see Cmd. 7380, Agreed Statement on Conclusion of the 
Conference of Party Leaders, 1948. 
57 It is to be noted that this provision does not exclude the possibility of challenge if an 
attempt were made, without more, to use this procedure to secure the passage of a Bill 
which was outside the scope of the Parliament Acts. 
b8 The possibility of challenge in the courts of a statute improperly brought within the 
procedure of the Act, is not excluded by the Acts themselves, nor, it seems, in general 
principle of law. 
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the Houses and the provisions relating to the identity of the last Bill with 
the first Bill are sufficiently rigid to present some difficulty in applying the 
procedure in particular cases. 
The general significance of the Acts. In fact the Parliament Act, 
1949, is the only Act to reach the Statute Book, which has been passed 
under the Parliament Act procedure and which has entered into force 
in the way intended.80 This fact does not, however, mean that the Act 
is without influence. The bargaining position of the government may 
be greatly strengthened by its existence. On the other hand it should 
not be thought that the existence of the legislation has made opposition 
from the House of Lords either meaningless or ineffective. It is difficult, 
however, to judge at this time the effect of the 1911 Act in this respect, 
since a degree of subservience of the House of Lords was in any event 
normally accepted even before 1911 and that subservience would tend 
to increase.ó1 It is to be noted that the Act of 1911 did not delimit 
the relationship of the two Houses, even in the legislative field, with 
rigidity. The basis of privilege was expressly preserved (section 6), 
and with it, implicitly, the possibility of further change. In particular 
that provision made it impossible for the Lords to claim that the Act 
was intended to be a conclusive delimitation of the role of the House in 
legislation. 
The Acts raise more general questions of constitutional theory. It 
has been argued that legislation passed under them is in truth a species 
of delegated legislation.ß2 Others have regarded the Acts as amounting 
to a redefinition of Parliament for certain purposes and in certain circum- 
stances,ó3 or it may be that the Acts redefine for particular purposes 
what the courts must recognise as law. It seems that either of the latter 
alternatives are to be preferred, but if they are preferred, the issue of 
other methods of redefinition must be considered.ó4 Finally it may 
be observed that the preamble to the Parliament Act, 1911, recited that 
the Act was intended as a prelude to further reform of the House of 
Lords. That process has been a halting one. The only substantial measure 
of reform, the Life Peerages Act, 1958, and the Peerage Act, 1963, were 
not entirely agreed measures, and any reform of the House of Lords 
bearing upon function is likely to meet with substantial political 
opposition. A reform which further limited the powers of the House 
would adversely affect its work as a revising chamber. Any reform 
which had the effect of increasing the powers of the House would clearly 
6° The Government of Ireland Act, 1914, and the Welsh Church Act, 1914, passed under 
this procedure; the former never came into force, the latter was substantially amended 
before it did. 
61 See generally Bromhead, The House of Lords: and Contemporary Politics, Chap. IX, 
and Jennings, Parliament, Chap. XI. The Peerage Act, 1963, may hasten this process. 
62 H. W. R. Wade, " The Basis of Legal Sovereignty " [1955] C.L.J. 172 at 193. 
63 G. Marshall, " What is Parliament? " (1954) Political Studies 193. 
64 Ante, Chap. IV. The provisions of the Ireland Act, 1949 (s. 1 (2) ), may be so regarded, 
for if Parliament may be redefined by subtraction, may it not also be redefined by addition? 
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meet with opposition from the House of Commons and could reintroduce 
a dangerous rivalry between the Houses." 
FINANCIAL LEGISLATION 
Financial legislation has hitherto been left on one side. Much of it is 
concerned with administration, and so it forms a convenient link between 
the legislative and administrative aspects of the work of Parliament. 
This type of legislation is peculiarly the concern of the House of Commons. 
Parliamentary control of finance is fundamental to the evolution of the 
present constitutional position of Parliament, but its roots run deep. 
Craig insisted on the necessity for the consent of the people and of the 
estates for taxation,66 and much of the seventeenth -century constitutional 
struggles were concerned with establishing this proposition,87 which 
was prominent in the Bill of Rights and Claim of Right. Historical 
causes gave emphasis to the control of taxation and also aided a separation 
between Supply and Appropriation, control over the former being 
established before control over the latter. The idea of control over 
appropriation is also ancient,68 but practical realisation of it on any 
large scale did not come about until the nineteenth century, and of that 
the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, 1866, is a mark. 
The modern system is, then, based upon this dichotomy, the two 
main annual Acts being the Appropriation Act and the Finance Act. 
Within the House the procedure is based upon two Committees of the 
Whole House, the Committee of Supply and the Committee of Ways and 
Means, and it is in these that those measures must originate. 
Appropriation. Parliamentary procedure still reflects an annual basis 
for national accounting. The financial year begins on April 1. Hence 
before that date estimates are introduced into the House, the process 
of formulating estimates within departments having started in the pre- 
ceding year. These estimates show expenditure in considerable detail 
and form the foundation for the Schedules to the Appropriation Act. 
The shape of estimates is of considerable importance to the subsequent 
control of expenditure by the House and is governed by the House and 
by the Committee on Public Accounts and the Select Committee on 
Estimates.ó9 The estimates may be considered over twenty -six Supply 
65 See also p. 93, ante; and see Report of Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform (1962 -63) 
H.C. 38, leading to the 1963 Act. It will be noted that all recent proposals are in 
relation to reform of composition and not of function. 
66 Jus Feudale I, 1, 16. 
67 The Act Anent Peace and War, 1703, A.P.S. XI, 107, was forced upon the King by with- 
holding supplies; and see A.P.S. XI, 112. 
68 See Chubb, Control of Public Expenditure. Early attempts were not always successful, 
the Act of 1698, A.P.S. X, 175, appropriating money to a Chair of Law in Edinburgh, 
proved abortive. 
69 The form of estimates was substantially simplified in the interest of greater clarity in 
1962. See (1960 -61) H.C. 252 and (1960 -61) H.C. 184 (Select Committee on Estimates), 
and as to the Supplementary Estimates, see (1962 -63) H.C. 41. 
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Days, but though these days are spread out as far as is possible, they 
have to be taken before the end of July, in order that the Appropriation 
Act may reach the Statute Book in due season. The choice of subject - 
matter for debate upon these days is recognised as being the right of 
the Opposition. Thus the estimate chosen merely provides a convenient 
peg for a debate which is generally upon policy and not upon detail. If 
these days are so used, it is clear that the Appropriation Act will not 
reach the Statute Book before the beginning of the financial year. Thus 
it is necessary to provide money for immediate needs of the public services. 
This is done in a Consolidated Fund (No. 1) Act, which authorises sums 
of money on account of votes which will later appear in the Appropriation 
Act. Since virement (the transfer of money voted for one purpose to 
another) is much more freely possible with the Service Estimates, a sum 
on account of one vote will normally suffice for them, but for the Civil 
Estimates sums on account must be authorised in respect of each vote. 
At the same time it is necessary to deal with Supplementary Estimates. 
Where the sums voted for one year prove to be insufficient, the additional 
sums must be sanctioned in the Committee of Supply and finally the issue 
of money for this purpose is authorised by the same Act.70 
It is to be noticed that the whole of the legislation is concerned with 
the expenditure of money and not with incurring liabilities, and although 
it has been said that the validity of contracts depends upon voting of 
supply, this is doubtful.71 In effect the Appropriation Act lays down a 
framework of law for the administration, but that law has only an 
" internal " character, that is to say the inclusion of an item gives no 
individual a necessary right to claim payment of sums due, the exclusion 
of an item does not deny his right to claim.72 This procedure applies 
to the Supply Services, for which expenditure must be authorised annually, 
and not to the Consolidated Fund Services, which include such matters 
as judicial salaries, and which are a standing charge upon the Consolidated 
Fund. The second group is not then open to annual debate. In practice 
the estimates have, overall, lost a great deal of flexibility. Out of the 
total amount of government expenditure a substantial amount is committed 
by rates determined by such Acts as the National Insurance Acts.73 
The Estimates procedure must then be looked at against this much 
70 It may be necessary to take up variations between estimates and expenditure for several 
years back. The appropriation of these sums is contained in the Appropriation Act. 
That Act also authorises Treasury borrowing. For further details, see Campion, Intro- 
duction to the Procedure of the House of Commons, and see the modifications made in 
(1960) 627 H.C.Deb. col. 2255 et seq. See, too, Brittain, The British Budgetary System. 
The sums involved in the Supplementary Estimates are considerable, amounting in 
1961 -62 to over £248m. 
71 See Churchward v. The Queen (1865) L.R. 1 Q.B. 173; and Mitchell, The Contracts of 
Public Authorities, p. 68 et seq. 
72 R. v. Fisher [1903] A.C. 158; and Street, " The Provision of Funds in Satisfaction of 
Government Liabilities " (1949) 8 Univ. Toronto L.J. 32. 
73 In 1958 -59 Charges on the Consolidated Fund amounted to £819m. " Fixed " charges 
(i.e., those determined by other legislation) amounted to well over half of the total of 
the Civil Estimates. 
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broader background, and against that background it has lost much of 
the significance which it once had. 
Supply. Supply is the process by which, to a great extent, the pool 
of the Consolidated Fund is filled.94 Here all is dependent upon the 
Budget, which is opened in the Committee of Ways and Means,75 and 
on the first day all the Budget resolutions with the exception of one 
necessary to keep the debate alive are passed. Statutory force is given, 
provided that certain conditions are fulfilled, to the resolutions which 
vary or reimpose or renew an existing tax (but not to new taxes) by the 
Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1913.76 The Finance Bill is founded 
upon the resolutions of the Committee of Ways and Means, but it is by 
no means unusual for its provisions to vary from the proposals originally 
put forward by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. These variations may 
often be the consequence of considerations brought out in the Budget 
debate, or as a result of it. The whole parliamentary procedure could, 
if it followed strictly the pattern of other public legislation, give rise 
to considerable duplication of debate, and some stages have therefore 
become formalised.77 Nevertheless the procedure has the disadvantages 
of rigidity in a situation in which the Budget is not merely the means 
of raising necessary money, but also a means of regulating the national 
economy.7ß Hence, in the Finance Act, 1961, power was taken (and has 
since been renewed) to change or institute certain duties by Statutory 
Instrument. Moreover, increasing concern over the efficiency of the 
system led to changes of method. Provision was made in 1960 for a 
debate upon a White Paper on Public Investment, and for the Select 
Committee on Estimates to report on the Supplementary Estimates and 
upon the variations in the Estimates for one year as compared with 
those of the preceding year.79 These changes were intended both to increase 
the efficiency of the whole budgetary process, and also to make it easier 
for the House to take greater account of the changing role of the Budget 
and of public expenditure in the general economic life of the country. 
It nevertheless remains true that the procedure connected with the major 
financial Bills is more closely linked with the role of Parliament in con- 
trolling or criticising the conduct of administration. On the one hand 
this appears in the use to which the Supply Days are put, and on the 
74 Money earned by revenue -earning departments is dealt with by appropriations in aid. 
75 The Committee has confusingly also the function of authorising payment of sums voted 
in the Committee of Supply for Supplementary Estimates and Votes on Account. 
76 The Act was made necessary by the successful challenge to the habit of collecting taxes 
on the basis of the resolutions in Bowles v. Bank of England [1913] 1 Ch. 57. It requires 
among other things that the Bill confirming the resolutions becomes law within four 
months after the passing of the resolutions. This and other conditions impose substantial 
restrictions on the legislative programme. New taxes may be made retrospective, and 
the Act is re- inforced as to customs by the Finance Act, 1926, s. 6. 
77 See Morrison, Government and Parliament, 2nd ed., 217 -218; and (1962 -63) H.C. 190. 
78 Prest, Public Finance, Chap. 8. The theories of Lord Keynes, while reflected in budgetary 
practice, are not reflected in parliamentary procedure. 
79 See the debate in (1960) 627 H.C.Deb. 2255 et seq. 
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other in the work of two committees, the Select Committee on Estimates, 
and the Public Accounts Committee, and their work is particularly depen- 
dent on the shape of the Appropriation Act. It seems that without a 
radical change in the relationship of government to Parliament the 
House could not reasonably be expected to deal with Estimates in detail. 
That task would require very different procedure in the House if the 
Estimates were to be passed by the necessary time. Even if such changes 
were made, such detailed scrutiny of Estimates might, it seems, involve 
a major alteration in the theory of parliamentary control of the adminis- 
tration. Thus it could provoke a substantial shift in the origination or 
choice of policy from the government to Parliament, since the priorities 
of expenditure depend upon policy. It is therefore necessary to consider 
the general role of Parliament in relation to the administration. 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS OF PARLIAMENT 
It is evident that Parliament does not concern itself exclusively with 
legislation, and, from what has been said, it is clear that debates which 
may have a legislative context are frequently concerned with parliamentary 
control of the administration. The words " administrative functions " 
are in a sense inapt. It remains true, as Mr. Gladstone asserted, that 
the business of the Commons or of Parliament " is not to govern the 
country, but it is, if you think fit, to call to account those who do govern 
it." In minor ways, as through private legislation, Parliament may have 
a direct hand in administration, and in the past, particularly/in revolution- 
ary times /Parliament has directly administered 80; and at times in the > 
early nineteenth century showed a tendency to concern itself in ways 
which could have had that effect.81 Nevertheless the evolution of doctrines 
of ministerial responsibility prevented any real development on these 
lines, so that the general principle may now be set out as above.82 The 
methods of parliamentary control must be reviewed against this back- 
ground, and against the general principles of the relationship of govern- 
ment to Parliament to be discussed subsequently. 
Parliamentary questions and related devices_ The most obvious and 
most praised method is the Parliamentary Question. Questions are 
limited by the fact that their subject- matter must engage ministerial 
responsibility, and by the fact that no minister can be compelled to 
answer, though clearly a minister will, normally, be reluctant to refuse 
to do so. Because of their popularity it has become necessary increasingly 
to regulate questions. Thus, substantial notice came to be required 
as a normal rule, subject to the exception of the Private Notice questions 
used in particular by the Leader of the Opposition. Further it has 
80 See, e.g., A.P.S. IX, 11 et seq., concerned with the Revolution of 1688 -89. 
81 For examples, see Williams, The Clerical Organisation of the House of Commons. 
82 See, too, Maitland, Constitutional History, 284 -285, and Alphaeus Todd, Parliamentary 
Government, Vol. I, p. 235 and Vol. II, Pt. V. 
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been necessary to limit the number of questions requiring an oral answer 
any one member can ask on any one day,83 and to limit the number of 
supplementary questions. Other devices, such as the " Rota System " 
as to subject- matter, have been adopted in an attempt to preserve the 
efficiency of this device, and in particular special arrangements have been 
made for questions addressed to the Prime Minister.ß4 In the House 
of Lords, where the device originated, " starred " questions, seeking only 
information, are a modern device, and are limited. The older form 
also requiring an oral answer normally receives a much longer reply 
than is customary in the Commons and may in fact initiate a brief debate. 
In the Commons an unsatisfactory answer may lead to a longer 
debate if the questioner can succeed in moving the adjournment of the 
House to discuss a " definite matter of urgent public importance. "S5 The 
Speaker must first be satisfied that each part of the phrase is applicable 
and that the matter involves ministerial responsibility. The criteria by 
which such matters are judged are strict. Although, as a result of the 
Report of the Select Committee on Procedure of 1959,86 some relaxation 
has occurred regularity of business requires a degree of strictness. Never- 
theless the possibility adds urgency to questions, just as the existence of 
parliamentary questions adds weight to the letters written by members 
to ministers. The letter contains the unwritten threat of a question. 
While the importance of questions as a device for controlling the admini- 
stration may be exaggerated, nevertheless the possibility of questions 
has a substantial influence on the conduct of administration. The 
existence of that possibility can have an effect upon the taking of decisions, 
which may be more important than the actual challenge of decisions 
once taken. The doctrine of a " Fleet in being " has more than one 
application. Questions also remain important constitutionally as giving 
a particular opportunity to backbenchers, and as a constant reminder of 
the doctrine of ministerial responsibility.87 As such they do much to 
preserve the ministerial system. In their absence a similar process to 
that by which ministers took effective and, eventually, nominal power 
also from the Crown might have been repeated in the case of ministers 
and civil servants. The latter exercise power in fact, but, among other 
things, questions prevent the overt assumption of power. 
Adjournment debates and related devices. Somewhat more general 
are debates upon the adjournment. Half an hour is allotted at the 
83 The number is now two, see 617 H.C.Deb. 33 -186. Written answers are printed in 
Hansard and are often lengthy and detailed. 
S4 July 18, 1961, 644 H.C.Deb. 1052. A change which marks the changing role of the 
Prime Minister. Some changes, such as the Rota System, are also administratively 
necessary. A minister must have reasonable time for his departmental duties. 
85 Under S.O. 9, see Greenleaf, " Urgency Motions in the Commons " [1960] Public Law 
270. 
86 (1959) H.C.P. 92. Questions may be combined with other parliamentary devices to 
produce a campaign, for an illustration see Hanson, Parliament at Work. 
87 See generally the very valuable survey Chester and Bowring, Questions in Parliament 
and Howarth, Questions in the House. 
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end of each day from Monday to Friday when private members may 
raise matters, the subject being either balloted for by members or chosen 
by the Speaker.88 The subject- matter of such debates must involve 
ministerial responsibility, but the form of debate (which is obviously on 
the motion to adjourn) prevents any specific resolution, thus the oppor- 
tunity is one for the ventilation of grievances. Somewhat similar in 
type are the debates upon the four annual " holiday " adjournments. 
Rather more general are the days allocated to private members' motions,89 
and somewhat more specific are the debates upon the motion for going 
into the Committee of Supply at the opening of the Civil and Service 
Estimates.90 Debates upon amendments to the motion for the address 
at the beginning of the session are varied, but all these afford opportunities 
for criticism 91 Much more specific are the opportunities afforded by 
the Estimate Procedure. By convention the Supply Days are used to 
debate matters chosen by the Opposition, and thus they afford opportu- 
nities for more serious and sustained attacks upon the government.92 
Thus, what are nominally debates upon estimates are in reality debates 
upon administration. There are then numerous possibilities of debating 
the activities of the administration, and the examples given do not exhaust 
the list. Prayers against Statutory Instruments may, for example, serve 
that purpose rather than a purpose more closely linked with the Statutory 
Instrument. Nevertheless these opportunities do not provide a sustained 
and planned surveillance of the administration -to a large extent their 
effectiveness depends upon their random quality. Moreover they are 
opportunities for debate, and do not involve the House in any direct 
participation in the administrative process. 
Such direct participation does in fact exist. S.O. 87 (relating to 
mail and telegraphic contracts) is a long standing minor example, but, 
in modem times, just as private Bill legislation gives Parliament a direct 
interest in local administration so also does public legislation give it 
such an interest in the conduct of the central government. Often legisla- 
tion, either in its primary or in its delegated form,98 is today only a 
facet of administration, and thus to the extent that Parliament influences 
legislation it is in such cases affecting administration. Such opportunities, 
however, necessarily also occur in a random way. More regular surveil- 
lance is provided by the two committees dependent on financial procedure, 
the Public Accounts Committee and the Select Committee on Estimates.94 
ss See the arrangements accepted on February 8, 1960, 617 H.C.Deb. 34 et seq. 
89 Ibid. 
99 See Erskine May, Parliamentary Practice, 16th ed., 726 -727. 
91 The shape of these debates can be readily gathered from Hanson, Parliament at Work. 
92 As a result of the Select Committee on Procedure, steps were taken to increase slightly 
their efficiency in this respect. 
93 See, e.g., the debate in 658 H.C.Deb. 395 et seq. 
94 See Chubb, The Control of Public Expenditure. Something of the manner of working 
of the Committee can be seen more shortly in the debate in 650 H.C.Deb. 637 -762, and 
that beginning at 652 H.C.Deb. 208. 
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Detailed controls. The Public Accounts Committee is established 
under S.O. 90 to examine the appropriation accounts, and other accounts 
laid before Parliament. The Chairman is, by convention, an Opposition 
member who normally has held office at the Treasury. The Committee 
is assisted by the Comptroller and Auditor -General, who, while being 
technically a witness before the Committee, is in fact its principal aide, 
other assistance being provided by two Treasury Officers of Accounts 
who are in attendance. The Committee, having power to send for persons 
and papers, deals with the Accounting Officers (normally the permanent 
heads of departments) and may be in effect a court to which they are 
answerable.95 So far as accounts are concerned the work of the Committee 
(and of the Comptroller) reaches far beyond consideration of narrow 
accountancy questions into questions of administrative efficiency, and in 
relation to the Defence Estimates its powers in relation to virement 
give to it a considerable potential interest in detail. 
The operation of the Committee is intimately connected with the 
shape of the Estimates and the Schedules to the Appropriation Act. 
As a consequence it is established that the Committee has a voice upon 
proposed alterations in the shape of the Estimates.96 The two facts, 
that the Committee receives expert help from the Comptroller and 
Auditor- General and that it deals with senior officials mark the work 
of the Committee, and give to it both effectiveness and weight. On 
the other hand, the fact that it is dealing with the made -up accounts means 
that a Report may lose in topicality. The Third Report adopted in July 
1961 dealt with accounts for 1959 -60, and with events running back to 
1955. Nevertheless it is clear that the Committee's Reports (upon which 
the Treasury comments are published) do have a substantial effect upon 
government activity and organisation. The Comptroller and Auditor - 
General, whose salary is charged upon the Consolidated Fund, and who 
is only removable on an address by the two Houses of Parliament,97 holds 
an office of great independence, enhanced by the fact that he is regarded 
as a servant of Parliament and of the House of Commons in particular. 
Over the years he has built up a peculiar position in relation to the civil 
service,98 being at the same time an inspector and a collaborator, and 
having many of the requisite facilities to survey the administration from 
a broad point of view. Thus this Committee has both the opportunity 
and the means of surveying the governmental machine and reporting to 
Parliament, and its strength is perhaps increased by the fact that so 
far as is possible it does not trench upon policy. It is probably also 
95 See the appropriate heading in the Epitome of Reports of the Public Accounts Committee 
and Brittain, British Budgetary System, 248 -250. 
98 See (1960 -61) H.C. 252 -l. 
97 Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, 1866, ss. 3 and 4. While his functions as Comp- 
troller are important from the point of view of the regularity of financial administration, 
those as Auditor have assumed an even greater importance. 
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helped by the fact that it takes evidence from senior civil servants, whose 
views take account of the general picture of the governmental machine. 
A somewhat similar function is performed by the Select Committee 
on Estimates. This Committee has sprung into importance after 1945, as 
a result of experience gained by the Select Committee on National 
Expenditure in the war years. Its predecessors before the war had met 
with little success. They concerned themselves with money, whereas 
Supply debates are concerned with policy, and for this among other 
reasons the work of the Committee had little effect.9° During the war 
the Committee on National Expenditure had concentrated upon particular 
problems of expenditure, and had operated through Sub -committees. 
This model was adopted for the reconstituted Select Committee on 
Estimates, and in 1960 its membership was increased to give greater 
scope for the appointment of sub -committees.' The Chairman is a 
government backbencher. While its function is to examine the Estimates 
it is supposed not to trench upon policy. In effect in these aspects its 
work bears a close resemblance to that of the Public Accounts Com- 
mittee and it also surveys the administrative machine.2 But to it are 
entrusted certain specific tasks, in particular the examination of the 
Spring Supplementary Estimates. It is also required to report to the 
House upon the principal variations between the Estimates and those 
of the preceding year before the autumn debate on public expenditure. 
These tasks were added in 1960 in an effort to increase parliamentary 
control of expenditure. 
The methods of operation of the Committee differ in two important 
ways from those of the Select Committee on Public Accounts. Its sub- 
committees may investigate on the spot, and it lacks the expert advice 
given to the Public Accounts Committee. While the first of these differ- 
ences does give the Committee advantages, there is also the danger that 
the evidence which it receives may be given by persons not fully aware 
of the whole departmental situation, and also that the smaller sub- 
committees may be heavily influenced by the views of particular members. 
These risks are not diminished by the second difference, which means 
that the Committee and its sub -committees rely almost entirely on their 
own resources, though this factor can also work in both directions. 
These differences have resulted in the work of the Committee being 
subjected to more criticism than that of the Public Accounts Committee.3 
Despite criticism it is clear that the Committee has been much more 
successful after the war than it was before, though it is also evident 
that except in relation to the matters added to its terms of reference in 
99 See Chubb, op. cit. Chap. VIII and Jennings, Parliament, Chap. IX. 
1 627 H.C.Deb. 1292. 
2 See, e.g., the report upon Treasury Control (1957 -58) H.C. 254 and 254-1 or the report 
on O. and M. (1946 -47) H.C. 143. 
3 See, e.g., the criticism contained in J. D. B. Miller's " The Colonial Office and the Estimates 
Committee " (1961) Public Administration 173 et seq. 
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1960 its work tends, in substance, to resemble that of the Public Accounts 
Committee. 
Added time was provided from 1960 for debating the reports of 
these Committees; but, apart from such debates, the fact that the reports 
of these Committees are answered by the Treasury or the relevant depart- 
ment means that they are capable of influencing administrative structures 
and practices. The work of these Committees is however to some extent 
generalised, retrospective and episodic, and does not amount to a continu- 
ing current scrutiny of administrative activity. It is, moreover, limited by 
the fact that neither Committee may, by its terms of reference, trench 
upon policy, though that is a word which is difficult to define in this 
context. 
Apart from these Committees, the Select Committee on Statutory 
Instruments 4 does affect and to some extent scrutinises administration, 
since Statutory Instruments even more than statutes may reflect the 
current needs and intentions of departments. Once again, however, this 
Committee is formally excluded from the field of policy, and once again 
the success of the Committee is perhaps attributable to the expert assis- 
tance which it receives from counsel to the Speaker. The Select Com- 
mittee on Nationalised Industries discharges, in substance though not 
in form, somewhat similar functions in its own field to those of the two 
financial Committees. This Committee, too, has asked, but in vain, for 
expert assistance.' 
The value of such Committees as controlling devices should perhaps 
not be estimated merely by the extent to which they discover faults. Their 
existence and the implication of potential scrutiny has its effect through- 
out the administration. Moreover their activity is circumscribed by 
general doctrines, both administrative and constitutional. So long as 
the doctrine of ministerial responsibility exists limits are imposed upon 
the questions which can properly be put to, and the answers which can 
properly be given by, civil servants. If such bodies are to operate im- 
partially then many points must be reserved for the House itself. Equally 
it is likely that the House would be jealous of any growth of the powers 
of such Committees since such growth would be likely to be at the expense 
of the House as a whole. Hence it is likely that the functions of such 
Committees are likely to remain as they now are, namely informing the 
House, informing individual members, and providing some, but limited, 
contact between administration and members. Any other role would 
have major consequences upon the role of the House of Commons 
itself. Administratively it may, in any event, be unsatisfactory for those 
limits to be greatly exceeded. Too detailed investigation can both 
disrupt and delay the administrative process, and produce the wrong 
4 As to which see post, Chap. 15. 
b See Special Report (1959 -60) H.C. 276; and on this and similar topics Wheare, Govern- 
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attitude of mind for efficient administration. Finally the whole of this 
question must be viewed against the more general background of the 
relationship of government to Parliament which is discussed hereafter. 
Conclusion. Overall it is, however, clear that there is a concentration 
of activity upon the floor of the House. The proceedings of the committees 
being private until their reports are published, their activities do not 
attract current attention. When published the reports tend to be over- 
shadowed in the public mind by other business, though their effect inside 
the administration is not thus limited. It is also clear that the work of 
these committees looks to the past and not to the future. It does not 
amount to a current supervision, although recent changes in relation to 
the Select Committee on Estimates have slightly altered that condition. In 
the House, where controls over the administration may have a greater 
impact on current activities, the operation of many of the mechanisms is 
necessarily affected by the political character of the House. This is by 
no means exclusively so, any member accepts readily the obligations 
which he has to protect the interests of his constituency and of all his 
constituents. The general establishment of " clinics " at which the 
member is available to hear complaints from his constituents is evidence 
of that acceptance, and the obligation which is felt is not simply one of 
party politics. Many of the grievances felt by ordinary citizens are thus 
heard and are dealt with, where appropriate, in correspondence with the 
relevant minister. Weight is added to such letters by the fact of being a 
member and by the backing of the parliamentary opportunities to raise 
grievances. Such activities attract little publicity, though achieving much 
good, and by filtering off the less controversial matters tend again to cause 
those matters with a more political character to be reserved for discussion 
in the House. These circumstances may cause the influence of members 
in individual cases to be underrated because that influence is not always 
publicised. They may also, in so far as the House is the great forum 
for political debate, wherein the debate is often as much intended for 
the ears of the electorate as for those of the opposing party, aid the House 
of Commons in fulfilling that function. 
As is to be expected, if the relative position of the government to 
each House is considered, the House of Lords is much more concerned 
in this matter with issues of general principle. The virtual exclusion of 
that House from the field of finance has the effect under the existing 
system of largely excluding it also from many opportunities of controlling 
administrative activity. The absence of many senior ministers from 
the House has also its effect in limiting the activities of the House in 
this respect. In more general debates the experience of some of its 
members may be valuable in moulding the pattern of administration. It 
is even possible that these limitations may have certain advantages. 
The task of answering in the House of Commons for a busy department 
which may be at the centre of controversy is a heavy one, and the absence 
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of such demands in the House of Lords may in the case of some depart- 
ments aid their administration, if it prove politically possible for the 
minister in charge to be in the House of Lords. The result is then that 
in so far as there is parliamentary control or supervision of the adminis- 
tration, that control is predominantly exercised by the House of Commons. 
Granted the present composition of the two Houses, no other result would 
be reconcilable with current theories of government. 
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THE EXECUTIVE -I 
THE CROWN 
IT is convenient to treat the Crown first of all under this heading, since 
it is in the name of the Crown that the central government operates. 
Further, the concept of the Crown dominates much of our constitutional 
thinking and continues to affect even detailed rules.' This domination 
produces both advantages and disadvantages. Some of the advantages 
may be psychological, but nevertheless important, such as the feeling 
of continuity or stability, others may be practical,2 and both may be 
dependent upon a lack of precision in ideas about the Crown. The 
disadvantages flow, in part, from the same imprecision. To a large extent 
the existence of the concept of the Crown has provided an excuse for a 
failure to produce a theory of the state, the absence of which may create 
difficulties in modern times. There may well be an unrealistic dichotomy 
in the treatment of the machinery of government because of the need 
to determine which parts of that machinery are, and which parts are 
not, to be regarded as " the Crown." 3 Further dependent terminology - 
such words as " prerogative " -may in modern conditions acquire 
distorted significance because of the connection with " the Crown." 
In many cases powers would be better seen for what they are if they were 
regarded as belonging to the government. 
The Sovereign -title and succession. The simplest meaning of the 
word " Crown " is that given by the Interpretation Act, 1889, s. 30 -the 
Sovereign for the time being. That Sovereign is determined by rules 
of succession laid down in the Act of Settlement, 1701, and incorporated 
in the Acts of Union (such incorporation being one of the main objectives 
of the English Commissioners). By the Act of 1701 the succession is 
settled upon the heirs of the body (being Protestant) of the Princess 
Sophia .4 The title descends lineally according to the old feudal rules, 
males being preferred to females, with the rule of primogeniture applying 
1 Consider the different remedies sought against the various defenders in Adams v. S. of 
S. for Scotland, 1958 S.C. 279 even though they were all engaged in a common enterprise. 
2 The separation of the " dignified capacity " of which Bagehot spoke in his English 
Constitution remains important. 
3 Maitland, Constitutional History, p. 417 and The Crown as a Corporation in his Selected 
Essays, and consider the interplay of terminology in Chandler v. D.P.P. [1962] 3 All 
E.R. 142 at 156. 
4 By H.M. Declaration of Abdication Act, 1936, the Duke of Windsor and his issue are 
excluded. 
137 
138 THE EXECUTIVE -I 
equally among males and females.5 By the Bill of Rights, again in- 
corporated (to this extent) in the Acts of Union, any person who becomes 
a Roman Catholic or marries a Roman Catholic forfeits all right to 
the throne and is treated as if dead .° Any person succeeding to the 
throne is required to take the coronation oath,' to declare himself a 
faithful Protestant,° to swear to maintain the Church of Scotland and 
the Church of England 9 and to enter into communion with the Church 
of England.10 It will be seen that the title is a parliamentary one, and it 
is only Parliament that can alter the succession 11 In this respect Parlia- 
ment is now limited by the Statute of Westminster, 1931. The preamble 
requires the consent of the parliaments of the dominions to any law touch- 
ing the succession and the royal style and titles, and any such law intended 
to have effect within a dominion would also be affected by section 4. 
The present title is regulated under the Royal Titles Act, 195312 The 
Commonwealth agreement which underlies this Act, demonstrated 
the two ideas of unity and independence which mark the theory of the 
Commonwealth. Each member was free to choose a title appropriate 
to its own circumstances, but all should include the description of the 
Queen as Queen of Her other Realms and Territories and Head of the 
Commonwealth. Thus the Act of 1953 authorises the adoption of a title 
for the purposes of the United Kingdom and the territories dependent 
5 This matter possibly admitted argument until the accession of the present Queen, pro- 
claimed as solely entitled. Though Coke and Blackstone asserted that the eldest daughter 
succeeded solely, and in 1936 the Law Officers regarded legislative clarification as un- 
necessary, the matter was perhaps not beyond dispute. For the arguments see Farran, 
" The Law of the Accession " (1953) 16 M.L.R. 140. For the older Scots law, which 
Craig asserted depended upon universal public laws (Jus Feudale 1, 14, 8), see the sources 
referred to in Sources and Literature of Scots Law (the Stair Society) at p. 360. It seems 
that Art. II of the Act of Union by implication made all the rules applicable to the Crown 
of England apply after the Union. 
6 The appropriate provisions of the Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement were also 
extended as United Kingdom law by the Succession to the Crown Act, 1707, and see 
the Claim of Right. 
7 The Coronation Oath Act, 1688. Despite the terms of this Act the Oath taken has 
been varied without statutory approval. See 511 H.C.Deb. at 2099 -2100 for the last 
form. 
° Bill of Rights, 1688, the Act of Settlement. The terms of the declaration were amended 
by the Accession Declaration Act, 1910, at the instigation of Edward VII. 
9 The Acts for the Security of the Church of Scotland, and for the Security of the Church 
of England, incorporated in the Union Settlement. 
1° The Act of Settlement. 
11 Thus H.M. Declaration of Abdication Act, 1936, was necessary to give effect to the 
declaration itself. Parliamentary control is expressly affirmed, and denial of it made 
treason by the Succession to the Crown Act, 1707; compare the Declaration of the 
Parliament of Scotland, 1685, A.P.S. IX, 459, accepting the ideas of Mackenzie in his 
Jus Regium. 
12 The Act emerged as a result of the agreement reached by Commonwealth ministers 
in 1953 (Cmd. 8748). Although this agreement is referred to in the preamble to this 
Act it is not scheduled to it, so that Lord President Cooper regarded the Act as incom- 
prehensible according to the ordinary rules of interpretation in MacCormick v. Lord 
Advocate, 1953 S.C. 396 at 411. The title adopted under the Act was " Elizabeth the 
Second, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, 
Defender of the Faith." See generally, de Smith, " The Royal Style and Titles " (1953) 
2 I.C.L.Q. 263 and Mansergh, Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs 
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on it. Objection was taken in Scotland to the adoption of the numeral II, 
which was first used in the proclamation, but the action was held to be 
incompetent,13 and the numeral was subsequently justified on the grounds 
that it was the custom to use the lowest numeral not yet used in England 
or Scotland. The changes in the royal title are significant as marking 
changes in the constitution of the Commonwealth,14 and should be 
studied in that context. 
The accession of a new Sovereign is marked by the proclamation 
authorised by an Accession Council, an assembly of notables, which 
in 1952 included representatives of the members of the Commonwealth. 
Proclamation is not essential in law since it has come to be accepted 
doctrine that the King never dies and that succession is instantaneous 
upon the death of the former Sovereign, assuming that the statutory 
conditions are fulfilled. In relation to matters of government, statute 
has provided for continuity, particularly the Demise of the Crown Act, 
1901, in relation to office holders 16 In due course the coronation follows, 
the service again tending to illustrate current constitutional facts. Thus, 
in 1953, apart from the Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church 
of Scotland having a part in the service, the Prime Ministers of member 
states of the Commonwealth were present. 
Minority and illness. In England minority was no bar to reigning and 
in Scotland the position had been variously regulated at different times.Y° 
Ad hoc arrangements were made, often with great difficulty, to deal 
with the minority, absence or incapacity of the King and in 1937 standing 
legislation was first introduced. This has required subsequent amend- 
ment, and the Regency Acts of 1937, 1943 and 1953 still retain certain 
ad hoc characteristics. 
The Regency Act, 1937, provides for the discharge of the royal functions 
by a Regent when the Sovereign is under eighteen,i7 or where the Sovereign 
is incapable by reason of infirmity of mind or body of discharging such 
functions, or where the Sovereign is for some definite cause not available 
13 MacCormick v. Lord Advocate, 1953 S.C. 396. 
14 Notably the adoption of the title Head of the Commonwealth in 1949 which marked 
the acceptance of republics within the Commonwealth. See Mansergh, op. cit., Vol. II, 
846, and de Smith, The Vocabulary of Commonwealth Relations. 
16 This is to be contrasted with the older rules limiting the grant of offices to the life of 
the Sovereign, see the rules discussed in Officers of State v. Lord Dunglas (1838) 1 D. 
300. In part these rules were to protect the royal revenues in part to protect the indepen- 
dence of action of each Sovereign. See, e.g., Fount. I, 339 on the danger of a Parliament 
surviving a King, and compare the modern rules contained in the Act of Succession, 
1707, the Meeting of Parliament Act, 1797, and the Representation of the People Act, 
1867, which ensure the rapid meeting of Parliament (even of a dissolved one) on the 
death of a Sovereign. 
16 See The Queen and Her Comptroller v. Hamilton (1557) Mor. 7855, and the various Acts 
in 1526 (A.P.S. II, 301), 1564 (A.P.S. II, 545), 1567 (A.P.S. III, 13 and 429) and 1704 
(A.P.S. XI, 136). For the English rule see Co.Litt. 43a, b; and see Farran, " The Regency 
Act " (1954) 17 M.L.R. 146. This legislation applies only to the U.K. and its dependent 
colonies. 
17 
S. 1 (2) makes the eighteenth birthday the appropriate date for making any necessary 
oath or declaration by the Sovereign. 
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for such functions.18 Normally, the Regent is the person next in succession 
who is a British subject of full age (which by the Act of 1953, s. 1 (1), 
here means eighteen), domiciled in the United Kingdom.10 The Regent 
is subject to the excluding rules in the Act of Settlement and is required 
to take the oath of allegiance. Temporarily, however, by the Act of 
1953, s. 1 (2), should a regency become necessary, either on the death or 
incapacity of the present Queen before any child or grandchild of hers 
attains eighteen, the Duke of Edinburgh becomes Regent and Guardian. 
The Regent has all the royal powers, save that, by section 4 (2) 
of the Act of 1937, he cannot assent to any Bill altering the order of 
succession to the throne, or altering the Act for the Security of the Church 
of Scotland.20 
Apart from Regencies difficulties had also arisen in other cases of 
illness, and the Act of 1937 makes provision for the appointment of 
Counsellors of State in the case of illness not amounting to incapacity 
or where the Sovereign is to be absent from the United Kingdom. The 
Counsellors of State are the spouse of the Sovereign, the present Queen 
Mother and the four persons next in succession (not being disqualified),21 
subject to the possible omission under the Act of 1943 of persons who 
will also be absent. The Counsellors of State can exercise such functions 
as are delegated to them by Letters Patent, but no power to dissolve 
Parliament save on express instruction or to grant any honours may 
be delegated.22 
The Royal Family. The eldest son of the Sovereign is, from birth, 
Prince and Steward of Scotland, and Duke of Rothesay.23 He is similarly 
Duke of Cornwall in the peerage of England and is created Prince of 
Wales. The law of treason protects a Queen Consort and the heir, 
but without special legislation the husband of a Queen is not so protected. 
Special privileges and precedence are conferred upon such a husband 
but the details may vary in each case.24 Marriages in the Royal Family 
are restricted by the Royal Marriages Act, 1772. For this purpose the 
Royal Family is defined as the descendants of George II other than 
the issue of princesses who have married into foreign families. Such 
18 These last two conditions are to be established to the satisfaction of three or more of 
the following, the spouse of the Sovereign, the Lord Chancellor, the Speaker, the Lord 
Chief Justice and the Master of the Rolls. What amounts to non -availability is not 
clear. 
1° Regency Act, 1937, s. 3. 
2° As to these provisions, see p. 64, ante. 
21 The limitation to members of the Royal Family dates back in practice to 1936. See Tom 
Jones, Diary with Letters, p. 63. 
22 In practice an equivalent protection of the Church of Scotland to the statutory one in 
the case of a Regency is included. 
23 And Earl of Carrick, Baron of Renfrew, Lord of the Isles. As Duke of Rothesay he 
voted in the elections of Representative Peers up to 1807, for its history see " A Short 
Account of the Principality of Scotland " by Lord Dunedin and see Croft Dickinson in 
(1924) Economica. 
24 See, e.g., London Gazette, Sept. 30, 1952. 
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persons if under twenty -five require the consent of the Sovereign to 
their marriage or if over twenty -five must obtain such consent or give 
notice to the Privy Counci1.26 For most purposes, however, the other 
members of the Royal Family are treated as ordinary subjects. 
The royal revenues. By a steady process, starting from the accession 
of George III the majority of the hereditary revenues of the Crown have 
been surrendered by each sovereign at the beginning of the reign in 
exchange for the Civil List -sums appropriated by Parliament.28 The 
Civil List Act makes provision for the Sovereign and for such other 
members of the Royal Family as may be appropriate. The sums payable 
to the Queen are appropriated under five heads. The revenues not 
surrendered are those of the Duchies of Cornwall and Lancaster and 
of the Principality of Scotland, the first and the last belonging to the 
heir apparent,27 and while the heir apparent is a minor the Civil List is 
abated. The surrendered lands and land revenues are now managed 
by the Crown Estate Commissioners under the Crown Estate Acts, 1956 
and 1961.28 A distinction must be drawn between the Crown Estate 
which is thus managed, and the private estates of the Crown which 
are separately regulated, notably by the Crown Private Estates Act, 
1862, and the Conveyancing (Scotland) Act, 1874. The latter estates 
are treated as private property, and bear appropriate fiscal burdens. 
At the back of this division lies a long history, especially in Scotland. 
There was for long a determined effort to annexe lands and revenue to 
the Crown, and to prevent their alienation, in order to preserve the 
national revenue. The distinction also appeared in cases where it was 
argued that the Crown, acquiring from a subject superior, utitur jure 
communi.29 
In a strict form these arguments have ceased to be important because 
of fundamental changes in the mature of government and of government 
finance. Nevertheless some of the principles which underlie the older 
cases remain of importance when the terminology is translated into 
appropriate modern words. Thus, the Regalia, the proprietary rights 
adhering to the Crown by virtue of the prerogative, are divided into 
25 See Farran, " The Royal Marriages Act " (1951) 14 M.L.R. 56; this Act, coupled with 
the Act 4 Anne, c. 1 conferring English nationality on the lineal descendants of the 
Princess Sophia, creates many uncertainties; see Clive Parry, " Further Considerations 
upon the Prince of Hanover's Case " (1956) 5 I.C.L.Q. 61. The latter Act, repealed 
by the British Nationality Act, 1948, was held in Att.-Gen. v. Ernest Augustus Prince 
of Hanover [1957] A.C. 436 to have conferred British nationality upon that Prince. 
26 See Civil List Act, 1952. 
27 Purves v. Laird of Luss (1680) Mor. 8542; Johnston V. Riccarton (1608) Mor. 11685 and see 
Bell, Princ. 672 and 674. The lands fall to be managed by the Crown Estate 
Commissioners. 
28 In effect the Crown Estate is regarded as held upon trust, see (1955) Cmd. 9483. 
29 e.g., Bruce v. Veitch, Nov. 28, 1810, F.C.; and see " The Royal Prerogative in Modern 
Scots Law " [1957] Public Law, 304 though for a rather fuller account and a slightly 
different view see Cameron, " Crown Exemption from Statute and Tax in Scotland," 
1962 J.R. 191. Among the institutional writers see, Stair, Inst. II, 3, 35, Ersk. Inst. II 
3, 15. Craig, Jus Feudale, 1, 15, 17. 
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regalia majora and regalia minora,30 the former being inalienable, the 
latter capable of alienation. The former, in particular, were regarded as 
being held upon trust for the people,31 and as belonging to the Crown 
as representing the state, and as existing for the protection of subjects.S3 
Generalised ideas, such as the idea of res extra commercium or of res 
publici#fl -also played their part.33 The functional aspects of these rights, 
as necessarily belonging to a government irrespective of its form, was 
also emphasised.34 These proprietary rights have then their importance 
for an understanding of the theory of prerogative, for they have developed 
from the period when jurisdiction was property,35 and they thus form 
a necessary link with the discussion of prerogative which is inseparable 
from a discussion of the royal functions. 
THE PREROGATIVE 
Introduction. Public right, said Figgis, shapes itself out of private right. 
The powers of modern governments run back to the proprietary rights 
and jurisdictions of particular persons. Pre -eminent among these was 
the Sovereign, and with the evolution of modem and responsible govern- 
ment these powers, and their derivatives, have in fact become the attributes 
of government, but their discussion is still obscured by the almost mystical 
aura of majesty which, because of their origin, still surrounds them. 
Maitland's warning 36 to observe how the new wants of a new age were 
being met is still neglected by governments and institutional writers, though 
there was a time when the courts in Scotland took a more realistic view.37 
Essentially prerogative powers are those which, of necessity, inhere in 
governments. 
The use of the word prerogative with us is confusing. It meant 
to Blackstone the special pre -eminence of the king, to Dicey the residue 
30 The details of the rights comprised under these heads are not appropriate to the present 
work, and for them the curious reader is referred to the Title Crown in the Encyclopaedia 
of the Laws of Scotland and to Fraser, Constitutional Law, p. 99 et seq.; Rankine, Land 
Ownership, Chap. XIV, and McMillan, Bona Vacantia. While in general the rights 
correspond to those in England there are differences, see, e.g., Henderson v. Scott (1793) 
Mor. 17072 in relation to waifs, and see now Lord Advocate v. Aberdeen University, 
1962 S.L.T. 413. 
31 Marquess of Bute v. McKirdy, 1937 S.C. 93; Smith v. Lerwick Harbour Trustees (1903) 
5 F. 680; Burnet v. Barclay, 1955 J.C. 34. 
32 See the authorities cited by Craig, Jus Feudale; Ersk. Inst. II, 6, 17 and Smith's case, 
supra; Cruickshank v. Gordon (1843) 5 D. 909 at 962. This was also the foundation 
of Montrose's famous letter upon prerogative. 
33 Such ideas ran through the treatment of public bodies, Wotherspoon v. Mags. of Linlithgow 
(1863) 2 M. 348; but cf. Western Heritable Investment Co. v. Glasgow Corporation, 1956 
S.L.T. 2 (affirmed 1956 S.C.(H.L.) 64). 
34 King's Printers v. Buchan (1826) 4 S. 559; and see the Aberdeen University case, supra, 
note 30. 
35 This idea underlay the provisions in the Act of Union for the benefit of royal burghs 
and the owners of the heritable jurisdictions. Its persistence caused considerable incon- 
venience, see Kames' Law Tracts on the Heritable Jurisdictions and Innes' Legal Antiquities. 
36 Constitutional History, 417. 
37 See Lord Advocate v. Galbraith (1910) 47 S.L.R. 529 and the cases cited in [1957] Public 
Law, 304 et seq.; 1962 7 J.R. 191 et seq. The view was charmingly and forcefully put 
in the Appendix on the indefeasible rights of Kings in Kames' Essays. It is accepted 
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of the discretionary or arbitrary power legally left at any time in the 
hands of the Crown,38 to Lord Haldane it meant the common law as 
distinct from the statutory powers of the Crown. 39 There is also the 
obvious distinction between the prerogative powers which remain personal 
to the sovereign and those which have been transferred to the government, 
and there is another complication, since terminology, such as the 
words Order in Council, may have a prerogative appearance which 
conceals the fact that an institution is statutory. Hence the basic ideas 
underlying the concept of prerogative separate out or coalesce in different 
ways in different situations. Thus, the idea of discretionary power 
sometimes refers to those powers which can be exercised by the govern- 
ment without the prior consent of Parliament. Such powers exist pre- 
eminently in the field of foreign affairs, and in effect these are common 
law powers, in the sense that they are powers which tend to inhere in 
any government 40 At other times the discretionary powers exercised 
by a government are in origin statutory, yet they attract the attributes of 
prerogative powers of the common law type, despite the fact that it has 
been declared by the House of Lords that a statute operating in the 
field of prerogative excludes the possibility of exercising the old preroga- 
tive powers41 This rule, which in some areas is applied with strictness,42 
could have surprising effects if applied with logical firmness to the depart- 
ments of the central government. In relation to them, it is not uniformly 
applied so that the lines of division are blurred. There may be from the 
point of view of the government both practical and psychological advan- 
tages in using the word prerogative, but this imprecision, while it has 
to be accepted, must also be watched 43 
This imprecision is perhaps attributable to the fact that disputes 
about prerogative have always been at the centre of constitutional 
law, but the disputes have never been settled in detail. What is clear 
is that prerogative cannot mean a power above the law. The view of 
Berkeley J. in the Case of Ship Money" or of Sir George Mackenzie 
in the Jus Regium that " It was fit for the people that Kings should be 
above the Law " was no longer tenable after the Civil War and the 
events of 1688 -89. It was these events which secured victory for the 
views of George Buchanan, Coke C.J. and Lord President Seton45 The 
38 Dicey's view runs through the opinions in Chandler v. D.P.P. [1962] 3 All E.R. 142. 
39 Theodore v. Duncan [1919] A.C. 696. 
40 Thus the constitutional limitations upon the powers of the President of the U.S.A. to 
declare war in practice give way before other powers of a President to take action in 
such a field, as the events of 1940 -41 demonstrate. 
41 Att.-Gen. v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel [1920] A.C. 508. 
42 Re Mitchell [1954] Ch. 525. 
43 See especially the Report on the Interception of Communications (1957) Cmd. 283, and 
compare Re K. (Infants) [1962] 3 All E.R. 1000 at 1014. 
44 (1637) 3 St.Tr. 825, 1098. See too Bates' Case (1606) 2 St.Tr. 371. For the background 
to this case and to the subject see Keir and Lawson, Cases on Constitutional Law, 
and (1953) 69 L.Q.R. 200. 
43 In the Case of Prohibitions (1607) 12 Co.Rep. 63 and Bruce v. Hamilton; see (1952) 58 
J.R. 83. Contrast Hope, Major Practicks, I, p. 13. 
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victory was secured with difficulty. Steuart in his Answers, while agreeing 
that law is the great litus of prerogative, was unwilling to discuss in 
detail the limits which the law might set to prerogative, advancing the 
matter little further than Dirleton's Doubts. Godden v. Hales and the 
Act of 1685 for the Security of the Officers of State supported the other 
view.46 Moreover, when won, the victory was not certain. Principles 
have had to be reasserted since.47 In effect the events of 1688 -89 only 
settled the relationship of law to prerogative at the highest and most 
general levels. The law could determine the existence of a prerogative 
power, but the courts could not enter into a discussion of the rightness 
of the exercise of an admitted power. Thus further controls were needed 
to supplement the control by law. These controls had, of necessity to 
be political. Thus, the system of responsible government (the form which 
these controls eventually took) must be looked at as the necessary comple- 
ment to the solution, in respect of legal controls, which was sketched 
by the Revolution. There was, thus, created a diarchy, which still exists 
and is most clearly seen operating in cases involving foreign relations 
in war and peace 48 and in statutes in the same field such as the Inter- 
national Organisations (Immunities and Privileges) Act, 1950, which, in 
any event, imposes limitations upon the activities of the courts. The 
shape which the political controls took have, perhaps, over the years, 
increased those limitations. 
At lower or more detailed levels the operation of the diarchy is not 
so clear, partly because of the ambiguity of the word prerogative. Cases, 
such as Liversidge v. Anderson,49 which fundamentally involve the same 
issues as those which formerly underlay the dispute about prerogative 
tend to be looked upon as distinct because of a statutory background. 
In fact the issue of the scope of the proper limits of judicial review of 
governmental acts remains a live and critical one. This background of 
" prerogative " should be remembered in that context for in both the 
questions involved are the place of the courts in the machinery of govern- 
ment and the limits and effectiveness of other controlling mechanisms. 
It is dangerous to assume that the issues of prerogative have been finally 
settled either in their traditional or newer forms. 
The personal prerogatives. Traditional prerogative powers may most 
conveniently be discussed under two heads: those which remain personal 
to the Queen, and those that are exercised by the government. The 
46 (1686) 11 St.Tr. 1166; A.P.S. VIII, 484. Not all lawyers would speak out. Fountainhall, 
as his Memorials show, could connive in illegality; Stair, though he claimed to have 
written upon prerogative never published the work. 
4z Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 St.Tr. 1029. That argument continues: see Cmd. 283, 
above, note 43. 
48 In such cases as R. v. Bottrill, ex p. Kuechenmeister [1947] K.B. 41; Mighell v. Sultan 
of Johore [1894] 1 Q.B. 149; Government of the Republic of Spain v. National Bank of 
Scotland, 1939 S.C. 413; and see Chandler v. D.P.P. [1962] 3 All E.R. 142, especially 
at 158 -159. 
49 [1942] A.C. 206. 
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former are obviously limited in modern times. It is said that the Sovereign 
has merely the right to be consulted, the right to warn, and the right to 
encourage, and in normal times this is true. In exceptional circumstances 
more effective power still remains. There is, however, one governing 
consideration -that the Sovereign should remain neutral in politics 
and should appear so. Power has steadily been transferred to ministers, 
a transference which owes much to the growth of the idea of ministerial 
responsibility but which owes something also to much older doctrines, 
and institutions, such as the evolution of the various seals,ó0 which, 
when coupled with the human desire of any office holder to aggrandise 
his office, can operate in much the same direction. The whole process 
of transference has in modern times also been aided by the attitude 
of the Sovereign for the time being.61 As a result the personal prerogatives 
are limited in scope. The Sovereign, it is said,62 acts personally in relation 
to certain Orders, the Order of Merit, the Garter, the Thistle and the 
Royal Victorian Order, but with the probable exception of the last two 
it is likely that ministerial advice will more and more predominate, since 
appointments may well take on a political significance. 
Apart from such rights the Sovereign retains the traditional rights, 
to advise, to warn and to encourage the government, and to be informed 
by it. These functions must be seen in proper perspective. They can be 
overemphasised or underrated. It is clear that no Sovereign can overrule 
a government or force it to take action against its will.b3 Instances 
of " warning " were relatively common under George V, and exist under 
George VI also, though, since the crises of that reign were not so much 
of a political kind, there was less opportunity for it.64 It is not easy 
to determine the weight that these interventions have had. Sometimes 
there is a conflict of evidence b6 but there certainly appear to be cases 
when the intervention of the King has been valuable, as in relation to 
Ireland in 1921 -22.66 Moreover the weight of any intervention by the 
Sovereign is not constant, depending as it does on many factors such 
as the experience of Sovereign or minister. The interventions can par- 
ticularly after a long reign be backed by a very full knowledge. The 
Sovereign receives Cabinet minutes and has frequent meetings with 
the Prime Minister, the political members of the household provide links 
with the party in power, and unofficial occasions allow contact with 
the Opposition. It is one of the functions of the Private Secretary to 
6o Such institutions were also a means of subjecting the King to law; see, e.g., A. v. B. 
(1538) Mor. 7854. 
51 See Mackintosh, The British Cabinet, particularly Chaps. 9 and 16, which should be 
generally referred to, together with Jennings, Cabinet Government. 
62 Morrison, Government and Parliament, 2nd ed., 85. 
63 Morrison, op. cit. 75. 
54 See Nicholson, George V, Wheeler- Bennett, George VI and Mackintosh, op. cit. 
55 As in the appointment of Mr. Bevin as Foreign Secretary which the King claimed was 
due to his suggestion but which is denied by Lord Attlee, a denial which seems to fit 
the facts. 
56 Or in relation to the Parliament Act, 1911. 
M.C.L.-10 
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ensure a store of political information.b7 Thus over the years a con- 
siderable experience could be built up. Perhaps for that reason George V 
was particularly insistent on his right to be informed. Clearly, however, 
any royal interventions cannot be made public at the time, nor can 
they be made from the standpoint of party politics, and ultimately the 
Sovereign, though he may warn, must give way to his government. 
Just as important can be the right to " encourage " a government. 
Encouragement may amount to no more than a sympathetic reception, 
but that can be significant. The manner of the reception by George V 
of the first Labour government probably helped that government to 
assume office and helped the country at large to accept that government. 
In this field too, as that episode emphasised, any activity of the Sovereign 
must be founded upon a spirit of impartiality. This necessity marks 
even more strongly the use of the residual political powers which upon 
occasion a Sovereign may have to exercise. 
It is arguable whether or not a Sovereign has a right to refuse a 
dissolution requested by a Prime Minister.68 There is no modern instance 
of a refusal, though George V was reluctant to grant a dissolution to 
Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in 1924. A refusal is likely to bring the monarchy 
into the centre of political controversy, as is shown by the experience of 
Lord Byng in Canada in 1926,69 and while it seems that the power may 
exist it is one which would only be exercised in extreme, and virtually 
revolutionary, circumstances to preserve the constitution. The same 
is true of the " right " to dismiss a ministry. Again there are no modem 
precedents, though modern authorities assert the right.80 Its exercise 
would be so dangerous to the monarchy that its use could only be justified 
in like extreme circumstances, and history alone would decide the appro- 
priateness of the decision. More real is the personal prerogative in 
relation to the choice of Prime Minister. In normal circumstances the 
issue does not arise. It can do where there is no party with a clear 
majority, or where, because of the death or resignation of a Prime Minister 
during the currency of a Parliament, a choice has to be made in the 
absence of an election. Such a choice has had to be made in 1923, 1931, 
1940 and 1957. On such occasions the Sovereign has not always had 
the advice of the outgoing Prime Minister, and, while the advice of 
elder statesmen is taken, there remains a personal responsibility of the 
Sovereign, the burden of which is increased by the fact that though the 
office of Deputy Prime Minister exists, it is not formally recognised (and 
in any event the Deputy is not necessarily heir apparent). Further it 
was said in 1922 that the King would not wait upon a party choosing a 
leader, though in 1957 the Labour Party indicated that that was the 
b7 The office can be one of importance, see the Appendix to Wheeler- Bennett, op. cit. 
68 The authorities are discussed in Jennings, Cabinet Government. 
59 Forsey, Dissolution of Parliament. 
89 See Jennings, Cabinet Government; Amery, Thoughts on the Constitution; Marshall and 
Moodie, Some Problems of the Constitution. 
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acceptable procedure as far as it was concerned.81 Such a choice is often 
difficult, and capable of arousing controversy, as did the action of George V 
in 1931 in relation to the formation of the National Government, even 
though it is accepted as constitutionally correct. It is, however, difficult 
to provide by rules for such cases (even the Labour Party proposals 
of 1957, designed to aid the Sovereign in remaining above politics, could 
cause further difficulties), and it is perhaps inevitable that a residual 
power should exist to meet such situations. The existence of that power 
re- emphasises the necessity for the continuous political education of 
the Sovereign. The effectiveness of a constitutional long -stop can be 
important even if his services are rarely needed. 
The political powers exercised by a Sovereign have then been reduced 
to a minimum. With that reduction the possibility of a Sovereign exercis- 
ing a more general influence upon the life of the community has perhaps 
increased, and such influence should be allowed for in any calculation 
about the importance of the monarchy in the constitution. Royal 
interest can give " respectability " to new institutions; such things as 
the interest which George V demonstrated in industrial society can be 
important. The exploration of these questions would go too far into the 
realms of sociology, but they must be mentioned in this context.82 It 
must also be emphasised that in the wider sphere of the Commonwealth 
the institution of monarchy and the prerogative may have an even greater 
importance. The element of neutrality which in this country enables 
persons who dislike the government for the time being to serve the 
Crown with equanimity, assumes a greater importance. Monarchical 
members of the Commonwealth are prepared to give to the Crown an 
allegiance which they would not give to the United Kingdom, and for 
the republican members the title Head of the Commonwealth can achieve 
many of the same results. Aided by these shadowy and ill defined concepts 
practical co- operation can develop through many agencies in ways which 
would otherwise be much more difficult. It should, moreover, be remem- 
bered that as a result of the resolutions of the Imperial Conference of 
1930, the Sovereign has, in a sense, an independent existence in relation 
to the other member states. Each has a right of direct access to the 
Sovereign, not through the United Kingdom government. 
As has been seen this Commonwealth interest in the Crown is reflected 
in, among others, the rules governing changes in the royal titles, and it 
must be remembered that the rules here discussed are United Kingdom 
rules. Because of this Commonwealth interest debate has arisen whether 
the Crown is one or several. Older cases tended to emphasise unity,83 
but subsequent events, in particular the abdication of Edward VIII, 
61 For details of these events see Jennings, Mackintosh and Marshall and 'Moodie in the 
works already cited, and Bassett, 1931 Political Crisis. 
62 Books such as Petrie, The Modern British Monarchy or Kingsley Martin, The Crown 
and the Establishment, can be starting points for further inquiry. 
63 Williams v. Howarth [1905] A.C. 551. 
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made it difficult to maintain a theory of indivisibility since he ceased to be 
King in different parts of the Commonwealth on different days. Never- 
theless an element of unity remains in the agreement which preceded the 
Royal Titles Act, 1953, and at times is operative in United Kingdom law,64 
though at others it is rejected.65 This uncertainty is understandable, 
but it must be remembered that when the Crown is here referred to it is 
the Queen in the right of the United Kingdom to which reference is 
made, and the prerogative rules discussed are those in relation to that 
Kingdom. 
POLITICAL OR GOVERNMENTAL PREROGATIVES 
This group of powers and immunities consists of those which have 
been transferred to or affect the central government. They do not 
unfortunately fall into tidy categories. They may be discussed under 
the following heads: 
The prerogatives connected with foreign affairs. These are perhaps 
the widest. The Crown by virtue of the prerogative in foreign affairs 
is master of the sending and receipt of ambassadors, of the recognition 
of foreign states as independent or sovereign,66 and of the recognition 
of persons or bodies as having diplomatic status.87 Similar powers 
are conferred by statute in other like cases.88 The existence of a state of 
war is determined by prerogative declarations.ó9 So far as treaties are 
concerned the Crown has, by virtue of the prerogative, a power to enter 
into any treaty, but where a treaty requires any alteration of domestic 
law to become effective that must be done by Parliament. Similarly 
it is probably true that any treaty involving the cession of British territory 
requires parliamentary approval for its effectiveness 70 By convention, 
under the so -called Ponsonby Rules, other treaties, particularly those 
imposing obligations are to be laid before Parliament, though the exact 
scope of these rules is a matter of dispute. For political reasons Parliament 
may often be involved in the treaty -making process even where there 
is no legal or conventional obligation, for, while the power to act may 
exist, the actings may later be reviewed in Parliament and the support 
which is politically necessary may then be found to be lacking without 
64 In the case of Mr. Holland Martin in 1955 disqualification from the House of Commons 
was founded upon this theory of unity. 
65 See generally de Smith, " The Royal Style and Titles " (1953) 2 I.C.L.Q. 263. 
66 Duff Development Co. Ltd. v. Govt. of Kelantan [1924] A.C. 797; Govt. of the Republic 
of Spain v. National Bank of Scotland, 1939 S.C. 413; Owners of SS. Victoria v. Owners 
of SS. Quillwark, 1922 S.L.T. 68. 
67 Engelke v. Musmann [1928] A.C. 433; and see Dykes and Oswald, Principles of Civil 
Jurisdiction, and the Diplomatic Privileges Act, 1708. 
68 e.g., International Organisations (Immunities and Privileges) Act, 1950; Diplomatic 
Immunities (Commonwealth Countries and Republic of Ireland) Act, 1952; E.C.S.C. 
Act, 1955 and see Diplomatic Immunities Restriction Act, 1955. 
69 R. v. Bottrill, ex p. Kuechenmeister [1947] K.B. 41. 
7° This applies even within the Commonwealth, see, e.g., Christmas Island Act, 1958. 
Details upon this whole subject should be sought in appropriate books on international 
law. 
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prior discussion. By an extension of these principles it has been said 
that the interpretation of treaties is a matter for the executive,71 and 
it may be noted that treaties, since they operate in the spheres of inter- 
national law, do not confer enforceable rights on particular subjects.72 
Within the field of international affairs there is also a power to take 
executive action. The plea of act of state will be a good defence in any 
action founded upon acts done upon the authority of the Crown, or 
subsequently ratified by it, where the act is under a general discretionary 
power and where the act is done to an alien outside British territory," 
though it will not be so where the act is against a British subject anywhere 
in the world," nor against a friendly alien here" There are suggestions, 
notably in Poll v. Lord Advocate,78 that the plea is of somewhat wider 
operation in Scotland, but in view of the authorities there cited (which 
would not support the broader statements in the opinion) and of the 
whole circumstances of the case it seems that these suggestions should 
be disregarded. What was in issue in that case was the right of the 
Crown to exclude any alien,77 a right which is generally admitted. 
The prerogative in an emergency. It is to be noted that in general 
the prerogative here looks outward. Internally (a word which in this 
context must be held to include dealings with British subjects) a different 
view is taken, in the interest of subjecting governmental acts to legal 
controls. The plea of act of state or state necessity is normally rejected. 
The contrast is made by Lord Camden C.J. in Entick v. Carrington 78: 
" And with respect to the argument of State necessity, or a distinction 
which has been arrived at between State offences and others, the common 
law does not understand that kind of reasoning, nor do our books take 
notice of any such distinction." So equally in Smith v. Jeffrey 79 there 
is an insistence that the courts must determine the validity of the exercise 
of claimed prerogative powers, and that legal authority for all acts 
must be demonstrated, an insistence more recently emphasised in Glasgow 
Corporation v. Central Land Board.80 
Nevertheless the existence of a state of war brings in its train enlarged 
prerogative powers in which the plea of state necessity plays a larger 
71 Cook v. Sprigg [1899] A.C. 572; Oyekan v. Adele [1957] 2 All E.R. 785. 
72 Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino v. Aotea District Maori Land Board [1941] A.C. 308; Civilian 
War Claimants v. The King [1932] A.C. 14. 
73 Buron v. Denman (1848) 2 Exch. 167 and see Sec. of State in Council of India v. Kamachee 
Boye Sahabu (1859) 13 Moo.P.C. 22; Wade, " Act of State in English Law," 15 B.Y.I.L. 
94. 
74 Walker v. Baird [1892] A.C. 491. 
7' Johnstone v. Pedlar [1921] 2 A.C. 262; as to enemy aliens see R. v. Bottritt (supra) and 
Commercial Estates Co. of Egypt v. B.O.T. [1925] 1 K.B. 271. 
76 (1899) 1 F. 823 (discussed [1921] 2 A.C. at 289), and see Boyesen v. Nixon, Jan. 16, 1813, 
F.C., and the remarks of Stephenson J. in R. y Governor of Brixton Prison, ex p. Soblen 
[1963] 2 Q.B. 243, at 282. 
77 And see Musgrove v. Toy [1891] A.C. 272. Where, however, instead of using prerogative 
powers, the Crown uses somewhat similar statutory powers, but errs in so doing, liability 
may arise, Kuechenmeister v. The Home Office [1958] 1 Q.B. 496. 
78 (1765) 19 St.Tr. 1029. 
79 Jan. 24, 1817, F.C. 80 1956 S.C.(H.L.) 1. 
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part. In 1914 the Trading with the Enemy Proclamation was made 
under the prerogative,81 and there arise rights to interfere with both persons 
and property. The right to impressment 82 or to quarter troops 83 is 
admitted 84 as is a right to requisition property. Such rights were treated 
by Hume 85 as depending upon necessity and as being possessed by 
other governmental bodies as well as the Crown. The scope of such 
rights in modern conditions is not entirely certain,88 wars have changed 
their character since the doctrines were recognised. Such special rights 
as do emerge are however controlled by the courts as to their scope 
and existence; a plea of state necessity cannot exclude the jurisdiction 
of the courts. It is in particular uncertain how far compensation is 
due for such interference with property,87 and it is customary to provide 
for it by legislation. 
Martial law. For convenience another power to deal with emergencies 
may be mentioned here, since it is sometimes treated as a prerogative 
power, that is the power to govern by martial law. The Bill of Rights 
prohibited trying civilians by martial law in time of peace, and, in effect, 
the Claim of Right contains similar provisions. Though the prohibition 
of the use of officers is more general, the provision in relation to the 
use of the army in time of peace is to a like effect. In substance it seems 
that when invasion or rebellion has caused such interruption of govern- 
ment that the courts cannot operate normally, then their powers are 
suspended and special tribunals may operate.88 It is however for the 
courts to determine whether such a state of affairs exists.89 The power 
of the courts is only suspended, and once normality is restored they may, 
in theory, review the legality of acts done meantime. In practice an 
Act of Indemnity would generally prevent such review. The obscurities 
81 Hankey, Supreme Command 92; though as to the operation of such proclamations in 
relation to prize see The Zamora [1916] 2 A.C. 77. 
B2 Smith v. Jeffrey, supra. 
B3 Boswell v. Mags. of Cupar, July 10, 1804, F.C. 
84 The Case of Saltpetre (1606) 12 Co.Rep. 12; Moffat Hydropathic Co. Ltd. v. Lord Advocate, 
1919, 1 S.L.T. 82. 
B5 Lectures, III, 205. In the Burman Oil Case, 1963 S.L.T. 261, compensation was denied 
for the destruction in war time of property owned by a British company where the des- 
truction was governed by military need. Lord Kilbrandon, who in the Outer House 
(1962 S.L.T. 347) had admitted the possibility of compensation, rejected a distinction 
between prerogative acts and acts of necessity in the context holding the act a prerogative 
one, and see Prosser [1963] Public Law 12; and Glanville Williams, " The Defence of 
Necessity " (1953) 6 Current Legal Problems 216. 
86 See Scott and Hildesley, The Case of Requisition. 
87 The case for compensation may be stronger in Scotland than England and may turn 
upon a distinction between taking and destruction, but compare The Moffat Hydropathic 
Co., supra, and Carlton Hotel v. L.A., 1921 S.C. 237 with Att. -Gen. v. De Keyser's Royal 
Hotel [1920] A.C. 508; and see note 85, above. 
88 Re Clifford and O'Sullivan [1921] 2 A.C. 570. 
89 R. v. Allen [1921] 2 Ir.R. 241; R. v. Strickland [1921] 2 Ir.R. 317; and see generally 
Ex p. Marais [1902] A.C. 109; Tilonko v. Att. -Gen. of Natal [1907] A.C. 93, and the 
articles in (1902) 18 L.Q.R. Martial law in this sense must be contrasted with military 
law governing service discipline, and the government of occupied territory overseas 
by the military forces. 
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of the common law on this subject are likely to remain, since it is customary 
to make statutory provision, as under the Emergency Powers (Defence) 
Act, 1939.90 Other aspects of these emergency powers, such as billeting, 
are also covered by legislation. Issues relating to the overlap of prerogative 
and statutory powers will be discussed later, as will be lesser powers to 
deal with lesser emergencies. 
Prerogative rules and immunities. Other prerogative powers are of 
continuing significance. These powers were substantially diminished in 
the seventeenth century, when any general power to legislate by preroga- 
tive was excluded,91 the suspending and dispensing powers were denied 
by the Claim of Right (more clearly) 92 and by the Bill of Rights, as 
were powers of taxation or of imposing customs by prerogative act. 
The erecting of courts where others already existed was excluded by 
the Claim of Right, and any prerogative power to create new courts is 
in England negligible because of limitations upon ií.99 Thus any power 
to govern by prerogative is excluded. Existing prerogatives do however 
aid government. Formerly the Crown had a complete immunity from suits 
in tort in England, and in contract could only be sued by the cumbrous 
method of a Petition of Right.94 In Scotland the situation was different. 
Without doubt the Crown could be sued in contract, and for long could 
be sued for other civil wrongs, though in respect of actions of reparation 
the English rule came to be accepted.99 This immunity has been largely 
removed by the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947 (which will be discussed 
later), though important procedural advantages still remain with the 
Crown.96 
The Crown has also an immunity from statute unless the statute is 
made expressly or by implication binding upon it. Again this rule did 
not exist in the old Scots law and appears to have come in after the 
Union through the Court of Exchequer.87 Even today there is probably 
a difference between the two jurisdictions in the scope of the immunity. 
D0 Though such provisions existed in a curious half- world. The powers there given were 
(by s. 9) expressly granted in addition to and not in derogation from prerogative powers. 
What therefore was the effect of a statutory right to compensation if the exercise of 
the prerogative gave none is not easy to determine; see too Naval Discipline Act, 1957, 
s. 138 (1). 
91 Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co.Rep. 74; no equivalent explicitly Scottish authority 
exists until Grieve v. Edinburgh & District Water Trustees, 1918 S.C. 700. 
92 This condemnation occurred shortly after the University of St. Andrews had been pre- 
vailed upon to send an address maintaining their rightness (Fount. I, 503). 
93 Re Lord Bishop of Natal (1865) 3 Moo.P.C.(N.s.) 115. 
94 See, generally, Robertson, Civil Proceedings against the Crown. 
95 MacGregor v. L.A., 1921 S.C. 847; Somerville v. L.A. (1893) 20 R. 1050, 1075. See, 
generally, Sir Randall Philip, " Crown as Litigant in Scotland " (1928) 40 J.R. 238, and 
Mitchell, " The Royal Prerogative in Modern Scots Law " [1957] Public Law 304. 
96 Duncan v. Cammell Laird Ltd. [1942] A.C. 624; Glasgow Corporation v. Central Land 
Board, 1956 S.C.(H.L.) 1. 
97 See the discussion in the article in [1957] Public Law referred to above, and contrast 
Cameron, " Crown Exemption from Statute and Tax in Scotland," 1962 J.R. 191, where 
he argues that the absence of a clear Scottish doctrine rather than the presence of a 
distinct one is material. While this view is not accepted, the results may not be very 
different in that both views lead to distinctions between English and Scots law. 
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The view of Lord Dunedin in Magistrates of Edinburgh v. Lord Advocate 98 
is entirely consistent with Scots law, and the rejection of that view in 
Province of Bombay v. Bombay Corporation 99 should not, it seems, be 
taken as applicable to Scotland. Lord Dunedin's view (which echoes yet 
older English views) was summarised by him when he said: " While I 
do not doubt that there are certain provisions by which the Crown never 
would be bound -such for instance as the provisions of a taxing statute 
or certain enactments with penal clauses adjected -yet when you come 
to a set of provisions in a statute having for its object the benefit of the 
public generally there is not an antecedent unlikelihood that the Crown 
will consent to be bound, and this I think would be so in the case of 
regulations which are meant to apply to all land in the city, and where 
the Crown's property is not property held jure coronae." 1 This view, 
which narrows the Crown immunity, commends itself as being rational. 
The evolution of the Crown's immunity from taxation has a somewhat 
similar history. Unless expressly granted it did not exist before the 
Union,2 but it came to be accepted as a consequence of the Exchequer 
Court (Scotland) Act, 1707, and includes immunity from local taxation. 
In its modem form this immunity operates even if it does so to the 
detriment of the public.3 
Other prerogative rules. Apart from these general prerogative im- 
munities there are other more detailed powers and privileges. The 
prerogative of mercy is exercised by either the Home Secretary or the 
Secretary of State for Scotland .4 Further, the interests of the Crown 
are protected by special rules, in particular the King's interest cannot 
be adversely affected by the neglect of his servants,s a rule which can 
be of importance,6 serving as it does to preserve the revenue. That rule, 
or others like it, prevents, in certain circumstances, the interests of the 
Crown being hampered by contractual obligations? Yet other rules, 
98 1912 S.C. 1085. 
99 [1947] A.C. 58; and see Street, Governmental Liability. Re M. (an Infant) [1961] Ch. 81 
and 328 seems more consistent with the former case, though Minister of Agriculture etc. 
v. Jenkins [1963] 2 All E.R. 147 is not. See, generally, Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 
and the articles referred to in notes 95 and 97, above. 
1 This distinction as to property may yet be important, though see Burnet v. Barclay, 
1955 J.C. 34. 
2 Bruce v. Veitch, Nov. 28, 1810, F.C. For the evolution of the doctrine see [1957] Public 
Law 304 and 1962, 7 J.R. 191. 
3 Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart N.V. v. Administrator of Hungarian Property [1954] 
A.C. 584. In view of the context there does not seem to be any room for any difference 
between the jurisdictions (LR.C. v. Glasgow Police Athletic Assoc., 1953 S.C.(H.L.) 13), 
even though this case appears to be inconsistent with the reasoning of other Scots cases, 
e.g., Salt v. McKnight, 1947 J.C. 99. The immunity may also have incidental effects; 
Re Automatic Telephone etc. Co. Ltd.'s Application [1963] 2 All E.R. 302. 
4 It extends only to penal consequences, Ersk. IV, 4, 105. Hume, Criminal Law, II, 496. 
5 A rule founded on the Act of 1600, A.P.S. IV, 231; Stair IV, 35, 11; Ersk. II, 2, 27. 
6 L.A. v. Mirrielee's Trs., 1943 S.C. 587; 1945 S.C.(H.L.) 1. The rule is probably better 
founded than was allowed for by some members of the House of Lords there. 
Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite v. The King [1921] 3 K.B. 500; Commissioners of Crown 
Lands v. Page [1960] 2 Q.B. 274. This whole subject has many aspects, including the 
operation of personal bar or estoppel: see Mitchell, The Contracts of Public Authorities. 
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particularly in relation to land, exist to aid the protection of those 
interests.8 
General considerations. It will be seen then that prerogative rules 
are capable of affecting all operations of the Crown and its servants. 
This fact makes it important to ascertain who may be said to be a servant 
of the Crown. A variety of criteria have, from time to time, been suggested 
and applied by which this question may be determined in the absence 
of any statutory clarification. At times function has been important, 
at others the method of creation of the body concerned, but most recently 
the test of control has predominated,9 and in modem statutes the tendency 
has been to define more clearly those bodies which are to be treated as 
Crown servants, or those to which prerogative attributes are to attach. 
This clarification, and slightly increased certainty in the law are to 
be welcomed, but there remain fundamental difficulties caused by the 
present shape of the law. Chief among them is the resultant dichotomy, 
in law, of the machinery of government, which contrasts with increasing 
unification in practice. In a functional sense it never did matter whether 
Commissioners of Sewers or like bodies were servants of the Crown. For 
technical reasons it always has mattered in law and perhaps now tends 
to matter more. Yet what should be significant about a highway authority, 
to take another example, is its public character, not its character as 
being or as not being a Crown servant.10 To some extent this modern 
division is attributable to the nineteenth -century uncertainty about 
the state, and public authorities, and to a concern to limit the operation 
of certain privileges, notably fiscal immunities.'1 The division of public 
authorities, which in the nineteenth century produced beneficial results, 
may in a modern and more complex state produce severe inconveniences 
to litigants and distort the law. It should be noted that these detailed 
rules or attributes, particularly those discussed under the last two heads 
apply to the Crown irrespective of the source of power for the act in 
question. For these purposes it does not matter whether the Crown 
is performing an act justified by common law or one justified by statute. 
The special attributes are related to the doer of the act, not to the kind 
of act done. It is this which gives importance to the classification of 
persons or bodies as being Crown servants. Nevertheless, the source 
of a power may matter. It has been held that where a statute occupies 
8 [1957] Public Law, loc. cit., note 95. 
9 See the Bank voor Handel case, supra, and the discussion in Glanville Williams, Crown 
Proceedings, Griffith and Street, Principles of Administrative Law, and 9 Univ. Toronto 
L.J. 169. 
19 To circumvent some of the difficulties that face a litigant raising an action against a 
Crown servant attempts have been made to distinguish the character in which such 
persons act, or to distinguish their functions as statutory or prerogative. Such attempts 
have met with little success, Merricks v. Heathcoat -Amory and the Minister of Agriculture 
and Fisheries [1955] Ch. 567; Harper v. S. of S. for the Home Department [1955] Ch. 238; 
Griffin v. L.A., 1950 S.C. 448. 
11 See, e.g., Greig v. The University of Edinburgh (1868) 6 M. (H.L.) 97, and the docks and 
harbour cases therein referred to which, among many others, illustrate both these aspects. 
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the same field as common law prerogative powers, the statutory powers, 
in the absence of any provision to the contrary, prevail in the sense that 
the Crown does not have the option of choosing between alternative 
justifications. Thus the conditions imposed upon the exercise of the 
statutory powers will apply even if the common law power was un- 
conditional.12 Such a solution is a necessary consequence of the ultimate 
supremacy of statutes, but it means that in such circumstances a distinc- 
tion has to be drawn between prerogative powers in the sense of common 
law powers, and statutory powers which may be of a like kind exercised 
by the Crown and to which, in consequence, some general prerogative 
rules may apply. 
Two further (and perhaps consequential) difficulties should be noted. 
First, this concentration of attention upon the Crown may provoke 
misconceptions about many rules. Many of the rules (and perhaps 
all of the most important ones) have nothing to do with the Crown in 
the sense of monarchy, they are simply the attributes of the Crown 
in the sense of government. Failure to notice this may make the 
student unaware of their universality 13 and that failure lies at the root 
of many of the irrationalities of the modern law 14 In this matter the 
older treatment in Scots law was much more rational, and elements of 
this still remain. The old concern was with powers which must belong 
to a government,15 looked at in that way and shorn of false feudalism, 
many of the rules can be better understood and applied. In the second 
place, and conversely, this overconcem with the Crown and with words 
like prerogative has tended to cause the neglect, and sometimes the 
disappearance, of somewhat similar rules (though differently named) which 
were applicable to other governmental bodies which could not be class- 
ified as the Crown.1° Both these aspects are important, for it remains 
true, as Montrose asserted, that prerogative, in the sense of essential 
governmental power, is often fundamental to the existence of the subjects' 
liberty. It exists, if properly regarded, as much for the subjects as for 
rulers. It should, therefore, be looked at from a functional point of 
view, which has too often been neglected in modern cases. 
12 See Att. -Gen. v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel [1920] A.C. 508. The exact operation of the 
statute is not clear. Lord Atkin (at 540) refers to the prerogative as abridged or in 
abeyance. Lord Parmoor (at 554) says the Crown must be presumed to act under the 
statutory powers. Cf. Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, s. 9. 
13 Compare, for example, Auby and Drago, Traité de Contentieux Administratif, Vol. I, 
wherein are treated similar rules and institutions, but from a quite general standpoint. 
Similar instances could be cited from the U.S.A.; see the discussion in Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186 (1961). 
14 Consider the evolution from Farrier v. Elder and Scott, June 21, 1799, F.C., to the acceptance 
of Bainbridge v. P.M.G. [1906] 1 K.B. 178. This confusion of thought may even be 
dangerous at a time when there is nothing to fear from the Crown in the sense of the 
Sovereign. 
15 See, e.g., King's Printers v. Buchan (1826) 4 S. 559, and " The Royal Prerogative in 
Modern Scots Law" [1957] Public Law 304. The wording of the Crown Suits (Scotland) 
Act, 1857, was perhaps more in accord with tradition than was its interpretation in 
MacGregor v. L.A., 1921 S.C. 847. 
16 Compare the underlying thought in Phin v. Mags. of Auchtermuchty (1827) 5 S. 690 and 
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Mention has already been made of differences between the law of 
Scotland and the law of England on this subject. At one time they 
were much greater than they are now. The mere existence of the Union 
would in any event produce pressure towards a standardisation of the 
law. That pressure was greatly increased by the Exchequer Court 
(Scotland) Act, 1707, which, in effect, directed the re- formed court to 
apply the same law as would be applied in Exchequer cases in England.' 
This had the effect of bringing into operation in Scotland all the preroga- 
tive rules which affected the Crown in relation to the revenue.18 The 
peculiarity of Exchequer causes tended not to be sufficiently observed, 
and the influence of the Act spread beyond those confines, in part as 
a result of a desire for uniformity.19 Against this process protests were 
raised,20 and as has been shown the House of Lords has held that prero- 
gative rules may differ in the two jurisdictions.21 Hence the tendency 
in this context, which existed at the beginning of this century, to follow 
(almost automatically) English authority in Scotland may no longer 
hold, where, as with the applicability of statutes to the Crown, reason 
and convenience do not add their weight to the law. 
17 See Clerk and Scrope, The Court of Exchequer. 
19 Advocate General v. Garioch (1850) 12 D. 447. 
19 Moffat Hydropathic Co. Ltd. v. L.A., 1918, 2 S.L.T. 220. 
20 Admiralty Commissioners v. Blair's Trs., 1916 S.C. 247 at 260 and 266; Somerville v. 
L.A. (1893) 20 R. 1050 at 1075. 
21 Glasgow Corporation v. Central Land Board, 1956 S.C.(H.L.) 1. This evolution is discussed 
in [19571 Public Law 303 et seq. 
CHAPTER 10 
THE EXECUTIVE -II 
GOVERNMENT AND CABINET 
General. Government is conducted in the name of the Crown, and 
there has already been discussed both the titular head of state, and 
some of the legal rules which concern the operations of the central 
government. There must now be discussed the effective machinery of 
government. At the outset two terms must be distinguished, government 
and Cabinet. At one stage these terms could be treated as virtually 
synonymous. With the growth of governmental activity and the conse- 
quential growth in the number of ministers a distinction has to be made. 
By the term government is meant the whole body of ministers, including 
junior ministers, by the term Cabinet is meant the central group of 
ministers who are constantly concerned with the general policy of the 
government; in effect the Cabinet lies at the centre of the government. 
Terminology is not always exact; often the phrase " The government 
has decided " should more accurately be " The Cabinet has decided," 
and, as will appear, it is often neither possible nor desirable to distinguish 
the two. Nevertheless the existence of both the macrocosm and the 
microcosm must be remembered if a true picture of the operation of 
the governmental machine is to be gained. 
It is impossible within the compass of this work to give a full account 
of the evolution of the modern machine or of its operation. For that 
the reader must turn to the specialised texts? All that can be emphasised 
here are the general basic principles which must, in short compass, be 
set out somewhat dogmatically. The system as it has evolved is a highly 
centralised one. Just as the Cabinet has to some extent separated itself 
from the government (and dominates it) so within the Cabinet there 
is a dominance of the Prime Minister, who has ceased to be merely 
Primus inter pares. It is with reason that one speaks of " Mr. X's Govern- 
ment." 2 Moreover, the system is one in which power flows from the 
top or centre, it is not delegated from the larger to the smaller bodies.3 
I Notably Jennings, Cabinet Government and Parliament, and Mackintosh, The British 
Cabinet (which is much broader in scope than its title suggests). Morrison, Government 
and Parliament, gives an admirable picture of the working of the institutions. For the 
earlier history see particularly Aspinall, Cabinet Council. The contrast between the 
text of Bagehot's English Constitution exposing a classical view and the views in Crossman's 
critical introduction to the Fontana edition of that book will show the changes over a 
hundred years. 
2 See particularly Mackintosh, op. cit. and his short Appendix on this topic. 
3 Sir Ernest Barker's pyramid of delegation, from the nation through Parliament to the 
Cabinet (Reflections on Government, Chap. II) to a large extent inverts the true position, 
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Our system is properly called one of Cabinet government rather than 
parliamentary government. To emphasise this is not to underrate the 
importance of other bodies, but if it is remembered from the outset that 
Parliament is not so much the source of power, but the forum wherein 
power is exercised many misconceptions about the relationship of govern- 
ment to Parliament may be avoided. 
This centralised quality of the government is obviously closely related 
to another quality, which is its cohesiveness. The mere existence of a 
pyramid of power dependent on the Prime Minister would not necessarily 
imply the degree of cohesiveness which marks our system. This second 
quality owes a great deal also to the party system, which is not so much 
a consequence as a cause of the present constitutional system, being 
fundamental to it. Dependence, in normal times, upon one party, of 
which the Prime Minister is leader, gives that cohesion. It must be 
noticed that primarily this is a dependence upon a parliamentary party 
rather than upon a party at large .4 This enhances the cohesiveness. Not 
only have ministers common beliefs (so far as there is unity in any party) 
but they have a common background, which is parliamentary. Moreover, 
their allegiance is in the first instance to a relatively defined body, the 
parliamentary party, and to that extent there is some immunity from 
the influence of pressure groups of varying kinds,3 influences which 
could tend to be schismatic in effect. These characteristics are bound 
up with a further principle of our government. The system is designed 
to produce a strong government bounded by certain checks, legal, con- 
ventional or institutional, rather than a completely representative govern- 
ment. In a changed form, with a substitution of Cabinet for King 
there has been a return (after no great interruption) to the old principle 
that the King makes the laws in Parliament. 
Two further points should be mentioned at the outset. There is 
both an independence of the Sovereign, and a dependence on, or answer- 
ability 8 to, Parliament, though words like dependence and independence 
must always be taken in a relative sense. Reliance upon parliamentary 
majorities in the years following 1832 enabled ministries to establish 
that independence, which was however established without giving to 
Parliament a mastery. In the process of the transfer of power much 
remained in the hands of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and did not pass 
from Sovereign to Parliament. 
Constitution, Chap. I); cf. Amery, Thoughts on the Constitution, and Crossman's introduc- 
tion to the Fontana edition of Bagehot. 
4 See Mr. Attlee's declaration in 1945, quoted in Morrison, op. cit., 143. Thus there is 
no room for the caucus system. The same principles operate in Opposition. Even 
if there is election to a Shadow Cabinet, the distribution of functions is left to the Leader, 
and membership of the Shadow Cabinet does not guarantee membership of the Cabinet. 
6 Such influences do exist; see Potter, Organised Groups in British National Politics. 
6 The apparent inconsistency of this word with what has gone before will be resolved when 
the relationship of government to Parliament is discussed. 
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All these factors must be borne in mind. The roots of the Cabinet 
system go deep? Impeachment can be seen as the start of responsibility 
to Parliament. The doctrine of the Seals necessarily produced a small 
body of men who between them controlled the sources of power. In any 
institution there tends to be an inner ring which controls. Cabinets in 
one form or another are universal, but certain historical and political 
factors have moulded our Cabinet into a particular shape and given it 
a distinctiveness. Thus, although the Lords of the Articles had many 
qualities of a Cabinet, and could properly be so called, the absence of 
other qualities make them entirely distinct. The modern British Cabinet 
can only be understood as an institution if it is seen as the seat of con- 
trolled power, and it is the forms of the controls (which are themselves 
the product of local politics and history) which mark it out as distinct 
among the many " Cabinets " which exists 
From these general principles flow many of the detailed rules which 
are accepted in the interest of the system as a whole. The doctrine of 
collective responsibility is fundamental to cohesion; Cabinet secrecy 
follows as a matter of common necessity .9 The legal rules by which 
it is backed are not the true compulsion. 
The Cabinet. It will be seen that the Cabinet is one of the parts of 
the governmental machinery least governed by law. Nearly all the 
important rules regulating its formation and relations with the Crown, 
Parliament and the Prime Minister are conventional.!° This situation 
exists because the evolution of the Cabinet is continuing, and its method 
of operation is, to some extent, dependent upon the character of each 
Prime Minister. Flexibility is preserved by retaining the conventional 
basis. That flexibility is restricted not merely by the forces which, in 
general, ensure observance of conventions, but also by a generally felt 
belief that an " ideal " Cabinet system had evolved by the early years of 
this century. Respect for this " ideal " has the effect of slowing down 
reaction to the pressure of current conditions. It must, however, be 
emphasised that because of the secrecy which surrounds Cabinet operations 
anything which is written may have already been overtaken by practice.!' 
While logically a start should be made with the Prime Minister, it 
is convenient to start with the Cabinet itself. The Cabinet is, then, a 
group of senior ministers, many of whom can by virtue of their office 
What could be taken to be the rudiments of a Cabinet system can be found in George 
Buchanan's De Jure Regni. 
8 Compare, e.g., Sawer, " Councils, Ministers and Cabinets in Australia " [1956] Public 
Law 110 to see the effect of slightly differing conditions. 
9 The common sense, rather than the mysticism, of our government can best be understood 
by reading Massigli, Sur Quelques Maladies de l'Etat, one of the best introductions to 
our system though not written about it. 
19 The split between government and cabinet is recognised by the Ministers of the Crown 
Act, 1937, s. 3. 
11 Mackintosh in his work has by various methods attempted to ensure that his account 
is as modern as possible, but his reliance on interview emphasises this point. 
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claim a seat in the Cabinet; the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Foreign 
and Home Secretaries, and the Secretary of State for Scotland, are obvious 
examples. The inclusion or exclusion of any particular minister is 
(as is the allocation of ministries) a matter for the Prime Minister's 
discretion, limited albeit by political considerations, and will depend 
upon the current importance of particular branches of government 
business. There is always included a number of ministers, whose 
departmental functions are not onerous, such as the Paymaster -General, 
but to whom particular tasks, which may be heavy, can be entrusted. 
Membership is very flexible. Mr. Casey was for example a member of 
the War Cabinet in the Second World War, as was General Smuts in 
the First. The number in the Cabinet has in recent times tended to be about 
eighteen to twenty. Although in both World Wars small War Cabinets 
have been formed, it was found that in practice such bodies rarely met 
without additional members. This size has an effect upon theory and 
operation. It results in the paradox that the bulk of the Cabinet, a 
body which determines general policy, consists of those ministers whose 
departmental duties are heaviest. It means also that, even at its relatively 
large modern size, a substantial number of ministers in charge of major 
departments is excluded from the Cabinet. There are then the problems 
of co- ordination and the proper formulation of policy, even though 
non -Cabinet Ministers may be summoned to particular meetings. 
Arguments have been advanced for small policy- making Cabinets 12 
but experience has shown that such bodies cannot in fact work within the 
limits of size envisaged. Moreover, experience has shown that " opera- 
tional " responsibilities are important. The " high brooding " minister 
can get out of touch with the realities of political life. Moreover, under 
our system, policy and administration cannot be separated. Small matters 
may suddenly become matters of great political importance in the Com- 
mons. Experiments by Mr. Churchill with Co-ordinating Ministers - 
the Overlords -failed. Not merely were lines of responsibility blurred, 
but the system coupled with our forms of parliamentary attack made it 
too easy for the Opposition to divide and conquer.13 Instead relief has 
been found by other means. Assistants have been found for some 
ministers by the appointment of Ministers of State (first used in connection 
with the Scottish Office), or by the invention of offices such as that of 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury. Such appointments are possible where 
a block of business or activity is reasonably severable, and the difficulties 
of the Overlord system are thus avoided. 
Cabinet committees. Above all, the related problems of co- ordination 
and the pressures of business have been met by the evolution of Cabinet 
12 Notably by Amery, Thoughts on the Constitution. 
13 See Morrison, op. cit., p. 45. The survivor, the Minister of Defence, is a special case, 
and under the arrangements forecast in 672 H.C.Deb. 40 et seq. his position vis -à -vis 
the Service Ministers will come close to that of the Secretary of State for Scotland vis -à -vis 
his Under Secretaries of State; see Central Organisation for Defence, (1963) Cmnd. 2097. 
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Committees. The existence of some, though not all, of such committees 
is known, as may also, from time to time, be the name of the Chairman. 
Some of the committees appear to exist regularly despite changes of 
government, such as the Defence Committee, the Legislation Committee 
and the Future Legislation Committee, others are dependent upon 
the philosophy of a particular government or the run of events,14 such as 
the committee in 1962 concerned with the negotiations over the then 
proposed entry of the United Kingdom into EEC. Such committees 
enable non -Cabinet Ministers (who are members) to work on the formu- 
lation of general policy, and also enable much business to reach the 
Cabinet in a pre- digested form. They are consistent with general con- 
stitutional theory, for they do not affect responsibility to Parliament. 
To the extent that the chairman of such committees performs the co- 
ordinating functions of an " Overlord " the difficulties inherent in that 
system (when such functions are overt), are avoided, since his functions 
are carried out behind the curtain. 
The existence of such committees may have consequences upon the 
place of the Cabinet and Prime Minister. In the pressure of business 
it is likely that a report from such committees will be accepted in the 
Cabinet, thus placing the real decision elsewhere. It has generally been 
denied that a real Inner Cabinet exists, except in the sense that there 
will inevitably be a certain group of ministers to whom a Prime Minister 
will talk more readily than to others, or in the sense of a committee of 
the Cabinet 14 It is possible that the group of chairmen could become 
such an Inner Cabinet. Since the Prime Minister is master of which 
committees shall be appointed, of their membership and of the chairman- 
ship, it is also possible that, granted the other conditions in which a 
Cabinet works, the influence of a Prime Minister could be enhanced. 
All accounts make it clear that the method of operation of a Cabinet, 
its discursiveness or brevity, is to a large extent a reflection of the person- 
ality of the Prime Minister. Equally the Prime Minister is the master 
of summoning Cabinets and of the business to be discussed.15 He controls 
the agenda,16 and the debate. It is clear that a vote or anything approach- 
ing it is a rarity in the Cabinet; the Cabinet should be a united body 
and anything which would tend to disrupt that unity, such as vote taking, 
is to be avoided if at all possible. Hence decisions will normally be 
taken by the Prime Minister gathering the sense of the meeting. 
Cabinet machinery. The Cabinet has evolved from highly informal 
meetings. The informality of its origin continues to mark its methods, 
and until modern times decisions were taken and recorded in a thoroughly 
unbusinesslike way. There were frequent incidents demonstrating the 
14 Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 437 et seq. 
15 Jennings, Cabinet Government, Chap. IX; Mackintosh, 429 et seq. 
16 Subject to this, or to the Cabinet requiring a report upon a particular subject, it is for 
the minister concerned to determine whether or not to submit any question for Cabinet 
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confusion and uncertainty which might exist in consequence. Reform, 
which was strongly opposed in some quarters,17 came about through 
Mr. Lloyd George's reorganisation of the War Cabinet in 1916 which 
resulted in Lt. -Col. Hankey, the Secretary to the Committee of Imperial 
Defence, becoming also Secretary to the Cabinet 18 After the war the 
two offices continued to be combined until 1938. In 1956 the office of 
Secretary to the Cabinet was joined to that of one of the Joint Secretaries 
to the Treasury, and in 1962 a separate appointment to the post of 
Secretary to the Cabinet was made. The Secretariat is intended to be 
no more than that, it is concerned with the preparation of Cabinet papers, 
the circulation of minutes and decisions. It is not an advisory body.19 
It seems that the minutes contain no more than is necessary to record 
the heads of argument and conclusions. Individual views are not recorded 
as such, so that ministers retain a freedom of action, and so that unity 
can be preserved by denying them an opportunity to " Hansardise " each 
other. 
It must be emphasised that the office remains small in size and limited 
in scope. Between 1939 and 1945 its functions expanded with an Economic 
Section and a Central Statistical Office as well as the Prime Minister's 
Statistical Section.20 After the war the Economic Section had a varied 
career, finally ending in the Treasury, and the Prime Minister's Statistical 
Office disappeared. Some of these changes were due to particular circum- 
stances, and thus, were not of general importance, but the scope of the 
functions of the Cabinet Secretariat is of constitutional importance. 
The limitation of that scope affords an institutional check upon the 
growth of the power of the Prime Minister. The availability of inde- 
pendent sources of information, in contrast to reliance upon ministers, 
could greatly enhance that power.21 
By these methods the capacity of the Cabinet to deal with the in- 
creased business and its general efficiency have been improved. Diffi- 
culties remain. It is clear on the one hand that decisions which would 
formerly have been taken by Cabinets are now taken by civil servants, 
and on the other that matters which in themselves are not of funda- 
mental importance and do not raise great principles are referred to the 
Cabinet because they may have political repercussions. While there is 
probably room for a better organisation of business it must be 
remembered that the Cabinet is a political body, it is not merely an 
17 In fact Cabinet Minutes were not a novelty, see Aspinall, Cabinet Councils, though the 
word had varying uses; see Mackintosh, op. cit. 
18 See Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference. 
19 For an account of how the office works see Hewison, " The Organisation of the Cabinet 
Secretariat " (1952) 30 Public Administration 221. The Cabinet minutes of one govern- 
ment are not, as such, available to its successor. Copies are currently transmitted to 
the Sovereign. 
29 The Organisation of British Central Government 1914 -1956 (ed. Chester), Chap. IX. 
21 Compare the growth of the White House Office, Hobbs, Behind the President. In wartime 
the staffs of Prime Ministers have increased, and this has contributed to the increased 
pre -eminence of the latter. 
M.C.L.-11 
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administrative mechanism, and this fact governs alike its composition 
and work. 
The Prime Minister. At the heart of the Cabinet is the Prime Minister. 
Again the office is recognised by law,22 but all the important rules which 
regulate it are conventional. As has already been seen there may, ex- 
ceptionally, be an element of personal discretion in the selection by the 
Sovereign of a Prime Minister. The person chosen must be one who 
is capable of forming a government acceptable to the House of Commons, 
and hence acceptable to the dominant party or combination of parties 
in that House. Although in 1940, there was some talk of Lord Halifax 
becoming Prime Minister,23 and even though/an element of ambiguity 
about the generality of the precedent of 1923 when Mr. Baldwin was 
chosen in place of Lord Curzon,24 it must now be taken as settled that 
the Prime Minister must have a seat in the House of Commons. There 
has also grown up a direct relationship with the electorate. Where the 
result of a General Election is clear, a Prime Minister is no longer expected 
to meet the new Parliament before resigning, and conversely the precedents 
of the accession of Sir Anthony Eden and Mr. Macmillan, suggest that 
a rule is emerging that a Prime Minister who becomes such during the 
life of a Parliament should seek confirmation from the electorate at a 
convenient early date. 
Once installed a Prime Minister has the right to choose his colleagues 
(and a use of the House of Lords may enable him to bring in ministers 
from outside Parliament). During the life of a ministry he has the 
right to promote or dismiss ministers and to determine the scope of 
ministries. Such rights can of course only be exercised within the limits 
imposed by political considerations. On the surface dismissals appear 
to be rare, they are couched in the terms of resignations.25 Moreover, 
the Prime Minister's powers are not only in respect of individuals. He 
can, as in 1962 and in 1947, carry through a major reconstruction of 
the government. Even greater power is given to him by his control of 
the time of a dissolution, or of the resignation of a government. There 
is some consultation with colleagues in the former case, but the matter 
is not one for Cabinet decision.28 As to the latter, it seems to follow 
from the former.27 It is this power of choosing the time for a dissolution 
22 Notably by the Ministers of the Crown Act, 1937, which, as amended, provides for a 
salary, and in effect annexes the office to that of First Lord of the Treasury. 
23 Wheeler- Bennett, George VI, 441 et seq. 
24 The considerations given in Nicholson, George V, at 376 -377, have an element of 
particularity. 
25 For such a dismissal see Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister, 383. The Cabinet recon- 
struction of 1962 affords examples of the varied shades of meaning in the customary 
letters. 
26 Mackintosh, op. cit., 386 -387; Laski, Reflections on the Constitution, 102 -103. 
27 In 1931 the Cabinet had, it seems, authorised a resignation, but Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's 
agreement to the formation of a new government under him was given without con- 
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which perhaps more than anything else has given the government control 
in Parliament and the Prime Minister control in government. Apart 
from such extreme instances it is recognised that, in the conduct of a 
government, a Prime Minister has a right of independent action.28 He 
may either openly or less obviously take control of particular branches 
of government. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald was his own Foreign Secretary. 
Other Prime Ministers have (sometimes harmoniously) assumed a joint 
direction of foreign affairs with the Foreign Secretary, and indeed 
the place of the Prime Minister in that field has been advanced, among 
other justifications, for having a Foreign Secretary in the House of 
Lords in modern times. 
To these powers must be added the Prime Minister's control of 
Cabinet business, already referred to. It is then clear that a modern 
Prime Minister has come to occupy much of the position of a governing 
President." Perhaps the greatest checks which remain to the growth 
of his powers are institutional; chief among them being the nature of 
the Cabinet office and the place of the Treasury in the governmental 
machine. This pre- eminence is not perhaps affected by the nomination 
of a Deputy Prime Minister. That office is a long time being born. 
Attempts have been made to nominate persons to it, and despite refusals 
to recognise the office,a° the attempts continue.3' Whatever the outcome, 
such an office is not likely to govern succession to the premiership. 
Cabinet and government. Beyond the inner ring of the Cabinet lies 
the larger group of non -Cabinet Ministers. Something must be said 
later of the role of particular ministers and of the operation of ministries, 
but at this stage the rules which govern the relationship of the Cabinet 
to the larger whole and those which govern both may be conveniently 
discussed. As has been said, it is for a minister to select in the first instance 
matters affecting his department which should be decided by the Cabinet. 
It is for the Prime Minister and Cabinet to control the general conduct 
of affairs. From this flows the general doctrine of collective responsi- 
bility-a doctrine which, it must be emphasised, applies to the govern- 
ment as a whole and not only to the members of the Cabinet. Special 
circumstances, such as the existence of a War Cabinet, have been thought 
to modify the vigour of the doctrine, but in normal times it binds all, 
including junior ministers.32 It means that, in one direction, any 
minister, in the broad sense, must accept government decisions and 
policy or resign office. In the other direction the " collective " quality 
28 Mr. Churchill's (and after him Mr. Attlee's) agreements in relation to atom bombs are 
outstanding examples, as is Sir Anthony Eden's initiative over Suez, but many others 
are given in Jennings. 
29 See, generally, Carter, The Office of Prime Minister. 
39 Wheeler- Bennett, King George VI, 797; and see 680 H.C. Deb. 582 -83. 
31 Mr. R. A. Butler was, in July 1962, named as Deputy Prime Minister and designated 
First Secretary of State, a novel designation for which a variety o treasons might exist. 
32 Morrison, op. cit., 60. 
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is in effect optional. A government does not have to support a minister 
who has made a mistake or whose acts prove to be unpopular. It may 
disown him.93 In the first sense the tendency has been for the doctrine 
to become more vigorous,34 and to extend not only as to the persons 
which it covers, but also as to the questions and actions which will be 
affected by it. Junior ministers have been dismissed for speeches both 
inside and outside Parliament. Inside Parliament this growth is significant 
in relation to the control by the government over Parliament. 
The doctrine is not, however, exclusive. A blending of collective 
and individual responsibility marks many of the practices of the central 
government. Even though a policy may have been determined by the 
Cabinet, a minister remains individually responsible for the manner in 
which it is carried out and for the working of his own department. He 
cannot rely exclusively on the more general responsibility. The limits 
of this personal responsibility (which requires a minister to accept respon- 
sibility for the faults of his subordinates, and which, in extreme cases, 
requires his resignation) are not precise. For any major fault, whether 
of commission or omission, these consequences should follow, for lesser 
faults confession and repentance may suffice.36 This individual responsi- 
bility, while it is maintained in theory, has recently been weakened in 
fact. Relatively frequent movements among ministerial posts, or the 
transfer of functions between departments, may mean that the minister 
in charge, and thus responsible, at the time of the discovery of the fault 
is not the same as the one who was in charge at the time of its commission, 
which has an effect of lessening the responsibility of each. There may 
too be an increased tendency to " close the ranks." and for the government 
to accept general responsibility, which may to some extent relieve an 
individual minister.36 Concentration upon the rare occasions upon which 
the major consequences of responsibility have been exacted should not, 
however, obscure the importance of its continuous reflection in smaller 
matters through parliamentary questions. 
The nature of the rules. In particular instances an admixture of 
functions makes the application of these rules difficult. This is so in 
relation to the Law Officers and to the exercise of the prerogative of 
mercy. The Law Officers, apart from their political functions, have 
also functions related to the administration of justice, especially in 
Scotland, which must be separated, as far as is possible, from political 
considerations. Because of this situation the general rules of responsibility 
are, in these cases, eased, and also a separation from the government in 
33 The case of Sir Samuel Hoare in 1935 is perhaps extreme. It is possible that Sir Samuel 
Hoare was in fact carrying out Cabinet policy. 
34 Jennings, Parliament, Chap. V. 
35 Again a civil servant cannot rely on avoiding all consequences of his acts by reason of 
the minister taking all blame. For the rules here, see particularly, 530 H.C.Deb. 1286. 
36 See 642 H.C.Deb. 211 -217 and [1961] Public Law 228 -229. 
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those respects is recognised.37 Equally in relation to the exercise of 
the prerogative of mercy answerability to Parliament has, in effect, been 
limited, in modern times.38 
These doctrines are, as has been said, conventional. This conventional 
nature involves their fluidity. They can be tailored to particular circum- 
stances, such as the position of particular ministers, or the emergence of 
a temporary institution such as a War Cabinet or to other special circum- 
stances. The existence of a minority or coalition government may 
require an adaptation of the normal rules.3° Such fluidity is necessary 
in practice, but rules which have that fluidity have also their dangers. 
The protections against abuse are to be found almost entirely in parlia- 
mentary traditions. 
The rules and the general law. Despite this conventional nature, 
the rules are capable of having their reflection in law in matters of practice.4° 
They do, in matters of principle, have even wider effects. One of the 
factors which has limited judicial control of administrative actions has 
been the existence of parliamentary responsibility.41 Within limits that 
reticence is justified. It is a mark of the diarchy to which reference has 
already been made. It is also true that there are " political " issues 
which are, as Lord Normand emphasised, more appropriate to Parliament 
than to courts. It is not, however, certain that the line between the two 
jurisdictions has always been drawn at an appropriate place. Judgment 
upon that issue, which is important in any assessment of the efficiency of 
the whole machinery of the constitution, must be a matter of individual 
determination after a study of the effectiveness of parliamentary control. 
The relationship of government to Parliament. That issue raises the 
whole problem of the relationship of government to Parliament. There 
is a dominance of government over Parliament which, as has been 
suggested, is consistent with our constitutional theory. It is consistent 
with the facts of political life. Often only a government has the knowledge 
essential for decision. This dominance manifests itself in many ways. 
It is possible for the government to monopolise the legislative time 
available. Government business has priority. In many matters Parlia- 






See Marshall and Moodie, Some Problems of the Constitution, 172 et seq. Such modi- 
fications are no doubt necessary, even though, as Sir Ilay Campbell emphasised, con- 
stitutional checks upon the Law Officers are desirable; and compare Hester v. Macdonald, 
1961 S.L.T. 414 on the attitude of the courts. 
See [1961] Public Law 8 et seq. 
See Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's declaration in 1924 (Jennings, Cabinet Government, 494), 
or the agreement to differ, Jennings, op. cit., 280. 
Adair v. Hill, 1943 J.C. 9 at 15, where the Lord Justice -Clerk (Cooper), an ex -Law Officer, 
recognises the existence of the responsibility of the Lord Advocate to Parliament for 
his actions. See, too, Dalziel School Board v. Scotch Education Department, 1915 S.C. 
234; Griffin v. L.A., 1950 S.C. 448; and Ryder v. Foley (1906) 4 C.L.R. 422. 
Pollok School Co. Ltd. v. Glasgow T.C., 1946 S.C. 373 at 386, per Lord President Normand; 
Liversidge v. Anderson [1942] A.C. 206 at 222, or Carlton Ltd. v. Commissioner of 
Works [1943] 2 All E.R. 560, suffice as examples. 
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dominance is aided by many things. Above all there is the party system 
and the fact that the government party has its majority in the House 
of Commons and the means of maintaining that majority. For that 
task (among others) the Whips, the Junior Lords of the Treasury, exist, 
and have at their disposal a number of weapons. A potent one is the 
threat of a dissolution which, apart from the uncertainty with which 
it faces a member, also makes him consider whether, although he may 
disapprove of a government decision, he does not on the whole prefer 
a government of that party to the alternative. Lesser weapons, such as 
the withdrawal of the Whip (in the sense of exclusion from the Party), 
are reinforced by the fact that disapproval by a party may have the 
consequence of excluding a member from committees or delegations on 
which he is anxious to serve,42 as well as prejudicing his political future. 
It should not, however, be taken that the dominance is complete. 
The Leader of the House, who regulates its business on behalf of the 
government, owes allegiance to the House as well as to the government. 
The Whips are as much channels of communication between backbenchers 
and government as they are controllers43 Indeed the influence of 
Parliament upon both government policy and legislative proposals can 
be underrated. Sometimes this influence is observable in changes in a 
measure on its way through Parliament 44; at other times the influence 
delays or prevents the introduction of measures .m In this last case 
the influence may not be seen until long after the event. In other cases 
such as debates upon White Papers (which have to a great extent taken 
the place of bringing in a Bill upon Resolutions) a careful comparison 
of the debate and the measure as subsequently brought in can reveal 
the operation of the influence. 
Further the methods by which opposition makes itself felt must be 
observed. There is the " official " Opposition, whose Leader is recognised 
and paid out of public funds.46 That Opposition has its conventional 
rights, the right, for example, to choose the subject matter of Supply 
Debates, or the right to move a motion of no confidence on occasions 
of its choosing. Hence on major issues the theoretical government 
monopoly of parliamentary time is limited by conventional rules, as is 
its control of subject matter of debate. That Opposition is limited 
also by similar conventional rules, by responsibility in the ordinary 
sense of the word.47 The effort and tactics of the official Opposition 
are largely dominated by the desire of that party to demonstrate, as 
42 See, e.g., 660 H.C.Deb. 221 -222. Exclusion at the time of an election is all the more 
serious since the virtual disappearance of the independent member. The candidate needs 
the party machine. 
43 This interplay of dominance and subservience is illustrated in many of the books cited. 
Its substance is perhaps best conveyed in Morrison, Government and Parliament. 
44 See generally Mackintosh, op. cit. Chap. XV; Jennings, Parliament, Chaps. V and VI. 
45 See, e.g., Tom Jones, Diary with Letters, p. 161 (the Hoare -Laval Pact) and p. 368 on 
the prelude to the Public Order Act, 1936. 
46 Ministers of the Crown Act, 1937, as amended by the Ministerial Salaries Act, 1957. 
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the alternative government, its fitness to be the government. Thus 
much of its activities are directed to the electorate rather than to the 
government. When formal battle is joined in the House and the Whips 
are on, it has little, if any, chance of defeating a government. This being 
so, great importance must be attached to the opposition within the 
government ranks, which operates to a great extent through the meetings 
of backbenchers, the " 1922 Committee " on one side and of the Parlia- 
mentary Labour Party on the other. As has been seen, these party 
meetings have already been constitutionally recognised in the rules 
of privilege, and it is in them that the most effective opposition may 
be felt. There a government can change its plans the more easily since 
it does so without public loss of face. 
It is these conditions which give substance to the assertion that 
Parliament is the forum wherein power is exercised, The importance of 
the fact that power is there exercised should not be underrated because 
of all the other elements which combine to produce a complex and 
subtle result, and which obscure the clear perception of each separate 
element. Influences which are not glaringly obvious may nevertheless 
be real and significant. 
It is, indeed, possible to assert that there is no modern instance of a 
defeat in the House causing the fall of a government. In 1940 Mr. 
Chamberlain in fact secured a majority in the Narvik debate. The Labour 
Government of 1931 fell in the Cabinet, not the House. In 1924, when 
the Labour Government was defeated over the Campbell case and resigned, 
it had already become clear that the government lacked the necessary 
solidarity of support. The effective causes of the fall of governments in 
1916 and 1922 are to be found outside the House of Commons. Neverthe- 
less the House of Commons is significant in the death as in the life of 
governments. Even without an actual defeat it is pressures and reactions 
in the House which demonstrate that a government has lost cohesion and 
confidence and the ability to govern. It is in the House that divisions 
inside a government, which cause its fall, become apparent. Ministers 
bred in parliamentary traditions accept the consequences without forcing 
an issue. If they did not, the power to defeat a government remains 
and would no doubt, in the last resort, be exercised. 
All this may be called the positive side of ministerial responsibility, 
that is to say the way in which the doctrines operate to achieve their 
intended purposes. There is another side to their constitutional effects 
which may be loosely called negative. The existence of these doctrines 
coupled with their historical background has effects upon constitutional 
growth, since a pattern of thought about the control of governmental 
activity, outside the field of specifically local government, has been 
set. The pre -eminence which Parliament has attained in the legislative 
field finds some counterpart in this other side of its activities, and in 
a growing belief in the necessary universality of parliamentary control, 
in the sense that that control tends to be regarded as the only appropriate 
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method where traditional judicial controls are not available. The latter 
have tended to contract in favour of Parliament. Thus, as will be seen, 
the tendency has, for several reasons, been to bring the control of national- 
ised industries more and more in line with traditional methods even 
though, as originally conceived, they were intended to break with that 
pattern. Again it is difficult for newly established bodies to take root, 
if they do not fit that pattern. The relative ineffectiveness of the fore- 
runners of the National Economic Development Council, such as the 
Council on Prices, Productivity and Income, is in part attributable to 
this, just as some of the proposals of the Franks Committee on Tribunals 
and Inquiries foundered upon the rock of ministerial responsibility. In 
considering such consequences it must be remembered that the scope 
for exercising parliamentary supervision even in traditional fields for 
which the doctrine of ministerial responsibility arose has increased 
greatly since the doctrines originated. The past and potential virtues of 
that system if not coupled with a close observation of its operation may 
then have an inhibiting effect upon the evolution of new machinery to 
deal with new and expanding fields of governmental activity. Similarly 
the system of ministerial responsibility may have the effect of increasing 
the pressures towards centralisation. The Cabinet system, as has been 
seen, necessarily produces a high degree of centralisation in the areas 
of activity for which it operates. Matters which come under parliamentary 
review must, under our system, also come under the Cabinet machinery 
and there thus results a steady concentration of the decision -making 
process over an increased range of subject matter in one relatively small 
body, originally conceived as operating for a much narrower range of 
decisions 48 This consequence may be inevitable with the evolution of a 
modern state, but it must be carefully noted if a proper evaluation of 
these doctrines is to be made. 
48 One consequence of this concentration may paradoxically be a weakening in fact of 
control. See the earlier discussion of ministerial responsibility in recent years, and 
see Davis, " English Administrative Law " [1962] Public Law 139. 
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CHAPTER 11 
THE EXECUTIVE -III 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
THERE is little need to describe in detail the structure and functions of 
each ministry. One or two only need be discussed as having particular 
constitutional importance. 
The general framework. In general the structure of a department 
conforms to the pattern of a minister supported by one or more political 
colleagues, an Under -Secretary of State in the case of a Secretary of 
State, or a Parliamentary Secretary in the case of other ministers. Under 
them are the permanent staff of the department spreading down from 
a Permanent Under -Secretary of State or Permanent Secretary as the 
case may be.2 Except where distinct attributions of functions are made 
(as with the Under -Secretaries of State of the Scottish Office) the powers 
of Parliamentary Secretaries may be very varied according to the dis- 
positions of their masters, who remain responsible for their Departments. 
It is one of the advantages of the doctrine of parliamentary responsibility 
that the public appearance of a rigid separation of the government from 
the administration is maintained. Subject to overriding statutes such 
as the House of Commons Disqualification Act, 1957, which by its 
Schedules regulates the number of ministers who may be members of 
that House, there is a considerable flexibility in the structure of the 
central government, which enables the pressures of events and the ideas 
of Prime Ministers to be reflected in it.3 The Ministers of the Crown 
(Transfer of Functions) Act, 1946, enables the transfer of functions 
on the dissolution of a ministry to be easily accomplished in law.4 The 
creation of a new ministry, if staff are to be directly employed, and not 
lent by other departments, requires statutory authority, but such statutes 
are short and stylised.3 Other administrative changes of major importance 
such as those affecting the Joint Permanent Secretaries to the Treasury can 
be made with little formality. 
The creation of new ministries cannot entirely solve the problem of 
the increasing burden of work falling upon the government as a whole. 
1 Details are readily available in, e.g., The Whitehall and The New Whitehall Series. 
2 Nomenclature may vary in particular departments, e.g., the Post Office. 
3 See, e.g., " Organisation of British Central Government 1956 -62," by F. M. G. Willson 
(1962) 40 Public Administration 159, and Organisation of British Central Government 
1914 -56, ed. Chester and Willson. 
4 See for a case study [1961] Public Law 150 et seq. 
8 The assumption of a title does not so require, e.g., Mr. Churchill's assumption of the 
title of Minister of Defence in 1940. 
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Such creations increase the problem of co- ordinating activity within 
the government, particularly if a demarcation of function cannot easily 
be made. Relief has been found for the most heavily- burdened ministers 
through the appointment of Ministers of State or their equivalent. Such 
appointments may be made where it is desirable that a particular facet 
of the work of a ministry should receive particular attention, but separa- 
tion into a separate ministry is thought undesirable either because of 
the temporary nature of the problems involved or because the work 
should not (for administrative reasons) be thus detached from the parent 
ministry. They may also be made, as in the case of the Minister of 
State for Scotland, or the Minister of State for Wales, where it is thought 
desirable that someone of ministerial rank, but free of many parliamentary 
duties, should be available. Other Ministers of State have distinct respon- 
sibilities, for which they are answerable to Parliament, as is the Chief 
Secretary to the Treasury (an office which is currently combined with 
the office of Paymaster -General), who is a colleague, but not the subord- 
inate, of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and has a seat in the Cabinet. 
The office of Minister of State and those offices akin to it thus afford 
added flexibility. 
The unity of government. All departments of the central government 
operate in the name of the Crown, but questions arise as to how far the 
administration must be regarded as a unitary whole. So far as Secretaries 
of State are concerned it is said that, each discharging part of what 
was once a single office, any Secretary of State can act for another.' 
This may well be so even though specific functions are conferred upon 
a specific Secretary nominatim. The argument, if sound, would cover 
that case as well as the exercise of more general powers. In other cases 
the specific functions of a minister may, at first sight, be designated with 
a degree of precision? Ambiguity may arise as to whether a particular 
matter falls within a certain description, or it may arise in cases where 
one minister acts on behalf of another. It has been said that the assump- 
tion of authority by a department, albeit ultra vires, will bind.' It seems, 
however, that such assertions go too far,9 and that for most purposes 
each department must be treated as a separate entity 10 (with the exception 
of the Departments of the Scottish Office, to be discussed later), though 
where cases of personal bar or estoppel arise it may be necessary to 
distinguish between simple attributions of power, and the power given 
to one minister to act with the approval of another. In the second 
6 Harrison v. Bush (1855) 5 E. & B. 344. 
7 See, e.g., Minister of Aviation Order, 1959 S.I. 1768. 
8 Robertson v. Minister of Pensions [1949] 1 K.B. 227. 
9 Howell v. Falmouth Boat Construction Co. [1951] A.C. 837. 
10 The Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, operates upon that assumption, though, by admission, 
the unitary theory was accepted in Commissioners for Crown Lands v. Page [1960] 2 
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case the qualification may be regarded as being a matter of internal 
law not affecting persons outside the government." 
The Treasury. The particular functions of the Junior Lords of the 
Treasury as Whips (in which capacity they are aided by unpaid Whips) 
have already been noticed. Otherwise function is sufficiently indicated 
by the name of the Ministry, save that the offices of Paymaster -General, 
Lord Privy Seal, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and Lord President 
of the Council frequently have particular other responsibilities added 
to their light departmental duties. Something must however be said of 
the Treasury. Traditionally its power rested upon the patronage which 
it controlled, which was of the utmost value to governments, and upon 
its control of finance.12 While the former basis has declined in importance 
the latter has increased. Treasury control operates not only at the stage 
of estimates, when it is the function of the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
(the effective political head of the Treasury) in conjunction with the 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury to keep departmental expenditure in 
line with general government policy, but also to some degree at the 
stage of administration, notably in relation to virement, and at the stage 
of ultimate accounting.13 The nature of Treasury control changes. 
Just as it was affected by the Gladstonian reforms, so also the generalised 
acceptance of Keynesian economics and of economic planning alters 
and extends its role in respect of forward planning,14 though these changes 
are only slowly being absorbed. The Treasury is, however, much more 
than a Ministry of Finance, even in the widest sense of that term. It is 
also responsible for a large number of managerial services in relation to 
the civil service, notably through its Organisation and Methods Division, 
but also in relation to recruitment, training, discipline and payment 
of civil servants. In recognition of this aspect of the work the Permanent 
Secretary to the Treasury was, in 1919, given the title of Head of the 
Civil Service, a title which was carried by one of the Joint Permanent 
Secretaries when the office was divided. The rearrangement of functions 
in July 1962 was in part intended to underline the importance of these 
tasks.' 
The Law Officers. Constitutionally the position of the Law Officers 
has also its peculiarities. They are the Attorney and Solicitor General 
for England and the Lord Advocate and Solicitor General for Scotland. 
The Attorney- General takes precedence,16 and the discharge of functions 
11 Mitchell, Contracts of Public Authorities, p. 234 et seq. 
12 Heath, The Treasury; Beer, Treasury Control and the sources therein referred to. 
13 See, generally, Sixth Report of the Select Committee on Estimates (1957 -58) H.C. 254. 
14 The Plowden Report, 1961 (Cmnd. 1432). The appointment in October 1961 of the 
Paymaster - General as Chief Secretary to the Treasury with particular responsibility for 
estimates, public investment and forward planning was one mark of this. See generally 
the articles in (1963) 41 Public Administration 1 -50. is Ante, p. 161. 
16 Att.-Gen. v. Lord Advocate (1834) 2 CL & Fin. 481. 
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among the two pairs of Law Officers is now regulated by the Law Officers 
Act, 1944. They are the legal advisers of the government, though the 
Attorney - General assumes also the more general advisory functions not 
limited to a particular jurisdiction. By custom the Attorney -General 
and the Lord Advocate have recognised claims to judicial office, and in 
particular to the Lord Chief Justiceship or to one of the Chairs of the 
Divisions in Scotland respectively, should a suitable vacancy occur. 
Each of these Law Officers has a certain precedence at their respective 
Bars. By reason of the existence of the office of Dean of the Faculty 
of Advocates the Lord Advocate cannot be said to be head of the Scots 
Bar, as the Attorney -General is in respect of the English Bar ; in contrast, 
however, the place of the Lord Advocate, within the Bar when he 
appears in court reflects the fact that in the past he was entitled to a seat 
upon the Bench. 
Despite this general identification there are significant differences. 
The Lord Advocate controls the system of public prosecution in Scotland, 
a system which does not exist universally in England.l" On the other 
hand he lacks the special place in relation to charities held by the Attorney - 
General, though in other cases the Advocate may be required to be 
served to represent the public interest. In relation to numerous appoint- 
ments which in England would be controlled by the Lord Chancellor's 
department it is the Lord Advocate who in Scotland has the effective 
voice.18 The parliamentary draftsmen for Scotland are to be found in 
the Lord Advocate's Department, whereas the office of parliamentary 
counsel falls under the Treasury. Formerly the Lord Advocate had 
extensive privileges as representing the Crown, including a right to 
sit upon the Bench particularly when the interests of the Crown were 
involved.19 His office is one of great historical importance. He was 
one of the great officers of state and for long periods, even after the 
Union, the Lord Advocate was the effective government of Scotland. 
Those privileges and his effective position have declined, but marks 
of them are to be found in the present position as, for example, in the 
patronage vested in him. His advisory capacity is not limited to those 
of legal adviser and other functions such as membership of the Scottish 
Universities Committee of the Privy Council adhere to the office. 
The offices normally follow the ordinary ministerial pattern, though 
exceptionally a Law Officer may not be of the Government party, or he 
may not have a seat in the Commons. Normally, however, a Law Officer 
17 It has been asserted that the Lord Advocate has complete immunity from legal proceed- 
ings arising out of the discharge of his duties in this respect: Hester v. MacDonald, 1961 
S.L.T. 414. Sed quaere. Cf. Henderson v. Robertson (1853). 15 D. 290. The views there 
expressed appear to go beyond what was necessary for the decision of that case or for the 
proper protection of the Lord Advocate. See, generally, as to his position, D. and J. Nicol 
v. Dundee Harbour Board, 1915 S.C.(H.L.) 7 and King's Advocate v. Lord Dunglas (1836) 
15 S. 314. 
19 623 H.C.Deb. 172 -173. 
19 See, generally, Omond, Lord Advocates of Scotland; Milne, The Scottish Office; and the 
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is at the same time minister (and thus bound by the ordinary political 
rules) and also an officer of the law in the sense that he is concerned 
with the neutral administration of justice. He is thus called upon to 
distinguish his functions, and on occasion to act in the interest of justice 
against what might be thought to be his political interests.20 This duality 
of interest causes difficulties in working the rules of ministerial responsi- 
bility, and, in practice, also causes their modification.21 
The service departments. At one time questions of the existence of a 
standing army were of considerable constitutional importance, as is 
made clear by both the Claim of Right and the Bill of Rights. So, from 
1715, military law was sanctioned each year by the annual Mutiny Act. 
From the Army Act, 1881, a standing code was enacted which was 
renewed in vigour each year by the Army Act. The Royal Air Force 
was brought under this system and the Act became the Army and Air 
Force (Annual) Act. These annual Acts were concerned with the con- 
tinuation of the code of military (or air force) law. Though they recited 
the concurrence of Parliament to the maintenance of land and air forces 
nothing was said on this in the enacted portion, and it appears that the 
parliamentary authority for the actual forces was, and is, the votes in 
respect of men in the Appropriation Act. In 1955 the system was changed, 
partly because it was found that the old procedure could provide fruitful 
opportunities for parliamentary obstruction, but also for other 
reasons.22 The Army Act (and the Air Force Act) of that year provided 
for a similar code of military law and a mechanism for enforcing it. The 
Act was to last for one year, with the possibility of annual renewal by 
Order in Council up to a total period of five years. In 1961 similar 
legislation amended and renewed the 1955 legislation. Thus there is the 
opportunity every five years for a substantial review of military law. 
Naval forces did not present the same threat to liberty as did land 
forces and annual legislation was theoretically not required for the 
maintenance of the navy. In practice the navy as much as the army 
depended on the annual Appropriation Act. The code of naval discipline 
is now contained in the Naval Discipline Act, 1957, which moves towards 
a common code of service law, but which unlike the other legislation 
is permanent. 
Constitutionally ultimate control is vested in the civilian heads of the 
Service Departments. Collective Service advice was given through the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee. Since 1955 there has been a separate Chairman 
of the Committee who is Chief of Defence Staff to the Minister of Defence. 
In 1962 this process was carried further by the proposal that the Ministry 
of Defence should in effect absorb the service departments, the three 
20 Shawcross, " The Office of Attorney- General," Parliamentary Affairs, 1953 -54. 
21 Marshall and Moodie, Some Problems of the Constitution, 172 et seq. 
22 (1951 -52) H.C. 241, 331; (1952 -53) H.C. 140, 289; (1953 -54) H.C. 223. 
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ministers becoming Minister of State subordinated to the Minister of 
Defence.23 
The Scottish Office. Mention must also be made of the Scottish 
Office. For a substantial period after the Union the Lord Advocate was 
to a great extent the government of Scotland. The present office springs 
from the Secretary for Scotland Act, 1885,24 which was extended in 1887. 
The Secretary became a Secretary of State in 1926 under the Secretaries 
of State Act. Despite the Reorganisation of Offices (Scotland) Act, 1928, 
the board system continued to have a wide operation in Scotland. That 
system was condemned in the Gilmour Report,25 and the Reorganisation 
of Offices (Scotland) Act, 1939, carried out the recommendations of 
the Report, removed some anomalies created by the 1928 Act, and 
made the Scottish Office resemble a normal department. There remained, 
however, a considerable number of government functions in Scotland 
which were not formally under the control of the Secretary of State. As 
a result of the Report of the Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs,26 
many functions were transferred from " United Kingdom " departments 
to the Scottish Office, e.g., in relation to roads. The result is that the 
Secretary of State has more diversified functions than any other minister, 
many of which he exercises jointly or in parallel with another minister, 
e.g., of Agriculture. Partly, but not entirely, because of this he has a 
distinct character as " Scotland's Minister " and is expected to represent 
Scottish interests and feeling generally in the Cabinet, and also, in Scotland, 
to concern himself beyond statutory functions with Scottish life and 
economy. The difficulties of combining these functions, some of which 
must be performed in London and others in Scotland, led to the appoint- 
ment in 1951 of a Minister of State, who has until the present time been 
a peer, and hence freed for performing duties in Scotland. This diversity 
of function also affects the structure of the Office. There are three 
Parliamentary Under Secretaries of State, each of whom is responsible for 
an area of activity. The departments of the Scottish Office are each 
headed by a Secretary who has many of the attributes of a Permanent 
Under Secretary of State in ordinary departments.27 The Permanent 
Under Secretary of State, while having a general oversight of the whole 
work of the Office has no specific departmental duties and is an adviser 
to the Secretary of State. 
23 672 H.C.Deb. 31 et seq. The new arrangements were outlined in Central Organisation 
for Defence (1963) Cmnd. 2097. 
24 A Secretary of State existed intermittently until 1746. Thereafter the Lord Advocate 
was minister for Scotland (as far as there was one) until this Act. For the history of 
the Office see Milne, The Scottish Office. 
25 (1937) Cmd. 5563. 26 (1954) Cmd. 9212. 
27 Since 1939 the Secretary of State has a free hand in the reorganisation of the work in 
the Office. In June 1962 the Office was reorganised. There are four main departments, 
the Home and Health Department (which includes National Health and Local Health 
and Welfare Services), the Scottish Development Department (covering Housing, Planning 
and Electricity among other things), the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, and 

















is that the 
r minister, 
r minister, 
he has a 
) represent 
1 Scotland, 
a life and 
of which 



















THE STRUCTURE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 175 
The general Scottish position. The organisation of the Scottish Office 
is peculiar in that it is the one department which is defined by geography 
rather than by function. It is the result of past history, as well as of 
other factors which mark off Scotland as an entity. That country is 
distinguished by the existence there of a separate jurisdiction, and a 
separate church, and these things combined with other factors produce 
solid differences which also distinguish the country as a unit. The 
organisation of the Scottish Office is a reflection of this. That organisation 
taken alone, suggests nothing more than a partial administrative devolu- 
tion, partial since many governmental functions necessarily continue 
to be carried out on a United Kingdom basis, and in particular the 
jurisdiction of the Treasury is universal. Nevertheless the whole con- 
stitutional position of Scotland can only be gathered if this organisation 
is seen in the context of the other distinguishing factors, which have 
been mentioned, and of the particular arrangements made for Scottish 
legislation and affairs in Parliament. To all these must be added such 
matters as the Electricity Reorganisation (Scotland) Act, 1954, which both 
in its transfer of responsibility from the Minister of Fuel and Power 
to the Secretary of State and in the exclusion of the Scottish Electricity 
Boards from the general scheme is an example of how this pattern of 
activity affects the whole of the machinery of government in Scotland. 
Thus, practical devolution may overall be greater than is apparent at 
first sight. This reality of the devolution may be obscured because of 
the piecemeal method by which it has been created. 
Northern Ireland and Wales. More extreme conditions and a different 
history have produced a greater and more formalised devolution in 
respect of Northern Ireland, which can be said to have a semi -federal 
relationship with Great Britain.28 Elsewhere in Great Britain particular 
arrangements have been made in relation to Wales. The Statute of 
Wales, 1284, and the Law in Wales Act, 1536, incorporated Wales into 
England, and until recent times no special measures had, in general, 
been taken in relation to the government of Wales, the most notable 
exceptions being the Welsh Board of Health and the administration of 
Education in Wales. In 1951 the Home Secretary was also named as 
Minister for Welsh Affairs, having a general rather than departmental 
interest. That responsibility was in 1957 transferred to the Minister 
of Housing and Local Government, and a Minister of State for Wales 
was appointed. In the same year the Council for Wales and Monmouth- 
shire was established as an advisory body. There had been development 
in the Welsh offices of various of the central departments and the Council 
pressed for the appointment of a Secretary of State for Wales after the 
28 For a description of that and of the organisation of government in the Isle of Man and 
the Channel Islands see the two volumes on the United Kingdom in Stevens' British 
Commonwealth Series; and see Queckett, The Constitution of Northern Ireland, and 
Barrett and Carter, The Northern Ireland Problem. 
176 THE EXECUTIVE -III 
manner of the Secretary of State for Scotland, a solution which was 
rejected.29 There is, therefore, no department charged with overall 
administrative responsibility for Welsh Affairs, and the arrangements in 
Parliament are, as has already been noted, more limited than those 
made in relation to Scotland. 
Decentralisation in general. Apart from Scotland and Wales, there 
exists administrative decentralisation in departments where that is 
possible such as in the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance, 
and in advisory bodies such as Regional Boards for Industry. On any 
substantial scale this decentralisation is only possible where the service 
is essentially local or where there is much detailed administration not 
involving major policy decisions. Something approaching a regional 
organisation had existed during the war of 1939 -45, but while pressures 
towards decentralisation exist, other factors, above all the general doctrine 
of parliamentary responsibility, and simple geographical considerations 
have militated against the emergence of any system of regional government 
based upon these foundations.3° 
The administration: the civil service. Within this general administra- 
tive framework, and under ministerial control, the work of administration 
is carried out by the civil service staffs. Two aspects of their position 
should be noticed, their relationship to the minister and their general 
position in law. All functions are carried out in the name of the appro- 
priate minister, but, since clearly the minister cannot do everything the 
civil servants have authority to act, and the act is accepted as that of 
the minister.31 This legal responsibility is balanced by a similar political 
responsibility. The minister is responsible for what his servants have 
done or might have done and for organising " a safe system of work " 
in his department.32 The maintenance of these responsibilities, par- 
ticularly the second, is an important element in the maintenance of the 
neutrality of the civil service. Despite this, there is also importance in 
retaining some element of individual responsibility on the part of the 
particular servant. It should, therefore, be noted that neither the responsi- 
bility which the department has in law for the acts of its servants (the 
enforcement of which was facilitated or created by the Crown Proceedings 
29 See particularly the Council's Third (1957) and Fourth (1959) Memoranda (Cmnd. 53 
and 631) and the earlier reply of the Prime Minister (1957) Cmnd. 334). Those disputes 
led to a reconstruction of the Council (see 595 H.C.Deb. 1323 -1324) and point to the 
difficulties of combining a system of Ministerial responsibility with other devices. For 
the division of responsibilities see 663 H.C.Deb. 1277. 
39 See particularly Sixth Report Select Committee on Estimates (1953 -54) H.C. 233. 
31 Cantons Ltd. v. Commissioner of Works [1943] 2 All E.R. 560; Adair v. Hill, 1943 J.C. 
9; Dalziel School Board v. Scotch Education Department, 1915 S.C. 234. There are 
probably limits to this doctrine. In some cases the court may require the minister to 
act personally, Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co. Ltd. [1942] A.C. 624, 638. Moreover a 
minister is not bound by a representation of authority made by one of his servants in 
excess of real authority. 
32 This responsibility is also not without limit. See ante, p. 164. 
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Act, 1947, to be discussed hereafter), nor the political responsibility to 
Parliament borne by the minister are entirely exclusive of any personal 
responsibility of the individual civil servant. 
Recruitment to the civil service is controlled by the Civil Service 
Commission.33 Once engaged, in law, the civil servant holds his position 
at pleasure.84 In practice he has a high degree of security of tenure 
and an elaborate system of internal tribunals exis . These must be 
regarded as part of a system of internal administrate a law. Conditions 
of employment are regulated by the Treasury and a system of collective 
bargaining exists through the Whitley Councils.36 Somewhat similarly 
the denial at law of a right to sue for his salary does not represent the 
true position of the civil servant.S6 Because of the nature of his employ- 
ment the civil servant is subjected to some unusual limitations. Certain 
grades are free from restrictions on political activities, others, particularly 
higher grades concerned with policy and those where the work is local 
and hence difficulty might arise, are restricted in their participation 
in national politics, and in particular cases in participation in local 
politics.37 Further the standards of conduct required may be higher than 
those exacted by the ordinary law,33 and in particular special security 
checks may be made, under the system established in 1948 and enlarged 
in scope thereafter.39 Here once again the element of " internal law " 
is apparent. Appeals run to the Three Advisers - former senior civil 
servants who act as a court of appeal. 
To a large extent the regulation of the civil service remains, in form, 
on a prerogative basis.40 The service is governed by Orders in Council, 
or by Treasury Circulars. The Civil Service Commissioners were estab- 
lished by Order in Council and continue upon that basis. In effect this 
basis preserves a discretionary element which is required for the running 
33 See generally, Mustoe, Law and Organisation of the Civil Service; The Civil Service in 
Britain and France, ed. Robson. 
34 Riordan v. The War Office [1959] 3 All E.R. 552; [1960] 3 All E.R. 774n. (C.A.) and see 
the older cases discussed in Mitchell, The Contracts of Public Authorities. The legal 
nature of the civil servant's engagement is ambiguous. See the arguments therein, and 
I.R.C. v. Hambrook [1956] 2 Q.B. 641, and the cases there cited, and Blair (1958) 21 
M.L.R. 265. 
35 The restrictive provisions in the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927, were 
repealed in 1946. 
36 Thus the Superannuation Acts preserve the " discretionary " element in pensions, although 
the existence of these is taken into account, together with security of employment in 
calculating salaries; see generally Blair, " The Civil Servant " [1958] Public Law 32; 
and see Bankruptcy Act, 1914, s. 51 (i); and Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act, 1913, s. 148. 
37 See Servants of the Crown (Parliamentary Candidature) Order, 1950, and the Masterman 
Report, 1949 (Cmd. 7718) and the White Paper of 1953 indicating the government's 
policy arrived at after consultation with the Whitley Council (Cmd. 8783) : over 60 °% of 
the service is completely free politically. 
38 (1937) Cmd. 5517, Acceptance of Business Appointments by Officers of the Crown. 
39 See the Report on Security Procedures in the Public Services, 1962 (Cmnd. 1681) which 
summarises past developments; see also . Jackson, " Individual Rights and National 
Security " (1957) 20 M.L.R. 364; and Jackson, " The Dismissal of Civil Servants in the 
Interests of National Security" [1963] Public Law 51. 
40 The justification of this may be doubtful. The differentiation from other forms of 
service is much more justifiable. The mere fact that an office was a munus publicum 
entailed many similar consequences (Ersk. III, 6, 7) and perhaps all that are desirable. 
M.C.L.-12 
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of the public service. It is probable that the exclusion of the general 
law is carried further than is necessary, and causes once again a sharp 
distinction between the servants of central government departments 
and other public servants which is not wholly justified. 
In general the importance of the place of the civil service in the 
machinery of the government should not be underestimated. The civil 
service reforms which followed the Northcote -Trevelyan Report of 1854 
should be rated as constitutional reforms. In particular the retention 
of the theory of civil service anonymity is of the greatest importance in 
working our system. It is upon that anonymity that the doctrine of 
ministerial responsibility depends, and the maintenance of a barrier 
between the political element, which must exist somewhere in a govern- 
ment department, and the administrative side is of great importance 
in the public administration. Moreover, while rivalry will exist in any 
large -scale enterprise, in a governmental enterprise this anonymity vis -ez-vis 
the public does much to ensure that the rivalry is a professional one, 
and to that extent the civil service can more easily remain and be accepted 
as politically neutral in its operation. The creation and maintenance of 
such a service in modern times might indeed be rated as one of the major 
constitutional achievements 41 
41 The foundation of the modern civil service is to be found in the Northcote -Trevelyan 
Report, 1854 (Paper 1713) (reprinted (1954) 32 Public Administration 1). See, too, 
Wheare, The Civil Service in the Constitution, and Wyn Griffith, The British Civil Service, 
1854 -1954. 
the general 
gain a sharp 
departments 
rvice in the 
1. The civil 




)f a barrier 
in a govern - 
importance 
exist in any 




)f the major 
tcote- Trevelyan 
1). See, too, 
h Civil Service, 
CHAPTER 12 
PUBLIC BOARDS AND CORPORATIONS 
Introduction. The modern creation of public boards is the result of 
several causes.1 Changing conceptions of the functions of the state 
result in an expansion of the areas of state activity, and in an expansion 
of the activities of traditional departments. If all new activities were 
to be carried out by traditional ministerial methods the consequence 
of the centralisation, which necessarily follows both in the administration 
and in Parliament, would overload existing machinery. Other con- 
siderations may suggest that the conduct of some governmental activities 
be isolated (to a greater or lesser degree) from Parliament. Quite apart 
from pressure on parliamentary time, the possibility of close parliamentary 
questioning dictates administrative procedures and attitudes which . 
may not be appropriate where procedures should be closer to those 
of large -scale business. Again, such isolation may be desirable to exclude 
political pressures, where those would be inappropriate, as for example 
with the B.B.C., and a greater freedom of action (including a freedom 
to make mistakes) than traditional methods will allow may also be 
desirable. Moreover the board form may facilitate the desirable partici- 
pation of persons not normally engaged in government service in the 
management of the enterprise.2 The weight of such considerations is 
not uniformly felt, for the choice of ministerial or board form will be 
greatly influenced by the inclination of the government for the time being. 
The pattern of creation of public boards is no more uniform. Economic 
or purely political considerations may cause a particular government to 
concern itself more immediately with a particular industry or activity 
rather than with others like it. Even if it be determined that government 
interest should be close, and that a board be preferred to a department 
the nature of the activity may cause considerable variation in the method 
of intervention. The National Health Service is run through boards 
and committees created ad hoc. The Legal Aid Scheme is run through 
ordinary professional bodies. The different qualities of gas and electricity 
cause differences in the organisation of those nationalised industries. 
Thus there is no uniformity of pattern any more than there is of legal 
structure. Cable and Wireless Ltd. exists under the Companies Acts, 
the Bank of England is a chartered corporation, the National Coal 
Board a statutory one. 
1 In small compass many of the reasons are seen operating in the Report on Crown Lands 
(1955) Cmd. 9483. More generally see Robson, Nationalised Industry and Public Ownership. 
2 See the Rochdale Report (1962) Cmnd. 1824, § 147, and 616 H.C.Deb. 33 -35, on part - 
time directors of the Bank of England, and Cnmd. 350, and 631 H.C.Deb. 200. 
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Nor are distinctions clear -cut. The Post Office is a department, but 
one which is specially regulated to acquire some of the features of the 
board system.3 At the other end of the spectrum there is a graduation 
upwards from the private enterprise village shop (which is nevertheless 
state -regulated in some respects, e.g., as to hours of opening or commodi- 
ties sold) through increasing degrees of regulation to the exclusive conduct 
of an activity under a public board, an operational board which may 
have emerged as the only convenient method of regulating an activity. 
Coal- mining, with immaterial exceptions, is exclusively in the hands of a 
public board. Iron and steel were " denationalised," 4 but the Iron and 
Steel Board continues to have regulatory powers over the industry. Parts 
of air transport are in the hands of a public board, but aircraft con- 
struction, although it remains in the hands of private industry, is heavily 
influenced by governmental policies, practices, and suggestions. While 
British European Airways are expected to provide uneconomic services in 
the Highlands and Islands, MacBraynes Ltd., an ordinary company, is 
subsidised to provide like services in other fields of transports The 
same gradations exist within the field of regulation narrowly so called. 
Nurses are governed by a state -created body, advocates or barristers 
by private corporations acting, in the public interest. 
Historical background. Public corporations must therefore be looked 
at against a broad background,3 and history must find its place in that 
background. There is nothing new about a public board, in the sense 
of a body which has some governmental attributes, but which also 
operates as might a private corporation. The Bank of Scotland 7 was 
such a body as were the Darien Company,8 the East India Company 
and the Hudson's Bay Company among many other examples. More 
recently the boards like the Poor Law Commission of 1835 were created 
to run what had come to be regarded as distinctively governmental services. 
These should perhaps not be regarded as the predominant stream in the 
ancestry of the present boards. Steadily they were reduced to the minis- 
terial pattern, and, although the name board might continue, as with 
the Local Government Board, in reality they had, for the most part, 
become, by the end of the nineteenth century, traditional ministerial 
departments. It should, moreover, be noted that in one sense they were 
almost " accidental " in the way in which modern boards are " deliberate." 
They were created before modern doctrines of ministerial responsibility 
had been worked out with all their consequences, and the decline in these 
3 The Post Office Act, 1961, and Report on the Status of the Post Office (1960) Cmnd. 989. 
4 Iron and Steel Act, 1953. 
5 Highlands and Islands Shipping Services Act, 1960. The share capital in that company 
is, however, half owned by the B.T.C., acquired on the take -over from theL.M.S. Railway. 
e The extension of that background to include experience with boards in Australia and 
the U.S.A. is desirable to break ideas of any necessary connection with certain political 
views, which may exist if only the local scene is regarded. 
7 See the Act of 1695 (A.P.S. IX, 494). 
8 See the Act of 1695 (A.P.S. IX, 377). 
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early boards corresponds to the growth of these doctrines. Whereas 
the newer boards are deliberately intended to breach these doctrines, 
the former were not so conceived. They were, moreover, early experi- 
ments based upon a simple theory that, once a policy had been deter- 
mined, able and upright men, like Chadwick, could administer, and 
nothing more was required. That theory proved to be inconsistent 
with doctrines of ministerial responsibility, and the falsity of the dichotomy 
which it contained was also demonstrated. The superficial attractiveness 
of that theory still keeps it alive. 
There is, however, another strain of boards, related perhaps to the 
nineteenth -century ad hoc commissions in local government for lighting, 
paving, etc., which can be said to start with the Mersey Docks and 
Harbour Board of 1857 and to run through the Port of London Authority 
and the London Passenger Transport Board. These were operational 
boards performing a commercial service with governmental interest 
strongly marked in financial controls, in appointments to the controlling 
board, and in general regulation, but having also a degree of independence 
from the government and having representatives of consumers and 
operators also upon that board. A degree of governmental regulation 
of such enterprises was no novelty. The idea of a public utility is of long 
standing traceable back to the old common law regulation of common 
carriers, innkeepers and the like, and continuing through the regulation 
of railways under such bodies as the Railway and Canal Commission or 
the Railway Rates Tribunal 9 and of other public utilities. These bodies 
had special rights and privileges, e.g., powers of compulsory purchase, 
etc., but they had also special liabilities in that they were subjected to 
varying degrees of regulation in the public interest. Thus, the new 
boards can be regarded as merely an accentuation of governmental 
interest, and it was through them, and in particular the Port of London 
Authority that a renewed interest was shown in the idea of public boards 
in this century. 
General difficulties. The pressures which stimulated that interest 
have been indicated. There are also matters in present circumstances 
which militate against the success of such boards. It has been found 
that the division between " policy " and " administration " is not, in 
general, a happy or workable one, particularly when the board is con- 
cerned with an essential service or product. Isolation from Parliament 
means, on one side, a diminution in parliamentary control but, on the 
other, it means a denial of the possibility of using the parliamentary 
forum to explain the hopes and intentions of the board, and reports of 
public boards no matter how well produced tend to reach only those 
readers who are prepared to venture into the lowest and darkest parts 
of libraries. Compromise solutions such as that of having a member 
9 See, generally, Kahn -Freund, The Law of Inland Transport, Chap. 4. 
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of the board who is also a member of the House of Commons were 
bound to fail. The member might answer for the board, but could not 
control it.10 Hence, with the rise of the doctrine of ministerial responsi- 
bility, as the dominant mechanism for control, the board system was 
heavily condemned 11 and in the more purely governmental fields of 
activity (of which the poor law stream is typical) declined, though some- 
what unevenly throughout the Kingdom as a whole.12 The forced decline 
of the " poor law stream " almost coincides with the vigorous expansion 
of the " Mersey stream." Once again it was hoped that if general policy 
had been determined these quasi- commercial ventures could largely be 
left to run themselves. So there emerged the London Passenger Transport 
Board, 1933, the Central Electricity Board, 1926, British Overseas Airways, 
1939, the North of Scotland Hydro -Electric Board, 1943. Nevertheless, 
in these new creations ministerial control was strongly marked, and 
persisted in the post -war creations. Thus, the inconsistencies condemned 
by the Gilmour Report were put once again upon the Statute Book. 
These creations of the years between the wars should be noted, for 
they tended to become models, both in form and in other ways, par- 
ticularly the B.B.C., created in 1926. The need to secure political neutral- 
ity for that body was evident, and hence, although a ministerial power 
of direction existed there was a refusal to answer parliamentary questions 
on the day -to -day affairs of the Corporation,13 a refusal which set a 
subsequent pattern. 
General problems. This outline and genealogy are a necessary prelude 
to any discussion of the constitutional position, since they make clear 
the facts that the creation of boards has not been based upon any con- 
sistent theory, that no continuous effort has been made to fit boards in 
to the general machinery, or to adjust that machinery to increase the 
10 The Forestry Commission had such an arrangement until 1945, and it is for the reasons 
given above, rather than for any others, that the House of Commons Disqualification 
Act, 1957, excluded members of the boards of public corporations from the House. 
For a general account of the 19th -century decline of boards see F. M. G. Willson, 
" Ministries and Boards " (1955) 33 Public Administration 43. 
11 In particular by the Royal Commission on the Civil Service, Fourth Report (1914) 
Cd. 7338, Chap. IX; the Report of the (Haldane) Machinery of Government Committee 
(1918) Cd. 9230, §§ 31 -33; and the Report of the Gilmour Committee (1937) Cmd. 
5563. 
12 The chronology here is interesting. The board system continued in full vigour in Scotland 
long after its decline had become marked in England. By the time the Scottish boards 
were just reaching a stage of absorption into the ministerial form, as the English ones 
had earlier, the new stream of boards springing from the Mersey Docks and Harbour 
Board was appearing. At the time of the abolition of the Scottish boards great energy 
was being devoted to the creation of newer United Kingdom boards in the " Mersey 
stream." These boards and their post -war fellows show signs of repeating only rather 
more rapidly the 19th- century cycle of development. It must be noted that the creation 
of local boards has not stopped, see the Covent Garden Market Act, 1961, and despite 
uncertainties about the mechanisms for controlling the newer national boards, others 
are being created on the old pattern; see Report on Civil Aerodromes and Air Navigational 
Services (1961) Cmnd. 1457. 
13 See Report of Select Committee on Nationalised Industries (1951 -52) H.C. 332. The 
action of the Assistance Board was also influential here, this being a board in relation 
to which it was most easy to divide policy and administration. 
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chances of fitting them in. That outline also emphasises the ambiguous 
character of many of these boards, being on the one hand in some ways 
an extension of government,14 and on the other hand being in different 
ways not distinct in kind from private organisations. These conditions 
make it difficult to define their constitutional position in law with precision. 
An effort must be made towards such definition, since the existence 
of these bodies creates constitutional problems. Lines of responsibility 
may become dangerously blurred if the relationship of boards to ministers 
is not clear. The relationship of boards to Parliament and the functions 
of Parliament in respect of boards are important, as are other methods 
of control; and these matters depend, to some extent, on that definition. 
Apart from these almost technical issues there are the broader ones 
(which increase the importance of the narrower) resulting from the 
existence of these agglomerations of power. The fiscal and economic 
significance of their operations is so great that they could affect the 
economic life of the nation as a whole.15 Moreover the monopolistic 
character of many, whether of a commercial type or not, makes possible 
the existence in an accentuated form of problems of abuse of power,16 
which may affect citizens or firms in their lives or livelihood. 
The general character of boards. Before approaching these problems 
some description must be given of the modern boards, though within the 
work must be generalised.17 There must 
be put on one side boards which are either ministerial departments, or 
parts of such departments such as the Board of Inland Revenue. There 
must also be discarded bodies such as the Air Licensing Board or the 
Service Committees under the National Health Service, which as regulatory 
bodies, will be discussed with administrative tribunals. Of the rest, 
there are two broad groups, a social service or administrative group, 
and an operational group, though the division is not a clear one. In 
the former group may be placed the New Towns Commission (for England 
and Wales), the Development Corporations for New Towns, the Regional 
Hospital Boards (and their subordinates, the Hospital Management 
14 See particularly Sir James Bowman (1956 -57) H.C. 304, Q. 911 and report of B.O.A.C. 
for 1961. At one extreme the Bank of England can be properly described as the city 
branch of the Treasury. 
is See for example the figures given in relation to nationalised industries in the White 
Paper, " The Financial and Economic Obligations of Nationalised Industries " (1961) 
Cmnd. 1337. The significance of these bodies is enhanced by the fact that they tend 
to exist at key points in the economy, and that the conditions which govern the methods 
of raising capital for them cause that operation to have a heavy impact on a particular 
capital market. Investment in nationalised industries amounts to almost half the national 
investment in the public sector, estimated at £965m. out of a total of £2,060m. for 1963 -64, 
see (1962) Cmnd. 1849. 
16 Consider the general situation in such cases as Eric Gnapp Ltd. v. Petroleum Board [1949] 
1 All E.R. 980; Barber v. Manchester R.H.B. [1958] 1 All E.R. 322; Palmer v. Inverness 
Hospitals Board, 1963 S.L.T. 124. 
17 For more detail see Griffith and Street, Administrative Law; and Robson, Nationalised 
Industries and Public Ownership. 
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Committees) or the National Assistance Board. Such bodies are ad- 
ministering services on behalf of the government in a relatively direct 
manner.18 They are bodies corporate, the members of the corporations 
being appointed by the minister, who is sometimes bound by a require- 
ment of consultation (before appointing) with local authorities or other 
appropriate bodies,12 but the minister nevertheless retains a very con- 
siderable discretion. Each corporation is entrusted with a relatively 
narrow field of administration and their finance is derived primarily from 
sums provided by the minister. Thus, the sums required for the hospital 
boards are contained in the ordinary Estimates. Critical matters, such 
as the rates of National Assistance, are determined by general law or 
by the minister, and it is generally true that the powers of overt control 
by ministers tend to be somewhat larger in relation to this group than 
they are in relation to the second. 
The second group, that here called " operational," includes the large 
nationalised industries, coal, electricity, gas, railways and the air cor- 
porations. These have the appearance, at first sight, of being commercial 
undertakings, in that they sell a product and thus have independent 
sources of revenue. Their apparent charter may be large, " securing the 
efficient development of the coal -mining industry," for example. Again 
the boards are bodies corporate consisting of members appointed by the 
minister (sometimes there is a generalised requirement that a member 
should have a particular skill) 20 but here too the terms are so broad 
that the minister has an abundant discretion. The board may itself 
be centralised, as with the National Coal Board, or the industry may 
be organised on a regional basis. Thus the area gas boards can be 
regarded as the basic units, the Gas Council, the central body having 
fewer functions, that structure having been at the time thought to be 
appropriate to the technical conditions of the industry.21 In regard to 
electricity, while generation is, in principle, centralised under the Central 
Electricity Generating Board, and distribution is in the hands of the 
area boards (who thus have a degree of autonomy) general policy is 
determined by the Electricity Council, composed mainly of the chairmen 
of the various boards. These arrangements for the electricity industry 
operate only in England and Wales. In Scotland the two boards, the 
South of Scotland Electricity Board and the North of Scotland Hydro - 
Electric Board each combines generation and distribution.22 Where 
the structure is thus decentralised the minister has direct links with 
the areas. The structure of the Transport Commission under the 
12 The relationship can in effect be one of agency, as with the Agricultural Land Commission 
in England. 
12 New Towns Act, 1946; National Health Service Act, 1946, Sched. 3; N.H.S. (Scotland) 
Act, 1947, Sched. 4. 
22 e.g., Coal Industry Act, 1949, s. 1; Transport Act, 1962, s. 1 (3). 
21 Gas Act, 1948. 
22 See Electricity Reorganisation (Scotland) Act, 1954, and Electricity Act, 1957; but see 
the Mackenzie Report, " Electricity in Scotland " (1962) Cmnd. 1859, § 186 et seq. 
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Reorganisation Scheme, 1954,23 was something of a compromise between 
the two forms. Under the Transport Act, 1962, an entirely new structure 
was created, which imposes decentralisation by region and by function. 
It created four boards, the British Railways Board, the London Transport 
Board (which has powers over both rail and road transport in the London 
Passenger Transport Area), the British Transport Docks Board and 
the British Waterways Board. In addition the British Transport Holding 
Company was created to hold and manage securities formerly vested 
in the Transport Commission and to control any wholly owned subsidiaries. 
Apart from the structure, in which (outside London) divisions are based 
on function, a regional structure is provided for in section 2 in relation 
to railways, these being in six Regional Railway Boards in the first instance, 
the members of the Regional Boards being appointed by the Railways 
Board with the approval of the minister. 
In relation to this second group the term " operational " has been 
used rather than industrial or commercial, for there is written into the 
terms of reference of the corporations an element of public interest,24 
either explicitly or implicitly, and this element is often of great significance. 
As will appear, the distinction between the two groups is not as 
clear as might appear at first sight, and in between them lie the Atomic 
Energy Authority, whose commercial activities may be said to be limited 
(with the Central Electricity Generating Board as its main customer), 
the B.B.C., the Independent Television Authority and the Bank of 
England. While the B.B.C. is primarily operational but dependent 
on public funds, I.T.A. (although it may be operational) is intended to 
be mainly regulatory and to negotiate with the programme contractors, 
from whom it receives its revenues. The Bank of England cannot be 
regarded as providing a service in the sense of the first group, but is 
perhaps a necessary halfway house between the Treasury and the world 
of business. 
Relationship to the government. The relationship of the boards to 
the government is complex. In all the Acts there are powers conferred 
on the minister to give directions to the corporation as there are by 
the Charter of the B.B.C. (though, for historical and other reasons, 
these latter must be somewhat differently regarded). These powers may 
be merely to give directions, as in relation to regional hospital boards, 
or to give directions of a general character, as in relation to the National 
Coal Board. This distinction can well be overemphasised. There is 
no clarity about the meaning of the word " general," which may well 
vary according to circumstances, and moreover it is clear that directions 
will be rarely used, and if used are a mark of the breakdown of the 
23 See Cmd. 9191. 
24 e.g., Hydro -Electric Development (Scotland) Act, 1943, where it is most explicit; but it 
exists elsewhere, e.g., Transport Act, 1962, s. 7 (1). 
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system. Ministerial influence pervades both groups equally.25 This in- 
fluence exists not merely because of the intimacy of the board staffs with 
ministerial staffs, but even more because of other reasons. Ministerial 
control over accounting dealings with surpluses can be important and 
the regulation of appointments to the boards and conditions of tenure 
enhance this influence. Perhaps most important of all, the methods of 
raising capital which, because of the nature of the boards involve the 
Treasury, afford many opportunities for influence.26 
Granted the nature and purpose of these boards it cannot be said 
that this influence is in any way improper. What may be asked is whether 
lines of responsibility are obscured or, alternatively, whether real responsi- 
bility corresponds with legal appearance. In effect, it must be asked 
whether as now organised a board system does not embody all the defects 
which were condemned in the context of a slightly different system by 
the Gilmour Committee. The answer to these questions involves the 
scope of parliamentary and other controls. 
Parliamentary controls. Parliamentary questions remain limited but 
significant in number and scope. Theoretically, a minister being respon- 
sible for what he could do but has not done as well as for what he has 
done, the scope of the ministerial directing power opens up a wide field 
for parliamentary questioning. Such questioning would be inconsistent 
with the intentions in establishing the boards; moreover, the precedent 
of the B.B.C., as has already been mentioned, imposed a limitation. 
Nevertheless the desire for questioning exists. In relation to some 
bodies, such as regional hospital boards, where the Acts and orders 
made thereunder give considerable responsibility to ministers, there is 
little difficulty. Difficulty does arise in connection with nationalised 
industries. Initial uncertainty was ultimately settled by a ruling of 
the Speaker that he would allow questions upon matters involving 
ministerial responsibility to stand upon the Order Paper which, in his 
opinion, were of sufficient public importance, despite the fact that answers 
to questions of a like type had previously been refused and, thus, under 
the normal rules the question would not have been accepted. Questions 
involving the " day -to -day " administration of the nationalised industries 
are normally excluded. Subsequently the Select Committee on National- 
ised Industries which examined the problem did not urge any alteration 
25 The Reports of the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries on both the Air Corpora- 
tions (1958 -59 H.C. 213) and British Railways (1959 -60 H.C. 254) make this abundantly 
clear. The figure of £250,000 at which ministerial approval was required for a capital 
project of the latter is well below the figure at which the approval of the central board 
might be requested in industries of a comparable size. The Transport Act, 1962, s. 27, 
continues a tight ministerial control, and see 682 H.C.Deb. 441 -452. 
26 " Government Control of the Capital Expenditure of the Nationalised Industries " by 
S. Please (1955) 33 Public Administration 31, and see " The Financial and Economic 
Obligations of Nationalised Industries " (1961) Cmnd. 1337. The relationship has 
been described as that of banker and customer: 668 H.C.Deb. 214. 
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of the rules." In this connection it must be remembered that a minister 
cannot be compelled to answer a question, but also that with sufficient 
ingenuity it is normally possible to circumvent the rules if it is desired 
so to do in a particular case. 
Other opportunities for discussing nationalised industries exist. 
Supply Days may be used for this purpose, as may debates upon capital 
investment. Moreover, three days are normally allocated for discussion 
of the annual reports of public boards, with the choice of report lying 
with the Opposition. Apart from these routine opportunities others 
exist. Since the establishment of nationalised industries, reports such 
as the Herbert Committee on Electricity,28 the Fleck Committee on 
Coal, the Guillebaud Report on Railway Pay, reports such as the Pro- 
gramme of Nuclear Power,29 or the Pilkington Report on Broadcasting 30 
have been sufficiently numerous to afford opportunities for fundamental 
review. Equally the changes in the original structure in railways or 
electricity, for example, have served the same purpose. So too have 
private Bills promoted by the corporations, the second reading of which 
affords an opportunity for surveying the work of the board in question. 
Again the financial structure of nationalised industries affords recurrent 
opportunities for discussing them. Authorisation of borrowing, such 
as the Air Corporations Act, 1960, or of advances, such as the Coal 
Industry Act, 1960, is given with a relatively low ceiling, so that a return 
to Parliament is inevitable, and as a further means to the same end 
in 1960 arrangements were improved for giving information about 
capital investment in nationalised industries.31 
Many of these opportunities for parliamentary discussion have a 
random quality. Moreover, in so far as they occur when changes are 
being discussed, the emphasis is upon the merits of the change rather 
than on general performance. Thus they do not afford an opportunity for 
continuous scrutiny, as far as that is consistent with the intended purposes 
of establishing the boards. A distinction must, however, be drawn which 
corresponds roughly to the broad division which has been made. Where 
the board, as with regional hospital boards or the Atomic Energy 
Authority, is primarily financed out of moneys supplied by Parliament, 
then the mechanism of the two financial Select Committees can operate 
and the Comptroller and Auditor -General can act in his customary way. 
In the case of the ordinary run of nationalised industries the accounts 
are audited by ordinary accountants appointed by the appropriate 
minister, and the final accounts and auditors' reports are placed before 
27 For the normal rule see 449 H.C.Deb. 172, and for the Report see (1951 -52) H.C. 332. 
The limitations can perhaps cause difficulty in relation to privilege, see the discussion 
of the Strauss case, ante, p. 104, and the importance there of the definition of " a 
proceeding in Parliament." For the present position see 682 H.C.Deb. 449 -455. 
28 (1956) Cmd. 9672. 
29 (1955) Cmd. 9389. 
30 (1962) Cmnd. 1753. 
31 See 619 H.C.Deb. 1113 -1114. From 1956 the financing of gas, electricity and transport 
was withdrawn from the market to the Exchequer: (1961) Cmnd. 1337. 
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Parliament. Under this procedure the scope for the intervention of 
the Comptroller and Auditor -General, and thus for the effective use of 
the Public Accounts Committee, is very severely limited.32 These diffi- 
culties, combined with others about Parliamentary questioning, caused 
pressure for the appointment of a particular Select Committee. The 
present Select Committee on Nationalised Industries emerged from the 
proposals of a Select Committee appointed to consider this issue of 
accountability.33 The recommendations were not fully accepted for no 
specific officer was appointed to help the committee which was established 
in 1955. The terms of reference of that committee excluded, inter alia, 
matters which had been decided by or clearly engaged the responsi- 
bility of a minister. This exclusion, together with others, left in the 
opinion of the committee too little room to work.34 Thereafter new terms 
of reference were devised and the committee was established in 1956.36 
That committee and its successors has in a series of major reports surveyed 
the operation of the main nationalised industries and the reports have pro- 
duced much valuable material. It has further surveyed its own work, and 
the report 36 shows that the particular reports have had results in practice 
beyond this informative function, though they have influenced the boards 
rather than governments. To some extent it is clear that the existence of this 
Select Committee has, by affording an opportunity for explanation, 
lessened the distrust of boards springing from their isolation. Its work 
remains limited by reason of the limited staff available to it, and a plea 
for further specialised staff 37 has not been acted upon. 
There exists therefore adequate machinery for periodic review in depth 
of public boards, which in the case of the B.B.C. is supplemented by 
the fact that hitherto the charter of the Corporation has always been 
of limited duration. Thus periodic review by a committee or Royal 
Commission is ensured. What does not exist in Parliament is machinery 
for regular supervision. Such machinery would be inconsistent with 
the aims which led to the establishment of those boards, and it must 
be remembered that parliamentary time is not infinitely expandable. 
Each new task that Parliament assumes can only be performed at the 
cost of some sacrifice of time which would otherwise be available for 
performing its functions in traditional fields. This position makes it 
necessary, however, to look at the other controlling devices. 
Other administrative controls. As has been indicated it is clear that 
internally particular ministries and the Treasury do exercise a supervision 
32 Chubb, The Control of Public Expenditure, 145 et seq. and H.C. 235 of 1952 -53. The 
Select Committee on Estimates has no foothold. 
33 (1952 -53) H.C. 235. 34 (1955 -56) H.C. 120. 
36 Having as its terms of reference " To examine the Reports and Accounts of the National- 
ised Industries established by Statute whose controlling Boards are appointed by Ministers 
of the Crown and whose annual receipts are not wholly or mainly derived from moneys 
provided by Parliament or advanced from the Exchequer." 
36 (1961 -62) H.C. 116. 37 (1958 -59) H.C. 276. 
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which is closer than the statutes might suggest on first -reading. Since, 
however, this supervision is conducted in the form of consultation and 
not direction, particular instances of its operation may well not be 
apparent at the time, in relation to the second group of boards. The first 
being much more closely connected with ministries and thus with tradit- 
ional methods of regulation there is little need for special machinery. 
The fact that the members of regional hospital boards or of development 
corporations are chosen from outside the civil service causes a dispersal 
of power and representation of other interests which may suffice, granted 
the nature of the service with which they are concerned. In the case 
of the second group different arrangements exist. For coal, there are 
under the relevant statutes two central bodies, the Domestic Coal Con- 
sumers' Council and the Industrial Coal Consumers' Council, whose 
functions include considering any representation made by a consumer, 
and considering anything referred to them by the minister. From their 
centralised character and the nature of the trade the activities of these 
bodies tend to be somewhat general and precatory. For gas and electricity 
there exist consultative councils for each area, the chairmen being also 
members of the area boards. The change of name is probably signifi- 
cant 33; they are much more links than merely complaint receiving 
bodies, though on the latter side their activities are somewhat more 
formalised. Machinery exists whereby failing a suitable response from 
an area board the Consultative Council may report to the Electricity 
Council 39 or to the minister as the case may be and those authorities 
may intervene with the board. 
In relation to air transport the Air Transport Advisory Council 
formerly existed both to receive complaints, and in its latter days to 
perform licensing functions. It has been succeeded by the Air Transport 
Licensing Board established under the Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act, 
1960, which is primarily a licensing body, though (under section 4) it 
has advisory functions. In addition B.E.A. has itself established advisory 
councils for particular parts of Great Britain, including one for Scotland. 
In relation to railways there was a dual system. So far as rates were 
concerned the Transport Tribunal was required to approve and review 
charges schemes, and to determine any question of reasonableness where 
a maximum charge has not been fixed 40 Apart from that there were 
erected under the Transport Act, 1947, the Consultative Committees, 
of which there is a central one, and area committees established by the 
33 The London Electricity Consultative Council in 1962 said that it had three objectives (1) 
to encourage the consumer to assist in the more economic use of generating plant, etc.; 
(2) to obtain the consumer's co- operation in the search for economics in administration; 
and (3) to secure a fair deal for the consumer. 
39 The individual who is discontented with the response of the Council may also appeal. 
40 The Transport Act, 1953, gave to the Commission in general a much greater freedom 
in relation to charges which it could move within the limits of a charges scheme. This 
freedom has, outside London, been very greatly increased by the Transport Act, 1962. 
See, generally, Kahn -Freund, The Law of Inland Transport, and for the working of the 
1947 and 1953 Acts see Milne and Laing, The Obligation to Carry. 
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minister, one of which must be for Scotland and another for Wales and 
Monmouthshire, both of which annually reported direct to the minister. 
These bodies could hear complaints, and in particular have been much 
concerned with the problems of closing branch lines. On such issues 
the committees in effect held public inquiries. 
The Transport Act, 1962, has substantially altered these arrangements. 
The Transport Tribunal sits in two divisions, the Road Haulage Appeals 
Division (which is not of present concern) and the London Fares and 
Miscellaneous Charges Division. This latter division has jurisdiction 
to make orders in relation to passenger railway fares where the journey 
is wholly within the London Passenger Area, and road passenger fares 
within the London Special Area. Such orders are to fix maximum fares. 
It has a general jurisdiction as to the carriage of mail, and members of 
the armed forces or police. Apart from these limitations the Railways 
Board can charge such fares as it thinks fit (section 43 (3) ). Under the 
Act there is also to be established the Nationalised Transport Advisory 
Council, consisting of the chairman of the Board and of the Holding 
Company, a chairman and vice chairman of the Council, and not more 
than five other persons. Its function is to advise the minister, particularly 
upon co- ordination. The Transport Consultative Committees are 
continued on the former pattern (section 56), to consider representations 
made to them by members of the public, matters referred to them by 
the minister or matters which one of the committees may itself raise. 
The central committee and the area committees for Scotland and for 
Wales must report annually to the minister. Under this Act the functions 
of the area committees as respects railway closures are strengthened, and 
the procedure is formalised (section 56). Except in this matter the 
movement, since 1947, has been to free the railways, to a greater or 
lesser extent, from the controls then established. 
Thus the special mechanisms outside Parliament for regulating or con- 
trolling the second group of boards are varied in nature and purpose. 
Sometimes the machinery exists as much to explain the board to the 
public as for any other purpose, sometimes the machinery can control 
effectively. At other times it is only advisory. In many cases especially 
with the consultative committees the machinery is probably less effective 
than was intended, because it is distinct from the ordinary machinery 
of local or central government, and its existence is too little known.41 
In other cases, where control was originally close, as with the Transport 
Tribunal, the scope of those controls has been substantially reduced 
since the original schemes were enacted. 
Judicial control. The full position of these boards can only be judged 
by considering also the role of the court, since in effect each regulator 
41 The report of the London Electricity Board for 1962 is here significant. Some bodies like 
the North of Scotland Hydro -Electricity Board have made very considerable use of local 
authorities to overcome this difficulty. 
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has an effect on each other one. The limits of parliamentary control 
may have been affected by the existence of the special mechanisms just 
discussed. Judicial controls are affected by the existence of them and 
of parliamentary controls 42 
Judicial control must clearly exist, but its scope is both affected by, and 
forms, ideas about the nature of these corporations. What is said here 
must be linked with what is said later about the general problems of 
judicial control. The " Charters " of the boards are broadly drawn, and 
hedged with provisos. It is the " duty " of the Hydro -Electric Board to 
provide supplies of electricity to meet demands, so far as is practicable, 
and the board shall, so far as its powers and duties permit, collaborate 
in carrying out any measures for the economic development and social 
improvement in its area. Such a formulation, which is not untypical, 
gives legal power but leaves its scope largely undefined, unless the courts 
are to assume a capacity to judge what is practicable; and the expertise 
of courts lies in law not electrical generation and distribution.43 Obliga- 
tions to balance the books and the like may be regarded as obligations 
which, except in extreme cases, are to be enforced by political means,44 
particularly where, as with the air corporations, the statutory powers 
of the boards are controllable by the minister. In the most recent statute, 
the Transport Act, 1962, this is made clear by those provisions which 
direct that particular sections shall not be construed as imposing any 
form of duty or liability enforceable in any court.45 In addition to 
these generalised powers and duties there are others which are more 
specific, and in relation to these the courts may be more able to intervene. 
All that can here be indicated are what are thought to be the relevant 
general principles. 
At the most general level, as in relation to the duty to supply electricity 
quoted above, it seems doubtful if the courts can intervene even in the 
absence of provisions such as those in the Transport Act. Such matters 
must be controlled by the minister. This is clear when the minister has 
specific statutory powers of supervision,48 hence the default powers of 
the minister under the National Health Service Act, 1946, and the National 
Health Service (Scotland) Act, 1947, (section 56), would preclude the 
courts from passing upon the suitability of the general hospital scheme 
for an area. On the other hand where a particular individual or group 
is particularly affected as a result of a failure to observe some general 
42 Compare Fife C.C. v. Railway Executive, 1951 S.C. 499 and British Oxygen Co. Ltd. v. 
S.W. Scotland Electricity Board, 1955 S.C. 440, 457. 
43 Magistrates of Paisley v. S. of Scotland Electricity Board, 1956 S.C. 502; though contrast 
Adams v. S. of S. for Scotland, 1958 S.C. 279. 
44 The whole complex of litigation by the British Oxygen Company ending in 1956 S.C. 
(H.L.) 112 and 1959 S.C.(H.L.) 17, emphasises this point. It is to be noted that that 
litigation reserved a place for the courts; cf. the Report on Railway Wages (1955) Cmd. 
9372 and 9352. 
43 See ss. 3 (4), 7 (9), 9 (3) and 10 (4). 
46 Watt v. Kesteven C.C. [1955] 1 Q.B. 408; and it is made explicit in the Transport Act, 1947, 
s. 3 (5). See generally on the effect of alternative remedies Griffith and Street, Administra- 
tive Law. 
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principle he may have a remedy in the courts 47 What interest will 
suffice is not clear. In effect the dispute is about the scope of the actio 
popularis, and the existing rules (which in themselves are imprecise) 
were worked out in relation to rather different authorities,48 and may 
not be entirely suitable. In particular the definition of the " proprietary " 
interest which will suffice may require adjustment. Although these 
generalised duties may not in themselves be capable of enforcement 
by an individual they may nevertheless influence a court when it is dealing 
with a more specific problem.4° Thus it cannot be said that courts are 
in no way concerned even with these general duties. Where the duties 
are individualised a remedy may lie,b° but a different problem of alterna- 
tive remedies may arise. The relevant statutes may provide for enforce- 
ment by prosecution,51 and in such cases, in the absence of particular 
damage, this may be the only remedy available.52 
To some extent the phraseology which makes it difficult to enforce 
duties has also the effect of making difficult the application of the ultra 
vires principle. At first sight the principle is applicable, since normally 
a section of each statute prohibits the corporation from disregarding 
any rule of law. Difficulty arises, however, where, as is customary with 
the second group of corporations, a " general powers " clause is added. 
In such cases it has been said that a power to carry on activities incidental 
to the primary purpose is not without limit, even though the activities 
claimed to be incidental would be convenient b3 However, except where 
express prohibitions are incorporated into the statutes,b4 or where it 
can be shown that there is an improper motive it is difficult to see how 
the courts could apply the doctrine in relation to general activities. Control 
must here lie primarily with the minister, as it is made to do expressly 
by the Air Corporations Act, 1949, s. 3 (2). The invalidation of 
acts on grounds of an improper motive (i.e., détournement rather than 
excès de pouvoir) presents its own difficulties. Where the act was clearly 
and exclusively directed by " malice " or by a wrongful purpose no 
doubt it may be overturned.65 Where, however, there is a mixture of 
motives, good and bad, the answer is not clear, but it would seem to 
require a very strong case before the courts would intervene, and in 
47 Adams v. S. of S. for Scotland, 1958 S.C. 279. The element of particularity existed as a 
result of the terms of a former endowment. 
43 D. &J. Nicol v. Dundee Harbour Board, 1915 S.C.(H.L.) 7; Conn v. Magistrates of Renfrew 
(1906) 8 F. 905. 
42 British Oxygen Co. Ltd. v. S.W. Scotland Electricity Board, 1955 S.C. 440 at 462. 
52 British Oxygen Co. Ltd. v. S.W. Scotland Electricity Board, 1956 S.C.(H.L.) 112. 
51 As is done in the Gas and Electricity Acts. 
b2 For instances of such prosecution, see Report of the Northern Gas Board, 1962, § 166. 
The arguments here on the exclusion of other remedies are general. 
53 D. & J. Nicol v. Dundee Harbour Board, 1915 S.C.(H.L.) 7. 
54 e.g., Electricity Act, 1947, s. 2 (3). 
55 Compare Earl Fitzwilliam's Wentworth Estates Co. v. Min. of Town and Country Planning 
[1951] 2 K.B. 284 (affirmed [1952] A.C. 362), and Iveagh v. Minister of Housing [1961] 
3 All E.R. 98. 
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many cases, granted the rules of recovery of documents, it may well 
be impossible to get sufficient proof. 
It is in regard to such matters, which may well be of the greatest 
importance to individuals, that the exercise of judicial control is most 
difficult,56 though it is often also in relation to them that other controls 
may also be relatively ineffective. In the more straightforward matters 
of contractual and delictual liability the courts are free to intervene,b7 
subject to the general rules about the interplay of statutory powers and 
duties and private rights and to a possible adjustment of remedies 68 
The general constitutional position. Generally it may be said that 
these new institutions have not been properly absorbed into our con- 
stitutional system. The intention was to break, on a national scale, 
with traditional methods by using mechanisms which had formerly only 
been used (save for untypical examples) on a local scale. The successful 
accomplishment of that intention required a greater adjustment of the 
traditional machinery of government than has hitherto proved to be 
acceptable. The result has been that while new boards are created, and 
the constitutional theory of the boards has remained unchanged, in 
practice there has been, behind these forms, something of a repetition of 
the nineteenth- century process, that is to say, ministerial influence has 
tended if anything to increase, so that substantial differences from 
organisation on a ministerial form have tended to diminish.69 This 
tendency has probably been more marked in fact than it has been in 
law, though Acts such as the Transport Act, 1962, increase the recognition 
in law of this tendency. Such a situation provokes constitutional problems, 
since true lines of responsibility do not accord with appearances, and 
these problems still require to be resolved. 
Interwoven with this uncertainty is another uncertainty, namely, as 
to the classification in law of these boards. Initially there could be 
substantial dispute about whether or not the boards were Crown servants.80 
While this argument can continue, and can on occasion be important,81 
it is to a large extent excluded in modern statutes by a clear provision 
on this point.ó2 What is of continuing importance is the uncertainty 
about the treatment in law of these bodies. Whereas some may be 
declared to be " public authorities," the extent to which such a declaration 
is significant is not clear. Little difficulty arises in relation to boards 
56 Part of the difficulty may lie in the absence of a specific jurisprudence of public law. 
57 Virtue v. Police Commissioners of Alloa (1873) 1 R. 285, where a former rule, once rejected, 
was reapplied. See, too, Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Gibbs (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 93. 
58 Mitchell, The Contracts of Public Authorities. 
b9 See particularly Special Report of the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries 
(1955 -56) H.C. 120, and for further examples, the report of that Committee on the 
Air Corporations (1958 -59) H.C. 213. 
66 Griffith and Street, op. cit. Chap. VII and the authorities there referred to. 
61 Adams v. S. of S. for Scotland, 1958 S.C. 279 appears to be fundamentally in conflict 
with Nottingham No. 1 Area H.M.C. v. Owen [1958] 1 Q.B. 50. 
62 e.g., s. 2 (8) of the New Towns Act, 1959; Transport Act, 1962, s. 30. 
M.C.L. -13 
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of the first group. A regional hospital board is a public authority, in 
the sense that it is created by an official act and is primarily financed 
from national revenues. It is also a public authority in the sense that 
it is providing a social service in the national interest, and the character 
of a " service " may have its effects on ordinary rules of law,83 and upon 
normal remedies. So far as the second group is concerned they are 
clearly public authorities judged by the criteria of methods of creation 
and to a considerable extent in relation to finance. Even if the fact 
that their deficits are met from national revenues is disregarded, their 
purposes and circumstances prevent capital being raised for them by means 
appropriate to private corporations.84 They are also public authorities in 
that they are intended to serve, to some extent, public purposes as 
distinct from purely economic purposes, and in their actings it is clear that 
such public or national considerations, rather than purely economic 
ones have on occasion been dominant. These characteristics are again 
capable of affecting legal obligations and remedies.B6 Nevertheless, this 
public character is not always apparent, and the effects of its existence 
are not universal, either because logically the liability in particular circum- 
stances is not, or should not be, affected by the public character of one 
of the actors ,86 or because, in relation to the facts in question, the corpora- 
tion may be carrying out a purely business transaction as would a purely 
private body. Just as the public service character may be overemphasised 
so may be the commercial character, and just as uncertainty about the 
nature of these bodies is at present reflected in general constitutional 
controls, so also is it reflected in more detailed rules of law.67 
It is probably a mistake, in this context, to attempt to classify these 
bodies for all purposes; what must be looked to is the particular function, 
or the manner in which the public purposes of the body will be affected.68 
Thus concentration upon the idea of public duties may aid in determining 
the extent to which ordinary rules of law may require variation. This 
concentration and the resultant increased segregation of these duties 
(which resembles, but does not coincide with, the classification into 
" day -to -day " activities and others) is likely to help a rationalisation 
of the broader constitutional controls. This process will be all the 
more difficult since unfortunately the idea of public utility, which marked 
so strongly one group of institutions and, which influenced the conception 
63 See the argument of Lord President Cooper in Hayward v. Edinburgh Royal Infirmary, 
1954 S.C. 453 at 478; cf. Barber v. Manchester Regional Hospital Board [1958] 1 All 
E.R. 322. In contrast to Barber's case the full consequences of the nature of the employ- 
ment are emphasised in Palmer v. Inverness Hospitals Board of Management, 1963 
S.L.T. 124 at 125. 
64 See the Herbert Report on Electricity Supply (1956) Cmd. 9672; and see (1961) Cmnd. 
1337, § 13. 
65 B.T.C. v. Westmorland C.C. [1958] A.C. 126, recognises this in principle. 
66 Edwards v. N.C.B. [1949] 1 K.B. 704. 
67 As for example in the decisions of the Air Licensing Board dealing with conflicting 
applications from private air lines and nationalised corporations. 
6 6 Mitchell, The Contracts of Public Authorities, Chap. V. 
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of these newer boards, has tended to disappear,89 at a time when it would 
have been helpful to expand it. The classification into governmental 
and private bodies (which is all that then remains) is too rough and 
ready to be useful for a modern complex state, and attempts to use it have 
tended, it seems, to produce constitutional anomalies and inadequacies. 
Here the proper treatment of these hybrid bodies has it seems yet to be 
worked out. That process may require a rejection of Dicey's concept of 
a uniform system of law,79 for it is that concept which may underlie 
much of the uncertainty of the present rules of law, which by hindering 
one form of control, through the courts, makes all the more difficult 
the application of other methods of constitutional regulation. 
69 Marshall v. Scottish Milk Marketing Board, 1956 S.C.(H.L.) 37; Western Heritable 
Investment Co. Ltd. v. Glasgow Corporation, 1956 S.C.(H.L.) 64. At one time these 
ideas, and those of a public service, were the formative ideas: Farrier v. Elder and Scott, 
June 21, 1799, F.C.; Whitfield v. Lord Despencer (1778) 2 Cowp. 754. 
70 See ante, p. 41, and post, p. 270. 
CHAPTER 13 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
A FULL discussion of local government would be beyond the range of 
the present volume, and for an exploration of all the intricacies of that 
important branch of law the reader must look elsewhere.1 The present 
purpose is merely to complete a sketch of the major institutions as part 
of the constitutional framework of our society. In that sketch particular 
emphasis will be placed upon the Scottish system.2. Although there 
are broad similarities in the evolution of local government in Scotland 
and England there are nevertheless substantial, but sometimes subtle 
differences between the two systems; hence an equal treatment of both 
might lead to too much detail. 
Historical. As in England, the foundation of local government in 
Scotland is to be found in the burgh.3 In Scotland a distinction must 
be drawn between royal burghs and burghs of barony and of regality, the 
first having superior status and privileges (particularly in monopolistic 
trading rights) and also heavier burdens, in that they bore the burghal 
share of land tax. The burghs became closed corporations, with the 
merchants holding a dominant position within them. Neither in this nor 
in the abuse of burgh property is their history distinctive. This situation 
endured until 1833.4 The organisation of the royal burghs in the Con- 
vention of Royal Burghs 5 had broader constitutional effects. In so far 
as it could act as a burghal Parliament it detracted from the Parliament 
of Scotland and its existence tended to isolate the burghal members 
from others. Apart from these " governmental " bodies it must be 
remembered that the church was carrying out what have become to be 
regarded as local government functions. This factor contributed to the 
1 See Whyte, Local Government in Scotland; Bennett Miller, An Outline of Administrative 
and Local Government Law in Scotland; McLarty, A source book of Administrative Law 
in Scotland; Campbell, The District Councillor. 
2 For England and Wales see Robson, Development of Local Government, and Hart, Intro- 
duction to the Law of Local Government, and Jennings, Principles of Local Government 
Law. 
3 Dickinson, The Sheriff Court Book of Fife; Early Records of the Burgh of Aberdeen, 
and The Court Book of the Barony of Carnwath. More shortly see Pryde, Central and 
Local Government in Scotland since 1707, The Scottish Burgh in Decline and Pryde and 
Mackie, Local Government in Scotland. 
4 As good a picture as any of their working is to be found in John Galt, The Provost, a 
book which is not entirely out of date, and see Dickinson, John Galt, The Provost and 
the Burgh (the John Galt Lecture, 1954). 
5 Pagan, The Convention of Royal Burghs. This body, which was once of considerable 
legislative and administrative importance, declined after the Union, particularly after 
the Reform Act, 1832. It remains of greater importance than the modern associations of 
local authorities since it cuts across classifications based on size or interest and is thus 
capable of producing a national viewpoint, since it now comprises all burghs. 
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delayed evolution of local government organisations outside the burghs, 
which began with the establishment of the Commissioners of Supply 
by the Act of 1667.6 These were initially solely concerned with the 
land tax, but to them were subsequently added local government functions. 
Thus, in Scotland, as in England, the " system " of local government was 
in origin a dual one,7 distinguishing between burghs and counties. The 
fact that in Scotland the " judicial " element (which was apparent in 
England because of the use of quarter sessions) was much less,8 has left 
its mark on the general control of local government. This duality has 
continued to mark the organisation of local government in England to a 
far greater extent than it does in Scotland.° 
In Scotland reform of the burghs started in 1833, both as to franchise 
and function. In that year there was introduced, as a result of the Burghs 
and Police (Scotland) Act, a new important category of burgh- police 
burghs (the word " police " having the significance of the word when 
used in the phrase " the police power " in the U.S.A., and embracing 
watching, lighting and sanitary functions). These police burghs could 
be separate bodies or an historic burgh could adopt the Police Acts, 
in which case there would exist a dual system of administration within 
its boundaries. That duality endured until the Burgh Police (Scotland) 
Act, 1892, and the Town Councils (Scotland) Act, 1900, which produced 
a degree of uniformity. County councils had emerged with the Local 
Government (Scotland) Act, 1889, though not to the entire exclusion 
of other bodies,10 and ultimately a general framework was established 
by the Local Government (Scotland) Act, 1929, which, as amended by 
the Local Government (Scotland) Act of 1947, still provides the framework 
of the administrative structure. In the course of this development there 
had been absorbed into the system various ad hoc boards.?' 
The administrative framework. The authorities for the purposes of 
local government consist of counties, counties of cities, large burghs, and 
small burghs. These bodies are scheduled to the 1947 Act,12 and except 
as to small burghs there is thus imparted a certain rigidity. County 
councils consist of members elected directly for the landward areas, i.e., 
6 A.P.S. VII, 540 (an Act of the Convention of the Estates). 
7 In England the distinction was between the borough system and that of government 
through quarter sessions in the counties. The significant role of the sheriff in Scotland 
has not affected the question of judicial review in the same way. 
The justices of the peace, never as important in Scotland as in England, had some local 
government functions but tended to give ground before the Commissioners of Supply. 
6 The Local Government Act, 1933, was the first universal Act, but it preserved elements 
of the differences, which still have their effect upon boundary problems. 
1° Over 1,300 authorities were concerned with local government in Scotland before the 
Act of 1929. 
11 Most notably the school boards established under the Education (Scotland) Act, 1872, 
which were abolished by the Education (Scotland) Act, 1918, being replaced by ad hoc 
education authorities, which survived until the Local Goverment (Scotland) Act, 1929, 
when counties and the counties of cities became education authorities. 
12 Though it must be noted that by s. 118 the counties of Perth and Kinross, and those 
of Moray and Nairn, are combined for many purposes. 
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those areas not comprised within a burgh, and of members representing 
the burghs who are indirectly elected, being elected by the town councils 
to serve on the county counci1.13 The whole council is renewable every 
third year (but a member of the second group ceases to hold office on 
ceasing to be a town councillor). Each council elects its own covener and 
vice -convener. Within the area of a county council there exist, for the 
landward areas, district councils, established under a scheme made by 
the county. The district council consists of the county councillors for 
the district, together with members specifically elected to it, though con- 
tested elections are rare. To these bodies are given few and minor func- 
tions (which may account for the lack of electoral interest), but the 
county may appoint the district council its agent to discharge other 
functions. 
Town councils, whether for large or small burghs consist of members 
elected either on a ward basis or on a burgh basis. These councils are 
renewable by thirds, one -third of the members retiring each year.14 
The council elects its provost, honorary treasurer and bailies. The 
provost and treasurer hold office for three years from their election, 
the baffles until they are due to retire as councillors.16 Large and small 
burghs are not, in structure, distinct one from the other. The distinction 
is in function. Whereas large burghs exercise a wide variety of functions, 
the most important function left with small burghs is probably housing. 
Similarly the counties of cities are not, in general, distinctive in compo- 
sition,16 in function they are all- purpose authorities combining the functions 
of counties and burghs. Apart from these primary authorities, local 
authorities may establish joint committees or boards for specific purposes, 
or the Secretary of State may under section 120 of the 1947 Act compel 
the combination of' particular authorities for specific purposes. A 
county council may establish special districts for administration in a 
particular area. Such special districts are not autonomous authorities as 
are district councils. 
Alteration of areas. Very limited powers exist to alter county bound- 
aries. Burgh boundaries may, subject to an appeal to the Court of 
Session, be altered by the sheriff (section 131 of the 1947 Act). There is 
no machinery (save an Act of Parliament, and for this purpose the 
Scottish private legislation procedure is inappropriate) which can create 
a new large burgh, but the sheriff may, after inquiry, create a new small 
burgh out of any populous place, with a population of at least 2,000 on 
the application of twelve or more persons. A small burgh may enter 
13 These members have limited voting rights; s. 72 of the 1947 Act. 
14 The strict rotation of members may be upset by various factors; see s. 17 of the 1947 
Act. 
16 In contrast to the position of aldermen in England the election of a councillor as bailie 
does not cause a vacancy as councillor. Provost, treasurer and bailies are all elected 
from among the councillors, whereas a mayor or alderman need not be. 
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into an agreement with the county for its dissolution. Thus, while at 
the top of the scale of local authorities there is considerable rigidity in 
the machinery, at the bottom there is considerable potential flexibility. 
Elections. The franchise for local elections, in addition to the require- 
ment of British nationality and the absence of disqualifications similar 
to those operative in Parliamentary elections, depends upon residence 
or the occupation of any rateable heritage of the yearly value of not 
less than £10. Peers are of course entitled to vote in such elections. 
Members of a local authority in addition to being British subjects of full 
age, must be either registered as local government electors, or have 
resided in the area of the authority for the twelve months preceding 
nomination.17 Disqualification, in addition to those also operative 
for parliamentary elections, arises from holding either by himself or 
through a partner any place of profit in the gift of the authority or of any 
relevant joint board. In general, elections are regulated in a like manner 
to Parliamentary elections, but no deposit is required. An obligation to 
appoint an agent was imposed by section 55 of the Representation of 
the People Act, 1949, and he may now be paid. The regulations limiting 
expenses are applicable with necessary modifications; thus a much lower 
limit is fixed for total permissible expenses. Clearly the regulations 
relating to corrupt and illegal practices apply.18 
Functions. Normally functions are allocated to local authorities 
according to type of authority. Thus, counties are exclusively responsible 
for education within their areas, and they have responsibility for health, 
housing and highways. These last functions are, however, shared with 
other authorities on differing bases. While the county is responsible 
under the Public Health (Scotland) Acts for all public health services 
in the landward areas, in small burghs lesser functions are entrusted to the 
burgh. Under the National Health Service (Scotland) Act, 1947, local 
health authorities are the county councils and the town councils of 
large burghs. So far as roads are concerned the county is again similarly 
responsible for all roads in the landward areas (with the exception of 
trunk roads which are the responsibility of the central government -i.e., 
the Secretary of State for Scotland) and for classified roads in small 
burghs, the town councils of which are responsible for public streets. 
For planning the county has (with minor exceptions) authority for the 
whole area, with the exception of large burghs (and the small burghs of 
St. Andrews and Thurso). Housing is the responsibility of the burghs, 
17 For qualification of electors see Representation of the People Act, 1949, s. 21; as to 
councillors see the Act of 1947, Part II. 
18 The general rules for the conduct of elections are now contained in the Representation 
of the People Act, 1949, Third Schedule (Scotland) and Second Schedule (England). 
The law relating to corrupt and illegal practices was amended and consolidated by the 
1949 Act, Parts II and III. For a commentary on this and a comparison with the older 
Law see Schofield, Local Government Elections (4th ed.). 
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the county being concerned only with the landward areas. Thus large 
burghs are entrusted with classified roads within their boundaries, public 
health functions and those under the National Health Service, and 
planning functions in addition to the functions which can be exercised 
by a small burgh. This distribution is theoretically accounted for by 
the size and probable wealth of authorities. Nevertheless, variations in 
size of population and wealth of authorities of any one group create 
dificulties.19 To some extent, as with planning, the major consideration 
may be appropriateness of area but again like variations cause similar 
difficulties. The counties of cities, being all- purpose authorities, combine 
within their areas the functions of large burghs and of counties. This 
modern statutory classification of authorities appears to be critical in 
relation to powers. While there are suggestions that the royal burghs 
may have additional powers by virtue of that character it is doubtful how 
extensive those are,20 and, with the exception of the possible enlargement 
of powers by local legislation (a process which has been extensive in 
the counties of cities), the powers of local authorities are those given by 
general legislation and are determined by this grouping. 
Two services should be mentioned specifically. Under the Fire Services 
Act, 1947, the pattern of organisation of the service in Scotland departed 
from that then established in England. Under that Act eleven combined 
areas were established for running the service, so that it was removed 
from the immediate control of any one type of local authority. In 
relation to police there has again been a process of concentration. Police 
authorities are, subject to amalgamation, counties and the four counties 
of cities, and the large burghs scheduled to the Police (Scotland) Act, 
1956.21 In relation to this service the pressures are towards larger areas. 
The functions discussed are those which can be called administrative. 
There are others, which are regulatory or legislative. Under the Building 
(Scotland) Act, 1959, for example, a dean of guild court or, outside 
burghs, a building authority composed of members of the local authority 
can regulate buildings. Among this group of functions may also be 
put those which can be regarded as policing in a civil sense. The inspection 
of such things as day nurseries or nursing homes may be as important 
as older inspecting functions such as those related to weights and measures. 
19 Among the counties, Sutherland has a population of 12,509, an area of 1,297,914 acres 
and a rateable value of £129,046. Lanark has a population of 572,102, an area of 535,792 
acres and a rateable value of £9,834,733. Among small burghs there are New Galloway, 
population 323, rateable value, £5,012, and Grangemouth, population 18,924 and rateable 
value £940,237. The White Paper -The Modernisation of Local Government in Scotland 
(Cmnd. 2067)- proposes adjustments in structure and function to overcome those 
difficulties. 
29 See Graham v. Glasgow Corporation, 1936 S.C. 108; and compare Att. -Gen. v. Leicester 
Corporation [19431 Ch. 86. The preservation of the rights and privileges of the royal 
burghs by the Act of Union is not to be construed as a permanent provision, many 
of these rights could not stand against a changing society. 
21 In fact by 1962 amalgamations had reduced the forces to 19 county forces, and 14 
forces in the burghs and counties of cities. The Royal Commission on the Police 
envisaged an extension of this process (see the Report (1962) Cmnd. 1728). 
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FUNCTIONS 201 
To get all these manifold functions in perspective it may be noted that 
in the City of Edinburgh, as an example, expenditure on education and 
highways amounts to half the total expenditure, and those items with 
expenditure of police and housing amount to over two -thirds of the 
total. Expenditure on education alone comes to close on half the total 
expenditure. There is further, a general power conferred by the Local 
Government (Scotland) Act, 1947, on counties and burghs to make 
by -laws for good rule and government, and in addition many other 
statutes have conferred legislative powers in relation to specific matters 
upon local authorities.22 The power is exercised subject to a confirming 
authority, normally the Secretary of State or the sheriff. 
This power of making by -laws is limited, but nevertheless deserves 
further attention, since the cases show the attitude of courts to local 
authorities. It should be noticed that the mere fact of confirmation 
does not prevent any subsequent challenge to validity in law, since the 
confirming authority is as much concerned with the expediency of the 
by -law in all the circumstances as it is with questions of law in the sense 
of vires.23 By -laws must be intra vires; those words mean not merely 
that the by -law must be within the terms of the authorising statute, but 
also that the power is exercised for the proper purposes, and not for 
collateral ones.24 Moreover, it is said that the by -law must not be in 
conflict with the general law. That phrasing is inelegant, since if the 
by -law is to do anything it must of necessity alter the pre -existing law. 
What appears to be intended is that the by -law must not make lawful 
anything declared unlawful by general law, and must not take away any 
right specifically given.25 It is also said that by -laws must not be un- 
reasonable or uncertain. Unreasonableness here goes beyond the question 
of expediency, it must in effect amount to oppression,28 and the courts 
22 A county council has by s. 300 of the Act of 1947 powers in relation to vagrancy and 
nuisances. That Act lays down a general procedural code for by -laws. Royal burghs 
have probably some non -statutory powers of making by -laws, but these have ceased 
to be significant. The Building (Scotland) Act, 1959, authorises the Secretary of State 
to replace by -laws by regulations. 
23 David Lawson Ltd. v. Torrance, 1929 J.C. 119; Glasgow Corporation v. Glasgow Churches 
Council, 1944 S.C. 97, a good authority on the issue of confirmation; and see Burgh of 
Dunblane Petitioners, 1947 S.L.T.(Sh.Ct.) 27. It was at one stage suggested that con- 
firmation by the Secretary of State would exclude subsequent judicial review, Crichton 
v. Forfar Road Trustees (1886) 13 R.(J.) 99. It is now clear that this is not so, and the 
case is typical of an era of uncertainty as to how courts should deal with the emerging 
phenomena of a modern state. The doubts expressed in Stewart v. Todrick, 1908 S.C.(J.) 8 
are indicative of the same uncertainty. For English law see Hart, op. cit. Uncertainty 
about the effect of judicial review can persist, Rossi v. Magistrates of Edinburgh (1903) 
5 F. 480 at 584 was said to be " a simple case." The House of Lords in (1904) 7 F.(H.L.) 
87 reversed the decision in the Outer House and Second Division. 
24 Somerville v. Lord Advocate, 1933 S.L.T. 48; Brock v. Forth Pilotage, 1947 S.N. 41. While 
chartered corporations have certain non -statutory powers of making by -laws (University 
of Glasgow v. Faculty of Physicians and Surgeons (1837) 15 S. 736) it is doubtful if in 
the field of local government, great reliance could be placed upon these; cf. Graham 
v. Glasgow Corporation, 1936 S.C. 108. 
25 Rae v. Hamilton (1904) 6 F.(J.) 42 and Aldred v. Miller, 1925 J.C. 21 at 27. In general 
the rules as to validity are uniform throughout the kingdom, compare the reliance on 
Kruse v. Johnston [1898] 2 Q.B. 91 in these cases. 
26 Glasgow Corporation v. Glasgow Churches Council, supra, note 23. 
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will be extremely reluctant to interfere with the exercise of a discretion of 
this type by an elected body.27 It is difficult clearly to distinguish cases 
of uncertainty from those of unreasonableness. Uncertainty may be 
an aspect of unreasonableness, where, for example, the by -law is not 
precise in its terms but merely confers too wide a discretion upon a 
local authority.28 It may, however, be an independent head of validity 
since, a breach of a by -law being punishable as a crime, any one is entitled 
to reasonable notice of an offence.29 It is a commonplace in England 
to obtain an injunction against a person who persistently breaks a by- law.30 
This process has met with criticism on the grounds that it can involve 
an increased penalty (as a result of proceedings for contempt of court) 
beyond that contemplated by legislation. It is asserted that the remedy 
of interdict in like circumstances is not available in Scotland. It seems 
probable, however, that the assertion goes beyond the present state 
of the authorities.31 
One difficulty, in Scotland, in describing the powers of local authorities 
lies in the fact that local legislation is there much more significant than 
is usually the case in England. This is especially true in the case of 
the counties of cities, and reference to the Dundee Corporation (Con- 
solidated Powers) Order Confirmation Act, 1957, will make apparent 
the scope of these special powers. They substantially extend or otherwise 
vary the powers available under the general law even in such matters 
as powers of arrest and search or rights of public meeting. In any particu- 
lar case reference must therefore be made to local legislation, and the 
significance of the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1936, 
must be judged against this background. 
Method of operation. It will be observed that functions are entrusted 
to county councils, town councils, etc. In theory of law it is, in general, 
the council which administers or decides. In practice councils work 
through a committee system, which may, with smaller authorities, not 
be significant in one sense, since all, or virtually all, the council may make 
up a committee. Committees may have matters referred to them, or 
may have delegated powers (except the power to borrow or levy a rate), 
27 Robt. Baird Ltd. v. Glasgow Corporation, 1935 S.C.(H.L.) 21. It is probable that the 
reluctance is increased where the order has been made or confirmed by a Minister as 
a result of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility: cf. Crichton v. Forfar Road Trustees, 
supra, note 23. It is also probable that it is now more difficult to establish unreasonableness 
than was formerly the case. 
28 McGregor v. Disselduff, 1907 S.C.(J.) 21. 
29 Allan v. Howman, 1918 J.C. 50; but see Marshall v. Clarke, 1957 J.C. 68 as to what 
is uncertainty of standard. 
39 Att.-Gen. v. Harris [1961] 1 W.L.R. 1200; [1961] 1 Q.B. 74 and see 77 L.Q.R. 25, and 
[1960] Public Law 415. 
31 Mags. of Buckhaven etc. v. Wemyss Coal Co., 1932 S.C. 201. It seems that the Lord 
President's judgment relies too heavily on Tay District Fishery Board v. Robertson (1887) 
15 R. 40, and upon assumptions about the position of the Attorney -General in England 
which are not entirely borne out by cases such as Att. -Gen. v. Harris (supra). In any 
event the case turned primarily on a question of title to sue. It is to be noted that Lord 
Sands very clearly reserved his opinion on the point of the availability of an interdict. 
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METHOD OF OPERATION 203 
the education committee in particular having a high degree of autonomy. 
That committee is also distinguished by the fact that since it is established 
under distinct legislation it often includes co -opted members, in contrast 
to the general rule for committees under section 116 of the 1947 Act, 
which provides that they shall consist of members of the authority only. 
Some committees, such as the finance committee are mandatory. The 
distinction between the council sitting as such, and sitting as a committee 
of the whole was at one stage of importance since the Press and public 
had no right to be present at a meeting in committee, but under the 
Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act, 1960, this rule has been 
altered 32 There is then a marked difference from the working of the 
central government. There can be no Cabinet system nor ministerial 
responsibility, though in practice the chairmen of committees are recog- 
nised as having distinct responsibilities (above all in the case of the 
treasurer), and the party system exists in a more rudimentary form.33 
These differences in method are apparent in much of the law. So far 
as membership is concerned there is an insistence on locality for candida- 
ture, and since the operation of the system involves a heavy expenditure 
of time, members are entitled to certain allowances to compensate for 
loss.34 Above all, the conduct of members is much more strictly regulated 
by law in relation to disabilities arising from financial interests,36 and 
to the personal responsibility of members for wrongful expenditure through 
the mechanism of surcharge, which will be subsequently discussed. Sim- 
ilarly there is a tight regulation of the officers of local authorities. There 
is regulation of the officers who must be appointed,36 and regulation of 
the qualifications which must be held by officers, as well as of questions 
of administrative morality.37 It has, moreover, long been recognised that 
the relationship of a local authority to its officers is not the usual 
master and servant relationship,38 and in certain circumstances an officer 
has a right or obligation of independent action since he is regarded as also 
being a servant of the public.39 Further, as will appear, there is often a 
tight control exercised by the central government in relation to officers. 
32 Subject to reservations, where confidentiality in administration is required, this Act confers 
on the Press and public a right to be present at meetings of local authorities, local water 
authorities and education committees, but not at committee meetings, unless the com- 
mittee consists of the authority. The Act can be circumvented if the committee consists of 
all but one of the members of the authority. 
33 Though in the larger authorities nevertheless in a significant form, party meetings outside 
the council chamber may determine conduct within it, and a system of whips exists. 
34 Public Authorities (Allowances) Act, 1961, and the legislation there referred to. 
36 Local Government (Scotland) Act, 1947, ss. 73, 101 and 126; Local Government Act, 
1948, s. 131, Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1953, s. 16, Local 
Government Act, 1933, s. 76 (as amended). Standing Orders or local legislation may 
increase the strictness of these provisions, as is the case in Edinburgh. 
36 See, e.g., Part IV of the 1947 Act. By s. 85 the town clerk must, save with the consent 
of the Secretary of State, be distinct from the town chamberlain. Offices such as those 
of medical officer of health, or sanitary inspector are also closely regulated. 
37 ss. 101 and 102 of the 1947 Act. 
38 Mags. of Montrose v. Strachan (1710) Mor. 13118; Simpson v. Todd (1824) 3 S. 150; 
Morrison v. Abernethy School Board (1876) 3 R. 945 and s. 100 of the 1947 Act. 
39 Consider the implications of s. 201 (1), proviso (b), of the 1947 Act. 
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Finance. Apart from the fund known as the common good in the 
burghs, which is the residue of the ancient burgh properties, local autho- 
rities rely on two sources of revenue, rates, and grants from the central 
government. The income derived from the common good has become 
insignificant in relation to general local government expenditure and it 
is used to supplement the main sources of revenue in minor ways 40 
Rates are a local tax upon the occupiers of heritable property,41 based 
upon a notional annual value, which is determined upon a rather different 
basis for dwelling houses and non -industrial hereditaments and for 
other properties.42 This annual value is determined in a variety of 
ways, too complex to be here discussed.43 The effect of valuation 
is complicated by the process of derating. Agricultural lands are entirely 
derated, industrial and freight transport lands and heritages are, under 
the Local Government and Miscellaneous Financial Provisions (Scotland) 
Act, 1958, derated up to 50 per cent., but this benefit will go as from 
1966 -67 under the Local Government (Financial Provisions) (Scotland) 
Act, 1962. There are also other relatively minor exemptions, such as 
churches and lands held for charitable purposes.14 Valuations are 
made by the assessor of a county or of one of the counties of cities, 
in contrast to the position in England where valuation is made by an 
officer chosen by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue. In practice 
the assessor has a considerable degree of independence. It is his responsi- 
bility to draw up the valuation roll, and, apart from an administrative 
appeal to him, appeal lies to the valuation appeal committee for the 
area, which committee is appointed by the sheriff. Thence appeal lies 
to the Lands Valuation Appeal Court, consisting of three judges of the 
Court of Session, from which there is no appea1.45 The raising of money 
by the actual levy of a rate is the function of rating authorities which 
are county councils for the landward areas, and town councils for burghs. 
Other authorities obtain their necessary funds by requisitioning (pre - 
cepting in England) on the rating authority. The latter must thus levy 
40 Graham v. Glasgow Corporation, 1936 S.C. 108. Expenditure is regulated in that it must 
be for purposes consistent with the public good, and for the general benefit, Kemp v. 
Glasgow Corporation, 1920 S.C.(H.L.) 73, and see s. 183 of the 1947 Act. Formerly the 
common good was a fund often much abused, and sometimes dissipated, see Royal 
Commission on Municipal Corporations (Scotland), 1835. 
41 Until the Valuation and Rating (Scotland) Act, 1956, they were also levied upon owners. 
See the Sorn Committee Report (1954) Cmd. 9244. 
42 Valuation and Rating (Scotland) Act, 1956, s. 6. The law in Scotland was thus brought 
much closer to that of England. 
43 For details see Armour's Valuation (3rd ed.). 
44 The main exemptions had their origin in economic measures to stimulate or subsidise 
particular areas of activity. Railway and electricity hereditaments are exempt, but 
make contributions to local authorities on the basis of their own legislation. For the 
exemption of charities see s. 4 of the 1962 Act. The equivalent section in the English 
Rating and Valuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, has been a fruitful source of 
litigation; See Bean and Lockwood, Rating and Valuation Practice. 
45 In England appeals run through local appeal courts to the Lands Tribunal from which, 
through the machinery of a case stated, the matter may reach the House of Lords. The 
effect of House of Lords decisions in Scotland was discussed in Assessor for Aberdeen 
v. Collie, 1932 S.C. 304. 
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a rate sufficient to meet its own requirements as well as those of appro- 
priate requisitioning authorities. This system produces a consolidated 
rate demand, but has the disadvantage of dividing the odium of collecting 
from the pleasure of spending. It is evident that this system of annual 
finance requires to be supplemented by long -term borrowing for capital 
purposes, as well as short -term borrowing for current needs. Such 
borrowing is authorised, subject in most cases, to ministerial control, 
by section 258 of the 1947 Act, as well as by other particular statutes40 
Local authority grants. This system of dependence on one local 
tax is a rigid one, and the fact of this dependence necessarily gives the 
central government a major place in the system of local government. 
The deficiencies of the system, even if there were not other causes, would 
lead to the intervention by, or participation of, the central government. 
It is evident that there is no necessary equation of the needs of a district 
and its ability to raise money through rates. Very often the greater the 
needs the less that ability. This and other factors make government 
grants essentia1,47 together with some redistribution of rating wealth. 
Specific grants had for long been made, but from 1929 block grants 
(which were made to the authority at large, and covered a range of 
services) began to be introduced. Today central government grants now 
fall into two main categories. First, there is the Exchequer equalisation 
grant which, in effect, writes the government in as a ratepayer where 
the actual adjusted rateable value of an area falls below the standard 
rateable value 48 These grants are however largely concerned with 
inequalities of wealth. In addition the Local Government and Mis- 
cellaneous Financial Provisions (Scotland) Act, 1958, and the English 
Local Government Act, 1958, introduced new general grants to replace 
a variety of ad hoc percentage grants formerly payable. Education 
(but not the police, which continues to receive a specific grant), then 
first came under this general grant system. Both grant systems contain 
elements of control by the Secretary of State, enabling him to reduce 
grants where services are not of a reasonable level, and further the cal- 
culations of relevant expenditure which enter in to the determination 
46 See generally Doodson and others, Local Authority Borrowing (the Institute of Municipal 
Treasurers). Governmental control is in gross (with the annual White Paper on Capital 
Investment) and in detail, when a particular request for loan sanction is made. 
47 These grants are not new. In 1858 grants were made available for police purposes in 
order to stimulate local activity. In other forms this stimulus from the centre is as old 
as the burgh itself. 
48 See particularly on these grants the Local Government (Financial Provisions) (Scotland) 
Act, 1954, the Valuation and Rating (Scotland) Act, 1956, and the Local Government 
and Miscellaneous Financial Provisions (Scotland) Act, 1958. Amendment to the method 
of apportioning grants was made in the Local Government (Financial Provisions) 
(Scotland) Act, 1962. The Local Government (Financial Provisions) (Scotland) Act, 1963, 
substitutes the basis of the product of a penny rate and the "standard penny rate product" 
as the basis of calculating grants. For the English system see Hart, op. cit. Terminology 
is confusing. The grants which were called exchequer equalisation grants became rate 
deficiency grants in England under the Local Government Act, 1958, but retained their 
name in Scotland. 
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of the grants also contain an element of approval of expenditure. This 
element is enhanced by the Local Government (Financial Provisions) 
(Scotland) Act, 1963 (particularly section 3 (1) ). 
Local government audits. It is not merely in the financing of local 
government that the central government plays a large part. The Secretary 
of State has also a role in accountability (apart from the general super- 
visory controls vested in him which will be discussed later). In this 
there is nothing new. There was theoretically some royal control over 
the funds of royal burghs. An Act of 1693 of the Parliament of Scotland 
attempted more, and an Act of 1822 subjected burgh accounts to the 
scrutiny of the Exchequer. The system is now regulated by Part X 
of the 1947 Act. It requires the appointment of auditors by the Secretary 
of State, the deposit of an abstract of the accounts of the authority, 
and the publication of a notice indicating the right of a ratepayer to 
object to the accounts and indicating where the auditor will hear such 
objections. Where the auditor considers that any payment is contrary 
to law, or that a loss or deficiency has been incurred owing to the negligence 
or misconduct of any persons, he reports to the Secretary of State. The 
Secretary of State, after intimation to the persons affected, and after 
holding a local inquiry (if requested), may, as he thinks fit, surcharge 
the amounts upon those responsible. The Secretary of State may however 
refrain from making a surcharge if satisfied that those persons acted 
reasonably, or in the belief that their action was authorised by law, 
or if he thinks relief fair and reasonable. His decision, unless he has 
clearly gone outside the law, is final" This procedure gives to ratepayers 
a possibility of intimate control or questioning, and to the Secretary of 
State a considerable opportunity for surveillance. The system is in 
important ways in contrast with that operating in England under the 
Local Government Act, 1933. Under that Act the district auditors (the 
most general system of audit) are appointed by the Minister of Housing 
and Local Government, and are on the staff of his department. They 
have themselves the power of surcharge, with the minister acting as a 
court of appeal. Alternatively appeal may be, subject to conditions, to 
the courts. Both the appeal bodies may themselves grant relief. The 
Scottish system concentrates power in the Secretary of State.49 Both 
systems theoretically enable a control to be exercised over the way in which 
local authorities exercise their discretion, but perhaps because the Scottish 
auditors do not form a distinct and expert corps, as do the English 
ones (who are, as has been mentioned, upon the staff of the ministry 
though enjoying a degree of independence), this aspect has never been 
so prominent in Scotland as in England.5° Both systems it must be 
4s County Auditor of Lanark v. Lambie (1905) 7 F. 1049. Though he may earlier be required 
to state a case for the opinion of the court. 
5° Though prior ministerial approval of expenditure does not, by the 1947 Act, exclude 
surcharge as it does in England this would no doubt be an element in the determination 
of reasonableness by the Secretary of State. 
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noted are capable of producing an individual liability of either members 
or officials of local authorities, which can be important.5' 
General relationship with the central government. Historically local 
authorities are autonomous bodies. In current practice this theory 
does not correspond with reality. For this there are many reasons. 
The former corruption in the burghs has left its mark, not merely in the 
provisions for audit. Modern tendencies towards centralisation, and 
the tendency to regard essential services as national obligations have 
contributed to the same end. Equally important is the fact that the 
system is founded upon authorities which owe much to older history, 
whereas the needs of modern local government spring from the more 
recent industrialisation of the country. Thus areas are not necessarily 
functional and in the case of the all- purpose or most -purpose authorities 
their areas are often inappropriate for many of their functions.62 Whilst 
the classification of authorities for workaday purposes has, of necessity, 
had to break with historical classifications (thus a royal burgh may be a 
county of a city, a large or a small burgh), the same process has not 
been operative throughout local government.b1 This inappropriateness 
of area combined with limitation of financial resources have caused 
reliance upon central government support. It must however be em- 
phasised that this strong element of central control is only the accentuation 
of a factor which has always existed in the modern local government 
system. The Board of Supervision was created to exercise central control 
in poor law matters, and from that Board (through the addition to it of 
public health functions and its change into the Local Government Board) 
has come the modern central department concerned with local govern- 
ment matters. A similar history exists in England; the Poor Law Com- 
missioners exercising central control and eventually becoming a depart- 
ment of state, now the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. 
The mechanisms of central control are varied. Where grants are 
payable, they are accompanied by default powers.ó3 In relation to 
51 No case akin to Roberts v. Hopwood [1925] A.C. 578 has arisen in Scotland, and the 
report in 1961 on rents of houses in Dunbartonshire, which emerged as a result of a 
separate inquiry, would in England in all probability have emerged through the action 
of the district auditor and surcharge by him. See also Taylor v. Munro [1960] 1 All 
E.R. 455. Compare with Roberts v. Hopwood, Re Walker's Decision [1944] K.B. 644 and 
see [1962] Public Law 52. For the conditions of relief see Local Government Act, 1933, 
s. 230 and Annison v. St. Pancras Auditor [1961] 3 W.L.R. 650. 
52 This problem has become much more acute in England, and standing machinery has 
existed for some years to review areas which in its present form consists of the Local 
Government Commissioners for England and for Wales, established under the Local 
Government Act, 1958, and the obligation upon counties to review the areas of county 
districts. The proposed reorganisation of local government in London by the London 
Government Act, 1963, is prompted by the same causes which there have an accentuated 
effect. The Housing and Town Development (Scotland) Act, 1957, is one sign of this 
problem. 
63 i.e., powers of the central government to act in default of action by local authorities. 
These powers are a last resort and are rarely used. In relation to housing they are con- 
siderably increased by the Local Government (Financial Provisions) (Scotland) Act, 
1963, s. 3. 
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most essential social services, such as education or health, the functions 
of the authority are to be carried out in accordance with an adminis- 
trative scheme which requires the approval of the Secretary of State. 
Specialised officials, such as the medical officer of health or sanitary 
inspector must have qualifications prescribed by general legislation 
or by the Secretary of State, who can also control the duties entrusted 
to them, and whose sanction is required for their dismissal. In other 
fields such as education, recruitment of staffs and methods of operation 
may be tightly regulated by the Secretary of State.54 In many services a 
system of inspection, which may be linked with grants, provides con- 
tinuing control, and section 356 of the 1947 Act provides general machinery 
for complaint to the minister and inquiry by him as to any default of 
a local authority in carrying out its function. Even outside such extreme 
provisions the Secretary of State is often, as in planning matters, the 
responsible authority to hear appeals from decisions of local authorities, 
so that those authorities in taking decisions are likely to make them 
accord with his known policies. The power or influence of the Secretary 
of State is increased by two considerations. First there may exist, even 
where qualifications may be laid down, a discretionary area in which 
some other policy of the Scottish Office may operate,55 which will allow 
further scope for control. Second, it is clear that local and central 
government cannot operate in a spirit of rivalry, and, granted the area 
where co- operation is compulsory, it is probable that the area of voluntary 
collaboration with, or of influence by, the central government is more 
extensive than was formerly the case. It is also probably true that 
experimentation (which is an aspect of autonomy of local authorities) 
is now less acceptable in certain fields than it was formerly.b6 It is also 
clear that the central government exercises a supervisory jurisdiction not 
merely as to policy, but as to questions of law also. As has been seen 
this is more evident in the auditing procedure in England than in Scotland. 
Default powers straddle issues of policy and of law, and provisions such 
as section 30 of the Local Government Superannuation (Scotland) 
Act, 1937, or section 16 of the Housing and Town Development (Scotland) 
Act, 1957, give to the minister powers of determining issues of law. 
There is thus a substantial administrative tutelage, though much of the 
law remains based upon the theory of autonomy. Here as elsewhere, a 
maladjustment between law and reality is unhealthy for society. 
54 Thus, although education now falls within the general grant, conditions of employment 
of teachers, or standards of school construction are thus regulated, and an extensive system 
of inspection exists. In effect control through a specific grant was superfluous and in 
giving it up the Secretary of State lost little if anything. 
55 Mags. of Kilmarnock v. S. of S. for Scotland, 1961 S.C. 350. 
56 Prescott v. Birmingham Corporation [1955] Ch. 210 at 225, which had its repercussions 
in Scotland. Public Service Vehicles (Travel Concessions) Act, 1955, as amended by 
the Local Government Act, 1958, and the Local Government and Miscellaneous Pro- 
visions (Scotland) Act, 1958. There has probably been a contraction in what is regarded 
as the proper scope of private legislation. 
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Police. One service, police, must be mentioned specifically, since 
constitutionally it has anomalous features. Regulations made by the 
Secretary of State, especially the grant regulations and the definition of 
the efficiency therein, give to the central government operating through 
H.M. Inspector of Constabulary the possibility of close control in many 
respects, though not in the actual day to day operation of the force. 
At the same time, the control exercised by local authorities (where they 
are police authorities) is limited. In law the police authority is little 
more than a paymaster.57 Police are then neither the servants of local 
authorities nor of the Crown 58 In some respects the police must observe 
directions of the Lord Advocate, but it must be noted that the existence 
of the system of public prosecution in Scotland materially affects their 
position. They are an investigatory body as far as crime is concerned 
and not a prosecuting one. It is possible to regard the relatively autono- 
mous position of the police and the dispersal of control over them as a 
sound constitutional safeguard. Others may regard this situation as 
producing a constitutional weakness be The question is one of balance. 
Too strong and too centralised police forces can be a danger, as can too 
weak forces, or forces over which too much political control can be 
exercised. 
The general character of local authorities and their servants. While 
it is true that each local authority is, in law, the employer of its own 
officials, it is not unreasonable to speak, in fact, of a local government 
service. To a great extent fundamental matters are dealt with on a 
national basis. Superannuation (under the English and Scottish Acts 
of 1937) is an obvious example, and brings many consequences in its 
train. Of equal importance is the fact that national schemes governing 
conditions of service were agreed in 1946 for England and Wales and in 
1947 for Scotland.88 Thus the area of discretion left to any individual 
authority is substantially diminished. The effect of these schemes is 
also to reinforce, in the field of internal administrative law general 
principles which have long been established marking off at least some 
local government service from the ordinary rules of master /servant 
relationship.8' Apart from these general conditions of appointment 
b7 See Mitchell, " The Constitutional Position of the Police in Scotland," 1962 J.R. 1. 
68 Girdwood v. Midlothian Standing Joint Committee (1894) 22 R. 11; Muir v. Mags. of 
Hamilton, 1910, 1 S.L.T. 164. The background to Fisher v. Oldham Corporation [1930] 
2 K.B. 364 does not really exist in Scotland. See too Report of Royal Commission 
on the Police (1962) Cmnd. 1728, Chap. IV. 
sa Compare the vigorous dissent to the Report of the Royal Commission by Prof. Goodhart 
with the views expressed in the article referred to in note 57, above. 
so These two " Charters " were the culmination of a process started by the Hadow Report, 
1934 (and see Royal Commission on Local Government (1936) Cmd. 3436). They are 
not identical in terms, though they are in general spirit. See Robson, Development 
of Local Government and Warren, The Local Government Service. 
61 Simpson v. Todd (1824) 3 S. 150; Farish v. Mags. of Annan (1836) 15 S. 107; Mags. of 
Rothesay v. Carle (1903) 5 F. 383; Lord Advocate v. Ayr District Board of Control, 1927 
S.L.T. 337. The fact that an officer holds " during pleasure " does not, however, deprive 
him of a right to reasonable notice, Board of Supervision v. Old Monkland Board (1880) 
M.C.L.-14 
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the conduct of officers is specifically regulated in sections 97 to 103 
of the 1947 Act. Section 103, it is to be noted, confers a personal im- 
munity upon officers who in the course of their functions act reasonably 
and in an honest belief that their actions were justified in law, even 
though the latter should prove not to be the case. 
Just as the public character of their functions marks the position of 
local government officers, so also this character marks the treatment 
in law of the authorities themselves, it imposes standards of conduct 
upon them in regard to their actions and imposes limitation upon their 
freedom of action,82 and for some purposes the distinction between 
their activities for public purposes and their other activities is impor- 
tant,83 though the distinction is not uniformly made.64 
Judicial control. It is evident that there exists a substantial judicial 
control over local authorities and of this the control over by -laws which 
has been discussed is a fair example. This is exercised to restrain autho- 
rities within the limits of their lawful powers, but it is also exercised to 
control the propriety of their actions,eb and in this respect it seems that 
in Scotland the courts will be less concerned than they are in England 
with the question of whether the actions can be classed as quasi-judicial 
or not, and to that extent the powers of the courts are, perhaps, more 
general.óe The difference may be attributable to two things. First to 
the " formlessness " or generality of the remedy of reduction, which 
contrasts with the formalism and particularity of remedy through the 
prerogative writs, and their successors the prerogative orders. Second 
to the differences in history. Courts played a much smaller part in the 
working of local government in Scotland than did quarter sessions in 
England. Similarly the Court of Session had a more general jurisdiction 
than did the court of Queen's Bench whose control was linked to its 
jurisdiction to control inferior courts. There is thus, perhaps, a greater 
readiness or ability, if required, to use particular powers to prevent 
7 R. 469, and s. 100 of the 1947 Act. Cf. Local Government Act, 1933, s. 121, reversing 
Brown Y. .Dagenham U.D.C. [1929] 1 K.B. 737. Similarly it is thought that the principles 
involved in cases such as Re Magrath [1934] 2 K.B. 415 would be applicable. 
62 Mags. of Kirkcaldy v. Marks & Spencer Ltd., 1937 S.L.T. 574; Paterson v. Mags. of St. 
Andrews (1881) 8 R.(H.L.) 117 and see Ersk. II, 1, 7. The fundamental issues here 
resemble, and are perhaps identical with those which underlie The Amphitrite Case [1921] 
3 K.B. 500; see Mitchell, The Contracts of Public Authorities. 
83 Glasgow Corporation v. I.R.C., 1959 S.C. 203. 
84 Western Heritable Investment Co. v. Glasgow Corporation, 1956 S.C.(H.L.) 64, where 
it is probable that because of a neglect of this distinction the purposes of the statute in 
question were frustrated. 
65 Moss' Empires Ltd. v. Assessor of Glasgow, 1917 S.C.(H.L.) 1; Nicol v. Mags. of Aberdeen 
(1870) 9 M. 306; Caledonian Ry. v. Glasgow Corporation (1905) 7 F. 1020. 
66 McDonald v. Lanarkshire Joint Fire Brigade Committee, 1959 S.C. 141; and see Mitchell, 
" The Scope of Judicial Review," 1959 J.R. 197, and Bennett Miller, " Quasi -Judicial 
Decisions in Scots Law," 1958 J.R. 39. To some extent this difference is attributable 
to the history of local government in the two jurisdictions. In England, courts, acting 
in one way or another, were much more prominent. 
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oppression by public authorities." It has, indeed, long been asserted 
that there exists in the Court of Session a general power to redress admin- 
istrative wrongs.68 This generality may affect the weight to be given 
to some English authorities. Thus, it is perhaps doubtful if Smith v. 
East Elbe R.D.C.69 would be accepted as a sound authority, granted 
this background. Nevertheless it has also been long accepted that the 
court must impose some limitation upon its control, if it were not effectively 
to determine policy. This problem was seen at the very beginnings of the 
modern state in cases such as Pryde v. The Heritors of the Kirk Session 
of Ceres.70 It is as a consequence of that that the courts accept within 
broad limits the bona fide exercise of a discretion by public authorities.7' 
As these authorities have become more democratic this acceptance has 
become somewhat broader,72 and the control more restrained. Moreover 
since the duties upon local authorities have become more general, the 
question of a title to sue has become more important, and limitations 
on that right have contributed also to restricting the scope of judicial 
review. The right to challenge illegal payments exists, as has been seen, 
as also does the right to challenge any ultra vires activity which would 
involve the expenditure of money from the rates. Much more difficulty 
arises in relation to raising a challenge to a failure to act, or to an un- 
reasonable action within the ambit of admitted powers. Review of the 
general administration of burgh funds has been refused 73 
The older cases tended to rest the title to sue upon injury to a patri- 
monial right, which was one method of securing the necessary limitation. 
That foundation may today be inadequate with the changed nature of 
many of the duties of local authorities, particularly when allowance is 
made for the differences between the position of Lord Advocate and 
Attorney- General, and the absence in Scotland of the equivalent of the 
English relator actions.74 Because of these circumstances the administra- 
tive supervision by the central government departments assumes greater 
67 See, e.g., the use of powers in relation to expenses in Marshall v. School Board of Ardrossan 
(1879) 7 R. 359; Love v. Lang (1872) 10 M. 782; Liddall v. Ballingry Parish Council, 1908 
S.C. 1082. 
68 Ross v. Findlater (1826) 4 S. 514, 518; and see Kames, Historical Law Tracts, 4th ed., 
p. 228, where he speaks of this power as being necessarily assumed by the Court of 
Session after the abolition of the Privy Council in Scotland. That assumption was one of a 
generalised power of control. It is one of the continuing uses, and perhaps the main 
one, of the nobile officium to overcome administrative difficulties, and this is another 
aspect of this jurisdiction. 
69 [1956] A.C. 736. 
70 (1843) 5 D. 552; Dawson v. Allardyce, Feb. 18, 1809, F.C., and see Lord Cockburn's 
comments in the Journal, Vol. II, 1 and 257. This problem is a facet of the fundamental 
issue which also appears in the argument about the relationship of courts to prerogatives. 
71 Guthrie v. Miller (1827) 5 S. 711. 
72 Sommerville v. Langmuir, 1932 J.C. 55; cf. Sommerville v. Lord Advocate, 1933 S.L.T. 
48; Parlane v. Perth and Kinross Joint C.C., 1954 S.L.T.(Sh.Ct.) 95. 
73 Conn v. Corporation of Renfrew (1906) 8 F. 905, though Lord Dunedin was hesitant about 
specific ultra vires acts: 1915 S.C.(H.L.) at 17. 
74 See the discussion of this problem in D. & J. Nicol v. Dundee Harbour Trustees, 1914 
S.C. 374 and 1915 S.C.(H.L.) 7. Compare Watt v. Kesteven C.C. [1955] 1 Q.B. 408. 
In early cases, such as Guild v. Scott, Dec. 21, 1809, F.C., although there is the appearance 
of the enforcement of a general duty the patrimonial interest was present. 
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importance, and is seen to have an additional function. It is arguable, 
however, whether, under the law as it now stands, a right balance has 
been struck between these two methods of regulation. Included in 
that argument is the question whether, as at present organised, the 
relationship inter se of administrative bodies is sufficiently regulated by 
law in order to preserve the distribution of powers which underlies the 
legal structure. These issues are, however, wide, stretching beyond the 
field of local government, and can best be discussed in the context of 
the general scope of judicial review which will be dealt with subsequently. 
CHAPTER 14 
THE COURTS 
Introduction. The place of the courts in the modern constitution is 
one of the major current issues. That subject, however, arises in the 
discussion of almost every institution or major rule. The present chapter 
is only concerned with an outline of the structure of the courts, and with 
the main rules which govern their constitutional position. The story of 
the evolution of the main courts is, in one sense, more straightforward 
in Scotland than it is in England.' Instead of the struggles of distinct 
courts for jurisdiction (which led to complexities in the forms of action 
and to complications derived from fictions), and instead of the double 
stream of law and equity up to the reforms of 1875, the story in Scotland 
on the civil side is of the evolution of the one central court, the Court 
of Session, which from its origin in 1532 2 can be said to have had a 
general jurisdiction, and which over the years has absorbed other courts 
of a more specialised type. Clearly, the development since 1532 was 
not entirely smooth, but this generality of jurisdiction, and the idea 
civil court 3 have left their marks on the attitude of 
courts to government. On the criminal side justiciars had existed in 
Scotland since about 1166 and the office of Lord Justice General had 
existed since 1524, but justices of the peace never took root, and the 
justice ayres never had the qualities of the justices in eyre in England. 
Any really effective circuit system had to await the abolition in 1747 
of the Heritable Jurisdictions .4 From 1836 (under the Court of Session 
Act, 1830), the offices of Lord President and Lord Justice General were 
conjoined and from the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1887, the 
Senators of the College of Justice became also Lords Commissioners 
of Justiciary, and the modern pattern was thus established for the High 
1 See on the one hand Plucknett, Concise History of the Common Law, and on the other 
Hannay, The College of Justice, and the articles in the Stair Society publications, Vols. 1 
and 20. For accounts of the modern jurisdiction see Walker, The Scottish Legal System; 
Smith, Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland; Gloag and Henderson, Introduction 
to the Law of Scotland and M'Millan, Evolution of the Scottish Judiciary. 
2 A.P.S. II, 335. The court did not, of course, spring new born from the statute. Behind 
the statute lay the history of the Lords Auditors and of the Lords of Council and Session, 
see Duncan, The Central Courts Before 1532 (the Stair Society, Vol. 20). 
3 The full centralisation was not established until relatively recently. In 1830 the civil 
jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court was transferred to the Court of Session and to sheriffs. 
The jury court, established in 1815, was absorbed in 1830. The Court of Exchequer, 
which was reconstituted immediately after the Union, was finally merged with the Court 
of Session by the Court of Exchequer Act, 1856. Between 1823 and 1836 the jurisdiction 
of the commissary courts was transferred to the sheriffs or the Court of Session. 
4 See the articles in Vols. 1 and 20 of the Stair Society Publications; Hume, Criminal Law. 
For the modern system see Renton and Brown, Criminal Procedure; and Smith, Short 
Commentary on the Law of Scotland. 
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Court of Justiciary. From the abolition of the heritable jurisdictions 
in 1747, the modern sheriff courts began to evolve, and it was the Sheriff 
Courts (Scotland) Act, 1825, which provided that sheriff substitutes 
should have legal qualifications, which is, perhaps, the most significant 
point in that evolution. 
In essence therefore the present system of major courts was 
established by the middle of the nineteenth century. 
The modern system. The central courts. At the heart of the modern 
system is the Court of Session, consisting of sixteen judges including 
the Lord President and the Lord Justice- Clerk,6 and evenly divided 
between the Outer and Inner House. The Inner House sits in two 
divisions, the First presided over by the Lord President, the Second by 
the Lord Justice -Clerk. The court retains something of its collegiate 
character in that a Lord Ordinary may make up a quorum in the Inner 
House or a judge of the Division can sit in the Outer House. Membership 
of the Inner House is governed by seniority, and appointments are not 
made to it directly as they are to the Court of Appeal. The Ordinary 
Lords of Session are appointed by the Queen upon the nomination of 
the Secretary of State for Scotland, who receives the advice of the Lord 
Advocates Appointments to the two chairs are normally made from the 
Law Officers or ex -Law Officers. 
In principle the Outer House is a court of first instance, the Inner 
House a court of appeal, though the distinction is not absolute. Certain 
matters, notably the exercise of the nobile officium, are reserved to the 
Inner House, as also are special cases for the opinion of the court and 
special cases for opinion and judgment (appeal lying to the House of 
Lords in this second form of special case). In its appellate jurisdiction 
the Inner House hears appeals both from Outer House decisions and from 
sheriff courts. Either Division may in a case of difficulty consult other 
judges or summon three others to make a court of seven judges or may 
consult all the judges or have a hearing before the whole court. These 
thus constitute useful mechanisms for the reconsideration of points 
of law though problems can arise in their operation.? Such courts 
have power to overrule an earlier decision of the Inner House, to resolve 
5 Sixteen is the number authorised by the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, s. 32. 
Under s. 49 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act, 1963, the authorised number is 
increased to seventeen. If a new appointment is made the balance between the Inner 
and Outer House will be disturbed. For the sake of brevity what follows is mainly 
concerned with the Scottish judicial system, for the English system see Hood Phillips, 
First Book of English Law; Jackson, Machinery of Justice in England; Kiralfy, The English 
Legal System. 
6 623 H.C.Deb. 172 -173, where the general patronage of the Lord Advocate is indicated. 
7 The collegiate character of the court raises argument about the effect of decisions reached 
by a court of seven. See Smith, Judicial Precedent in Scots Law, 28 et seq. Until 1808, 
the court sat as a whole, further reforms, notably the Act of 1830, produced the modern 
arrangement. In Carron Co. v. Hislop, 1930 S.C. 1050, the full court considered the 
issue of who could judge the validity of an Act of Sederunt. This issue was not debated 
in the House of Lords; 1931 S.C.(H.L.) 75. 
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conflicts of decisions, or to overrule a decision that has come to be 
regarded as erroneous. As has been indicated, the Court of Exchequer 
has now been absorbed in the Court of Session, though Exchequer business 
is still marked by peculiarities of procedure and remedy.8 In addition 
certain special jurisdictions have been conferred upon the Senators, the 
Lands Valuation Appeal Court consisting of three Senators hears appeals 
from local valuation appeal committees. The Registration Court of 
Appeal under section 45 (9) of the Representation of the People Act, 
1949, consists of three Senators, and election petitions under section 110 
of the same Act are to be heard in the Election Petition Court by two 
Senators. 
The High Court of Justiciary. The High Court, the criminal counter- 
part of the Court of Session, has many equivalent attributes, such as a 
power equivalent to the nobile officium.9 It has exclusive jurisdiction 
in the most serious crimes,10 and for criminal trials circuit courts are 
held. Appeals from the High Court and from proceedings on indictment 
in sheriff courts lie, under the Criminal Appeal (Scotland) Act, 1926, 
to the Court of Criminal Appeal.11 In contrast to hearing appeals, 
properly so called, the High Court has also power to review the proceed- 
ings of the lower courts. This power may be exercised through the 
mechanism of a stated case, under the Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) 
Act, 1954, which can be used in cases where allegations of corruption, 
malice, or oppression are made, apart from normal questions of law. 
Review is also possible through the common law means of suspension 
or advocation, both of which are parts of a very long established super- 
visory jurisdiction.12 It has also jurisdiction in the limited civil appeals 
from the Small Debt Court. 
Sheriff courts. Ín the ordinary life of the country the system of 
sheriff courts is of as great importance as any other system of courts. 
The fact that this system, which emerged from the destruction of the 
heritable jurisdictions, provided the machinery for regular administration 
of justice at a local level is the justification for Cosmo Innes's assertion 
that that destruction is one of the cornerstones of liberty.13 For the 
hereditary sheriffs were substituted sheriffs- depute (now sheriff-principals) 
3 Barrs v. I.R.C., 1961 S.C.(H.L.) 22, and see 1960 S.L.T.(News) 46, " Habeas Corpus 
in Scotland." 
9 Milne v. M'Nicol, 1944 J.C. 151. It has, too, the same power of convening a larger 
court than is normal for particular purposes, Renton and Brown, Criminal Procedure. 
10 As well as in relation to charges of wilful neglect, corruption or malversion of office 
by public officials: Hume, Criminal Law, II, 58; Alison, Criminal Law 633. 
11 No appeal lies to the House of Lords; Mackintosh v. Lord Advocate (1876) 3 R.(H.L.) 
34; cf. as to England, where criminal appeals are now governed by the Administration 
of Justice Act, 1960. 
12 The details of these procedures are inappropriate here, see Moncrieff, Review in Criminal 
Cases and such modem works as Renton and Brown, op. cit. 
13 Scotch Legal Antiquities, 149 and Ilay Campbell, Scottish Judicatures. 
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as the effective judges.14 The substitutes which the latter appointed were, 
from 1825, required to have legal qualifications, and there thus emerged 
the position where full-time legally -qualified judges were readily available 
in any locality. The offices of sheriff-principal, which remain part -time 
offices (except in Lanarkshire and the Lothians and Peebles), not only 
provide a local method of appeal, but also provide the machinery for 
training or testing those who may be made judges of the Court of Session. 
In ordinary civil actions there is no upper pecuniary limit to the sheriff's 
jurisdiction, but below £50 his jurisdiction is exclusive and his decision 
final. The main limitations upon the jurisdiction are the exclusion of 
actions concerning status, and many company matters where the paid -up 
capital of the company exceeds £10,000, actions for reduction and actions 
of proving the tenor.lb Appeal from the sheriff- substitute lies to the 
sheriff-principal, and thence to the Inner House, or alternatively direct 
to the Inner House. As a criminal court the sheriff court has full juris- 
diction, with the exception of the crimes of treason, murder (and attempts 
thereat), incest and rape, but since the powers of sentencing are limited 
many of the more serious offences tend to be taken to the High Court. 
As has already been noted, the sheriff has many administrative functions 
as well as his judicial ones.16 
The Court of the Lord Lyon. This court retains an active jurisdiction 
in matters of heraldry, being concerned with questions of the grant or of 
the abuse of arms, and on its criminal side has its own procurator- fiscal.17 
The jurisdiction, which has a common law origin, was confirmed by 
the Lyon King of Arms Act, 1867. The court was formerly subject 
to the Privy Council in Scotland, and after the Union this power of review 
passed to the Court of Session 18 from which appeal lies to the House of 
Lords.19 The court has no jurisdiction to determine questions either 
of precedence or of chieftainship.20 
14 For the peculiarities of terminology see 1952 S.L.T.(News) 121. The fact that a sheriff - 
substitute is normally expected to live in his sheriffdom is of considerable social im- 
portance, and some provision to that effect is generally included in his commission. 
At one time, residence elsewhere was inconceivable in law: Smith v. Falconer (1890) 
18 R. 343. 
15 See, generally, Smith, Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland, and Gloag and 
Henderson, Introduction to the Law of Scotland, and Sheriff Courts (Civil Jurisdiction and 
Procedure) (Scotland) Act, 1963. 
16 In all respects the sheriff court is to be contrasted with the county courts in England 
which have a limited civil jurisdiction, no criminal jurisdiction, and fewer administrative 
functions. On the criminal side quarter sessions have wider powers of punishment than 
have sheriffs. For the present limits for County Courts see the County Courts Act, 
1959, and the County Courts (Jurisdiction) Act, 1963. 
17 Tunes of Learney, Scots Heraldry. Cf. Manchester Corporation v. Manchester Palace 
of Varieties [1955] P. 133 and 71 L.Q.R. 187. 
18 Procurator Fiscal of the Lyon Court (1778) Mor. 7656, and it seems that ultimately the 
decrees of the court are only enforceable through the Court of Session: Macraes' Trs. 
v. Lord Lyon King -of -Arms, 1927 S.L.T. 285. 
19 Stewart Mackenzie v. Fraser Mackenzie, 1922 S.C.(H.L.) 39. 
20 Royal College of Surgeons of Eainburgh v. Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh, 
1911 S.C. 1054; Maclean of Ardgour v. Maclean, 1938 S.L.T. 49; Maclean of Ardgour 
v. Maclean, 1941 S.C. 613. 
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The Scottish Land Court was established by the Small Landholders 
(Scotland) Act, 1911,21 having as its chairman an advocate who enjoys 
the rank and tenure of a Senator of the College of Justice. The other 
members have a more limited tenure.22 Its jurisdiction, which is im- 
portant, and has increased with recent agricultural legislation, is now 
concerned with agricultural problems going far beyond those of small 
land holding.23 No appeal lies to the Court of Session, but the court 
may be required to state a case on a question of law for either Division 
of that court, and it is subject to the more general supervisory control 
of that court.24 The position of the Land Court has certain peculiarities. 
While it has many of the attributes of an ordinary court it lacks others, 
for example, while being a court of law it is doubtful if it is a court of 
record or superior court,23 and it lacks the power to enforce its own 
orders. 
The Restrictive Practices Court. Among these specialised courts 
should be noted the Restrictive Practices Court, established under the 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956. This court has several notable 
features. Like the Land Court it could be regarded as the most highly 
judicialised form of administrative tribunal though by the Act it is declared 
to be a superior court of record, even though for some purposes it has 
to rely on the aid of the ordinary established courts. Its principal peculiar- 
ity is, however, that it is a United Kingdom court. Judges nominated to 
it are three from the High Court in England, one from the Court of 
Session and one from the Supreme Court of Northern Ireland. Whereas 
the court can sit anywhere in the United Kingdom, none of these judges 
can be required to sit outside their jurisdiction of origin but there is 
nothing to debar them from so doing by consent. Whether the court 
is sitting in England or Scotland a member of either Bar has a right of 
audience (Northern Ireland is specially treated). Orders of the court 
are by section 20 (3) made effective throughout the United Kingdom. 
Thus there has emerged (perhaps for the first time) a United Kingdom 
court.26 Appeals on points of law from the court are fitted into the 
appellate system of the jurisdiction in which it sits. The jurisdiction 
of the court is concerned with the validity of agreements which restrict 
21 See 1958 S.L.T.(News) 129 and 1956 S.L.T.(News) 65, and see Connell and Johnston, 
Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act. 
22 See Scottish Land Court Act, 1938. 
23 The main extensions are to be found in the Agriculture (Scotland) Act, 1948, and the 
Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act, 1949. Administrative functions relating to 
crofters were transferred under the Crofters (Scotland) Act, 1955, to the Crofters 
Commission. 
24 Kennedy v. Johnstone, 1956 S.L.T. 73. 
25 Mackay and Esselmont v. Lord Advocate, 1937 S.C. 860; Milburn, 1946 S.C. 301. The 
term " court of record " though used in Milburn has probably no precise meaning in 
Scotland. 
26 This United Kingdom character is capable of having certain inconveniences as to the 
law administered by the court, see, e.g., 1959 S.L.T.(News) 13 et seq.; and generally 
see Wilberforce, Restrictive Trade Practices. 
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trading (section 6), and is of considerable economic significance. In 
addition to the judicial members of the court, others, experienced in 
industry, commerce or public affairs, are appointed on the recommenda- 
tion of the Lord Chancellor, and for any hearing the court must consist 
of the presiding judge and at least two other members. The presiding 
judge (who delivers the judgment of the court) has special prerogatives 
in relation to the operation of the court. 
Local courts. Some local courts of limited jurisdiction should 
also be noted. The justices of the peace have some jurisdiction in civil 
matters in the small debt court under the Small Debt (Scotland) Act, 
1825. The jurisdiction is limited to £5, and, subject to reduction by the 
Court of Session, the decision is final. In the counties the justice of 
the peace court is concerned with breaches of the peace and petty offences. 
From it appeal lies to quarter sessions and to the High Court of Justiciary 
by way of a stated case. The jurisdiction is limited by the fact that 
penalties imposed cannot exceed a £10 fine or imprisonment for sixty 
days,27 and it is concurrent with the jurisdiction of the sheriff. In burghs 
a similar minor criminal jurisdiction exists in the police or burgh court. 
In both cases the system of public prosecution in use in higher courts 
is operative, each court having its own fiscal.2B 
Church courts. Among the other courts in Scotland must be noted 
those of the Church of Scotland. With the abolition of Papal jurisdiction 
in 1560 29 there was immediate confusion; the Reformed Church and 
the Court of Session exercised consistorial jurisdiction until the Com- 
missary Courts were established in 1563. The jurisdiction of those 
courts was eventually absorbed, in the nineteenth century, by the Court 
of Session and the sheriff courts. Thus the church courts of the Reformed 
Church never really exercised this jurisdiction. These courts however 
continued to operate both to maintain discipline within the church 
and to punish moral offences 39 which fell outside the criminal law, 
and effectively their jurisdiction is today exercised only within the first 
field, though that may have consequential effects upon civil rights. Within 
their jurisdiction it was recognised by the Court of Session that they were 
supreme -" within their spiritual province the church courts are as 
27 Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) Act, 1954, s. 3. 
28 The origin of the burghal jurisdictions is partly common law. The Act of Union had 
preserved the rights and privileges of the royal burghs, and the Heritable Jurisdictions 
Act, 1747, had continued their powers, but from 1813 processes of reform produced 
more standardisation, and the Burgh Police Act, 1892, in particular, defined the juris- 
diction of these courts (see now the Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) Act, 1954). For 
an outline history of these courts see Introduction to Scottish Legal History (the Stair 
Society, Vol. 20) and for details of their jurisdiction see Smith, op. cit., and Renton and 
Brown, op. cit. 
29 A.P.S. II, 534. See, generally, Introduction to Scottish Legal History, Chap. 27. 
3o Ersk. I, 5, 35. At one time the jurisdiction extended over parochial schooling. 
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supreme as we are within the civil " said Lord Justice -Clerk Moncreiff.31 
This jurisdiction (and its pre- eminence) is recognised by the Church of 
Scotland Act, 1921,32 and is exclusive. The ultimate court of appeal 
within the system of church courts is the General Assembly of the Church 
of Scotland.33 
The matters thus baldly stated were at one time a matter of heated 
argument and of deep significance in the history of the country, under- 
lying, as they do, the Disruption cases, and in particular the Strathbogie 
Cases.34 It was the object of the Declaratory Articles to close that 
unhappy chapter and to declare " the right of the church to self- govern- 
ment in all that concerned its own life and activity." 36 The result is 
to produce a marked contrast to the practice of the Church of England, 
in relation to which the Sovereign is, under the Submission of the Clergy 
Act, 1533, and the Act of Supremacy, 1558, the supreme governor of 
the church. In consequence the ultimate court of appeal for that church 
is now the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and parliamentary 
control over the legislation of the church is preserved under the Church 
of England Assembly (Powers) Act, 1919, which nevertheless permits 
a large element of practical devolution to the Assembly.36 
In relation to both Scotland and England the above statements 
apply to the courts, of the established churches. Jurisdiction in other 
voluntary churches depends upon contract or trust,37 and even where 
similar particular rules may apparently apply to both established and 
voluntary churches the basis for that application differs.88 
The House of Lords. The courts hitherto described have been those 
which have their seat in Scotland. Apart from these there are others 
which affect Scotland, chief among them being the House of Lords, the 
ultimate court of appeal in civil matters. The Acts of Union contained 
what was, perhaps, a deliberate ambiguity. It was provided that no 
cause in Scotland should be heard in certain named courts or those 
31 Wight v. Presbytery of Dunkeld (1870) 8 M. 921, 925. As courts they receive the customary 
protections, Sturrock v. Greig (1849) 11 D. 1220, and there is an obligation on lay courts 
to lend their aid: Presbytery of Lewis v. Fraser (1874) 1 R. 888. 
32 See Ballantyne v. Presbytery of Wigtown, 1936 S.C. 625, 657 " the right claimed by the 
Church of Scotland to legislate and adjudicate finally in all matters of government is 
now the law of the Church, declared by the Church itself, and recognised by Parliament." 
Arts. IV and V of the Declaratory Articles Scheduled to the Church of Scotland Act, 
1921, are of particular importance. Art. VIII recognises that " The Church has the right 
to interpret these articles " 
33 As to the constitution and procedure of the courts see Cox, Practice and Procedure in 
the Church of Scotland. 
34 See particularly The Presbytery of Strathbogie (1840) 2 D. 585. 
36 1936 S.C. 625, 654, per Lord Justice -Clerk Aitchison. See, too, Sir Thomas Taylor, 
" Church and State in Scotland," 1957 J.R. 121, and for the background, Taylor Innes, 
The Law of Creeds. 
36 See generally Halsbury's Laws of England, sub tit. Ecclesiastical Law; and for discussion 
see Dr. Garbett, Church and State in England; and for the system of courts Ecclesiastical 
Jurisdiction Measure (No. 1), 1963. 
37 McMillan v. General Assembly of the Free Church (1859) 22 D. 290; Skerrett v. Oliver 
(1896) 23 R. 468. 
38 Presbytery of Lewis v. Fraser (1874) 1 R. 888. 
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sitting in Westminster Hall. The House of Lords answered to neither 
description, and from the Union appeals started to run to that House. 
There was considerable uncertainty about that jurisdiction.39 The 
appeal for remeid of law to the Parliament of Scotland had itself been 
a matter of dispute,4° and in any event appeal to the House of Lords 
was of a somewhat different order from the appeal for remeid. On the 
other hand, the right to petition Parliament was, however, specifically 
inserted in the Claim of Right. The jurisdiction of the House was not 
at first challenged and when it was, in somewhat exceptional circumstances, 
was upheld.41 In effect, however, this jurisdiction simply grew and 
became accepted 42 This appellate jurisdiction exists, with few exceptions, 
in civil matters 43 It does not in criminal matters44 
The difficulties which the House of Lords encountered in acting as 
a court of appeal in England were accentuated as far as Scotland was 
concerned43 Even when lawyers were available, they were not familiar 
with Scots law, nor, for many years, were judgments in the Court of 
Session given in a form which might aid the House. Substantial relief 
came with the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, authorising the appoint- 
ment of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, and from that time there has 
always been one Scots lawyer in the House,46 and by convention there 
are now at least two. For judicial purposes the House now consists 
of the Lord Chancellor, the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary and other peers 
who have held high judicial office.47 Lay peers do not sit, or if they do, 
their votes are not counted,49 and the conventional separation of the 
House has long been recognised,49 and from 1949 an Appellate Committee 
has been constituted, though upon a sessional basis to preserve con- 
stitutional proprieties.39 The existence of the House as the final court 
of appeal has had a considerable effect upon private law in both jurisdic- 
tions, producing an influence of one upon the other (though probably 
in the main of English upon Scots Law), which has at times been beneficial 
39 Lady Mary Bruce v. Earl of Kincardine (1707) II Fount. 367. 
49 The Earl of Callander's Case (1674) Stair's Dec. II 262 and Mor. 2991; and Sir George 
MacKenzie's Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland, and Stair, Inst. IV, 1, 56. 
41 Greenshields v. Mags. of Edinburgh (1709) 1 Rob. 12. The point there was a very narrow 
one, but if appeals were there accepted they must also be on more general matters. By 
1712 Fountainhall was already complaining of this growth; Fount. II, 7, 34; and see the 
introduction to Robertson's Appeals, Malcolm, " The House of Lords and Appeals from 
Scotland " (1910) 22 J.R. 295; Beven, " Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords " 
(1901) 17 L.Q.R. 357 et seq. and 11 Macq. 577. 
42 See MacQueen, Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords. By 1709 the House of 
Lords regulated appeals to bring them into conformity with English ones. 
43 Even when it does not exist, the weight of a House of Lords decision was elegantly 
described by Lord Sands in Assessor for Aberdeen v. Collie, 1932 S.C. 304, 312. 
44 Mackintosh v. L.A. (1876) 3 R.(H.L.) 34. Though the House of Lords has heard such 
appeals, Karnes, Historical Law Tracts, sub tit. Courts. 
48 " The House of Lords as a Court of Law " (1936) 52 L.Q.R. 186, 205 et seq. 
46 For the list see Walker, Scottish Legal System, (2 Ed.) 179. 
47 A term which will include Lords of Appeal who have retired on reaching the age limit. 
48 O'Connell v. The Queen (1844) 11 Cl. & F. 155; Bradlaugh v. Clarke (1883) 8 App.Cas. 
354 and see Current Legal Problems (1949), p. 1. 
49 Re Lord Kinross (1905) 7 F.(H.L.) 138. 
69 Bromhead, House of Lords in Contemporary Politics, 83 et seq., and see ante. Chap. 8. 
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but has at other times been much criticised.b1 It seems, however, that the 
House cannot, when acting in this capacity, be properly regarded as a 
United Kingdom body for all purposes, and decisions are technically 
only binding on the House itself in the same way, that is to say, that a 
decision in an English appeal does not absolutely preclude a conflicting 
decision in a Scottish appeal. Judgments are only binding in the juris- 
diction whence came the appeal, and the order of the House is directed 
specifically to the Court of Session or as the case may óe.62 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Somewhat similar is the 
position of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, established under 
the Judicial Committee Act, 1833, and composed of persons with like 
qualifications to those who make up the House of Lords acting as a 
court, together with members from Commonwealth countries.fi3 In the 
main its jurisdiction is to hear appeals by right, or by special leave, from 
those parts of the Commonwealth which have not abolished such appeals. 
In addition it hears appeals from ecclesiastical courts in England, and in 
prize. Matters may also be referred to the Judicial Committee for its 
opinion under section 4 of the Act of 1833, and these may often be 
matters of considerable constitutional importance.ó4 It further hears 
appeals from the Medical Disciplinary Committee of the General Medical 
Council under the Medical Act, 1950, and from certain other similar 
medical bodies. 
Courts- Martial Appeal Court. Courts- martial, which are concerned 
with offences against discipline in the armed services present some 
peculiarities. Irrespective of the place of trial a Scottish advocate or 
solicitor (or their English counterpart) has a right of audience and, under 
the Courts -Martial (Appeals) Act, 1951, there is established a Courts - 
Martial Appeal Court, consisting of judges from England, Scotland 
and Northern Ireland which can sit in divisions in any place within or 
without the United Kingdom. In practice when sitting in Scotland it 
consists of such Lords Commissioners of Justiciary as have been nomi- 
nated to it, but wherever sitting the law applied by the court is English 
criminal law, by reason of the Army Act, 1955, s. 70. 
General considerations. The whole structure of the judicial system 
thus discloses both unity and separation. Some courts are purely local, 
others are clearly United Kingdom courts, others are partly one and 
partly the other. It must, however, be emphasised that the preservation 
61 See, e.g., Dewar Gibb, Law from over the Border; Smith, British Justice, the Scottish 
Contribution. 
52 See Glasgow Corporation V. Central Land Board, 1956 S.C.(H.L.) 1 and the authorities 
quoted in Smith, Judicial Precedent in Scots Law, 48 et seq. Where the House is, as 
with revenue law, dealing with United Kingdom law the binding force is enlarged: 
I.R.C. v. City of Glasgow Police Athletic Association, 1953 S.C.(H.L.) 13. 
63 See 503 H.L.Deb. 273. 
64 e.g., Re Parliamentary Privilege Act, 1770 [1958] A.C. 331. A like jurisdiction exists 
under the House of Commons Disqualification Act, 1958, and see Government of Ireland 
Act, 1920, ss. 51 -53. 
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by the Acts of Union of the Court of Session preserved a separate and 
distinct jurisdiction and system of law.55 This fact, while its effects are 
limited by a variety of statutes, can nevertheless in particular areas of 
the law produce inconvenience, unless there is further regulation.56 
The tenure of judges. In England the Supreme Court of Judicature 
(Consolidation) Act, 1925, s. 12, provides that, with the exception of the 
Lord Chancellor, all judges of the Supreme Court hold office during 
good behaviour, subject to removal by His Majesty on an address pre- 
sented by both Houses. This and equivalent provisions in the Appellate 
Jurisdiction Act, 1876, repeat the provision of the Act of Settlement. 
There are thus two methods of removal, since removal by the Crown for 
official misconduct is not ruled out. Other judges are specifically regulated. 
Under the County Courts Act, 1959, county court judges may be re- 
moved by the Lord Chancellor for inability or misbehaviour. The Lord 
Chancellor's powers to remove, while rarely used, are much less limited 
in respect of justices of the peace.b7 In Scotland the same abuses of 
power by the Stuarts produced a reaction like that which occurred in 
England 86 The Claim of Right recited as a grievance the changing of 
judges' commissions ad vitam aut culpam into commissions durante bene- 
placito. Before the Union control over judges could have been exercised 
by the Scottish Privy Council, but that body ceased to exist after 1707 
and there is no equivalent provision to that contained in the Act of 
Settlement applicable to Scotland. It seems therefore that removal for 
misconduct can only be by the Crown. There are suggestions that 
redress lies through Parliament. " If any judge, either judicially or not, 
should commit a wrong, God forbid there should be no remedy; but 
then the redress does not lie with us; it is by application to the King in 
Council or to Parliament," said Lord Robertson.55 Other suggestions 
are more specific that the machinery of an address moved in both Houses 
is appropriate.60 It seems, however, that there is no obligation in law 
to pursue such a course, though it might well, should occasion ever 
arise, be the most convenient method. 
This tenure, ad vitam aut culpara, is in Scotland regarded as the 
natural consequence of judicial office,ó1 unless specific provision is 
made to the contrary, and it is noticeable that the Judicial Pensions 
Act, 1959, imposing an age limit of seventy -five upon all judges in the 
55 See particularly Lord President Inglis in Orr Ewing's Trs. v. Orr Ewing (1884) 11 R. 606 
and see (1885) 13 R.(H.L.) 1; (1886) 2 L.Q.R. 111. More recently the detailed conse- 
quences of this separation were emphasised in McCullie v. Butler [1961] 2 All E.R. 554. 
56 Stuart v. Stuart and Moore (1861) 4 Macq. 1, and the Report on Conflicts of Jurisdiction 
affecting Children (1959) Cmnd. 842. 
57 Colonial judges hold at pleasure, Terrell v. S. of S. for the Colonies [1953] 2 Q.B. 482. 
58 See McNeil, " The Independence of the Scottish Judiciary," 1958 J.R. 132. 
ss Haggart's Trs. v. Hope (1824) 2 Shaw App. 125, 135. 
69 Cruickshank v. Gordon (1843) 5 D. at 963, per Lord Medwyn; MacMurchy v. Campbell 
(1887) 14 R. 725; M'Creadie v. Thomson, 1907 S.C. 1176 at 1182. There have also been 
suggestions that use might be made of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 
61 Ersk. I, 2, 32, and Mackay & Essehnont v. L.A., 1937 S.C. 860. 
THE PROTECTIONS OF INDEPENDENCE 223 
Court of Session, Supreme Court, or House of Lords, did not alter 
the position of existing judges. Specific provision is made in relation 
to sheriffs by the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act, 1907. Section 13 provides 
for removal, on grounds of inability, neglect of duty 62 or misbehaviour, 
by the Secretary of State acting on the report of the Lord President 
and the Lord Justice -Clerk, though in the case of a sheriff -principal the 
order of removal requires to lie before Parliament for four weeks. Sheriffs 
and sheriffs- substitute and county court judges are required to retire 
at the age of seventy-two.63 
The protections of independence. Certainty of tenure does not alone 
ensure independence. The insistence on the separation of courts from 
government, already noted,84 must also be observed. So, too, must the 
earlier rules about declinature,66 which were at one time of importance 
in ensuring the neutrality of judges as between parties. Further it was 
once the rule under Acts of 1424 and 1457, that judges must have a 
sufficient personal fortune so that they could be made to suffer for 
wrongdoing. Political neutrality is ensured by exclusion from the 
House of Commons,86 and by the fact that their salaries are charged upon 
the Consolidated Fund, thus removing an opportunity for annual debate. 
The House of Commons will not discuss the conduct of a judge save on 
a substantive motion. Independence requires protection in other ways. 
A degree of immunity from criticism is necessary, though that can be 
carried to extremes. Murmuring the judges was a crime capable of too 
wide an application,87 and the protection of judges in this respect is now 
normally the province of the law of contempt,G8 a power which will 
also protect the court in the sense of excluding influences calculated 
to affect the administration of j ustice.ó9 
Bt These words are omitted as to sheriffs- substitute. Justices of the peace may be removed 
by the Secretary of State. 
ss Sheriffs' Pensions (Scotland) Act, 1961, s. 6, which did not affect existing holders of 
office, and the County Courts Act, 1934, s. 7. 
64 In cases such as Earl of Morton v. Fleming (1569) Mor. 7325; Lord Cooper's note on 
Bruce v. Hamilton in (1946) 58 J.R. 83 and the Case of Prohibitions (1607) 12 Co.Rep. 12. 
65 Ersk. I, 2, 25 and 26. 
66 House of Commons Disqualification Act, 1957, Sched. II, excludes judges of the Supreme 
Court in England, of the Court of Session, sheriffs and salaried sheriffs -substitute, and 
county court judges among others. As to the origin of this rule in Scotland see 1957 
S.L.T.(News) 134. As to Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, see ante, p. 91. 
67 See the Act of'1540, A.P.S. II, 374, and H.M. Advocate v. Robertson (1870) 1 Coup. 404. 
Hume, Criminal Law, Chap. X, but consider Kennedy, " The Second Division's Progress " 
(1896) 8 J.R. 268. As to other protections see Ersk. I, 2, 36. 
68 As to the principles that govern see Milburn, 1946 S.C. 301. It is there emphasised that 
contempt can also be too broadly interpreted. See too Ambard v. Att.-Gen. for Trinidad 
and Tobago [1936] A.C. 322 at 335, " Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed 
to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary 
man." 
69 Stirling v. Associated Newspapers, 1960 J.C. 5. It should be noted that s. 11 of the 
Administration of Justice Act, 1960, extending the defences in cases of contempt does 
not apply to Scotland. The rules exemplified in Stirling's case are more rigorous than 
equivalent rules in England. This is partly attributable to the public character of pre- 
liminary proceedings in England, as against the privacy in Scotland and this difference 
sets a different pattern of thought. For the subtlety of the rules to take account of the 
nature of the court see R. v. Duffy, ex p. Nash [1960] 2 Q.B. 188. 
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Immunity from suit is also required, or said Stair none but a fool or 
a pauper would become a judge. So far as the Court of Session and 
High Court of Justiciary are concerned this immunity is absolute,70 
as it is in England in respect of judges of superior courts 71 As to other 
judges the law is not clear. It is said, that the sheriff is in a like position,72 
and granted the position and jurisdiction of a sheriff (at any rate in 
civil matters) the proposition is a reasonable one. As to inferior judges 
it seems that liability attaches for acts which are outside their jurisdiction, 
and probably for acts done within their jurisdiction where malice and 
want of probable cause can be shown, though it is arguable whether 
liability will arise from culpa levissima.73 In criminal matters the situation 
is regulated by the Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) Act, 1954 (section 
75).74 Strict conditions are laid down before any suit for damages can 
be brought for any action done under that Act, conditions which support 
the above views and suggest that a mere misconstruction of powers will 
not result in liability. In England there is also uncertainty, but it seems 
that there is liability on the part of judges of inferior courts for acts 
done without or in excess of jurisdiction, though again the concept of 
reasonableness enters ín.75 
It has been said that this immunity is based on the fact that the 
judges are the Queen's judges, and to allow liability to exist would be to 
substitute responsibility to subjects for that to the Queen.76 The argument 
is, however, a weak one. How far it is correct to treat judges as Crown 
servants is debatable,77 the more so in Scotland where many incidents 
of their office have been attributed to the fact that that office is a munus 
publicum. The foundation of the principle appears to be the simple fact 
that it is one necessary for the administration of justice. This is reflected 
7° M'Creadie v. Thomson, 1907 S.C. 1176, and the cases there referred to; cf. the older rule 
in Band v. Clerk and Scott, May 31, 1797, F.C. 
71 Anderson v. Gorrie [1895] 1 Q.B. 668. 
72 Harvey v. Dyce (1876) 4 R. 265, though it must be noted that the case was one of alleged 
slander, and in this field the law confers much broader protection than in others. Cf. 
Watt v. Thomson (1869) 8 M.(H.L.) 77. As to administrative acts see Beaton v. Ivory 
(1887) 14 R. 1057. The position of the sheriff in criminal matters is not quite so clear. 
It is true s. 75 of the Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) Act, 1954, excludes sheriffs from 
its scope. But the penalties under the Act of 1701 anent Wrongous Imprisonment 
were it seems recoverable from sheriffs, Andrews v. Murdoch (1814) 2 Dow. 401. The 
arguments based on scope of jurisdiction which are emphasised in Hamilton v. Anderson 
(1856) 18 D. 1003 do not carry the same weight on the criminal side, and see the hesitation 
in Watt v. Thomson (1868) 6 M. 1112 at 1120. See also Glegg, Reparation, 4th ed., 163-164. 
73 M'Creadie v. Thomson, 1907 S.C. 1176; Murray v. Allan (1872) 11 M. 147. 
74 Replacing earlier legislation. As to the effect of this section, see Renton and Brown, 
Criminal Procedure, 449 -452. 
75 Houlden v. Smith (1850) 14 Q.B. 841; Calder v. Halket (1839) 3 Moo.P.C. 28. County 
court judges are in this category, and the difference between them and sheriffs is explicable 
when their jurisdictions are compared. For the equivalent to the 1954 Act see the Justices' 
Protection Act, 1848, and Thomson, " Judicial immunity and the protection of Justices " 
(1958) 21 M.L.R. 517; and Sheridan, " The Protection of Justices " (1951) 14 M.L.R. 
267. 
76 M'Creadie v. Thomson, 1907 S.C. 1176, a further difficulty is suggested in Haggart's 
Trustees v. Hope (1824) 2 Shaw App. 125 of one judge sitting judgment on another. 
77 Holdsworth (1932) 48 L.Q.R. 25 and Glanville Williams, Crown Proceedings, 38. For 
purposes of National Insurance they are treated as self -employed. 
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in a variety of rules. The exception in section 2 (5) (which of itself proves 
nothing about the position of the judges in this respect), to the generality 
of the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947 (whereby it is provided that no 
action shall lie against the Crown by reason of anything done or omitted 
in the discharge or purported discharge of judicial responsibilities or in 
connection with the execution of judicial process), is one application of 
this principle. Such a rule is also needed to prevent the retrial of decided 
issues by a collateral attack. So, too, is the immunity of prosecutors in 
Scotland,78 and the immunities of those taking part in judicial pro - 
ceedings.79 The special privileges of the police which have been noted 
spring from the same stock. This general principle is one dictated by 
necessity and has nothing to do with Crown service. It will be noted 
that in most of its applications there is a gradation in the absolute quality 
of the immunity so that its application is confined within the scope 
necessary to achieve the desired end. So it is that the central privilege, 
that of judges, is graded downwards from that of superior judges. The 
cases have tended to increase protection.89 Perhaps the warnings which 
the courts have sounded in relation to the power to commit for contempt,81 
which has a certain similarity in purpose with the rules now in issue, 
are also relevant in this context, where the absence of the restraints 
imposed by a separation of powers should be noted. It must however be 
noted, that here again institutional checks are operative. The organisa- 
tion of the respective Bars affords a check (and in Scotland the role of 
the Dean of the Faculty of Advocates is to be particularly noted) as does 
the rule of publicity.82 Above all the techniques of recruitment to, and 
traditions of the Bench are of great importance. 
What has been described is the formal structure of the courts, together 
with the rules which establish the independence of courts and judges. 
The operation of the courts, and thus their true constitutional significance, 
cannot be so easily described, and yet that is, perhaps, one of the most 
important subjects in constitutional law today. It is evident that the 
rudimentary and traditional role -the administration of justice in a 
civil or criminal sense, continues as before. It is though also evident 
that in other respects the role of the courts has changed. The extent 
78 Henderson v. Robertson (1853) 15 D. 292; Graham v. Strathern, 1924 S.C. 699; and 
Hester v. MacDonald, 1961 S.C. 370. The older cases (if obiter) allowed an absolute 
privilege to the Lord Advocate, and more limited protection to other prosecutors. The 
last case, if it be correctly decided on this branch of the argument, extends an absolute 
privilege to all. Sed quaere, compare Rae v. Strathern, 1924 S.C. 147. The terms of 
s. 75 of the Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) Act, 1954, appear to be inconsistent with 
the broad proposition. 
79 Williamson v. Umphray (1890) 17 R. 905 though the limits there stated should be noted, 
and Marrinan v. Vibart [1962] 3 All E.R. 380. On this matter, generally, see Glegg, 
Reparation, 4th ed., 165 -169. These cases emphasise the element of public policy which 
also underlies the cases on judicial immunities. 
29 Hester v. MacDonald, 1961 S.C. 370, and compare the old general rules as to judges 
in Band v. Clerk and Scott, May 31, 1797, F.C. and Ersk. I, 2, 32. 
81 Note 68, supra. Cf. the provisions for appeal contained in the Administration of 
Justice Act, 1960, in England. 
22 Riddell v. Clydesdale Horse Society (1885) 12 R. 976. 
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to which courts are law -makers has diminished, though clearly it per - 
sists.83 For this change there are many reasons. The rules which the 
courts themselves evolved, such as the doctrines of precedent, have had 
a confining influence. The rise of Parliament, both in stature and in 
scope of operation in regard to legislation and the control of the admin- 
istration, clearly has its effect, especially when coupled with the growth 
of ideas of democratic government in restraining courts. There has 
grown up a reliance upon other forms of control to the exclusion of 
judicial controls, even though the practical working of those other 
forms may not accord with the assumed manner of their working. More- 
over the issues of public policy have become more obvious and at the 
same time more political. The development of ideas of corporate per- 
sonality during and after the Industrial Revolution, which was largely 
the work of the courts, had considerable social implications, but these 
were not so generally obvious as are similar implications of litigation 
concerning the activity of a modern state. Law, in modem statutory 
forms, is more than ever an instrument of policy, and of policy upon 
which opinion may be sharply divided, and this fact may again provoke 
judicial reticence.S4 All the difficulties which surround courts are aggra- 
vated by the fact that the law in many important areas is changing from a 
law of obligations to a law of standards. Questions of land use are, 
for example, today as important as questions of land ownership, yet 
they cannot be decided by similarly objective rules. Hence, as will 
appear, many matters of vital concern to particular citizens have been 
withdrawn from the ordinary courts and entrusted to administrative 
tribunals. Thus courts do not assume the dominant place in the thoughts 
of citizens (other than criminals) that they once did. Issues which concern 
citizens are determined elsewhere, either in the first instance or finally. 
This fact too has its influence upon the place of courts. These matters 
will be elaborated in the following chapters, but in assessing the con- 
stitutional position of the courts allowance must also be made for what 
has already been said in relation, for example, to:prerogative or local 
government. The doctrine of the separation of powers, if it is to have 
value, must involve more than a formal separation. There must also 
be a distribution or balance of power. While the formal separation is 
preserved, it is for the reader to consider whether the distribution or 
balance is correct at the moment. 
83 Lord Devlin confesses that he doubts " if judges will now of their own motion contribute 
much more to the development of law " and considers that " The work done by the judges 
of England is not now as glorious as it was "- Samples of Law Making, pp. 23 and 6. 
In effect the courts are confined to the process of refinement. Earlier the efforts of 
courts were more fundamental, see, e.g., Fifoot, Judge and Jurist in the Reign of Queen 
Victoria. 
84 For some illustrations of this tendency see Mitchell, " The Flexible Constitution " 
[1960] Public Law 321. The narrowness of the boundary between law and policy is 
illustrated by Adams v. S. of S. for Scotland, 1958 S.C. 279. In the end of the day the 
field of policy may for the reasons suggested in the text have expanded at the expense of 
the field of law. 
Part Three 
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introduction. As has been shown, with minor exceptions, whatever 
arguments may exist about other meanings of the sovereignty or suprem- 
acy of Parliament, there can be none about that meaning of those phrases 
which implies that Parliament is the sole source of legislative power. 
It is evident that all legislation necessary for the community cannot 
be made by Parliament. Hence powers of legislation are conferred by 
Parliament on other bodies, ministers, town councils, universities, and 
many others. In some of these cases the word delegation may be accurately 
used, in the sense that the power of law- making is conferred upon the 
other body to act (within limits) without reference to Parliament, and 
by -laws may be taken as an example of this form of delegation. In other 
cases legislation may result from processes by which most of the formal 
legislative stages occur outside Parliament, but some stages occur or 
may occur inside Parliament. When the term delegated legislation is 
used to describe such legislation the phrase subordinate legislation 
might be more accurate, since the final power of making the law is not 
delegated by Parliament, but is retained by it or alternatively a right of 
veto is reserved to Parliament and to that extent a residual power is 
retained by Parliament. Parliament is simply relieved to a greater or 
lesser extent in the preliminary stages, and the ultimate parliamentary 
stage may be more or less of a formality. Such legislation is subordinate 
in the sense that the provisions governing it are contained in an ordinary 
statute, and in the sense that it is of more limited scope than primary 
legislation made by means of an ordinary statute. The Scottish private 
legislation procedure, which has already been noted, may be taken as 
an example. In most cases, under that procedure the most important 
stages occur outside Parliament, but parliamentary stages remain, and 
the procedure is considered to be inappropriate for major issues of 
principle, for which primary legislation should be used. This second 
type of subordinate legislation appears in many forms, the Provisional 
Orders arising from the general procedure or Special Procedure Orders 
are examples, as are Statutory Instruments, and procedures such as 
those under the Consolidation of Enactments (Procedure) Act, 1949, are 
not clearly distinguishable. It may be possible by formal definition 
to distinguish these two broad types of delegated or subordinate legisla- 
tion, but if substance rather than form be looked at it is difficult to 
distinguish them in many cases, and the term subordinate legislation 
will be used to cover both types. 
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Development of subordinate legislation. In one sense there is nothing 
new about subordinate legislation. The Statute of Proclamations, 1539, 
conferred law- making powers upon Henry VIII. In Scotland delegations 
to conventions, to the Privy Council or to commissions were common 
and apparently exhibit many modern characteristics.' These early delega- 
tions are not, however, true examples of what we would now recognise 
as subordinate legislation. They differ in that ideas of parliamentary 
supremacy in the legislative field had not then been fully developed. 
The breach with exclusively parliamentary methods of legislation was 
not then as conscious as it now is. Moreover they belong to a different 
period of legislative draftsmanship, when the respective Parliaments 
were only just assuming control of the final shape of legislation.2 Modem 
subordinate legislation is the result not of accident or oversight, but of 
principle and necessity. In the years following 1832 the idea that admin- 
istration, including administrative regulation, could safely be left to 
others played its part,3 but the necessity of adjusting legislative methods 
to the requirements of a new industrialised society, coupled with the 
importance of focusing (whenever possible) parliamentary attention 
on matters of principle, thereafter ensured that subordinate legislation 
would grow in size and bulk.¢ That, as Maitland observed, we became 
a much governed nation, was a condition forced upon us, rather than 
chosen by us. To some extent the legislative needs could be met by 
improvements in legislative . procedure,5 but, whatever improvements 
were made, difficulties remained. Pressure on parliamentary time 
became steadily greater despite the evolution of the committee system 
and of closure devices, and without undesirable inroads into time available 
for other necessary parliamentary purposes time could not be found 
for the necessary quantity of legislation unless relief was sought and 
found outside Parliament.6 
Further the House of Commons is not a technical house. Candidates 
are chosen for their ability as candidates, not for their technical skills, 
and where there is expertise in the House it is often maldistributed between 
' See, e.g., A.P.S. II, 10, the Act of 1425 giving powers to the King and a commission 
to amend the laws that need amending, the statute of 1685, A.P.S. VIII, 494, giving 
power to Commissioners to regulate inferior courts and " to make orders to have the 
samen force and effect as if they were past into a law by ane Act of Parliament in all 
time thereafter, and to be printed and published as ane Act of Parliament," or the Act 
Anent the Poor of 1698, A.P.S. X, 177, giving powers to Commissioners to make orders 
not inconsistent with the standing laws. 
2 Rait, Parliaments of Scotland, Chap. VI; Plucknett, Concise History of English Law, 324. 
3 e.g., the Poor Law Amendment Act, 1834, s. 15. The problems of the poor seem always 
to have influenced constitutional developments. 
4 See Ilbert, Legislative Methods and Forms; Thring, Practical Legislation; Willis, The 
Parliamentary Powers of English Government Departments; Allen, Law and Orders; 
Sieghart, Government by Decree and for the general background, Maitland, Constitutional 
History; Lowell, Government of England, Chap. XIX. 
5 Ilbert, op. cit. Chap. IV, and Chap. 8, ante. 
6 The point is made by a simple comparison of the annual volume of statutes and statutory 
instruments. In statistical terms the growth of legislation is set out in the Minutes of 
Evidence to the Third Report from the Select Committee on Procedure, the Appendices 
to the evidence of Sir Gilbert Campion (H.C. 189 -1 of 1945-46). 
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government and opposition; yet increasingly law is technical, and is 
made not for the lawyer so much as for the chemist or the engineer. 
Thus, the floor of the House is not always the appropriate place for 
criticism. Again, there is a need for flexibility in law to meet changing 
conditions, and a need to experiment, and a need to act quickly in an 
emergency.? These needs cannot be met within the limits of the ordinary 
parliamentary timetable. 
For these reasons subordinate legislation became increasingly im- 
portant in practice, and was accepted in theory. Mill in his Representative 
Government wrote of the unsuitability of a numerous assembly for the 
business of legislation 8; Lord Thring wrote of the necessity of con- 
fining parliamentary attention to principle and leaving the details to 
departments 9; Sir Courtenay Ebert indicated the necessity for some 
delegation,10 a necessity accepted by Maitland 11 and Dicey.12 The 
virtue of delegated legislation is not that it takes something from Parlia- 
ment, but that it enables Parliament to do better the task for which it 
is fitted.13 In fact delegated legislation is a universal phenomenon. 
Sometimes attempts are made (with indifferent success) to formalise it 
and define its scope.14 Elsewhere, as with us, it breaks through con- 
stitutional machinery, even where, it might be thought, that a monopoly 
of legislative power was given to one body.15 It should not, however, be 
thought that the constitutional merits of subordinate legislation are 
only of this almost technical order. Government is a rational art, and 
requires the co- operation of the governed. Delegated legislation can 
help to win that co- operation and to produce more sensible rules than 
would otherwise be made. It has these effects since it enables the process 
of legislation to be spread much more widely through the community. 
As has already been indicated the legislative process in the sense of 
primary legislation involves consultation with outside interests. That 
consultation must be limited in certain ways out of respect for Parliament, 
which could well resent being faced with, what might appear to be, a 
" negotiated " Bill, or with one which because of the nature of the pre- 
liminary consultation it would be difficult to change at the parliamentary 
7 Consider, Rating and Valuation Act, 1961, s. 2; Civil Defence Act, 1948; Emergency 
Powers (Defence) Act, 1939; Finance Act, 1961, s. 9 (as amended by the Finance Act, 
1962, s. 34 and Eleventh Schedule); Road Traffic Act, 1960, s. 46, or among statutory 
instruments the trades dealt with in any wages Council Order or the permitted emulsifiers 
in S.I. 1962 No. 720, to take two simple and common -place examples; and see Carr, 
Concerning English Administrative Law, Chap. II, and Delegated Legislation, Chap. II. 
The " management " of a modern Parliament modifies but does not remove this 
unsuitability. 
Practical Legislation, 2nd ed., pp. 44-45. 
to Legislative Methods and Forms, Chap. III. 
11 Constitutional History, 415 et seq. 
12 Law of the Constitution, Chap. I, where, indeed, he urges the extension of the practice. 
13 Griffith, The Place of Parliament in the Legislative Process (1951) 14 M.L.R. 279 and 425. 
14 See the French Constitution of 1958, and see P.-M. Gaudemet, " La Loi dans la con- 
stitution de 1958 " [1961] Public Law 386, and the sources there referred to. 
13 See particularly Yalcus v. U.S., 321 U.S. 414 (1944) and compare Panama Refining Co. 
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1934). Constitutional necessities have everywhere a way of defeating 
neat semantic arguments. 
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stage. Such Bills do exist; any multiplication of them could be injurious 
to Parliament. In the case of subordinate legislation, when principles have 
already been supposedly determined by Parliament, difficulties in con- 
sultation are not so great. It is possible by that means to secure the 
effective advice of those most knowledgeable in a particular field, and 
it is indeed possible for such persons to have the feeling that they are 
effectively part of the legislative process, with consequences upon their 
acceptance of the rules which emerge. This generalised participation in 
the legislative process is in itself a valuable element in government.16 
Yet, while the merits and universality of the institution may be ad- 
mitted, there are dangers in it; and virtues in parliamentary legislation 
which Ilbert, among others, emphasised in the passages above referred to. 
It is possible that too broad powers could be conferred, that matters 
of principle could be concealed behind the guise of detail and improperly 
kept from Parliament, or that there should be too little scrutiny of the 
use made of powers conferred by Parliament. Above all there is the 
danger of " hip -pocket " law, law which may vitally affect a citizen 
but of which, by reason of defects of publicity in its making or promul- 
gation, he could not be reasonably aware.17 These dangers gave rise 
to exaggerated fears,18 which prompted the appointment in 1929 of the 
Committee on Ministers' Powers. The report of that Committee 19 
accepted, within limits and subject to safeguards, that delegated legisla- 
tion was constitutionally legitimate and necessary, but recommended 
a greater systematisation, and certain safeguards. In particular it was 
concerned that powers should be clearly defined, that judicial review 
should not be excluded, that measures should be taken to increase in- 
telligibility and publicity, and it was proposed that a special supervisory 
committee of the House of Commons should be established. The report 
had little immediate effect, but since 1944 a Select Committee has been 
set up by the House of Commons in each session.20 In the House of 
16 There are obvious dangers of syndicalism if the process is carried too far, but the process 
as now organised ensures that the government is involved and should therefore be able 
to judge where the general interest lies and protect that. Moreover, the process of 
legislation requires degrees of refinement or specification. The legislative process initiated 
by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962, was completed by a variety of statutory 
instruments made under it (e.g., S.I. 863, 1316, 1340, 1341, 1342 all of 1962), by the 
instructions to immigration officers and by R. v. Edgehill [1963] 1 All E.R. 181, at least as 
far as England is concerned. 
17 This danger does not only exist in subordinate legislation; see, Mitchell, " Reflections 
on Law and Orders " 1958 J.R. 19. 
18 Which found expression in Lord Hewart's New Despotism. 
19 (1932) Cmd. 4060. 
20 As to the origin of this see Morrison, Government and Parliament, 2nd ed., 150 et seq. 
Its terms of reference are to consider every statutory instrument or draft laid before the 
House " with a view to determining whether the special attention of the House should 
be drawn to it on any of the following grounds: (i) that it imposes a charge on the public 
revenues or contains provisions requiring payments to be made to the Exchequer or any 
government department or to any local or public authority in consideration of any licence 
or consent, or of any services to be rendered, or prescribes the amount of any such charge 
or payments; (ii) that it is made in pursuance of an enactment containing specific provisions 
excluding it from challenge in the courts, either at all times or after the expiration of a 
specified period; (iii) that it appears to make some unusual or unexpected use of the 
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Lords a too little observed Special Orders Committee had existed since 
1925.21 Major legislative reform did not result from the report of the 
Committee on Ministers' Powers until the Statutory Instruments Act, 
1946, which replaced, and improved on, the earlier Rules Publication 
Act, 1893. 
It must be noticed, however, that these reforms are concerned, in the 
main, with one form of subordinate legislation -that made by ministers. 
Other forms remain to a large extent in an unregulated state, and what 
has earlier been said about the by -laws of local authorities is to a large 
extent applicable to these other forms.22 
The formal framework of modern subordinate legislation. Powers having 
been conferred by statute, they are normally today exercised by Statutory 
Instrument. That term is defined by section 1 of the Act of 1946.23 It is 
a term of art in that its use (or the use of the phrase " Order in Council ") 
in a statute brings into operation the provisions of the 1946 Act, which 
has thus to be invoked by post -1947 statutes. There are excluded from 
the Act such things as Provisional Orders, or such things as " rules " 
to be made by ministers, where the power of making them is not cast in 
the appropriate terms. Delegated legislation exists, however, at several 
levels. It is possible for the exercise of delegated legislative power to 
confer a further power of law- making, thus there arises what is termed 
subdelegated legislation. It has been suggested that this falls outside 
the scope of the Act,24 but the government view and the general practice 
appears to be that subdelegated legislation falls within the Act.23 It 
powers conferred by the statute under which it is made; (iv) that it purports to have 
retrospective effect where the parent statute confers no express authority so to provide; 
(v) that there appears to have been unjustifiable delay in the publication or in the laying 
of it before Parliament; (vi) that there appears to have been unjustifiable delay in sending 
a notification to Mr. Speaker under the proviso to subsection (1) of section four of the 
Statutory Instruments Act, 1946, where an instrument has come into operation before 
it has laid before Parliament; (vii) that for any special reason its form or purport calls 
for elucidation." 
21 Carr, " Parliamentary Control of Delegated Legislation " [1956] Public Law 200, and 
Kersell, " Upper Chamber Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation " [1959] Public Law 46. 
22 See, e.g., the Universities (Scotland) Act, 1889, s. 21 giving rise to university ordinances 
upon which regulations and rules of senates and faculties depend. 
23 As explained by the Statutory Instruments Regulations, 1947 (S.I. 1948 No. 1) and the 
following regulations, S.I. 1948 No. 2. The point of technicality as a justification for 
delegated legislation is made by this start to the new Act. Under s. 1 rules, etc., which 
are to be made by a power expressed to be exercisable by statutory instrument are statutory 
instruments, and orders made under a power conferred on Her Majesty to be exercisable 
by Order in Council also fall within the definition. For some difficulties see 1960 S.L.T. 
(News) 173 and for detailed discussion see Griffith and Street, Principles of Administrative 
Law, particularly for the arrangements for bringing the provisions in pre -1948 Acts into 
the general scheme. 
24 Blackpool Corporation v. Locker [1948] 1 K.B. 349. It may be noted that in Palmer 
v. Inverness Hospitals Board of Management, 1963 S.L.T. 124 at 128, a circular from 
the Secretary of State under the N.H.S. Acts was treated as legislative, at least as far as 
the Hospital Board was concerned. 
25 Griffith and Street, op. cit. 55 -56, and see reg. 2 (1) (a) of the Statutory Instruments 
Regulations, 1947 (1948 S.I. No. 1), There may, as the Blackpool case indicates, be 
substantial difficulty in distinguishing genuine subdelegated legislation and ministerial 
circulars, etc.; and consider the treatment of the circular in Palmer's Case, 1963 S.L.T. 
124. 
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should, however, be noted that the power to subdelegate in that manner 
is not readily conceded.26 
The fact that the Act is applicable causes (section 2) the instrument to 
be numbered and printed, and under the Act the procedure for laying 
instruments before Parliament is standardised (sections 4, 5, 6 and 7). 
Thus where the instrument is subject to annulment following a resolution 
of either House it must be laid for forty days,27 and the consequences of 
annulment are defined. These provisions are subject to escape clauses. 
Thus, if it be essential that an instrument come into operation before 
copies are laid, provision is made for this in section 4 and for an explana- 
tion being given to the Speaker and Lord Chancellor. Under the Regula- 
tions exemptions from the existing requirements are made, for, e.g., 
bulky schedules, temporary or local instruments, or instruments 
otherwise normally published.28 Force is given to the requirement of 
publicity by section 3 (2) of the; Act, which provides that in any proceedings 
for any contravention of an instrument it shall be a defence to prove that 
at the date of the contravention the instrument had not been published, 
unless it can be shown that reasonable steps had been taken to bring 
the instrument to the notice of the public or of persons likely to be 
affected by it.29 The exact force of these requirements is uncertain. They 
may be mandatory, or they may be directory only, in the sense that 
failure to observe some of them will not involve the invalidity of the instru- 
ment in question. On the one hand, the existence of the National Fire 
Service Regulations (Indemnity) Act, 1944, might suggest that such 
provisions as those relating to laying are mandatory (though such Acts 
may be passed ob majorem cautelam); on the other hand there is judicial 
authority for the view that such provisions are directory only.30 It is 
clear that where further positive parliamentary action is contemplated 
the provisions are more than directory, and it may be that no universal 
classification is possible.S1 In any event the provisions relating to publicity 
avoid this difficulty, at least in regard to any criminal prosecution, though 
the issue could still arise in a civil cause, e.g., in relation to contract, 
when questions of illegality of the contract could arise. 
The controls of subordinate legislation. The Statutory Instruments 
Act, 1946, goes some way to meeting criticism in relation to publicity. 
There is a well- ordered system of publication of one form of delegated 
legislation to which resort can be had. The extent to which use is made 
of this facility is not a matter of legislative regulation. The value of that 
publicity is perhaps diminished by drafting techniques which do not 
26 a ;g., H.C. 5 - III (1958 -59). 
27 See, too, Laying of Documents before Parliament (Interpretation) Act, 1948. There is 
no absolute uniformity of timetable, see Finance Act, 1961, s. 9 and Third Schedule. 
28 S.I. 1948 No. 1, regs. 5 to 8. 
29 See Defiant Cycle Co. Ltd. v. Newell [1953] 1 W.L.R. 826; R. v. Sheer Metalcraft Ltd. 
[1954] 1 Q.B. 586. 
30 R. v. Sheer Metalcraft Ltd. [1954] 1 Q.B. 586, 590. 
31 Hepburn v. Wilson (1901) 4 F.(J.) 18. 
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always aid comprehension by the uninitiated,32 though these difficulties 
are in part met by the explanatory note which now accompanies each 
instrument. Apart from that the main importance of the Act may well 
be that it provides a framework within which other controls may work. 
Parliamentary controls 33 present the greatest difficulties of balance. 
If they are too light it is said that Parliament is being robbed of its 
functions ; if they are too heavy the essential objectives of the whole 
system are frustrated. In effect they are of three main types. There 
is first, control of the nature and scope of the power delegated at the 
time that the parent Act is before Parliament as a Bill. On the whole 
it may be said that greater attention is now paid to this element of control. 
In the second place there is the control of the exercise of the power granted. 
It must be emphasised that this is restrained by the fact that, as now 
organised, Parliament can only accept or reject an instrument even 
where it has a positive role to play. It cannot amend, after the manner 
of a Bill, and this limits parliamentary control to a significant extent. 
The formal control arises as a result of the mechanism of laying. Laying 
may take a variety of forms. The instrument may be required to be 
laid, either before or after it becomes operative, without anything more. 
In effect this procedure is informative only. Secondly, the instrument 
may be laid and made subject to annulment, the so- called negative 
procedure. If a prayer is successfully moved against an instrument, then 
it may be revoked by an Order in Council.34 Such revocation does 
not affect the validity of anything done under the instrument nor does 
it prevent another instrument in identical terms being put before the 
House, even before the revocation takes effect.35 
Moving for such an address became at one stage a major tactic in 
party warfare, but that harassing quality has been much diminished by 
S.O. 95A.36 Frequently the debates upon such motions are not so much 
specifically directed to the terms of the Order in question as to the general 
issues which can reasonably be raised on its terms. Sometimes the 
debate may be merely seeking information, and it is rare for an instrument 
to be entirely rejected, though a minister may withdraw it in order to 
put forward an amended version. Thirdly, laying may take the form of 
laying subject to an affirmative resolution. Without that resolution the 
instrument has no force or ceases to have force. In practice the main 
32 In particular, legislation by reference is unhelpful, though such techniques may be required 
to make the law as watertight or " rogue -tight " as is possible. 
33 See generally Kersell, Parliamentary Supervision of Delegated Legislation, and Carr 
[1956] Public Law 200. 
34 Statutory Instruments Act, 1946, s. 5. 
s5 See, e.g., S.I. 315 and 845 of 1951. 
36 See, e.g., 561 H.C.Deb. 187 -190. The Standing Order provides that on a motion for 
a prayer against a statutory instrument, the Speaker may adjourn the debate at 11.30 p.m. 
if he thinks that because of the time of starting the debate and because of the importance 
of the matter, the time for debate has not been adequate. This removes much of the 
" harrying " quality of such motions (leading to all -night sittings) which they formerly 
had. 
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difference between this and the preceding form is that here it is the govern- 
ment which has to make time and keep a House for the debate. In the 
former case such matters are the concern of those moving the prayer, 
but over all there is little difference in time occupied by the positive and 
negative forms.37 A fourth possibility is laying in draft subject either to 
an affirmative or negative resolution.38 These opportunities for parlia- 
mentary control are important, but they must remain controls much 
more of principle than of detail, and their value is affected by the fact 
that the use made of them is frequently (and properly) political, for the 
House of Commons is a political body. 
The third form of parliamentary control through the Select Committee 
on Statutory Instruments, commonly called the Scrutiny Committee, is 
perhaps the most important. The terms of reference of this Committee, 
which is a sessional one, have already been given,33 but the importance 
of " laying " may simply be that as a necessary consequence the instru- 
ment comes under consideration of the Committee. That Committee, 
like the Public Accounts Committee, receives expert advice, in this 
case from Counsel to the Speaker 40 In the first fifteen years of its 
existence the Committee considered 10,232 instruments of which it 
reported 120 to the House, most falling fairly equally between the heads 
of " unusual or unexpected use of power," " delay in publication or 
laying " or " need of elucidation." Its importance should not be 
judged by a simple comparison of these figures. The mere existence 
of the Committee is important as a potential check, particularly since 
it has the power to require explanations from the departments concerned, 
and in a variety of ways, especially as to clarity, its influence has been 
noticeable. The special reports produced by the Committee have drawn 
useful attention to general problems 41 The work of this Committee is to 
a large extent dissociated from the challenge by way of motion. Often, 
since the Committee requires written explanations, its reports may be too 
late for such a motion, and furthermore the purposes of the two techniques 
of control differ. The motion, if it is not simply intended to seek infor- 
mation, is generally an attack on government policy, whereas the Com- 
mittee is not intended to consider the merits and policy of an instrument42 
In the House of Lords instruments which require an affirmative resolution 
are referred to the Special Orders Committee which may, according to 
37 See Report of the Select Committee on Delegated Legislation (1952 -53) H.C. 310. It 
should be noted that under this positive form the instrument may either never have 
effect until approved or may cease to have effect unless approved within a limited period. 
38 As to the use of these see Griffith and Street, op. cit. For an example of inconsistency 
compare S.I. 1959 No. 1975 with S.I. 1959 No. 1827. 
39 Note 20, supra. 
49 Who at the establishment of the committee was Sir Cecil Carr, whose works have been 
referred to above. 
41 See as to its working, Report of the Select Committee on Delegated Legislation (1952 -53) 
H.C. 310. 
42 The difference between this and an unusual use of the power is not easy to draw, see 
Sir Cecil Carr, Third Report of Select Committee on Procedure- Minutes (1945 -46) 
H.C. 189 -1 Q. 4669. 
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the circumstances, report that the House should examine by a Select 
Committee,43 and until a report is received from the Special Orders 
Committee this affirmative motion is not moved. 
Institutional controls. What may generally be called institutional 
controls are perhaps as important as any, since they operate at the stage 
before the instrument is made, and at a stage therefore where amendment 
is relatively easy. They include the process of consultation, which may 
be informal or may be much more formalised. Even apart from any 
special provision the general convention of consultation in relation to 
legislative proposals is here operative, and perhaps more effectively so 
than in relation to primary legislation 44 Special provisions take many 
forms. They may require consultation with an ad hoc body (as under 
the Protection of Birds Act, 1954, s. 13) or with a particular body which 
exists for more general purposes (as under the Police Act, 1919, s. 4, or 
more importantly with the Council on Tribunals under section 8 of the 
Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958, as to procedural rules made for Tri- 
bunals falling under the supervision of the Council) or with bodies 
which are approved or accepted for the purposes of the parent legislation 
(as under the Education (Scotland) Act, 1946, s. 59).46 The more general 
these provisions the more difficult they may, theoretically, be of enforce- 
ment, but in practice little difficulty arises. 45 
One particular instance may be noted, namely the National Insurance 
Advisory Committee created under section 41 of the National Insurance 
Act, 1946. That Committee has the function of advising the minister 
and, in general, under section 77 of the 1946 Act, the right to see all 
draft regulations, upon which it reports, having made such inquiry or 
taken such evidence as it thinks appropriate. Its position is particularly 
strong since the Committee's Report and the minister's reasons for not 
accepting any of the recommendations in the former must be laid before 
Parliament. The Committee itself is a strong one and its work has been 
invaluable. It is, however, to be doubted whether a widespread use of 
such a device would not unduly impede governmental action. While 
the process of consultation, in whatever form, has the democratic virtue 
of bringing informed opinion to bear,47 it has also possible disadvantages. 
If too elaborate it may impose delay, and provoke resistance,43 or erode 
43 The procedure of the Special Order Committee (see [1956] Public Law 207) makes its 
work particularly useful. 
44 At its most extreme it may, as under the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) 
Act, 1946, amount to preparation of the subordinate legislation by affected interests. 
Too widespread a use of such devices could be, it seems, constitutionally dangerous. 
46 The Educational Institute for Scotland has, for example, by its charter particular rights 
to be consulted. 
46 Thorneloe and Clarkson Ltd. v. B.O.T. [1950] 2 All E.R. 245 and as to the meaning of 
consultation and advice see Rollo v. Minister of Town & Country Planning [1948] 1 All 
E.R. 13; Hayman v. Lord Advocate, 1951 S.C. 621. The question arises here too whether 
or not such provisions are mandatory or not, May v. Beattie [1927] 2 K.B. 353. 
47 Cf. Circular 21/61 of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. 
43 On the first point see the debate in 650 H.C.Deb. col. 771; on the second compare Jaffé, 
" The American Administrative Procedure Act " [1956] Public Law 218. 
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both parliamentary control and doctrines of ministerial responsibility. 
While some erosion may well be acceptable, the process could go too far. 
The value of this control must therefore be judged in a quite general 
setting. 
A second group of what one may call institutional safeguards exists 
within the administration itself. Subordinate legislation is not taken lightly 
by the civil service. Internal committees exist to consider drafts, consider- 
able weight being given both to ministerial approval and where possible 
to ministerial signature. The form of power asked for, whether it is to 
be subject to positive or negative procedure, is carefully considered 
as is draftsmanship itself.49 All these devices may be conventional, but 
do not for that reason lack force, and the necessary or desirable scope of 
other forms of control should be calculated against the background of 
their existence. 
Judicial control. It is evident that the controls hitherto discussed have 
each a slightly different object. One form of parliamentary control 
is concerned with policy, a second with technical regularity and general 
observance of parliamentary intent. Among the institutional controls one 
is greatly concerned with content, another with administrative morality. 
None of these classifications is absolute, but the degree of specialisation 
is useful. None of these controls is primarily concerned with legality, 
though clearly that is an important element of administrative morality, 
and equally the House of Commons Committee when it is considering 
an unusual or unexpected use of the power given is very close to the 
question of ultra vires. In the main, however, control of legality must 
properly be left to the courts. Concern for the preservation of this 
element of control is evident in the report of the Committee on Ministers' 
Powers, and in the terms of reference of the Scrutiny Committee of the 
House of Commons. It is also evident in the attitude of the courts 
themselves. 
The role of the courts is at the centre of the debate about the effect 
of provisions such as one that the orders " shall have effect as if they 
were contained in this Act." Assuming the inability to challenge a statute 
it was argued that such provisions also made subordinate legislation 
unchallengeable. It was mistakenly thought that such provisions were 
modern, whereas they were ancient, running back to a time of uncertainty 
about the nature of both primary and secondary legislation.6° In origin 
such provisions probably meant little more than that the rules were to 
be observed as law. One result of this misconception was that there were 
49 See particularly Minutes of Evidence, Select Committee on Delegated Legislation (1952 -53) 
H.C. 310-1) especially the evidence of Sir Frank Newsam and Sir David Milne, and see 
Mitchell, " Reflections on Law and Orders," 1958 J.R. 19. 
59 See the examples in note 1, supra. 
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suggestions that such provision did effectively exclude judicial review,51 
though these suggestions did not form part of the ratio of the decision. 
In later years, in England, considerable doubt has been cast upon such 
suggestions, particularly in Minister of Health v. The King (on the prose- 
cution of Yaffe) 62 though it cannot yet be said that the widest interpreta- 
tion (which would exclude judicial review) will not sometimes be there 
accepted.63 In Scotland substantial uncertainty existed,54 and was 
not quietened by Lockwood's case, but it has finally been asserted that 
even a provision in the form " as if enacted in the Act " will not entirely 
exclude judicial review.55 
The argument is, however, not entirely simple. Judicial review 
may be concerned with procedural or with substantive regularity, and 
the attitude of the courts, reflected in the cases referred to above, may 
affect the interpretation of the sections conferring legislative power. 
So far as procedural irregularities are concerned, where these do not go 
to matters of substance, and the order has been made, the courts may 
more readily accept its finality,55 though they are prepared to intervene 
in the preliminary stages.b7 It is clear that in matters of substance the 
courts are prepared to consider whether or not an order is ultra vires 
in the simpler sense of that phrase, but the exercise of the power to review 
in that sense depends upon the phraseology of the Act conferring the 
legislative power. Where that conferment is either in very broad terms, 
or in terms which largely involve elements of policy, judicial review may be 
effectively excluded, even though it is not expressly excluded. The wording 
of the power may be such that the courts are incompetent to determine 
whether the exercise of it is properly to be regarded as ancillary to the 
primary purpose,b8 or, where the ambit of the power is defined by such 
phrases as " for purposes of maintaining services essential to the life 
of the community," the courts may feel that the interpretation of these 
phrases is not for them.b9 Again a power conferred upon Commissioners 
of Customs and Excise to make regulations for matters for which 
provision " appears to them to be necessary " does not in terms exclude 
51 Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood (1894) 21 R.(H.L.) 61 at 67; [1894] A.C. 347, 
360, per Lord Herschell. 
52 [1931] A.C. 494; see particularly p. 503, per Lord Dunedin. The rejection of Lockwood's 
case is not as clear as might have been wished. 
53 Bankes v. Salisbury Diocesan Council & Ors. [1960] Ch. 631 at 656. 
54 Crichton v. Forfar County Road Trs. (1886) 13 R.(J.) 99; Glasgow Insurance Committee 
v. Scottish Insurance Commissioners, 1915 S.C. 504; Shepherd v. Howman, 1918 J.C. 78; 
David Lawson Ltd. v. Torrance, 1929 J.C. 119; Bell v. S. of S. for Scotland, 1933 S.L.T. 
519. 
55 M'Ewan's Trs. v. Church of Scotland General Trs., 1940 S.L.T. 356 at 359. It seems that, 
interpreted in the light of Lord Robertson's remarks, such phrases add little to the strength 
of the order when made. This interpretation is probably consistent with the history of 
these provisions. 
66 Hepburn v. Wilson (1901) 4 F.(J.) 18; R. v. Sheer Metalcraft Ltd. [1954] I Q.B. 586. 
b7 Bell v. S. of S. for Scotland, 1933 S.L.T. 519. 
58 Demetriades v. Glasgow Corporation [1951] 1 All E.R. 457. 
59 Pollok School v. Glasgow Town Clerk, 1946 S.C. 373. 
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judicial review, but makes its exercise very difficult.60 In practice it is 
in relation to such provisions that debate as to the exclusion of the courts 
now mainly centres. Provisions of the type " as if contained in the 
Act " are now rare, and provisions of the type now under discussion 
(i.e., provisions which do not, in terms, exclude judicial review, but 
which by their breadth make it difficult) are much more common. Yet 
their full implication for judicial review may escape the attention of 
the Scrutiny Committee. In assessing the scope of judicial review allow- 
ance must be made for the deference of courts to Parliament, and of the 
reliance which is placed upon the effectiveness of the doctrine of minis- 
terial responsibility. Such deference has the effect of still further increasing 
the scope of broad provisions, since their exercise will clearly involve 
considerations of policy which will make the courts reluctant to intervene. 
One further factor should be considered in relation to the possibility 
of a real or effective exclusion of judicial review. That is the existence 
of provisions which allow a short period for challenge, but once that 
period has elapsed it is declared that " the Order shall not be challenged 
in any legal proceedings whatsoever." Such provisions are useful in 
limiting challenge upon procedural grounds or based upon straight- 
forward issues of vires, which was probably their original purpose. 
They may work hardship where the challenge is based upon bad faith, 
since the grounds for such a challenge might not be discernible within 
the limited period. It has been held in England that such provisions 
would operate to exclude challenges to validity based upon assertions 
of bad faith, where the challenge is made outside the short period of 
time.ß1 It is, however, doubtful whether such provisions would be 
similarly interpreted in Scotland.ó2 The element of general principle in 
the judicial control of public bodies which marked the growth of Scots law 
in this context would appear to be inconsistent with such a result. 
Subject to these reservations judicial control can ensure that proper 
procedures are followed,63 that the order, as made, is squarely within 
the terms of the power and is not achieving some oblique purpose.84 
The courts will also concern themselves with the form of orders, par- 
ticularly where there is the possibility of a prosecution in the event of 
60 Commissioners of Customs & Excise v. Cure & Deeley Ltd. [1961] 3 All E.R. 641. The 
difficulty is probably enhanced by the fact that constitutional cases not being clearly 
separated from others the influence of some, decided in special circumstances, such as 
Liversidge v. Anderson [1942] A.C. 206 lingers on too strongly in changed circumstances. 
The particular case of Cure & Deeley Ltd. may, however, be of limited application since 
it involves taxation where rules of construction are more strict. It is to be noticed that, 
perhaps for the first time, in Ridge v. Baldwin [1963] 2 All E.R. 66 at 76, per Lord Reid, 
full weight is given to such special circumstances. 
61 Smith v. East Elbe R.D.C. [1956] A.C. 736. 
62 See, e.g., the reservations in Pollok School v. Glasgow Town Clerk, 1946 S.C. 373 and 
Demetriades v. Glasgow Corporation [1951] 1 All E.R. 457. See, too, Caledonian Ry. 
v. Glasgow Corporation (1905) 7 F. 1020 at 1027, per Lord President Dunedin. 
63 Magistrates of Ayr v. Lord Advocate, 1950 S.C. 102; Kerr v. Hood, 1907 S.C. 895. 
64 Caledonian Ry. v. Glasgow Corporation (1905) 7 F. 1020; Rossi v. Magistrates of Edinburgh, 
1904 7 F.(H.L.) 87; Brock v. Forth Pilotage Authority, 1947 S.N. 41; London and Westcliff 
Properties Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government [1961] 1 All E.R. 610. 
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breach, and will thus insist upon a minimum degree of certainty and 
clarity.65 Thus there exists a sufficient framework for judicial contro1.66 
The operation of that control is, it must be emphasised, affected by 
many of the considerations indicated above. It is probable that subordi- 
nate legislation made by bodies other than ministers will be more closely 
scrutinised (though the tests may formally be the same) than will be 
ministerial subordinate legislation.67 It is at such points that the theoretical 
effectiveness of conventional doctrines such as those of ministerial responsi- 
bility have effect in determining the attitude of the courts. Moreover 
while principles may still be formulated in traditional words it may also 
be true that the practical application of these principles has changed.ó8 
Judicial control must be looked at against the background of the whole 
complex of controls. That complex is necessary because of the different 
elements of subordinate legislation which require surveillance, not all 
of which could be overseen by one body. 
Thus the sufficiency of the present system of surveillance cannot be 
judged from the point of view of any one method of control. The opera- 
tion of each is to a certain extent determined by views which are held 
of the operation of others, and these views may amount to little more 
than an acceptance of traditional phraseology, or they may be determined 
by a realistic assessment of the operation of other controls. It is for the 
student to determine for himself whether an appropriate balance is now 
struck, particularly in relation to judicial control, though it must be 
emphasised that all the difficulties which face courts when they reach out 
into the realms of policy (albeit through the mechanism of " reasonable- 
ness "), and which have already been noted,69 are here as great as 
anywhere else. 
65 Marshall v. Clark, 1957 J.C. 68, Tuker v. Minister of Agriculture [1960] 2 All E.R. 834. 
It should, however, be noted that in the former case the suggestion is not that the regula- 
tions would be invalid, but that they would be unenforceable, moreover the attitude of 
the court in the former case emphasises the importance of the operation of the Scrutiny 
Committee in relation to clarity. 
66 It must be emphasised that the framework only is here discussed. The detailed application 
of the rules gives rise to many difficult questions, including such matters as the relationship 
of subordinate to primary legislation, see for example among recent illustrations Bingham 
v. Bruce [1962] 1 All E.R. 136; Canadian Pacific Steamships v. Bryers [1958] A.C. 485; 
Stephens v. Cuckfleld R.D.C. [1960] 2 Q.B. 373; Boddington v. Wisson [1951] 1 K.B. 
606. The proper explanation of these aspects is more appropriate to books on Adminis- 
trative Law, and the reader is referred to Griffith and Street, op. cit.; Wade, Administrative 
Law; and Bennett Miller, Local Government and Administrative Law. 
67 See Marshall v. Clark, 1957 J.C. 68; Pollok School v. Glasgow Town Clerk, 1946 S.C. 
373; or Sparks v. Edward Ash Ltd. [1943] K.B. 223. 
68 Consider, e.g., the modern application of the principles enunciated by Lord President 
Inglis in Nicol v. Magistrates of Aberdeen (1870) 9 M. 306 at 308 in the light of Blair 
v. Smith, 1924 J.C. 24, and compare Sommervillev.Langmuir, 1932 J.C. 55 with Magistrates 
of Ayr v. S. of S. for Scotland, 1950 S.C. 102 at 106 -107, or the weight attributed to 
laying before Parliament in either Lockwood's case or (more particularly) Yaffe's case 
note 52, above. 
69 Ante, p. 226. 
CHAPTER 16 
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS 
Introduction. The changing role of government had its effects on the 
machinery for adjudication, just as it had upon the machinery for legisla- 
tion. The introduction of a system of National Insurance, for example, 
brought with it a vast increase in the number of issues upon which adjudi- 
cation was necessary. Similarly the changing nature of law had its effects. 
In many important fields, such as property, law was changing from a law 
of obligation to a law of standards; questions of land use, for example, 
became almost as important as questions of land ownership. Thus 
new issues arose for decision, or old issues arose in greater quantity or 
in more significant forms? Coupled with such developments, was the 
development of the courts themselves. The process of the refinement 
of the judicial process involved an increasing rigidity in courts, and in 
their procedures, which reduced the suitability of courts for the more 
modern forms of adjudication which were required. A specialised 
machine designed for making a precision product is expensive to run and 
relatively inflexible. Thus superior courts were unsuited for the deter- 
mination of many issues, because of expense and slowness, qualities which, 
within limits, were necessary consequences of their other functions.2 
Lower courts could equally be overwhelmed by the mass of these newer 
disputes,3 and even if they were not overwhelmed the ordinary adminis- 
tration of justice could suffer insupportable delays. In neither set of 
courts may the judge have the necessary expertise in the qualities of 
good farming or good town planning, and in both, the procedures and 
rules of evidence, designed for dealing with issues of fact, may well be 
inappropriate or too complex for the matters involved, and may well 
increase the expense of securing a determination.4 
Other reasons contributed to these developments. In its expanded 
scope efficient administration required new methods for reaching decisions. 
The necessary information upon which to formulate a decision might 
1 The aedilic jurisdiction of the dean of guild court, and the concern of that court for 
neighbourhood questions is a sufficient example. 
2 See, e.g., Lord Cooper, " The Defects in the British Judicial Machine," 2 J.S.P.T.L. 
(x.s.) 91, and his views in " Administrative Justice " (1954) 32 Public Administration 165. 
3 Local appeal tribunals under the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act heard in 
1961 7,006 cases, claims determined under that and the National Insurance Acts in that 
year numbered some 15,000,000 (Report of the Ministry of Pensions and National 
Insurance for 1961). The industrial injuries jurisdiction was transferred from sheriff 
and county courts as possible and usual tribunals of first instance. The jurisdiction was 
to a great extent arbitral. The litigious element in the Workmen's Compensation Scheme 
was one of the points of criticism of it. 
4 The Small Debt Court exists to overcome somewhat similar difficulties. 
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most easily be acquired by means of a local inquiry, at which adversary 
procedures could be important in testing the weight of evidence. Moreover 
with the advent of an " open " society, administration must itself, if its 
results are to be generally acceptable, become more open in its processes. 
One consequence of this pressure is the development of consultation in 
the legislative process, another is the development of local inquiries to 
which reference has already been made. Again, as law developed in the 
ways that have been indicated it became, in one sense, less pure. The 
element of policy in any decision tended to grow and to be more obvious,b 
and thus it was felt that decisions should be taken by bodies other than 
the ordinary courts, a feeling which increased as respect for the neutrality 
of those courts developed. It must be emphasised that the evolution 
was, until recent years, slow, but that there is nothing new in administra- 
tive tribunals. The Commissioners for the Plantation of Kirks and 
Valuation of Teinds 8 were such, and met with all the criticisms of modern 
administrative tribunals. Correspondingly, because of the length of 
that development the courts are not without the marks of administrative 
tribunals? Just as the evolution of delegated legislation gave rise to 
problems and to disquiet so too did the rise of administrative tribunals. 
Informality and speed can prejudice justice, in the administration of 
which the courts had an expertise, even if they were not expert on other 
aspects of the disputes. The expert may be too enthusiastic, and give 
too little weight to other considerations. The creation of administrative 
tribunals can be carried too far, so that the process of administration be- 
comes too judicialised,8 and other constitutional doctrines, such as 
ministerial responsibility, are eroded. Here as elsewhere the problem 
is one of finding the right balance of controlling techniques.° 
Types of tribunal. It is impossible to separate by any clear and 
meaningful test administrative tribunals from courts properly so called.10 
There is a gradation from what could be called a typical judicial process, 
to a typical administrative process. One useful distinction may, however, 
be made between administrative tribunals and inquiries. Proceedings 
6 See, e.g., General Poster & Publicity Co. Ltd. v. S. of S. for Scotland, 1960 S.C. 266 at 
275. It must be remembered that an element of policy has always been present (cf. the 
history of the doctrine of common employment) but the nature of " policy " in the cases 
now under discussion is sharper and more debatable. 
6 A.P.S. V, 35. 
7 e.g., in questions such as the appointment of Curators, or in questions of guardianship, 
see the discussion in Re K. (Infants) [1962] 3 All E.R. 1000; Fowler v. Fowler and Sines 
[1963] 1 All E.R. 119. 
8 Cf. M'Millan v. Inverness C.C., 1949 S.C. 77, per Lord President Cooper. 
° See, generally, Allen, Law and Orders; Griffith and Street, Principles of Administrative 
Law; de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action; Wade, Administrative Law; 
Dicey's article, " The Development of Administrative Law in England " (1915) 31 L.Q.R. 
148, should be noted for his reaction to the growth of administrative tribunals. 
10 The attempt was made in the Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers (1932) Cmd. 
4060, §§ 73 -74, to isolate the so- called quasi-judicial function, that attempt has often 
been attacked, see, e.g., Robson, op. cit. and de Smith, op. cit., and the Report of the 
Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries (1957) Cmnd. 218 (the Franks 
Report). Chap. 3 commends an empirical approach. 
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in the former result in a decision, those in the latter normally result 
in a recommendation, the final decision being taken by or on behalf of 
the minister. The two types of proceedings are distinguished in the 
Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958, s. 1.11 All that here can be done is 
to indicate the range of tribunals and the sort of decision with which 
they are concerned. A detailed survey of all tribunals would only serve 
to obscure a picture which is in any event sufficiently difficult to 
comprehend. 
It would be reasonable to regard both the Restrictive Practices Court 
and the Scottish Land Court, to which reference has already been made, 
as administrative tribunals of a highly formalised type. In both cases 
the element of policy or discretion can be great, involving non -legal con- 
siderations in a way which distinguishes the operation of such courts 
from that of a court concerned with an ordinary civil cause.12 Although 
both have marked judicial characteristics, the " administrative " quality 
of both is indicated by the sharing of related functions with administrative 
bodies. Thus, in the case of the Restrictive Practices Court the related 
problem of monopolies is entrusted to the minister and the Monopolies 
Commission (since questions of policy or politics assume in that context 
a greater significance). So too in relation to crofting, policy, in a slightly 
different sense, requires a sharing of functions between the Land Court 
and the Crofters Commission.13 In this same group must be placed 
certain other tribunals. The Lands Tribunal, operating in England 
and Wales,14 is a tribunal dealing very broadly with problems of valuation 
and compensation, so that there can be built up both expertise and 
uniformity, but its aspect as a court is emphasised by the fact that its 
president must either have held judicial office or be a barrister of seven 
11 The distinction there made is useful, because it affects the operation of the Council on 
Tribunals. It may not be as " real " as it appears. Of the 6,500 inquiries in 1960 under 
the Minister of Housing, the Minister accepted the Inspector's recommendation in 93 per 
cent. of the cases (641 H.C.Deb. col. 5). Although in Scotland the term Reporter suggests 
a concern with fact only, the St. Andrews House Circular of May 12, 1958, says the 
report will normally lead up to recommendations. A fair idea of the range of the first 
group of tribunals can be gained from a scrutiny of Parts I and II of the First Schedule to 
the Act of 1958. The lists there given cannot be taken as generally exhaustive, being only 
for the purposes of the Act and also being liable to amendment as new tribunals are 
created. The distinction between the Tribunals and Inquiries is based on the Franks 
Report, Chap. 3, emphasising the weight of rules of law in relation to the decisions of 
administrative tribunals. 
12 s. 21 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, sets out the grounds upon which the 
court may hold a registered agreement not to be contrary to the public interest. These 
grounds involve the assessment of economic and other considerations quite outside 
the range of law. See, too, the considerations which must govern the Land Court in 
determining whether or not to uphold a notice to quit, Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) 
Act, 1949, s. 25 (as amended). 
13 Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, ss. 28 and 29 and the Crofters (Scotland) Acts, 
1955 and 1961. Storing and Self, " The Birch in the Cupboard " [1960] Public Law 
367 should be considered in this context: and see The Farmer and the State by the same 
authors. 
14 Established under the Lands Tribunal Act, 1949; see, generally, Van Oss and MacDermot, 
The Lands Tribunal. Its functions as an appeal court in the rating system are performed 
by the Valuation Appeals Court in Scotland. Compensation, failing agreement, on a 
compulsory purchase is there dealt with by arbitration. 
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years' standing. From it appeal lies by way of case stated to the Court 
of Appeal. In relation to inland transport, the Transport Tribunal 
operates both as a court of first instance in relation to charges schemes 
in London, and as a court of appeal from licensing authorities for goods 
vehicles, and for its different purposes is now organised in two divisions.76 
It has marked characteristics as a court, the president, a lawyer, holds 
office during good behaviour, and from it appeals on questions of law 
lie to the Court of Session or Court of Appeal, depending upon the venue 
of the original hearing.16 The Special Commissioners of Income Tax,17 
form in effect a court of a similar specialised type, but in that case, and 
in relation to the Air Transport Licensing Board,i8 the strong " judicial " 
element in the presidency which has been noticed in relation to the 
bodies just discussed is not so apparent, or is absent. The Special 
Commissioners are civil servants, the chairman of the Air Transport 
Licensing Board holds office according to the terms of the instrument of 
his appointment. 
Apart from such specialised tribunals the curial character of adminis- 
trative tribunals varies greatly. Where tribunals concerned with a 
particular subject- matter are organised in a hierarchy that character is 
often marked in the higher tribunals, whereas the lower ones may merge 
with the administration. Thus in the field of National Insurance, the 
initial decision is taken by an insurance officer who is a civil servant 
chosen by the minister. Thence appeal lies to a local tribunal of three 
members; a paid chairman, and one chosen from a panel of employers 
and self -employed persons, the third from an employed persons panel.10 
All are part -time appointees and have no real long -term security of tenure. 
From this body appeals lie to the Commissioner (or Industrial Injuries 
Commissioner in the case of the parallel scheme) who is required to be 
an advocate or barrister of not less than ten years' standing, who holds 
office during good behaviour.20 Somewhat similarly under the National 
Health Services Acts,21 there is an increase in formality from the service 
committees which investigate alleged breaches of service by National 
15 See, generally, for the history of this body, Kahn- Freund, The Law of Inland Transport, 
and for the present structure see Transport Act, 1962, s. 57. 
is As to appeals see British Transport Commission v. L.C.C. [1953] 1 Q.B. 736, and Merchan- 
dise Transport Ltd. v. B.T.C. [1962] 2 Q.B. 173. 
17 Income Tax Act, 1952, s. 8, the legal qualifications of the Special Commissioners are 
markedly different from those of the General Commissioners. 
19 Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act, 1960, s. 1, and First Sched. 
19 For a good factual analysis of the staffing of administrative tribunals see McCorquodale, 
" The Composition of Administrative Tribunals " [1962] Public Law 298. 
20 The term Commissioner includes Deputy Commissioners. In case of difficulty a tribunal 
consisting of the Commissioner and two Deputies may be convened. For operation 
see Safford, " The Creation of Case Law under the National Insurance and National 
Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Acts " (1954) 17 M.L.R. 197. In 1961 the Commissioner 
decided 1,544 National Insurance appeals, 773 under the industrial injuries scheme, 
80 family allowance appeals. Seven appeals were heard by tribunals, being appeals 
which involved questions of law of special difficulty. 
21 National Health Service Act, 1946, and National Health Service (Scotland) Act, 1947. 
In 1961 1,297 recommendations were made by Executive Councils and 1,347 decisions 
issued by the Minister of Health or Tribunal. Out of 95 appeals 21 were allowed. 
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Health Service staffs, and report to the Executive Council which decides 
upon a recommendation to the minister. Anyone aggrieved by the 
decision of the Executive Council may appeal to the minister, who may 
(and sometimes must) hold a local inquiry, at which procedure becomes 
much more formal. 
In other cases administrative tribunals are not thus part of a system. 
Of this group there are many examples, and the independent schools 
tribunals,22 or rent tribunals," can serve as examples. Among this group, 
where appellate procedures are provided, appeal may lie to the minister, 
as in the system of licensing public services by road transport.24 
Types of inquiry. Inquiries are as varied in form and purpose as are 
tribunals. The Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958, s. 1, speaks of them 
in the context of " administrative procedures involving ... the holding 
by or on behalf of a minister of a statutory inquiry." That context is 
broad enough. It can cover inquiries which precede decisions about 
the designation of a new town, those which precede the confirmation 
of a compulsory purchase order, or approval of a planning scheme. 
They may be concerned with the enlargement of a burgh, the alterations 
of ward boundaries within a burgh, the reorganisation of local government 
areas. They may be established primarily for the ascertainment of facts, 
as in connection with accidents on the railways, in the air or at sea, 
or mining accidents. In such cases they may, either originally, or as 
the inquiry progresses become concerned with the attribution of blame 
or the ascertainment of fault. In such cases, when the inquiry becomes 
thus centred upon an individual it is noticeable that the procedure becomes 
more formalised in relation to that individual.E6 Just as the subject - 
matter of inquiries is varied, so is the type of person who holds the inquiry. 
He may hold such inquiries as part of his normal duties. A sheriff is 
responsible, for example, for inquiries in connection with the extension 
of a burgh, and that administrative function is part of the standing obliga- 
tions of the office. He may hold a specialised appointment such as 
that of the Commissioner of Wrecks (when the inquiry into marine 
accidents is most formal). The person presiding may, as with the In- 
spectors on the staff of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 
be a civil servant responsible for holding inquiries into a large range of 
matters related to local government, or he may, as is frequently the 
22 Education (Scotland) Act, 1962, s. 113; Education Act, 1944, s. 72. 
23 Rent of Furnished Houses Control (Scotland) Act, 1943, s. 1 or the English Act of 
1946. 
24 In contrast to the system in relation to goods vehicles (note 15, supra) the Transport 
Tribunal has jurisdiction as to road transport in the London area, Transport Act, 1962, 
s. 45. The route of appeal is not uniform. The Caravan Sites and Control of Develop- 
ment Act, 1960, s. 33 gives an appeal against a planning enforcement notice to the minister 
in England and Wales. In Scotland such appeals still run to the sheriff, as they have 
since 1947. 
25 The Report of the Committee on Civil Aircraft Accident Investigation, 1961 (C.A.P. 
169) will give an indication of the techniques and difficulties. 
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case in such cases in Scotland, be a " Reporter " named ad hoc for the 
purposes of the particular inquiry who is otherwise a practising member 
of the Bar. At one time the appointment of advocates was almost 
automatic, though recently there has been an increasing tendency to 
appoint former civil servants of distinction, or other similar persons. 
The inquiry may then be primarily fact finding; it may be primarily 
concerned with governmental matters. Even these last may affect in- 
dividuals in a variety of generalised ways, as for example in connection 
with the adjustment of burgh boundaries. The inquiry may affect an 
individual much more directly and closely in relation to his property, 
as for example, where the inquiry is in relation to a compulsory purchase 
order, or upon a planning matter. Except where the revocation of a 
licence is involved (as may be the case with pilots of aircraft, officers of 
the Merchant Navy or mining officials) there is always a substantial 
element of policy involved in the final decision even when individual 
property rights are most immediately affected (as in the case of a com- 
pulsory purchase order). Considerations of the location of population, 
of public investment, or even of the desirability of the project for which 
the order is required may all be involved. All of these may be matters 
of argument rather than of proof. Thus, it is clear that in these cases 
although there may be a dispute, there is much less of a lis or specific 
claim than in those matters which are normally dealt with by tribunals. 
On the whole questions have arisen largely in connection with inquiries 
arising from proposals for compulsory purchase orders, or from inquiries 
relating to planning matters, and it is these which will be mainly discussed 
here. 
The problem of administrative tribunals and inquiries. It is apparent 
that among administrative tribunals there is no uniformity as to structure, 
nor as to their relationship with the ordinary courts. From some appeals 
lie to the ordinary courts, from others appeal is to another administrative 
tribunal or to an administrative body. Some closely resemble courts 
in composition, and, in operation, are simply specialised courts. In 
other cases the resemblance is much more to an administrative body. 
Yet others resemble more closely bodies which are halfway between 
public and private bodies. Under the Police Acts, and the disciplinary 
regulations made thereunder, tribunals are constituted for hearing 
allegations of offences against those regulations.26 Such bodies closely 
resemble in function professional disciplinary bodies such as the Dis- 
ciplinary Committee of the General Medical Council from which, under 
the Medical Act, 1956, appeal lies to the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Counci1.27 There is a further shading from such bodies to the 
26 See, too, the Police Appeals Acts, 1927 -43, and as to fire services see M' Donald v. Lanark- 
shire Fire Brigade Joint Authority, 1959, S.C. 141. 
27 The public character of similar bodies is reflected in the Report of the Committee on 
Powers of Subpoena (1960) Cmnd. I033. These medical tribunals are concerned with 
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disciplinary organs of private bodies, such as trade unions, whose opera- 
tions can have consequences of which the state must take notice.28 
Because of this variability and of these gradations there are obvious 
difficulties in formulating general rules of law for controlling all such 
bodies. 
Inquiries. These difficulties are enhanced when inquiries are con- 
sidered. The device of an inquiry (which, when that course is suitable 
and convenient, is held locally) is an obvious one, serving the useful 
purpose of gathering information and permitting objectors to proposals 
to formulate their objections. Most frequently the device was (and 
still is) used in circumstances which involved the compulsory purchase 
of land. The system could conveniently be worked so long as local 
authorities were originators, and had a relatively high degree of autonomy 
in such matters as slum clearance, building lines, or housing. In such 
circumstances the minister could appear as the deus ex machina, hold an 
inquiry, and issue a determination. Once, however, it was common for 
the proposals to originate with the minister (as they must under the 
New Towns Act, 1946) or it was common for the minister to be in close 
contact with a local authority at all stages in a proposal (so that he 
could not suddenly appear as a neutral) the situation was altered.29 
In any event, other doctrines come into play in relation to many such 
inquiries. If the theory of ministerial responsibility is to be maintained 
the person holding the inquiry cannot formally decide in his own name.38 
Moreover the element of policy involved in the decisions in question 
was such that ultimately the controlling voice had to be administrative. 
Individual disquiet was therefore inevitable. The individual, rightly or 
wrongly, might assume that he was in the face of a judge, who was not 
neutral, and he would see overridden arguments, which were to him 
convincing. 
The process of reform. The haphazard growth of tribunals and 
inquiries meant that there were faults in the system. Reasons might 
not be given for a decision, and there was no clear feeling that justice 
was done. The feeling of malaise grew, and was emphasised in the same 
way as was that in relation to delegated legislation. The Committee 
the profession generally, those above referred to are concerned with policing the National 
Health Service. 
28 e.g., Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board [1953] 2 Q.B. 18; Lee v. Showmen's Guild 
[1952] 2 Q.B. 329. 
29 This alteration in England provoked all the argument about a /is or a quasi -lis; Board 
of Education v. Rice [1911] A.C. 179; Errington v. Minister of Health [1935] 1 K.B. 249 
leading up to Franklin v. Minister of Town & Country Planning [1948] A.C. 87. In England 
the position was aggravated by the fact that the inquiry was normally held by an inspector 
who was on the staff of the minister. In Scotland it was held (as has been indicated 
above) by a reporter, normally a member of the Bar. 
39 In fact, it was, however, said that of 6,500 inquiries under the Minister of Housing the 
inspector's report was accepted in 93 per cent. of the cases and in the balance of cases 
the departure from the report was not always substantial (641 H.C.Deb. col. 5). 
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on Ministers' Powers therefore considered administrative adjudication 
as well as administrative legislation. The misfortune of the report 
was that it attempted to separate, by definition, judicial, administrative 
and quasi-judicial decisions, but in practice these definitions proved in- 
adequate as a basis for legislative reform.3' While therefore the Com- 
mittee recommended minor reforms no action was taken. Interest 
was renewed particularly as a result of Franklin v. Minister of Town and 
Country Planning,92 and of unhappy events at Crichel Down 33 (even 
though the latter were, in truth, distinct from the issue of administrative 
adjudication). In consequence a Committee (commonly called the Franks 
Committee) on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries was estab- 
lished.34 The report of that Committee adopted an empirical approach,36 
and proposed detailed reforms in procedure, as well as the general 
reform of the establishment of a supervisory body. As a result of the 
consideration of the report, the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958, 
was passed carrying out those of the proposals of the Committee which 
were acceptable to the government. Yet others, e.g., in relation to pro- 
cedures at inquiries were implemented by administrative means. While 
the Report is of general importance, it seems most suitable to consider 
its consequences in the context of the various controls of administrative 
tribunals. 
Institutional controls. Attention has already been drawn to the 
requirement that the president of certain tribunals should have legal 
qualifications. By section 6 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act there 
was an extension of this requirement to certain tribunals under the 
National Service Acts. More importantly by section 3 the chairmen of 
certain tribunals established under the National Assistance Act, or 
National Insurance Act, and of rent tribunals under the Furnished Houses 
(Rent Control) legislation, shall now be selected from panels appointed 
by the Lord Chancellor or the Lord President or Lord Chief Justice of 
Northern Ireland, as the case may be, for tribunals operating in England 
and Wales, in Scotland, or in Northern Ireland. Further, by section 5, 
no power to terminate a person's membership of any of the tribunals 
listed in the First Schedule to the Act (with few exceptions) can be exer- 
cised without the approval of the Lord Chancellor, Lord President or 
Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, according to where the tribunal 
31 For criticism of these definitions, see Ridge v. Baldwin [1963] 2 All E.R. 66, per Lord Reid 
and in the books see Robson, Justice and Administrative Law; and Griffith and Street, 
op. cit. Chap. IV; and see, generally, Wade, Administrative Law; and de Smith, Judicial 
Review of Administrative Action, Chap. II. 
32 [1948] A.C. 87. 
33 Report of the Public Inquiry on the Disposal of Land at Crichel Down (1954) Cmd. 
9176. 
34 The report (the Franks Report) was published in 1957 as Cmnd. 218. The report and 
the minutes of evidence are to be commended as a mine of information on administrative 
adjudication. 
35 Though at points the semantic approach was not absent, see particularly § 40 and Chap. 4. 
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sits. If it sits in more than one jurisdiction each appropriate person 
must consent. Thus there is some buttress for independence, but where 
appointments are for limited terms, as is normal, this provision does 
not affect the question of renewal of appointment, so that its effect can 
be overemphasised. Probably the most important provision in the 
Act is section 1 establishing the Council on Tribunals with a specific 
Scottish Committee (some of whose members are, and others of whom 
are not, members of the General Council). Under the Act the Scottish 
Committee must be consulted where appropriate and it may of its own 
motion report on a matter to the Council. 
The charter of the Council is a broad one. It is charged with keeping 
under review the constitution and working of the tribunals listed in the 
First Schedule to the Act 38; with reporting on such matters as may be 
referred to it concerning any tribunal (other than a court of law); and 
with reporting on matters referred to it or which it may consider to be of 
special importance with respect to administrative procedures which 
involve the holding of an inquiry. Further, by section 8 of the Act, no 
power to make procedural rules for any of the Scheduled Tribunals 
may be exercised by any appropriate authority without consultation 
with the Council. As a result of a somewhat inelegant process of amend- 
ment a new section, 7A, is inserted by section 33 of the Town and Country 
Planning Act, 1959, and of the Scottish Act of the same year, giving to 
the Lord Chancellor and the Lord President the power to make rules 
(after consultation with the Council) regulating procedure at inquiries. 
By section 4, the Council is given the specific task of making general 
recommendations on appointments to tribunals or to the panel from 
which they are formed. 
There is thus constituted for the first time a body capable of keeping 
under continuous review the system of administrative adjudication, and 
the performance of that function will be aided by the practice of the 
Council of making on the spot inspections of tribunals. It is likely that, 
as a result of the operations of the Council greater uniformity of practice 
will arise, and that newly created tribunals will conform to an established 
pattern.37 It must, however, be emphasised that the Council is an 
advisory body. Recommendations which it makes, while having great 
weight, are not binding upon ministers.38 It is in such matters that 
36 Under s. 10 additional tribunals may be added to the Schedule as was, for example, 
the Registrar under s. 13 of the National Insurance Act, 1959. 
37 See Wade, " The Council on Tribunals " [1960] Public Law 351. Unfortunately the 
Tribunals and Inquiries Act is in one sense not complete in itself. Further amendments 
to the law which resulted from the Franks Report are to be found, e.g., ss. 179, 181 of the 
Town and Country Planning Act, 1962, and ss. 31, 32, of the Town and Country Planning 
(Scotland) Act, 1959. In both cases s. 32 (or 181) extends s. 9 of the Tribunals and 
Inquiries Act to inquiries, the original section having been limited to tribunals, and s. 31 
(or 179) extends forms of procedure applicable in cases of compulsory purchase to 
planning. 
38 Second Report of the Council on Tribunals, § 46, and compare the report of the Council 
on the Rights of Third Parties at Inquiries (Cmnd. 1787) and the subsequent regulations 
S.I. 1962 Nos. 1424 and 1425 (made, for England and Wales, under the new s. 7A above 
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the weight of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility is seen, as it is 
also in a comparison between the recommendations contained in the 
Franks Report and the ensuing Act. A choice has to be made between 
different methods of control, and if a choice is made to maintain the system 
of ministerial responsibility the ultimate effectiveness of such institutional 
controls as the Council must be thus limited. It must equally be em- 
phasised that the Council is supervisory. It is not an appellate body. 
Though it receives complaints from individuals it can, it seems, only 
concern itself with the general principles involved.99 In effect, therefore, 
its concern is primarily with procedure, and in operation it in no way 
derogates from other controls. 
Judicial control. The other main control over administrative adjudica- 
tion is of necessity judicial. In relation to the most highly judicialised 
tribunals, parliamentary control would be inappropriate, as it would be 
in relation to those tribunals organised on a hierarchic basis. Where 
ultimately, as from the Air Transport Licensing Board, appeal lies to 
the minister the ordinary rules of answerability to Parliament are applic- 
able. Those rules also apply in relation to inquiries, and there with 
particular force. The decision is that of the minister, the procedure 
is designed to preserve that situation and therefore his responsibility 
remains. There is, however, nothing particular to observe about parlia- 
mentary control in this context. The existence of that control does not 
exclude judicial control, for example, over procedural matters in relation 
to inquiries,40 but, as has already been indicated, the two methods react 
upon each other. If parliamentary controls are to be maintained they 
will relate to substance. That being so, judicial control will be primarily 
concerned with procedural and not substantive due process. 
There are other reasons which lead to the same conclusion. In the 
same way that the reasons for the existence of delegated legislation 
impose limitations upon the controls, so also do the reasons for creating 
administrative tribunals have a like effect. An appeal upon the subject - 
matter of the expertise from an expert body to a less expert body is 
generally inappropriate. The expertise of the courts lies in law and 
the administration of justice and it is therefore largely upon these matters 
that judicial control is focused. The topic cannot here be explored in 
the detail which is appropriate to a work of administrative law, and 
what follows will be largely concerned with general principles. 
A distinction must be made at the outset between appeal and judicial 
review. Where an appeal exists it may be on a question of fact or of 
law, or of both. Appeals where they lie to the ordinary courts from 
referred to), and the correspondence between the Chairman and the Lord Chancellor 
reported in [1962] Public Law 392 et seq. and 239 H.L.Deb. 1149; 664 H.C.Deb. cols. 
726 -752. As an example of the rejection of recommendations as to rules see the Report 
for 1961, § 33. 
a9 Third Report of the Council for 1961, §§ 12, 13 and 63 -70; cf. Report for 1962, § 62. 
40 e.g., Magistrates of Ayr v. S. of S. for Scotland, 1950 S.C. 102. 
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administrative tribunals are normally only upon law, and the normal 
mechanism is by way of stating a case for the opinion of the court. Such 
proceedings are concerned with the substance of the dispute, and the 
appellate tribunal may substitute its own decision for that of the inferior 
tribunal. The Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958, s. 9, extended the range 
of tribunals from which such appeals might lie 41 By the Town and 
Country Planning legislation of 1959 this section is extended to specified 
ministerial decisions following inquiries. From many important tribunals 
such as the Lands Tribunal, such an appeal already lay. In other cases, 
notably the National Insurance tribunals, it was considered that the 
system of tribunals was itself so strong that the addition of an appeal 
was unnecessary, and might indeed impede.42 Judicial review on the 
other hand is concerned with the regularity of proceedings, and so 
the consequence is that the superior tribunal exercising its power to 
review will reduce or quash the decision of the inferior tribunal or, if 
the inferior has not acted, direct it to act. It is in connection with judicial 
review that most problems arise. 
In England the scope of judicial review was, until recently, largely 
determined by the forms of action, which survived in the field of public 
law long after private law had been freed from all save their ghosts. 
The prerogative orders (formerly writs) of mandamus, certiorari or 
prohibition (these being the most important here) which were the means 
by which review was sought also dictated its limits. Mandamus existed 
to compel a tribunal to act, certiorari to quash a decision, and prohibition 
to prevent a tribunal acting wrongfully. Of them all certiorari was the 
most important, and since it turned upon the " record " of the proceedings 
its effectiveness might be limited by the silence of the record as to reasons43 
The formalism of judicial review has in recent years somewhat abated as 
a result of the evolution of the more generalised remedy by way of a 
declaratory order, but it remains important for the influence it has had 
upon modes of thought,44 in particular the classification of a function 
as being judicial or quasi-judicial as against administrative may assume 
undue importance45 In contrast judicial review in Scotland has, it seems, 
a much more generalised basis, and to a large extent lacks specialised 
41 s. 13 also removed some limitations on appeal to the House of Lords. 
42 Under the National Insurance Act the minister determines some issues, and from his 
decisions appeal lies to the courts. The factor of efficiency should be noted. Control 
may lead to inertia or to delay, and thus absolute regularity may be bought at too high 
a price. See, however, Punton v. Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance [1963] 
1 All E.R. 275. 
13 R. v. Northumberland Compensation Tribunals, ex p. Shaw [1952] 1 K.B. 338. 
44 For details of these techniques the reader should refer to de Smith, Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action; Griffith and Street, op. cit.; Wade, Administrative Law, and 
Zamir, The Declaratory Judgment. 
45 Compare, R. v. Central Professional Committee for Opticians, ex p. Brown [1949] 2 All 
E.R. 519 and Hayman v. Lord Advocate, 1951 S.C. 621 and compare the speech of Lord 
Reid with those of the other members of the House of Lords in Ridge v. Baldwin [1963] 
2 All E.R. 66, and see too Mitchell, " Reflections on Law and Orders," 1958 J.R. 19 and 
Bennett Miller, " The Place of Quasi -Judicial Decisions in Scots Law " in the same 
volume. 
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procedures, those available for reducing (or quashing) a quasi-judicial 
act are often the same as those which would be used for a like purpose 
in relation to administrative acts.46 Thus, there has been an insistence 
that the Court of Session must be open to those who complain of a wrong 
done by an inferior body,47 and in this respect the abolition of the Scottish 
Privy Council had the consequence of enlarging the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Session,48 and while limitations have, by statute, been placed 
upon that review, the court is reluctant to admit limitations upon its 
powers,49 and it is probable that the Tribunals and Inquiries Act was 
of less significance in Scotland than in England. 
The grounds of review. Broadly speaking the grounds for judicial 
review are first that the tribunal has acted improperly. Here, above all, 
the rules of natural justice are of importance." These rules involve 
that no man shall be a judge in his own cause, and that the judge shall 
be without bias. They also imply an obligation to hear both sides, 
which itself involves the proposition that each side shall know the case 
he has to meet. Clearly, within the bounds of the ordinary courts these 
rules are rigidly adhered to. Within the scope of administrative tribunals 
some require modification if the purpose of creating the tribunals is not 
to be frustrated. The impartiality of the tribunal will be safeguarded,61 
and there is also insistence upon the absence of such an interest of the 
judge as may create bias,62 but while the fact of a " hearing " will be 
insisted on,63 the form of " hearing " need not involve the submission 
of oral evidence. These rules are insisted upon not merely where injustice 
may have been done, but where a suspicion could arise that justice may 
not have been done. Improper action may cover more than this insistence 
on a reasonable standard of conduct. Thus, the tribunal must itself 
decide and cannot delegate that function b4 It must, too, decide upon 
46 This formlessness, unless observed, can lead to mistakes about the scope of judicial 
review in Scotland, as it did in the Franks Report, § 107. See generally Mitchell, " The 
Scope of Judicial Review," 1959 J.R. 197. 
47 Jeffray v. Angus, 1909 S.C. 400 at 402, per Lord Justice -Clerk MacDonald; Ross v. Find - 
later (1826) 4 S. 514 at 518, per Lord Pitmilly. 
46 Karnes, Historical Law Tracts, 4th ed., 228. 
42 Guthrie v. Cowan, Dec. 10, 1807, F.C.; Guthrie v. Miller (1827) 5 S. 711; Lord Advocate 
v. Police Commissioners of Perth (1869) 8 M. 244; Sitwell v. McLeod (1899) 1 F. 950; 
Kerr v. Hood, 1907 S.C. 895; Royal Victoria Hospital v. Lord Advocate, 1950 S.C. 511 
among many cases. 
50 See the formulation in Local Government Board v. Arlidge [1915] A.C. 120; and Board 
of Education v. Rice [1911] A.C. 179; Ridge v. Baldwin [1963] 2 All E.R. 66. 
51 Lockhart v. Irving, 1936 S.L.T. 567. The principle is of long standing; in Gray v. Earl 
of Lauderdale (1685) Mor. 16497 it was argued " Judges must be like Caesar's wife, not 
only chaste but void of all suspicion, debent et mentis et nmanumiewpuras habere." More 
recently see Barrs v. British Wool Marketing Board, 1957 S.C. 72. 
52 University of Edinburgh v. Craik, 1954 S.C. 190; Moore v. Clyde Pilotage Authority, 1943 
S.C. 457; Walsh v. Magistrates of Pollokshaws, 1907 S.C.(H.L.) 1, though the rules 
as to a disqualifying interest are complex and should be pursued in the books referred to. 
53 This insistence is also of long standing -Earl of Roxburgh v. A Minister (1683) Mor. 
7328; Brown v. Heritors of Kilberry (1825) 4 S. 174. For recent illustrations see Barrs 
v. I.R.C., 1961 S.C.(H.L.) 22, and Ridge v. Baldwin [1963] 2 All E.R. 66. 
54 Thomson v. Dundee Police Commissioners (1887) 15 R. 164; Brown v. Minister of Pensions, 
1946 S.C. 471. 
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the facts and evidence, and cannot simply decide either by general principles 
which it applies automatically, or by its own unaided knowledge.ó5 The 
contrasts thus drawn are not easily applied. Clearly the tribunal must 
have general principles, or else the random quality of its decisions provokes 
criticism; clearly, too, it must use expert knowledge. It was created 
for that purpose, but the borderline between correct and incorrect methods 
of decision may perhaps be easier sensed than described. 
In the second place judicial review will ensure that the inferior tribunal 
has acted within its jurisdiction.56 Again, it is not easy on the borderlines 
to separate issues which go to jurisdiction from those which go to the 
substance of the decision.67 While clearly a tribunal cannot give itself a 
jurisdiction, where properly it should have none, by a finding of fact, 
those facts which go to jurisdiction may also be the facts which are 
involved in the merits. Similarly, this element of control implies that, 
within limits, the courts should scrutinise the principles applied by the 
inferior tribunal, for a gross error can amount to an excess of jurisdiction, 
yet, if the courts carry this control too far the distinction between review 
and appeal (which is valuable) largely disappears.68 Under this same 
head could be placed the control of the motives of the tribunal, for a 
wrongful motive could carry the tribunal beyond its allotted function, 
and this issue is involved in many of the cases already referred to b9 
In the main it is evident that judicial review is concerned with questions 
of law, but it is not easy to distinguish these from issues of fact. At a 
certain point a misconstruction of fact may involve an excess of jurisdic- 
tion, since the legal definition of jurisdiction only has significance once 
it is interpreted in a factual situation.80 
There remains a discretionary element in judicial review. That 
element arises not merely from the uncertainty of many of the boundaries 
which have been discussed, but from other causes also. Normally where 
appellate procedures are available and have not been exhausted the 
courts will not intervene, but they will where there are sound reasons 
why resort should not be had to those procedures.81 Further, many 
of the matters which might be used in seeking review of the decisions of 
the inferior body involve, or may involve, questions of policy. That 
55 Compare M'Lean v. Paterson, 1939 J.C. 52 or M'Callum v. Arthur, 1955 S.C. 188, with 
Alexander & Son Ltd. v. Minister of Transport, 1936 S.L.T. 553; Buchan v. Stephen's 
Reps., 1946 S.C. 39 and Cotton v. Assessor for Dumbarton, 1936 S.C. 279, again it is 
difficult to define with precision the exact limits imposed upon the tribunals. 
56 Lord Prestongrange v. Justices of Haddington (1756) Mor. 7350; Cheyne v. Architects' 
Registration Council, 1943 S.C. 468. Note that in Robb v. School Board of Logiealmond 
(1875) 2 R. 698 the court required reasons to be adduced. 
57 Patullo y Sir Wm. Maxwell, June 25, 1779, F.C., is a good example, compare Foote & 
Marshall v. Stewart, Aug. 9, 1778, F.C. 
58 This was early perceived, Pryde v. Heritors of the Kirk Session of Ceres (1843) 5 D. 552; 
Guthrie v. Miller (1827) 5 S. 711; Barrs v. I.R.C., 1961 S.C.(H.L.) 22; Hayman v. Lord 
Advocate, 1951 S.C. 621. 
b9 Caledonian Ry. v. Glasgow Corporation (1905) 7 F. 1020, is one example. 
80 Consider, e.g., Bennett v. Scottish Board of Health, 1921 S.C. 772. 
61 Adair v. Colville, 1926 S.C.(H.L.) 51. 
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fact inhibits courts, and may itself add an element of discretion or un- 
certainty, since the inhibiting effect may be outweighed by other con- 
siderations. A degree of uncertainty is probably inevitable and perhaps 
provoked much of the malaise about such tribunals. 
The procedural reforms contained in the Tribunals and Inquiries 
Act, 1958, have helped. Their mere existence may well prove to be as 
important as any use that is made of them. That is to say, that in so 
far as the possibility of judicial review was enlarged as a result of them, 
there will be a reflection in the attitude and actions of inferior tribunals 
irrespective of the use that is made of that possibility. In particular 
section 12 requires that the tribunals specified in the First Schedule to 
the Act must, subject to limited and reasonable exceptions if requested, 
give reasons for the decision. The section is particularly important in 
England as opening up a possibility of review by certiorari, which would 
not exist in the absence of reasons but would exist where it can be said 
that the order is a speaking order. It also probably facilitates review 
in Scotland, even though the Court of Session had power to require reasons 
to be given.82 That power of the court could nevertheless still be im- 
portant, for the reasons stated in accordance with a request under section 
12 may be inadequate in their vagueness or in their formulation,89 and 
this older power could be used to require them to be supplemented. 
Moreover, under section 11, any provision that any order shall not be 
challenged in any court contained in Acts passed before the commence- 
ment of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act shall' not have the effect of 
excluding review by reduction or suspension (or certiorari or mandamus, 
as the case may be). The importance of this section can be overemphasised 
since such provisions were rare, and it was uncertain how effective they 
were, particularly on jurisdictional matters.ó4 Moreover the force of 
the common provision which excludes review after a limited period of 
time is not affected by this section. As to future legislation, no doubt 
the Council on Tribunals would make representations should a Bill 
contain an absolute finality clause. 
What has been said hitherto upon the topic of judicial review applies 
in the main to administrative tribunals properly so called, in relation 
to which the problems were not acute. As has been indicated above, 
greater dissatisfaction was felt with inquiries. In relation to them the 
element of policy which enters into the final decision is greater, and 
may outweigh, in the minister's mind, arguments which appeared con- 
vincing to an opponent of a proposal. Thus, particular decisions can 
B2 Robb v. School Board of Logiealmond (1875) 2 R. 698. It has been asserted that a similar 
power exists in England, R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal [1952] 
1 K.B. 338. Sed quaere. 
68 Ex p. Woodhouse, The Times, June 18 and 28 and Dec. 16, 1960, and Second Report of 
the Council on Tribunals (1960), § 105 and Third Report (for 1961), § 44. See also 
Benjamin v. Minister of Pensions [1960] 2 Q.B. 519; Re Poyser and Mills Arbitration 
[1963] 2 W.L.R. 1309; and Report for 1962, § 44. 
64 de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 226 et seq.; and Punton v. Minister 
of Pensions [1963] 1 All E.R. 275. 
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provoke discontent. There was, too, difficulty arising from the fact 
that in England (though not in Scotland) 65 the great majority of in- 
quiries were held by departmental officials. Thus a suspicion of bias, 
whether well or ill founded, inevitably arose. The fact that the report 
on the inquiry was not made public, out of deference to the doctrine of 
ministerial responsibility, increased doubts about this procedure. Secrecy 
heightened suspicion. In the inter -war years an attempt had been made 
in law to " judicialise " these inquiries, but it had broken down because 
of the compulsions arising from the mechanics of government. By reason 
of the structure of local government the minister was increasingly con- 
cerned with the matters covered by the inquiry before the stage of inquiry 
was reached and thereafter had to gather departmental views upon the 
report. The application of rules requiring a neutral judge became 
therefore increasingly difficult. It was sometimes thought, though 
probably inaccurately, that any judicial element in this process of inquiry 
and decision had been largely removed by Franklin v. Minister of Town & 
Country Planning,66 in which the proposal had in the first instance neces- 
sarily come from the minister who was also responsible for the inquiry. 
This view of the case is probably unjustified, and the judicial element 
of the inquiry stage was unaffected by it.67 
The Franks Committee, whose report covered both tribunals and 
inquiries, recommended a variety of reforms, some designed to make 
the inquiry more open and others to increase the judicial air of the inquiry. 
Not all of these were accepted. The Tribunals and Inquiries Act (as 
amended) enabled rules to be made (after consultation with the Council) 
governing procedure at inquiries, and by section 12 required that where 
a minister notifies a decision after holding an inquiry, he shall if requested 
give reasons therefor, thus opening up wider possibilities of review.68 
These rules 69 are designed to improve the quality of the inquiry by 
giving each side greater information of the arguments of the other, as 
well as by ensuring that government views are put upon record to a 
greater extent than was formerly the case. In particular, provision is 
made, in certain circumstances, for a government department, which 
has expressed views upon the proposal in dispute, to send a representative 
to the inquiry, who may be examined as a witness. He may be asked 
questions upon fact though he cannot be asked questions on government 
policy. The conduct of the inquiry is, subject to certain general principles, 
65 The use of reporters in Scotland could make a significant difference to the approach of 
the courts; see Magistrates of Ayr v. S. of S. for Scotland, 1950 S.C. 102, where it 
helped the court to distinguish Franklin's case (note 66, below). 
66 [1948] A.C. 87. 
87 See Griffith and Street, op. cit. 179 -180, and the Franks Report, Part IV. 
68 This provision does not apply s. 12 (2) to ministerial decisions which are legislative 
and not executive in character, and this distinction may be difficult. Nor does the pro- 
vision apply where there are other statutory provisions requiring that reasons should 
be given. 
69 See S.I. 1962 Nos. 1424 and 1425 for England which should be looked at for details 
(the rules for Scotlandlhave not yet been made). 
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largely in the hands of the person holding it. By earlier circulars (which 
do not appear to be entirely displaced by the new regulations) 7° he was 
required, if so requested, to make available to parties his findings of 
fact before they were submitted to the minister, so that parties may com- 
ment on them. The recommendations of the reporter do not bind the 
minister, but, under the new regulations, where he differs from the 
reporter on a finding of fact or after the closing of the inquiry receives 
any new evidence, including expert opinion on a matter of fact, or takes 
into consideration any new issue of fact (not being a matter of govern- 
ment policy), and for any of these reasons is disposed to disagree with a 
recommendation, he must notify the parties of the new material and 
give an opportunity to them of making representations or of asking 
for the inquiry to be reopened. These rules are intended to strike a 
balance between the administrative and the judicial aspects of the inquiry 
system, and are the result of considerable debates.7' It is too early to 
forecast their results, but they will not be easy of application, " fact " 
and " policy " are not always clearly distinguishable, nor is " expert 
opinion on a matter of fact " a phrase which rules out all doubt. It seems 
that the rules have the defects of a compromise (perhaps necessary) 
between pressures to judicialise the process and pressures to maintain 
ministerial responsibility. 
The rules must be considered in the light of the obligation (referred 
to above) of the minister to give reasons. In that context it is evident 
that the control of vires is, or may be, enhanced if full and explicit reasons 
are given.72 Judicial control of procedure is not increased to the same 
extent, since many of the rules governing the inquiry stage confer a 
discretion, the exercise of which would be difficult to challenge. It is 
at that stage that the more generalised approach of Scots law is signifi- 
cant. In the matters with which inquiries are normally concerned there 
is a limit beyond which they cannot be made to resemble judicial pro- 
ceedings. On the other hand a concern for their effectiveness, even if 
they are accepted as part of the administrative processes, may enable 
the court to control procedures where otherwise it could not. It was such 
a concern which enabled the court to intervene in Magistrates of Ayr 
v. S. of S. for Scotland,73 and it is perhaps that approach which enables a 
nicer balance to be struck between the administrative needs and the 
aspirations of affected citizens.74 Thus the differences in the general 
70 e.g., Department of Health for Scotland Circular of May 12, 1958. 
71 See [1962] Public Law 125 -129, 254 -256 and 392 -394 and the references there given. 
72 London & Westcliff Properties Ltd. v. Minister of Housing & Local Government [1961] 
1 All E.R. 610, although the power will not be easy to exercise in all areas, see, e.g., 
Hanks v. Minister of Housing and Local Government [1963] 1 All E.R. 47, and see Mandel - 
ker, " Planning Appeals and the Adjudication of Policy " [1960] Public Law 257. 
73 1950 S.C. 102 at 110. 
74 General Poster & Publicity Co. Ltd. v. S. of S. for Scotland, 1960 S.C. 266, though the 
procedure adopted in that case could substantially affect the operation of the " new 
evidence " provisions in the new rules. 
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legal background of judicial review in England and Scotland may still 
be important. 
Difficulties remain which spring from the concept of a " lis." In 
particular third parties who may be adversely affected by the decision 
in planning matters are. by the rules, given the possibility (but not the 
right) of appearing at the inquiry; but their rights at later stages are 
even more limited,75 and they will not normally be able to avail them- 
selves of statutory appeal procedures, which are generally limited to 
" persons aggrieved," a highly technical phrase which often excludes 
both those who are disappointed by a decision and those who may be 
adversely affected by it,76 and such persons may also find that they 
have no such title to sue as would enable them to pursue alternative 
remedies.77 Some of these difficulties may be said to result from a formal- 
istic approach. Others are perhaps the consequence of a failure to 
evolve concepts and techniques appropriate to the present scope of 
public law.78 
" We do not have a developed system of administrative law- perhaps 
because until fairly recently we did not need it," said Lord Reid in a 
slightly (but not essentially) different context.79 The need is now pressing, 
and it remains to be seen how far the adaptation of traditional techniques 
will suffice to meet that need. Two examples of the sort of problem 
may indicate the difficulties. On the one hand, concepts such as that 
of title to sue were developed in a different context, and may not be 
entirely appropriate in this one. On the other hand, the elaboration of 
control, either by procedural rules or by extending judicial review can 
unduly retard government action.90 It is possible that the search for a 
solution which involves the separation of inquiries from the rest of the 
administrative machinery is not entirely helpful. The essential problem 
is a broader one, namely, that of judicial control of administrative activities 
more generally conceived. The real issue is, as the Franks Committee 
emphasised, one of policing administrative morality.ß1 Judicial control 
of decisions taken following upon inquiry should be looked at in this 
broader setting, and against a background of other controls. Those 
controls must include the simple element of openness which has in- 
creased after the Franks Report. To the extent that judicial control, 
however extended, must remain largely a control of form, it must be 
75 [1962] Public Law 392 -394, and Report of the Council on Tribunals on the position 
of " Third Parties " at Planning Appeal Inquiries (1962) Cmnd. 1787. 
70 Magistrates of Kilsyth v. Stirling C.C., 1936 S.C. 149; Buxton v. Minister of Housing 
and Local Government [1961] 1 Q.B. 278. 
77 Simpson v. Edinburgh Corporation, 1960 S.C. 313. 
78 The courts have regretted their impotence in this field, Buxton v. Minister of Housing 
and Local Government, supra, note 76. 
79 Ridge v. Baldwin [1963] 2 All E.R. 66 at 76. 
B0 Consider M'Millan v. Inverness -shire C.C., 1949 S.C. 77. 
81 " We wish to emphasise that, whatever our recommendations under either part of our 
terms of reference may be, nothing can make up for a wrong approach to administrative 
activity by the administration's servants ": Report, § 405. It might be added that it is 
considered that concern for this morality is felt as much in the civil service as it is elsewhere. 
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considered whether such controls by reason of their technicality are 
always satisfactory.82 To the extent that controls of substance or policy 
are reserved to Parliament, out of respect for the doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility, it must be considered how real is parliamentary control. 
It is thought that the proper balance has not yet been found and that 
solutions may have to be found through other administrative devices or 
through a slightly different use of courts.83 These issues are, then, 
related to the general questions of the courts in relation to public autho- 
rities, and they should then be looked at in the light of the considerations 
raised in the following chapter.84 
82 A minor change in wording in R. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government, ex p. 
Chichester R.D.C. [1960] 2 All E.R. 407 would have made the order unassailable, and 
have carried out the intent of the Act and the minister. See too R. v. Agricultural 
Land Tribunal (S.W. Province), ex p. Benny [1955] 2 Q.B. 140. Some degree of flexibility 
can exist, e.g., Kay v. Perth County Council, 1959 S.C. 132. 
83 See the discussion in Mitchell, "The Flexible Constitution " [1960] Public Law 332. 
84 In particular the question of the creation of a Parliamentary Commissioner or Ombudsman 
as against a broader use of courts is here relevant. 
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CHAPTER 17 
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN THE COURTS 
Introduction. The scope and availability of actions against public 
authorities lie at the heart of any discussion of the rule of law. The place of 
the courts in the framework of the state can only be assessed after a 
consideration of such matters. While the subject of remedies against 
public authorities is therefore of great importance, too detailed an 
exploration of the subject would advance too far into the field appropriate 
to administrative law, and what follows will be concerned with general 
principles. To a great extent it will also be concerned with the remedies 
available to private individuals against public authorities. As has already 
been indicated the control exercised by superior administrative bodies 
over inferior is normally exercised by administrative means, such as 
directions which are frequently backed by financial sanctions.t It is 
possible that the superior authority may enforce obligations through the 
courts,2 though this is rare. On broader questions it is also rare that an 
inferior administrative body should challenge the actings of the superior 
in the courts. A challenge to a ministerial direction by a nationalised 
industry on the grounds that it lacks sufficient generality is almost in- 
conceivable in practice, though theoretically possible. On more detailed 
matters such challenges exist, the appeals by local authorities from minis- 
terial decisions in town planning matters are examples.3 So, too, as 
between equal authorities, the tendency is for disputes to be determined 
elsewhere than in the ordinary courts,4 and frequently by a minister. 
For such a tendency there are good reasons, including cost and the 
need for administrative harmony. Nevertheless these conditions mean 
that the courts do not play the part in policing the administrative structure 
of the state that they do elsewhere,b and where, as in planning appeals, 
the local authority does challenge a decision it does so in the same way 
and on the same footing as would a private individual, and a neglect 
of the " public " character of the disputants may, on occasion, have 
its inconveniences.e 
1 See, e.g., Town Development Act, 1952, s. 3; Housing and Town Development (Scotland) 
Act, 1957, s. 16; Local Government (Scotland) Act, 1947, s. 356. Where, as in that 
case, provision is made for an ultimate appeal to the courts for an order that functions 
shall be performed the courts are placed in a difficult and almost impossible position: 
Board of Supervision v. Local Authority of Lochmaben (1893) 20 R. 434. 
2 S. of S. for Scotland v. Fife C.C., 1953 S.C. 257; S. of S. for Scotland v. Fife C.C., 1957 
S.C. 261. 
3 Or see Fife C.C. v. Lord Advocate, 1950 S.C. 314. 
4 e.g., S.I. 1958 No. 1486, Coal Mining (Subsidence) (Land Drainage) Regulations. 
5 See generally Mitchell " The Flexible Constitution " [1960] Public Law 332. 
8 Magor & St. Mellons R.D.C. v. Newport Corporation [1952] A.C. 189. 
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It is in this area of law that the belief that public law is not something 
distinct has had its greatest influence. The insistence upon the ordinary 
law and the ordinary courts has, it is believed, been a limiting factor 
upon the operation of the courts, since rules which work justly between 
individuals do not necessarily do so between an individual and a public 
authority, nor always are remedies appropriate? It may also be true that 
the concentration upon delegated legislation and administrative tribunals 
has distracted attention from the more generalised questions of the 
judicial control of administrative action. Those two matters are, it is 
believed, simply facets of a more general problem and what has been 
said in the preceding chapters must be borne in mind in reading the 
present one. 
While the problem of that control is essentially one, it is with us 
fragmented, for reasons which have already appeared. The machinery 
of government, the administration, cannot for many purposes be regarded 
as one. That part of it which can be regarded as the Crown, or as servants 
of the Crown, must often be isolated, since different rules are applicable 
to the Crown, even though the distribution of functions between the 
Crown and other public authorities is often a matter of historical chance. 
Although that distribution has consequences in law, those consequences 
may be justifiable only upon historical and not upon rational grounds.8 
Remedies against the Crown. The dominant piece of legislation today 
is the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947; though that Act has to be seen against 
a rather different historical background in England and Scotland. In 
England, it was not possible to sue the Crown in tort, and in contract 
resort had to be had to the cumbrous procedure of a petition of right.9 
To some extent deficiencies in the law could be overcome by fictions 
such as the nominated defendant,'° but such devices met with opposition 
in the courts which in turn led to mounting pressure for proper regulation. 
In Scotland, on the other hand, it had always been possible to sue the 
Crown in contract, and it seems that it was clearly possible at one stage 
to raise an action for reparation against the Crown," though in later 
years it came to be accepted, but not without objection, that the English 
rule as to actions in tort applied in similar circumstances in Scotland.12 
7 Consider, e.g., the consequences of a refusal to consider the purposive element in a 
statute in Western Heritable Investment Co. v. Glasgow Corporation, 1956 S.C.(H.L.) 
64, and Mitchell, " Contrats Administratifs en Grande Bretagne " (1959) R.D.P. 491. 
s Thus the ability to get an injunction or interdict depends not on the character of the 
function performed but upon the chance circumstance of whether it is performed by a 
local authority or a Crown servant. Compare Nottingham No. 1 Area Hospital Manage- 
ment Committee v. Owen [1958] 1 Q.B. 50, and Adams v. S. of S. for Scotland, 1958 S.C. 
279. 
9 See Robertson, Civil Proceedings by and against the Crown; Robinson, Public Authorities 
and Legal Liability; Street, Governmental Liability. 
19 Adams v. Naylor [1946] A.C. 543; Royster v. Cavey [1947] K.B. 204. 
11 Earl of Morton v. Lochleven (1543) Mor. 16479; and see Sir Randall Philip, " The Crown 
as Litigant in Scotland " (1928) 40 J.R. 238. . 
12 Perhaps the final acceptance may be said to have been MacGregor v. Lord Advocate, 
1921 S.Ç. 847; for earlier protests, see, e.g., Lord M'Laren in Somerville v. Lord Advocate 
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Even when that stage had been reached remedies were more readily 
available against the Crown in Scotland than they were in England.13 
An earlier statute, the Crown Suits (Scotland) Act, 1857, which as amended 
remains in force, had regulated procedure, but the apparent generality 
of its words was restrictively construed.14 
The Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, was intended, in principle, to 
equate civil liability of the Crown to that of private individuals. The 
substitution of an action for a petition of right (s. 1) enabled actions 
in contract to be brought in England and sections 2 and 43 subjected 
the Crown to liability in reparation (or tort) in respect of acts committed 
by its servants or agents where, apart from the Act, a cause of action 
would have existed against the servant or agent, or in respect of duties 
owed as an employer to servants or agents, or in respect of common 
law obligations arising from the ownership, possession or control of 
property. Similarly (s. 2 (2) ) liability for breach of statutory duty 
is imposed where a private person would be liable,15 and the general 
rules as to indemnity and contribution are made applicable. The generality 
of the liability thus imposed is however limited in a variety of ways. 
Some are necessary concessions to the position of government, others 
have a historical explanation. So the Act does not (s. 1 (5) ) extend liability 
in respect of matters arising from the discharge of judicial functions 
or the execution of judicial process, and while salvage claims may now 
be made against the Crown, actions in rem are incompetent. By section 9 
certain immunities in relation to postal packets are continued,16 by section 
3 the special rights of the Crown to use patented inventions are preserved,11 
and by section 10 the position of persons in the armed forces is so regulated 
that service injuries can only be dealt with under the pension warrants. 
More generally by section 11 all powers and authorities of a prerogative 
type, particularly those connected with defence, are specifically preserved. 
In procedural matters the position of the Crown as government comes 
out more clearly. While the old rule that the Crown can only be con- 
vened in the supreme courts has been abrogated and actions can now 
(1893) 20 R. 1050 at 1075. See generally Philip, " The Crown as Litigant in Scotland " 
(1928) 40 J.R. 238, and Lord Murray, " Rex non Potest Peccare," 55 S.L.R. 1 and 40. 
13 Bell v. S. of S. for Scotland, 1933 S.L.T. 519, where an interdict was readily granted, 
and see generally Mitchell, " The Royal Prerogative in Modern Scots Law " [1957] 
Public Law 38; see, however, Cameron, " Crown Exemption from Statute and Tax in 
Scotland," 1962 J.R. 191, where he suggests a somewhat different basis for the rules. 
14 The Act authorised all actions brought on behalf or against Her Majesty, or in the 
interest of the Crown, or on behalf of or against any public department, to be raised 
by or against the Lord Advocate. The Act, which is primarily of procedural importance 
was held in MacGregor v. Lord Advocate, 1921 S.C. 847, not to enable actions of reparation 
against the Lord Advocate. The description of the bodies which the Lord Advocate 
may represent is of interest as showing uncertainties about " The Crown " and " Public 
Authorities." See now Forestry Commission v. Argyll C.C., 1950 S.C. 304. 
15 The phraseology of the section can give rise to difficulty, e.g., arising from the nature 
of vicarious liability, or consider The Truculent [1952] P. 1. Only general principles can 
here be discussed, for details see Glanville Williams, Crown Proceedings; Bell, Crown 
Proceedings; Griffith and Street, Principles of Administrative Law; and Street, Governmental 
Liability; Wade, Administrative Law; Treitel [1957] Public Law 321. 
16 Triefus & Co. v. Post Office [1957] 2 Q.B. 352; and Post Office Act, 1961. 
17 See too Patents Act, 1949; and Meinhardt (1949) 12 M.L.R. 112. 
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be raised in county or sheriff courts, the Crown may still require the 
proceedings to be transferred to the supreme court. More importantly 
a pecuniary judgment against the Crown cannot be enforced against 
the Crown, and remedies which could particularly interfere with the 
administrative process, interdict or injunction or an order for specific 
implement or specific performance, are excluded (ss. 21 and 43) and 
the appropriate court can only make a declaratory order.12 While it 
must be expected that in all ordinary cases the executive will obey any 
order of a court these provisions are necessary concessions to the needs 
of governments, though they are perhaps somewhat more broadly phrased 
than is necessary. Concessions are similarly made to the executive in 
sections 28 and 47, which first apparently enable a litigant to secure 
disclosure 19 of documents by the Crown, but proceed to maintain the 
vigour of any rule which " authorises or requires the withholding of 
any document " where disclosure would be injurious to the public 
interest.20 These two sections, though similar in wording may be markedly 
different in effect, since it has been held, in England, that a minister's 
declaration that disclosure would be contrary to the public interest 
cannot be overridden,21 although the fact that the principle thus stated 
is modified by administrative action 22 appears to show that it is wider 
than is necessary. In Scotland it has been held that the Court of Session 
retains an inherent power to override such declarations in the interest 
of justice.23 
It is thus evident that there are substantial limitations upon the 
equiparation of the Crown and individuals contained in the Act itself. 
These are made the more significant by various finality provisions con- 
tained in ít,24 and by the consideration that the prerogative rules -such 
as that the Crown is not necessarily bound by statutes -which have been 
discussed, are also applicable. Moreover the terminology of the Act 
may conceal difficulties. References to " a contract " must be read in 
the light of the supposed rule that the Crown cannot fetter its future 
executive action,26 or that in certain instances estoppel or personal 
28 As to which see Griffin v. Lord Advocate, 1950 S.C. 448. Formerly, see the principle under- 
lying Lord Advocate v. Matheson (1866) 1 S.L.R. 174 and Carlton Hotel Co. v. Lord 
Advocate, 1921 S.C. 237. This provision has the inconvenience (perhaps unforeseen) 
of denying interim relief; International G.E.C. etc. Ltd. v. Commissioners of Customs 
& Excise [1962] Ch. 784, the principles of which seem to be logically equally applicable in 
Scotland. 
12 A term intended to bridge English discovery and Scots recovery of documents. 
20 The two sections differ as to oral answers, but, subject to what is said about the general 
differences in law in the two jurisdictions, it is doubtful whether this particular difference 
is important in practice. 
21 Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co. Ltd. [1942] A.C. 624. 
22 197 H.L.Deb. 741 -748; 237 H.L.Deb. 1191. The constitutional desirability of creating 
this form of sub -law is debatable to say the least, it would certainly not have commended 
itself to Dicey. 
23 Glasgow Corporation v. Central Land Board, 1956 S.C.(H.L.) 1; Whitehall v. Whitehall, 
1957 S.C. 30. 
24 ss. 10 (2), 11 (2), 40 (3); and see Adams v. The War Office [1955] 1 W.L.R. 1116. 
25 Rederiaktiebolaget " Amphitrite" v. The King [1921] 3 K.B. 500. The formulation of 
this rule there should not be taken at its face value. See the discussion in Mitchell, 
The Contracts of Public Authorities. 
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bar does not operate against the Crown,26 or that other necessary acts 
by the Crown may entirely alter the relationship of the parties.27 In 
the same way, the existence of governmental powers may render lawful 
acts which would otherwise be delictua1.28 Thus essentially the Crown 
Proceedings Act is concerned with ordinary civil wrongs, and even in 
that context has to make concessions to the necessities of a government. 
What it does not deal with in any satisfactory way are what may be 
called governmental wrongs, or the problems of abuse of power.29 
Certain other constitutional matters arise in relation to the Act. 
There is ambiguity in the use of the word " Crown " since there is un- 
certainty about the nature of the Crown, or about what it is. The Act 
makes clear (s. 40 (1)) that it speaks only of the Crown in a political 
or governmental sense, and in no way affects the law in relation to the 
sovereign in a private capacity. There are, however, other uncertainties 
inherent in the word Crown. It was at one time thought that the Crown 
was one and indivisible,30 but for most purposes that theory must be 
now abandoned, and the Crown Proceedings Act makes this explicit. 
The operation of the Act is confined to liabilities arising in respect of the 
Crown as being the government in the United Kingdom, and does not 
affect proceedings by the Crown in any other capacity. Again provision 
is made for conclusive certification by a Secretary of State as to the 
capacity in which the Crown did a particular act.31 Within the United 
Kingdom itself there are problems of the extent to which the administra- 
tion should be regarded as an entity. The Act assumes a unity, or else 
provides, for greater caution, that no set -off or counterclaim shall be 
available in any action by the Crown for taxes, duties or penalties, and 
that otherwise set -off or counterclaim shall not be available by or against 
the Crown (except with leave of the court) unless the transactions in 
question relate to the same department.32 Again, this segregation of 
departments is probably necessary for administrative reasons. 
The Act speaks of delictual liability arising by reason of things done 
or omitted by the servants or agents of the Crown. In the general law 
the problem of determining who is a Crown servant is a difficult one, 
but for the purposes of the Act there is a specific definition of the persons 
through whom liability may attach for the purposes of section 2. These 
26 Lord Advocate v. Mirrielees' Trs., 1943 S.C. 587, per Lord Keith. The doubts in the 
House of Lords, 1945 S.C.(H.L.) 1, on the origin of this doctrine are perhaps unfounded. 
27 Commissioners for Crown Lands v. Page [1960] 2 Q.B. 274. 
28 Burmah Oil Co. (Burma Trading) Ltd. v. Lord Advocate, 1962 S.L.T. 347, 353, and 1963 
S.L.T. 261. Whether in that case the right consequences were derived from this finding 
as to the legality of the act in question may be debated, but this does not affect the 
present point. 
29 Consider the difficulties indicated in R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex p. Soblen [1962] 
3 All E.R. 641 at 661 and 664. 
36 Williams v. Howarth [1905] A.C. 551. 
31 In the absence of such certification problems of some complexity could arise, Reardon 
Smith Line Ltd. v. Minister of Agriculture, etc. [1962] 1 Q.B. 42 and [1960] 1 Q.B. 439 at 
467. 
32 ss. 35 (2) (g) and 50. Atlantic Engine Co. (1920) Ltd. v. Lord Advocate, 1955 S.L.T. 17, 
and see p. 170, ante. 
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are defined as officers directly or indirectly appointed by the Crown and 
who were at the material time paid wholly out of the Consolidated Fund, 
moneys provided by Parliament, or other fund certified by the Treasury.33 
It seems then that for liability to attach it must be shown that the wrong- 
doer was a servant in the ordinary sense, and fulfils the above conditions. 
The definition has a restrictive effect on the liability of the Crown. Under 
the general law the master may be responsible for the servant who is 
" borrowed " not hired. Such liability appears to be excluded by the 
payment provisions.34 Liability can also attach to the Crown for the 
acts of agents (which appears to mean independent contractors) and 
who are not affected by the limitations in section 2 (6). 
The problems do not, however, end there. The particular definition 
of servants refers only to the liabilities arising under section 2. Other 
parts of the Act refer simply to the Crown, notably the provisions relating 
to the disclosure of documents.33 Similarly in any litigation against 
the Crown, prerogative rules such as the immunity from statute, or the 
rules as to personal bar may be relevant. For these purposes the general 
tests of Crown service are appropriate,33 and it must be remembered that 
the peculiar rules relating to the Crown may be applied even though that 
application is not for the benefit of the Crown.37 It is these rules which, 
in litigation, give particular importance to the segregation of the Crown. 
Further issues arise. The Act deals with proceedings against the 
Crown, and provides (s. 21 (2) ) that no order shall be made against an 
officer of the Crown if the effect would be to grant any relief against the 
Crown which could not have been obtained in an action against 
the Crown. The purpose of this provision is simply to prevent circum- 
vention of the Act by raising actions against officers of the Crown as 
individuals, and not against the Crown itself. Attempts have, however, 
been made to distinguish the character in which a particular officer has 
operated, and, where a particular duty has been cast on him by statute, 
to assert that in performing that duty he is carrying out a duty independent 
33 s. 2 (6). Although this subsection uses the term officer, and s. 2 (1) (a) uses the term 
servant, it seems that the two are synonymous. This could otherwise bring within the 
scope of the Act Regius Professors where it can be established that their stipend comes 
entirely from the University Grants Committee. Even if it could be shown that police 
are Crown servants, any act by them could not give rise to liability on the part of the 
Crown by reason of s. 2 (6). 
34 Other difficulties arise, particularly as to the servants of boards which are themselves 
Crown servants. See Glanville Williams, Crown Proceedings, Chap. 2; and Griffith and 
Street, op. cit. 307 -308. 
35 It must be noted, however, that the plea by the Lord Advocate to prevent recovery of 
documents, is more general, and is made in the public interest, M'Kie v. Western S.M.T., 
1952 S.C. 206. The power of the Court of Session to overrule such a plea was reaffirmed 
in Glasgow Corporation v. Central Land Board, 1956 S.C.(H.L.) 1 at 16; and any inter- 
pretation of the opinions in M'Kie suggesting a weakening of that power was firmly 
rebutted by Lord Normand. 
36 See p. 170, ante, and the authorities there referred to. For the application of the rules 
see Glasgow Corporation v. Central Land Board, 1956 S.C.(H.L.) 1; 1955 S.C. 64. Such 
cases are cases of Crown privileges properly so called. 
37 Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart N.V. v. Administrator of Hungarian Property [1954] 
A.C. 584. 
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of the Crown, and hence any action relating to it would fall outside the 
scope of the Act. It seems, however, that such attempts will not normally 
be successful.38 To that extent it is clear that the courts will not dis- 
tinguish between the common law and the statutory duties of the Crown, 
but that all governmental powers will be treated as a unity, and the 
distinction sometimes drawn between the prerogative powers (in this 
sense of common law powers) and statutory powers or duties is not 
here of significance.39 
While the 1947 Act enables an action for breach of statutory duty 
to be raised against the Crown, it does so (s. 2 (2)) only where that 
duty is also binding upon persons other than the Crown. That limitation 
does not affect the possibility of enforcing statutory duties against the 
Crown by a declaratory order (as limited by the Act), but such enforce- 
ment is difficult. Statutory or other duties are normally generally phrased, 
and it is frequently said in one formulation that the duty resting upon 
the Crown does not confer any enforceable right upon a particular 
individual who is within its ambit 40 That is to say that, in effect, a 
title to sue is denied, and this may be so where the duty is either common 
law or statutory. Alternatively it may be said (which comes to the same 
thing) that the duty so far as one exists is one owed to the Crown and only 
enforceable in Parliament.41 Thus it is that only where the duty is specific 
and any discretionary element is lacking that it is at all easy to enforce 
obligations through the courts 42 It is possible that the courts may be 
somewhat more liberal in this respect in Scotland than in England, and 
rather more willing to approach the boundary of what must be left to 
the administration43 On the other hand, restraining the wrongful acts 
of the Crown is somewhat easier where the authority to act is statutory 
and it can be shown that the proposed act is ultra vires.44 Where, however, 
the claim to restrain is based upon an assertion of improper motive, once 
again the tendency is to rely upon parliamentary controls to the exclusion 
of judicial ones. Again the problems of the admixture of motives arise46 
38 Griffin v. Lord Advocate, 1950 S.C. 448; Merricks v. Heathcoat -Amory etc. [1955] Ch. 567. 
39 Theodore v. Duncan [1919] A.C. 696, per Lord Haldane. 
40 Civilian War Claimants Assoc. v. R. [1932] A.C. 14; China Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Att.-Gen. 
[1932] 2 K.B. 197; Griffin v. Lord Advocate, 1950 S.C. 448. 
41 Griffin v. L.A., 1950 S.C. 448; Harper v. S. of S. for the Home Department [1955] Ch. 238. 
There is nothing novel about this idea, see Grant v. Lords of Treasury (1704) II Fount. 
224; Stewart v. Bothwell, Feb. 26, 1742, F.C.; Craigie v. Hepburn, Dec. 22, 1809, F.C. 
42 R. v. Commissioners of Income Tax (1881) 21 Q.B.D. 313, where the duty rested upon 
officials as personae designatae, and where the right was equally specific; contrast R. 
v. S. of S. for War [1891] 2 Q.B. 376. The principle of these cases, although enunciated 
in the context of mandamus is no doubt applicable in the context of declaratory orders, 
and see de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Chap. 12. The same principles 
appear, in Carlton Hotel Co. Ltd. v. L.A., 1921 S.C. 237, to be accepted by Lord Salvesen 
at p. 249, and (probably) by Lord Dundas. 
43 See, e.g., Adams v. S. of S. for Scotland, 1958 S.C. 279, wherein the court left a discretion 
to the Secretary of State, but limited it. 
44 The positive and negative aspects may tend to run together, Mags. of Kilmarnock v. S. of 
S. for Scotland, 1961 S.C. 350. 
46 Consider such cases as Pollok School v. Glasgow T.C., 1946 S.C. 373; 1947 S.C. 607; 
and R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex p. Soblen [1962] 3 W.L.R. 1154. 
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These problems are not unlike those which have already been discussed 
in the context of administrative tribunals and inquiries; and while the 
control of motive is preserved in theory,46 its practical application remains 
difficult. 
Procedural aspects. Something must be added on the mechanism of 
the Act. In Scotland proceedings may be brought against the Lord 
Advocate, by virtue of the Crown Suits Act, 1857, which (s. 1) authorises 
such a course in actions against the Crown, or against any public depart- 
ment. The latter phrase is partially defined by the Act (s. 4) but it seems 
that it must be limited under the ejusdem generis rule to those departments 
and authorities which would be regarded as the Crown or as Crown 
servants,47 and it seems that in determining who would be so regarded 
the general test of control will be applied, and that some weight will 
be given to the English list of " authorised departments." 48 The title 
of the Lord Advocate to defend extends to agencies of the Crown in 
right of the United Kingdom, even though the events giving rise to the 
action occurred outside Scotland40 There existed a variety of statutory 
provisions which authorised government departments to sue and be 
sued b0 These were repealed by the Second Schedule to the Crown 
Proceedings Act, 1947, but it seems that, since there is no prohibition of 
raising an action against such bodies contained in the Crown Proceedings 
Act, such actions remain competent, although in practice actions will 
be normally raised against the Lord Advocate. To that general pro- 
position there is one, large exception. Section 1 (8) of the Reorganisation 
of Offices (Scotland) Act, 1939, contemplates legal proceedings against 
the Secretary of State in the name of the " Secretary of State for Scotland," 
and it is customary, where there is involved any department for which 
the Secretary of State is responsible, to raise the action in those terms 51 
This position appears to be entirely consistent with the theory of the 
Act, so far as that theory appears from section 17 (which is applicable 
to Scotland). It is also consistent with the terminology of the Crown 
Suits (Scotland) Act, 1857. What has been said about raising an action 
against the Crown applies, subject to necessary modification, to actions 
by the Crown, and it may be noted that, under the Crown Suits (Scotland) 
Act, 1857, while the Lord Advocate is required to have the authority of 
the public department in question (either for instituting or defending 
48 Even in the most difficult of areas, Chandler v. D.P.P. [19621 3 All E.R. 142 at 158, per 
Lord Devlin. 
47 Smith v. Lord Advocate, 1932 S.L.T. 374; Lord Advocate v. Argyll C.C., 1950 S.C. 304. 
48 i.e., those authorised to sue and be sued under the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, s. 17 (1); 
Lord Advocate v. Argyll C.C., 1950 S.C. 304. 
40 Cameron v. Lord Advocate, 1952 S.C. 165; Burmah Oil Co. (Burma Trading) Ltd. v. 
Lord Advocate; 1963 S.L.T. 261. 
b0 Provisions which gave rise to certain difficulties, see Glanville Williams, Crown Proceedings. 
81 For the background of this position see Fraser, Outlines of Constitutional Law, p. 162. 
The practice of submitting a stated case to the Court of Session in the name of the relevant 
minister where that is the appropriate appellate procedure from an administrative tribunal 
continues. 
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actions), no private party can challenge that authority, upon grounds 
that it has not been given or that evidence of such authority has not 
been produced. It would, it seems, be competent to challenge on the 
ground that the public authority in question was not of the type covered 
by the Crown Suits Act, i.e., was not a Crown servant. 
In England the position is differently regulated, since the Attorney - 
General did not have the representative character of the Lord Advocate. 
Section 17 of the Act of 1947 provides for the Treasury issuing lists speci- 
fying the government departments which are authorised departments for 
the purposes of the Act to sue or be sued in their own name. If no 
authorised department is appropriate, or if there is doubt as to which 
is appropriate the action may be raised by or against the Attorney - 
General. At any stage in the proceedings the Attorney -General may 
make an application to have himself substituted as defendant in 
place of an authorised department or have such a department similarly 
substituted for himself. 
Problems can arise as to venue. The jurisdiction to hear actions 
against the Crown which is conferred upon the sheriff courts by the 
Act of 1947 is subjected to all the limitations, whether as to subject- matter 
or otherwise, applicable to those courts. Among the grounds of juris- 
diction is the fact that the defender resides, or has a place of business 
or owns heritable property in the particular sheriffdom. It follows 
that, since there is a sheriff court house in each sheriffdom the Crown may 
be sued in any, irrespective of the local origin of the cause of action. 
No doubt if the action is raised in a sheriffdom which is inconvenient 
in the particular case the provisions for transfer to the Court of Session 
would be invoked. Similarly the jurisdiction of the Court of Session 
or of the Supreme Court in England does not depend upon the locality 
of the cause of action. It is theoretically possible, therefore, to raise 
an action in Scotland although the cause of action arose in England,52 
and there may be reasons of convenience why the action should be 
raised in one jurisdiction rather than the other. It may be time barred 
in one and not the other,63 or rules of procedure or evidence may be 
more convenient in one than in the other.64 It is possible that the pursuer 
in an action of which the cause was essentially English might be met 
by a plea of forum non conveniens, but it is doubtful how far such a plea, 
as it is now interpreted,65 would be successful, and it is to be noticed 
that there is no provision in the Act of 1947 for any transfer of actions 
between one jurisdiction and another. 
Other public authorities. Formerly, other public authorities were 
given particular protections under the Public Authorities Protection 
Act, 1893, and these protections were extended to the Crown by the 
52 Street (1948) II M.L.R. 141. 
63 As was the Burmah Oil case, supra, note 49. 
b4 As in Glasgow Corporation v. Central Land Board, 1956 S.C.(H.L.) 1. 
55 Duncan and Dykes, Principles of Civil Jurisdiction. 
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Crown Proceedings Act, 1947. Now, however, the Law Reform (Limita- 
tion of Actions, etc.) Act, 1954, has repealed the Act of 1893, and actions 
against public authorities are mainly governed by the general law which 
would be applicable in actions between individuals.56 In other respects 
it seems at first sight that the ordinary law is applicable to actions against 
public authorities. On closer examination this is not so, and rules akin 
to those which have been discussed as prerogative rules emerge. Thus 
public authorities other than the Crown cannot contract away their 
public responsibilities,57 their capacities as proprietors may be affected 
by statutory or common law restrictions.b8 Liability in reparation (or 
in tort) may be affected by the governmental or public character of their 
responsibilities,ó° as it is by the fact that public authorities may be per- 
forming statutory functions.80 Even the relationship of the authority to 
its servants and the nature of the functions imposed on the latter may 
affect the law.ó1 Those servants themselves by virtue of their public 
character may receive either at common law, or by statute,ó2 particular 
immunities as a result of the " malice or want of probable cause " rule 
or its equivalent. Thus the character of public authorities does affect 
the substantive law as it is applicable to them in ways which are similar 
in principle if not in phraseology to the rules applicable to the Crown. 
In a somewhat similar way the remedies available to an individual 
are affected. While the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, excludes execution 
against the Crown, to a large extent the same effect is achieved, either 
by common law or statute, in relation to other public authorities.63 
56 Some special periods continue, e.g., Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) Act, 1954, s. 75 
(the protection of magistrates), or Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act, 1954, 
s. 5 (2) (imposing a twelve -month period of limitation in actions against the Crown in 
respect of registered postal packets), or Licensing (Scotland) Act, 1959, s. 195. For a 
table applicable to Scotland setting out the periods additional to the ordinary prescriptive 
periods see Walker (1954) S.L.T.(News) 125, and see Preston and Newsom, Limitation 
of Actions. 
59 Ayr Harbour Trustees v. Oswald (1883) 10 R.(H.L.) 85; William Cory & Sons v. Corpora- 
tion of London [1951] 2 K.B. 476; and see Mitchell, Contracts of Public Authorities, 
Chap. II. 
58 Magistrates of Kirkcaldy v. Marks and Spencer Ltd., 1937 S.L.T. 574, in which there are 
signs of the survival of the idea of the res extra commercium. 
56 While the particular point at issue in Plank v. Magistrates of Stirling, 1956 S.C. 92 is no 
longer of importance as a result of the Occupiers' Liability (Scotland) Act, 1960, and 
the Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957 (applicable to England), the general approach which 
underlies the opinion in Plank may still be important, and questions of " occupation " 
can still arise. Cf. M'Phail v. Lanarkshire C.C., 1951 S.C. 301; and see Keogh v. Edinburgh 
Corporation, 1926 S.C. 814. 
60 East Suffolk Catchment Board v. Kent [1941] A.C. 74, the principles of which seem likely 
to be applicable in both jurisdictions. The whole question of liability for performing 
statutory duties is here relevant. 
61 The instance of the police has already been given. Despite the suggestion that the position 
of the police may be unique (Kilboy v. S.E. Fire Area Joint Committee, 1952 S.C. 280) 
this appears not to be so: see M'Phail Y. Lanarkshire C.C., 1951 S.C. 301 at 313. 
62 e.g., s. 103 of the Local Government (Scotland) Act, 1947, which is a commonplace pro- 
vision. 
63 Phin v. Magistrates of Auchtermuchty (1827) 5 S. 690; Kerr v. Magistrates of Linlithgow 
(1865) 3 M. 370; Magistrates of Lochmaben y Beck (1841) 4 D. 16, though compare 
Wotherspoon v. Magistrates of Linlithgow (1863) 2 M. 348, and Macdonald v. Reid (1881) 
9 R. 211, which appear to be distinguishable. See too Att.-Gen. v. Walthamstow U.D.C. 
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Remedies which directly interfere with the administrative process may 
be applicable only with modification to local and other public autho- 
rities,84 though, since such interference may not be so critical in relation 
to public authorities other than the Crown, and since the functions of 
such authorities are much more " mixed " (many not being so marked 
with public characteristics), the rules are not so absolute as they are in 
relation to the Crown. Orders ordaining a public authority to perform 
a specific duty may be obtained, but as has been indicated the rules 
giving a title to sue have not yet been fully worked out, and the courts 
carefully, and necessarily, avoid being placed in the position of con- 
trolling services,66 being concerned rather to control only excesses.66 
Further, although a jurisdiction exists to control the propriety of the 
actings of public authorities 67 it is one sparingly used because of the 
difficulties of determining questions of motive, and when used the question 
is in effect posed as one of ultra vires.88 It is probably true here, as in 
relation to the Crown, that the jurisdiction to restrain is much more 
effective than the jurisdiction to compel action. The reason for the 
difference being simply that the latter intermingles the courts much more 
in the administrative process and therefore is avoided except in extreme 
cases. 
General considerations. Many of the problems of the judicial control 
of the administrative actions of public authorities are similar to those 
of the control of the judicial or quasi-judicial actions of such bodies. 
Administrative morality is equally important in relation to any activity 
of a public authority. It is probable that the fact that the forms of action 
which were most commonly used in England until the more recent 
development of the declaratory order had the consequence of focusing 
attention on the control of judiciaquasi judicial action. Indeed, at 
times, it appeared that a classificatign of an activity as " administrative " 
resulted in an absence of judicial control, or in a marked diminution of 
it.69 In Scotland the fact that remedies are much more generalised has 
(1895) 11 T.L.R. 533 and Stancomb v. Trowbridge U.D.C. [1910] 2 Ch. 190; Local Govern- 
ment Act, 1933, s. 211, and Local Government (Scotland) Act, 1947, s. 287. 
64 Pride of Derby and Derbyshire Angling Assoc. v. British Celanese & Ors. [1953] Ch. 149, 
181 and Att.-Gen. v. Colchester Corporation [1952] Ch. 586, both of which illustrate 
principles of general application. 
65 Watt v. Kesteven C.C. [1955] 1 Q.B. 408; Grahame v. Magistrates of Kirkcaldy (1882) 9 
R.(H.L.) 91; and see Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Chap X. 
66 British Oxygen Co. Ltd. v. S. of Scotland Electricity Board, 1959 S.C.(H.L.) 17 and 1956 
S.C.(H.L.) 112; Parlane v. Perth & Kinross Joint C.C., 1954 S.L.T.(Sh.Ct.) 95. 
67 Nicol v. Magistrates of Aberdeen (1870) 9 M. 306; Associated Picture Theatres Ltd. v. 
Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B. 223. 
68 As an example of their reluctance see Blair v. Smith, 1924 J.C. 24, and for the difficulties 
of challenge see Ganz, " A voyage of discovery into administrative action " [1963] 
Public Law 76. 
69 R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex p. Parker [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1150; Ex p. Fry 
[1954] 1 W.L.R. 730; R. v. Central Professional Committee for Opticians, ex p. Brown 
[1949] 2 All E.R. 519; cf. McDonald v. Lanarkshire Fire Brigade Joint Committee, 1959 
S.C. 141, or Hayman v. Lord Advocate, 1951 S.C. 621, and consider the two aspects of 
Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne [1951] A.C. 66, the insistence on reasonable grounds, but the 
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meant that that effect has been much less marked.70 This has not involved 
any diminution upon the insistence in the principle of natural justice,71 
but it has enabled judicial review to be exercised upon a somewhat more 
liberal basis. Nevertheless, even in such conditions, the difference is 
one of degree and not of kind, since many of those conditions which 
inhibit courts are universal. By reason of their bulk the English decisions 
help, however, to form a pattern of thought throughout the Kingdom. 
The whole business of government cannot be transferred to the courts 
by means of actions purporting to call upon courts to enforce generally 
phrased statutory duties, and fear of such a consequence induces a 
judicial reticence.72 In England this reticence has found expression in 
the cóncentration upon the judicial, quasi-judicial questions. In Scotland 
it exists though not in that form. 
One other factor should be noted. The denial of public law as a 
distinct corpus of law, except for teaching purposes, was probably useful 
in the process of building up a rule of law. In a modern, highly developed 
society it possibly has damaging consequences. The departures from 
the rules of private law, in contract or reparation, are regarded as excep- 
tions, and thus little attempt is made to systematise them. Corres- 
pondingly, there is, it seems, an inadequate development of rules and 
concepts in the courts. Thus the critical concept of a title to sue remains 
undeveloped,73 as are others, such as the operation of the ultra vires 
rule in relation to public authorities. Procedural techniques and remedies, 
it seems, suffer also. The absence of subtlety in the rules about the 
disclosure of documents has been met by administrative adjustment,74 
which is in itself an unsatisfactory procedure. More seriously, it may 
be said that other detailed rules of law remain undeveloped, and do 
not take account of the conditions of a contemporary society. The 
responsibility of public authorities of tatements made by their servants 6-1 
does not, it seems, take proper account of the altered position of those 
authorities 75 Similarly, just as certain standards of " reasonableness " 
as to their rents policy may be enforced by the Secretary of State upon 
local authorities as housing authorities, so also it may be that the dominant 
limitation of procedural due process, and Wade, " The Twilight of Natural Justice " 
(1951) 67 L.Q.R. 103. These cases should now be considered in the light of the opinions 
in Ridge v. Baldwin [1963] 2 All E.R. 66. The generality of principle in the opinion 
of Lord Reid should be particularly observed. 
70 See the cases in note 69, and Mitchell, " The Scope of Judicial Review," 1959 J.R. 197, 
and " Reflections on Law and Orders," 1958 J.R. 19. 
71 Barrs v. British Wool Marketing Board, 1957 S.C. 72; and Bennett Miller, " Problems 
of Natural Justice," 1960 J.R. 29. 
72 This fear is evident from Pryde v. Heritors of Kirk Session of Ceres (1843) 5 D. 552 and 
Cockburn's Journal, II, 1 and 257 to the British Oxygen case referred to above, note 66. 
73 Consider the circumstances in D. & J. Nicol v. Dundee Harbour Trustees, 1915 S.C.(H.L.) 7. 
74 Ante, note 22; these adjustments though not as such applicable in Scotland are likely 
to affect practice there. 
76 Consider Southend -on -Sea Corporation v. Hodgson (Wickford) Ltd. [1962] 1 Q.B. 416; 
Att. -Gen. for Ceylon v. A. D. Silva [1953] A.C. 461 and the problems involved in Howell 
v. Falmouth Boat Construction Co. [1951] A.C. 837; and Mitchell, "The Flexible Con- 
stitution " [1960] Public Law 332. Lord Reid's assertion in Ridge v. Baldwin (supra) 
that we have no proper system of administrative law is equally true in this context. 
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position of local authorities in that capacity, as to certain types of housing, 
may also require enforcement of standards of reasonableness as to terms 
and conditions in ways which would be inappropriate in questions 
between tenant and private landlord.76 At an earlier stage such differing 
standards were enforced in the relationship between the emergent public 
authorities and their officials, as against the rules of private employment. 
The creative process, however, appears to have stopped. 
That is to say that it is arguable that the general isolation of problems 
relating to quasi-judicial functions and the concentration upon those 
aspects of judicial review has tended to prevent the proper development 
of substantive public law, and to limit the proper exercise by courts of 
their functions in respect of other actions of administrative bodies. That 
development is also hampered by the dichotomy between the Crown 
and other parts of government. Increasingly the governmental machine 
is becoming, in fact if not in law, unitary by the interlocking of its parts, 
a process which is apparent both in the field of local government and 
in the field of public corporations. Yet the general law is based on, and 
greatly influenced by, this theoretical dichotomy. Thus an overall 
treatment of governmental operations becomes difficult. Specialised 
terminology, such as the word "prerogative," springs from the same cause, 
and has like effects. 
Put more shortly, it is arguable that by reason of a failure to develop 
a system of public law adequate to the demands of a modern state, courts 
are playing a less significant role in the machinery of government than 
was once the case or is entirely satisfactory. That argument may certainly 
be carried too far, but it should, perhaps, be considered, since it appears 
that the feeling of malaise has not been entirely removed by reforms 
in relation to delegated legislation, nor by those in relation to administra- 
tive adjudication which culminated in the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 
1958. These reforms were necessary, but their achievement has dis- 
tracted attention from the other weaknesses of the law in dealing with 
governmental activity, which, because of its scale and nature, is often 
distinguishable from other forms of activity, but which can only be 
properly regulated by a distinct corpus of law which allows both for 
the needs of government and the rights of citizens. The failure to produce 
such a body of law may result in admission of the former (since the 
needs are compelling and are evident in, for example, the Crown Pro- 
ceedings Act, 1947) without an adequate protection of the latter. 
This malaise continues. Evidence of it can be found in the fact that, 
despite the reforms referred to, other methods of controlling governmental 
activity have been advocated, notably the introduction of an Ombudsman, 
or Parliamentary Commissioner, having something of the character of a 
Comptroller and Auditor General whose task it would be to investigate 
76 See Carleton Y. Greenock Corporation, 1962 S.L.T. 35, and Lord Porter's reference to 
discretion in Shelly v. L.C.C. [1949] A.C. 56 at 66. 
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cases of alleged maladministration.77 Specific proposals for the appoint- 
ment of such an official were made in 1961,78 but were rejected by the 
government 74 It is in relation to such problems that general theories of 
constitutional law become relevant. The institution of such an official 
can only be reconciled with doctrines of ministerial responsibility and 
ministerial answerability to Parliament, by rigidly limiting the powers 
given to him. Even without such limitations it does not appear that 
such an official could do anything to make good the deficiencies of law 
which have been mentioned. Those deficiencies can only be made good 
by a court. Thus, it seems possible to argue that there is an imbalance 
in our constitutional machinery in relation to the manifold activities of 
a modern state. Reliance upon parliamentary controls (which were 
evolved when the operations of government were less complex and much 
more limited) tends to overload those controls and thus render them 
less effective. Such reliance tends also to reduce the scope for the opera- 
tion of courts which have themselves lost, in their present form, much 
of their former flexibility and creative ability. To correct this imbalance 
two related things are perhaps necessary: a clearer conception of what 
is properly a " political " decision, and which should therefore be taken 
in Parliament, and a revival of law as a more significant part of the 
regulatory mechanism. That revival could, it seems, only come about 
through the institution of a genuine administrative jurisdiction capable 
of evolving the new substantive law and the new procedural rules and 
the new remedies which are required. In the absence of such a jurisdiction 
the dual system of control inherent in the Revolutionary Settlement of 
1689 cannot, it seems, operate satisfactorily in the modern state. 
77 For a description of the functions of such an official in Denmark see Hurwitz, " The 
Danish Parliamentary Commissioner " [1958] Public Law 236, and Rowat, " The Nordic 
Public Defenders " (1962) Canadian Public Administration, and the references there given. 
78 The Citizen and the Administration -a report by JUSTICE, which is discussed in a series 
of articles in [1962] Public Law 24-57. 
79 See 503 H.L.Deb. 384. Such an official has been appointed in New Zealand under 
the Parliamentary Commissioner Act, 1962. 
CHAPTER 18 
FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES 
Introduction. The issues raised at the end of the last chapter, and those 
discussed in the context of delegated legislation and administrative 
adjudication, are clearly concerned with the liberty of the subject. The 
expansion of individual liberty (in one sense) as a result of the develop- 
ment of social services and of the acceptance of principles of social 
security, as well as the general growth of state activity, can all create 
problems of the protection of individuals. These developments serve 
to emphasise that the concept of liberty is neither static nor precise. In 
all its aspects questions of balance arise since there is a conflict between 
various desired ends. Any formulation of principle must therefore be 
in general, or qualified, terms. This consideration may make the fact 
that we lack any specific guarantees of liberty less significant than it is 
sometimes thought to be. Such guarantees, where they exist, may only 
be meaningful when read in the context of the constant shifts of judicial 
decisions, and, even when couched in absolute terms, concealed reserva- 
tions are always present.' Despite the absence with us of such general 
guarantees, the background of insistence on fundamental rights should 
be noted. While the Bill of Rights insists on political liberties and pro- 
cedural rectitude, the contemporaneous Claim of Right goes somewhat 
further. In effect it stipulates liberty of opinion, reciting that the opinion 
of the Lords of Session " that persons refusing to discover their private 
thoughts and judgments in relation to points of treason, or other men's 
actions, are guilty of treason " is contrary to law, and that the forcing 
of the lieges to depone against themselves in capital crimes is contrary 
to law.2 Both documents have an underlying insistence upon the freedom 
of the person, and both too assume the existence of a freedom of property. 
The former is made more explicit by the special penalties provided in 
both the Act Anent Wrongous Imprisonment, 1701, and the Habeas 
Corpus Act, 1679. 
Similar fundamental assumptions are apparent in the cases. They are 
1 Consider among many possible examples The Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses 
Incorporated v. The Commonwealth (1943) 67 C.L.R. 116, particularly in the opinion of 
Williams J., and consider the shape of the Canadian Bill of Rights and the comments 
of Bora Laskin in (1962) 11 I.C.L.Q. 519 and in (1959) 37 Can.B.R. The device of" guiding 
principles " in the Indian constitution may here be noticed. This question of " balance " 
runs of course most clearly through the opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes. 
2 So, too, the Articles of Grievances, 1689, recite " That the obliging the lieges to depone 
upon crymes against delinquents utherways than when they are adduced in special processes 
as witnesses is a great grievance." 
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made sufficiently obvious as to personal liberty in either Knight v. Wedder- 
burn 3 or Somersett's Case,4 and thereafter in the tenor of the law in many 
branches, ranging from the Truck Acts to the law regulating contracts 
in restraint of trade. Similarly, the assumption of a right of property 
is inherent in Smellie v. Struthers.b The continuing influence of such 
conceptions can be seen in the presumptions in statutory interpretation. 
The weight of this tradition should not be underestimated, and it is one 
which must always be kept alive. The absence of general declarations 
may make that task more difficult on occasion, though correspondingly 
the presence of such declarations may produce a sense of false security. 
In either case the ultimate safeguard remains the outlook of members 
of society.6 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
If a choice had to be made of the most important among fundamental 
liberties in a modern society perhaps freedom of speech and opinion would 
be chosen, for upon that depends the ventilation of grievances and the 
exposure of abuses. Of necessity the freedom is qualified. It is limited 
by the law of defamation, which in itself demonstrates the impossibility 
of absolutes in this area of law. Where other necessities, such as the 
administration of justice, require it statements are absolutely privileged.? 
Where the weight of other considerations is not so great qualified privilege 
may be granted by the law, or no privilege may be given at all. The 
public interest in the dissemination of news, granted the conditions of 
publishing newspapers today, may require special rules to be applicable 
to the Press, and these are provided.8 In other circumstances, such as 
an election, particular care must be taken against the making of false 
statements and the general law is adjusted to make provision for such 
cases.° 
Similarly the law at one time was particularly careful of the reputation 
of those administering it. By common law insulting a judge was a crime, 
and murmuring a judge contrary to the Act of 1540 was an indictable 
3 (1778) Mor. 14545. Cf. Carrington v. Geddew (1632) Mor. 9454. Stair I, 2, 11 could 
condemn English villeinage, but gloss over the condition of colliers and salters. Fountain - 
hall, in one of his elegant passages (I, 825), at least condemned the institution as contrary 
" to the mildness of our government." By Erskine's time liberty had risen to be a favourite 
of the law (Inst. I, 1, 56). 
4 (1772) 20 St.Tr. 1. 
b May 12, 1803, F.C. in The Case of Saltpetre (1606) 12 Co.Rep. 12, or The Moffat Hydro - 
pathic Co. Ltd. v. Lord Advocate, 1919, 1 S.L.T. 82, or The Burmah Oil Case, 1963 S.L.T. 
261; and see Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History. 
8 Compare Report of the Royal Commission on the Police (1962) Cmnd. 1728, § 138. 
7 Ante, p. 224 and see generally works on defamation such as Cooper, Chap. XIV. The 
existence of verbal injury in Scots Law should be noted, see Smith, Short Commentary 
on the Law of Scotland, p. 175; Cooper, Defamation, Chap. XI. 
8 Defamation Act, 1952, s. 4. See too on the confidentiality of the sources of information 
of the Press, Att. -Gen. v. Clough [1963] 1 All E.R. 420 and Att. -Gen. v. Mulholland [1963] 
2 W.L.R. 658, wherein the element of judicial control providing a twofold check, should 
be noted. See, too (1963) 79 L.Q.R. 167. 
° Representation of the People Act, 1949, s. 91; Defamation Act, 1952, s. 10; and see 
Plummer v. Charman [1962] 3 All E.R. 823. 
M.C.L.-18 
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offence.10 It is doubtful if any such charge would now be laid, and 
matters would be dealt with by proceedings for contempt." Such pro- 
ceedings are also used to limit abuses of the freedom of speech and report- 
ing in the interest of the fairness of a trial.12 In Scotland the rules in this 
matter go much farther than they do in England. This is in part accounted 
for by differences in criminal procedure, notably the absence of a public 
preliminary hearing, but even apart from that fact the greater strictness 
is evident. Comment is inhibited not merely from the moment when 
any charge is made, but the inhibition may also reach back into the 
stage of investigation.13 There is a greater strictness for another reason, 
in that the Administration of Justice Act, 1960, ss. 11 and 12, provides 
special defences (particularly, in cases of unintentional contempt), but 
these sections are not applicable to Scotland. It has, however, been 
emphasised in Scotland that a rule of law necessary for the proper admin- 
istration of justice should not be abused or be allowed to degenerate 
into an instrument of oppression,14 so it is probable that like considerations 
would apply. It may be noticed that the provisions in section 13 of that 
Act for an appeal in cases of contempt do not apply to Scotland, and 
though appeal would lie from committal in a sheriff court no such appeal 
lies, it seems, in the case of either the Court of Session or the High Court. 
Criminal aspects. The interests of the state impose limitations on 
any absolute freedom or licence. The crime of sedition consists in 
inciting violence or illegality against the government. The older defini- 
tions of this crime, such as those in Hume," while they may still be 
acceptable as a formulation will be applied differently. To Hume, " stir- 
ring those foul and mutinous humours in the multitude, which when once 
set afloat may naturally issue in open violence and insurrection " was 
sedition and the offence might be constituted by attacking the " settled 
frame and order of things." In modern practice, without any specific 
formulation of the principle, a clear and present danger is looked for, 
and alternative charges of a lesser order are most frequently used.18 
Other interests of the state are protected by the limitations on free 
speech based on the rules governing such offences as blasphemy or 
obscenity. There has, somewhat similarly, been a tendency over the years 
to liberalise the law. Blasphemy, speech or writing designed to vilify 
or ridicule the scriptures or the Christian religion, no longer inhibits 
10 H.M. Advocate v. Robertson (1870) 1 Coup. 404. 
11 See Macdonald, Criminal Law, 178 for other like offences. 
12 Again for the flexibility of the law see R. v. Duffy, ex p. Nash [1960] 2 Q.B. 188. 
13 Stirling v. Associated Newspapers, 1960 J.C. 5, 10, and MacAlister v. Associated News- 
papers, 1954 S.L.T. 14; and ante, p. 223. 
14 Milburn, Petitioner, 1946 S.C. 301. 
16 Criminal Law, Chap. XXVII. 
16 See in particular the Incitement to Disaffection Act, 1934, making it an offence to en- 
deavour to seduce any member of H.M. Forces from his duty or allegiance. Prosecutions 
in England require the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (such a provision 
being unnecessary in Scotland). S. 2 (2) gives extended powers of search. As to the 
police, see Police Act, 1919, s. 3. 
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any reasonable criticism,17 and prosecutions are rare. Prosecutions 
which might once have been brought for this crime are brought instead 
for offences against public order. Concern for morals is reflected in 
the law against obscenity. In Scotland the offence has most recently been 
defined in Galletly v. Laird,18 where Lord Cooper emphasised two elements. 
The material must be such as is calculated to deprave or corrupt those 
open to such influences and it must be shown that it is being circulated 
in such circumstances that it is likely to fall into the hands of those 
liable to be corrupted. Thus, all is a matter of place and circumstance. 
In England the definition of the offence (which closely resembles that 
in Scotland) is given in section 1 of the Obscene Publications Act, 1959. 
That Act, by section 4, admits a defence based on the assertion that 
publication was for the public good, or the interest of science, literature, 
art or learning, or other objects of public concern. The Act does not 
apply to Scotland, and it would seem that such a defence is excluded by 
Scots law as it now stands. It is uncertain how far this difference will, 
in practice, be significant. In this context the court has refused to examine 
the reasons which may have moved the Lord Advocate in refusing to 
initiate a public prosecution, and has denied that a private prosecutor can 
have a sufficient interest to be allowed to proceed with a private prose - 
cution.19 It is then likely that a degree of uniformity will exist despite 
differences in the law (as the case cited indicates). There is thus a wide 
discretion, apparently uncontrollable by the courts, vested in the Lord 
Advocate in this matter as a result of the system of public prosecution. 
It must, however, be emphasised that this discretion relates only to the 
initiation of a prosecution. 
It may here be noted that in England the courts have claimed a 
general power to police morality. " In the sphere of criminal law I 
entertain no doubt that there remains in the courts of law a residual 
power to enforce the supreme or fundamental purposes of the law, to 
conserve not only the safety and order but also the moral welfare of the 
state, and that it is their duty to guard it against attacks which may be 
the more insiduous because they are novel and unprepared for " said 
Lord Simonds,20 upholding the relevancy of a charge of " conspiring 
to corrupt public morals." While this case is authoritative only in 
England, a like power could exist in Scotland under the doctrine enunciated 
17 Bowman v. Secular Society [1917] A.C. 406; for an example see Paterson v. Brown (1843) 
1 Broun 629. 
18 1953 J.C. 16. 
19 McBain v. Crichton, 1961 J.C. 25. The book in question had been found to be not 
obscene in England as a result of the Act: R. v. Penguin Books Ltd. [1961] Crim.L.R. 
690. As to stage plays, a system of licensingunderthe Lord Chamberlain exists by the Theatres 
Act, 1843. The showing of films is regulated by local authorities under the Cinematograph 
Act, 1909; supplemented by the voluntary British Board of Film Censors. The Television 
Act, 1963, imposes some limit on the programmes of independent television (see earlier 
the Television Act, 1954). See too, Children and Young Persons (Harmful Publications) 
Act, 1955. 
20 Shaw v. D.P.P. [1962] A.C. 220, 267; and see Seaborne Davies, " The House of Lords 
and the Criminal Law " (1961) 6 J.S.P.T.L.(N.s.) 104; Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality. 
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in H.M. Advocate v. Greenhuff.21 The existence of such a jurisdiction 
poses problems. It fits uneasily with any doctrine of precedent, and 
calls in any event for a high degree of wise judicial restraint. The abandon- 
ment of such a jurisdiction, so that these matters are left exclusively 
to the control of the legislature, is probably a less happy solution, since 
these matters fit even less easily into the world of politics. 
FREEDOM OF MEETING AND ACTION 
Crimes against the state. The conflicts between the need of a state to 
protect itself and the desire of individuals to change that state provoke, 
in a slightly different context, similar and related problems of balance. 
Membership of any society involves obligations and restraints, but the 
scope of these is not constant. Emergencies involving the defence of 
the state justify inroads upon property or personal liberty, which would 
at other times be regarded as unacceptable.22 Similarly the law of 
treason, in the interest of maintaining the unity of the state, limits the 
freedom of action of those to whom it applies. The foundation of this 
law remains the Statute of Treasons, 1351, which, by the Treason Act, 
1708, was extended to Scotland.23 Under this Act, high treason consists 
of (1) compassing or imagining the death of the King, the Queen Consort 
or their eldest son and heir, (2) violating the King's consort, his eldest 
daughter unmarried or the wife of the King's eldest son and heir, (3) 
levying war against the King in his realm, (4) adhering to the King's 
enemies in his realm, giving them aid and comfort in the realm, or else- 
where, or (5) slaying the Chancellor, Treasurer or the King's justices 
performing their office, to whom were, by the Act of 1708, added the 
Lords of Session and Justiciary or (6) by the Act of 1702, depriving the 
person next in succession of his right to succeed. 
" Imagining " must be accompanied by an overt act, which may, 
in certain circumstances, include writing.24 Levying war within the 
realm can be constituted by any armed rising 25 which has for its object 
some national political purpose.28 Adhering to the King's enemies may 
be constituted by acts done elsewhere.27 It should be noted that the 
offence of treason depends upon allegiance, which may be owed by 
those who are not British subjects.28 The Treason Act, 1945, assimilated 
21 (1838) 2 Swin. 236; and see Elliott, " Nulla Poena Sine Lege," 1956 J.R. 22. 
22 The Case of Saltpetre (1606) 12 Co.Rep. 12; The Burmah Oil Case, 1963 S.L.T. 261; 
Smith v. Jeffrey, Jan. 24, 1817, F.C., when a common law right of impressment or con- 
scription is admitted in emergencies. 
23 An extension, which, while no doubt necessary, had all the inconveniences of legislation 
by reference. Smith, Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland, 175. The details of 
this offence should be sought in appropriate works on criminal law. 
24 Hume I, 517. Blackstone, IV, Comm. 74. 
25 The case of Sir James Wilson, Trials for Treason in Scotland, II, 335, 339. 
26 R. v. Dammaree (1710) 15 St.Tr. 521. 
27 R. v. Casement [1917] 1 K.B. 98. 
2a Joyce v. D.P.P. [1946] A.C. 347; R. v. Ahlers [1915] 1 K.B. 616. Moreover, a British 
subject cannot shed his nationality in time of war (R. v. Lynch [1903] 1 K.B. 444) in order 
to surmount that difficulty. 
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procedure in a trial for treason to that in trials for murder, and it seems 
that that Act, by amending the Act of 1708, has removed the possibility 
of trial outside Scotland of those who might commit treason in Scotland, 
a matter which was of considerable consequence after 1745.29 
In modern times statutes have created special offences with lesser 
punishments which might have fallen under the heading of treason. The 
Treason Felony Act, 1848, made it an offence (by that name) to compass 
to depose the sovereign or to wage war in order to make him change his 
counsel, or to overawe Parliament, or to incite foreigners to invade his 
realms, and by the Treason Act of 1842 a special offence was created 
of alarming the sovereign in circumstances which could otherwise only 
have given rise to a charge of high treason.30 
Such offences as treason and treason felony have both an internal 
and external aspect, and in the case of somewhat similar offences this 
aspect of internal order becomes accentuated. It has recently become 
clear that the Official Secrets Act, 1911, can have an inhibiting effect 
upon some political demonstrations, and is not limited to offences of 
espionage or sabotage in the generally accepted use of those terms.31 
In a more strict sense of the maintenance of public order in the com- 
munity there is, in Scotland, the offence of mobbing and rioting, which 
is constituted by the act of several persons acting in concert to achieve 
an illegal purpose, or to achieve a lawful purpose by the illegal means 
of using threats of violence. There must be some element of common 
purpose, which may, however, arise after a meeting has come about 
accidentally even if with lawful purposes, e.g., if carried away by oratory 
a crowd starts to act in a tumultuous manner.S2 In England there are 
a series of offences, unlawful assembly, rout, and riot, which are of 
increasing gravity, dealing with the same problem. In effect each of 
these offences corresponds to a stage in the seriousness of any mass 
meeting.33 On top of these common law offences there is, in both juris- 
dictions, the statutory offence resulting from a contravention of the 
Riot Act, 1714. That Act contains a proclamation which may be read 
where twelve or more persons are assembled riotously and tumultuously 
to the disturbance of the peace. The proclamation calls upon those 
present to disperse, and the Act creates a more serious offence if they 
do not do so within the hour. It must be emphasised that the Act 
supplements, but does not displace, the common law. 
There is, under the general law, a communal responsibility in respect 
of riots which appears in two forms. There is an obligation on every 
29 See Smith, Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland, 175. 
30 The Treachery Act, 1940, passed to deal with the special conditions in the last war, 
ceased to have effect in 1946. 
31 Chandler v. D.P.P. [1962] 3 All E.R. 142. 
32 Compare H.M. Advocate v. Wild (1854) 1 Irv. 552 where the ultimate purpose might be 
considered lawful, but the means were not, with H.M. Advocate v. Martin (1886) 1 White 
297 where the purpose itself was unlawful. 
33 For details of these offences see, e.g., Kenny, Criminal Law. 
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citizen to aid in the maintenance of public order,34 an obligation which 
appears in an accentuated form in the obligation of magistrates to maintain 
order, and of the armed forces to aid the civil power. The circumstances 
in which force may be used require nice judgment, since if the use of 
force is deemed excessive or premature a criminal charge against both 
those who invoke the force and against those who exercise it may 
result. If it is not invoked timeously a criminal charge against those 
responsible for maintaining the public peace may likewise arise.36 For- 
tunately, in recent times, the occasions for exercising such judgment 
have been rare. This communal responsibility is also manifest in the 
obligation of the community to pay for damage caused by a riot. This 
liability is now based on the Riot Act, the obligations being extended 
by the Seditious Meetings Act, 1817, and in Scotland the procedure 
is now regulated by the Riotous Assemblies Act, 1822. In England the 
equivalent regulation is to be found in the Riot (Damages) Act, 1886,36 
and it is largely in this context that the question of riot has had any 
real significance in recent times. 
Breach of the peace. Such offences look to conditions of considerable 
disturbance. More significant in ordinary times is the question of 
breach of the peace. The right to hold meetings is certainly not an 
absolute one, but it is wrong to consider that a meeting can be held 
only by tolerance. A predisposition in favour of meetings as part of 
the more general freedom of speech is evident in Burgh of Dunblane 
Petitioners 37; moreover at common law magistrates cannot prohibit 
meetings in advance,38 unless there is a fear of a breach of the peace. 
The question, however, resolves itself into one of time and place. Streets 
are for passage, and public parks and open spaces are for the general 
use of the public, and where holding a meeting conflicts with such primary 
purposes it is those purposes which may prevai1.39 There does not appear 
to be in this respect any difference in principle between static meetings 
and processions, though because of differences in their natures the appli- 
cation of the same principle may differ, since the former is the more 
likely to cause obstruction. 
34 Alison I, 534; R. v. Brown (1841) Car. & M. 314. 
36 R. v. Pinney (1832) 5 C. & P. 254, which appears to be equally applicable in Scotland. 
As to the duties of the armed forces see Dicey, Law of the Constitution, App. Pt. V. 
36 Capaldi v. Mags. of Greenock, 1941 S.C. 310; Coia v. Robertson, 1942 S.C. 111; Pompa's 
Trs. v. Mags. of Edinburgh, 1942 S.C. 119; Munday v. Receiver for Metropolitan Police 
[1949] 1 All E.R. 337. The confused state of Scots law was criticised in Coia. By s. 235 
of the Edinburgh Corporation Order Confirmation Act, 1958, the payment of such 
sums is apparently made discretionary. 
37 1947 S.L.T.(Sh.Ct.) 27; Hutton v. Main (1891) 19 R.(J.) 5, 7. In Aldred v. Langmuir, 
1932 J.C. 22 the possibility of land being dedicated to this purpose was contemplated. 
See, too, Burden v. Rigler [1911] 1 K.B. 337, and Aldred v. Miller, 1924 J.C. 117 and com- 
pare Paterson v. Mags. of St. Andrews (1881) 8 R.(H.L.) 117. 
38 M'Ara v. Mags. of Edinburgh, 1913 S.C. 1059. 
36 M'Ara's case, supra; Aldred v. Miller, 1924 J.C. 117 and Aldred v. Langmuir, 1932 J.C. 
22. 
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Public meetings. Greater difficulty arises from the fact that a public 
meeting or a procession may lead to a breach of the peace, either because 
the meeting itself becomes unruly, or because opponents of those holding 
the meeting are likely to attack the meeting. As to the first case, it 
seems clear that, if a meeting is of such a character (held where it is) 
that it is likely to cause a breach of the peace (by reason, for example, 
of being insulting to the local inhabitants) those holding the meeting 
commit an offence 40 In such cases the breach of the peace is foreseeable, 
and may be said to be directly provoked by those who hold the meeting. 
More difficulty arises when the meeting or procession is lawful, and 
when the fact of holding it is not of itself offensive to the inhabitants of 
a particular area, but when rivals are known to be likely to band together. 
and to offer violent opposition. That is to say, it is the conduct of others 
(not being those organising the meeting or procession) which is the 
prime cause of the breach of the peace. It is that situation which faced 
the court in Beatty v. Gillbanks 41 where it was held that those who were 
innocent in their intent could not be bound over to keep the peace since 
" there was nothing in their conduct when they assembled which was 
either tumultuous or against the peace." The evidence showed, said 
Field J., that disturbances were caused by those antagonistic to the 
promoters of the procession. In Scotland when the same rivals, the 
Salvation Army and the Skeleton Army, came into collision it was 
held in Deakin v. Milne 42 that the Salvation Army had been properly 
convicted of breaking the public peace, in circumstances closely resembling 
those in Beatty v. Gillbanks. The cases may, however, be distinguished 
on the ground the procession of the Salvation Army itself in the latter 
case amounted to a disturbance of the peace, irrespective of the acts 
of others. The basis of the decision is not clear, and it may be (particularly 
if the views expressed in the opinion of Lord Craighill be accepted) that 
the possibility of conflict resulting from the acts of others would alone 
suffice to found a charge against the promoters of such a procession43 
These disputes about the interpretation of Deakin v. Milne may now 
have become purely academic. This consequence follows partly from 
the adoption of by -laws, such as that upheld in Aldred v. Langmuir," 
4° Marr v. M'Arthur (1878) 5 R.(J.) 38 at 43; M'Ara v. Mags. of Edinburgh, 1913 S.C. at 
1074; Wise v. Dunning [1902] 1 K.B. 167, where a person having the intention of com- 
mitting acts of such a type was bound over. It must be noted that that procedure for 
binding over does not now exist in Scotland. 
41 (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 308, see too Beatty v. Glenister (1884) 51 L.T. 304 and see Goodhart, 
" Public Meetings and Processions " (1937) 6 C.L.J. 161; Wade, " Police Powers and 
Public Meetings " (1937) 6 C.L.J. 175; Glanville Williams, " Preventive Justice and 
the Rule of Law " (1953) 16 M.L.R. 407. 
42 (1882) 10 R.(J.) 22. That part of the decision which rests upon the effect of the proclama- 
tion by the magistrates must now be rejected in view of M'Ara's case, supra. See also 
Whitchurch v. Mi lar (1895) 23 R.(J.) 1; and Jordan v. Burgoyne [1963] 2 W.L.R. 1045. 
43 This view would accord with R. v. Justices of Londonderry (1891) 28 L.R.Ir. 440, which 
was in Wise v. Dunning preferred to Beatty v. Gillbanks. In general principle Beatty 
v. Gillbanks appears preferable and on the first reading suggested above Deakin v. Milne 
is not inconsistent with that. Earlier in Marr v. M'Arthur (1878) 5 R.(J.) 38 there was 
insistence upon an intent to provoke a breach of the peace. 
44 1932 J.C. 22. 
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and by sections in local Acts such as section 303 of the Edinburgh Corpora- 
tion Order Confirmation Act, 1933, giving to the magistrates the power 
to regulate or to prohibit processions. In part that consequence follows 
from the newer habit of charging different offences. In Duncan v. Jones,45 
the accused was charged with obstructing a police officer in the execution 
of his duty under the Prevention of Crimes Acts, 1871 and 1885 (which 
are United Kingdom statutes). Fearing a breach of the peace (though 
the accused had at the time committed none) a police officer required the 
accused to hold the meeting elsewhere. On her refusing to do so she was 
taken into custody, and charged with the offence in question. Such a 
charge circumvents the difficulties of Beatty v. Gillbanks, and is built 
upon the foundation of the obligation of the police to maintain order, 
and was in effect foreseen by Lord Dunedin in M'Ara's case.46 It raises 
the issue, however, of who is to judge the likelihood of a breach of the 
peace. It is said that the apprehension by the police of a breach of the 
peace must be reasonable, but it has also been said that " I think that a 
police officer charged with the duty of preserving the Queen's peace 
must be left to take such steps as, on the evidence before him, he thinks 
proper." 47 Such assertions, if too much weight were given to them, 
might effectively make the police judges of whether or not meetings should 
take place. It must, therefore, be remembered that there has, at any 
rate in Scotland, been an insistence upon the discretion to be used in 
interfering with public meetings.48 
Further powers of regulating processions are given by the Public 
Order Act, 1936. That Act prohibits (s. 1) the wearing of a uniform which 
indicates association with a political organisation at any public meeting, 
or in a public place. It prohibits (s. 2) the organisation of quasi -military 
formations, either to usurp the functions of the normal forces of law 
and order, or for displaying force in connection with the promotion 
of any political purpose, and (s. 4) prohibits the carrying of offensive 
weapons at any public meeting. Further by section 3, the chief officer of 
police (or in burghs in Scotland, the magistrates) are given power to 
impose conditions upon processions in the interest of the preservation 
of the peace. Further (s. 3 (2)) the chief constable may apply to the 
magistrates of any burgh 49 for an order prohibiting for a period not 
exceeding three months all or any class of public processions within 
the area, and the magistrates may (with the consent of the Secretary of 
State) make such an order. In London it is the Commissioner of Police 
of the City or of the Metropolitan Police who, with like consents, may 
make such an order. 
45 [1936] 1 K.B. 218 and see the criticism of that case in 6 C.L.J. at 177 et seq. 
46 1913 S.C. at 1074. 
47 Piddington v. Bates [1960] 3 All E.R. 660 at 663, per Lord Parker C.J. 
48 Aldred v. Miller, 1924 J.C. 117. 
49 Borough or urban district in England, and see generally Ivamy, " The Right of Public 
Meeting " (1949) Current Legal Problems 183; and see Public Order Act, 1963. 
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The meetings hitherto spoken about are largely those occurring in 
public places, though the provisions of the 1936 Act relating to uniforms 
etc., apply also to public meetings held in private places. That Act also 
strengthened the Public Meetings Act, 1908, making it an offence to 
disrupt the conduct of a public meeting. The Act of 1936 enables a 
constable, at the request of the chairman of the meeting, to demand the 
name and address of those suspected of an offence under the Act of 1908. 
Thus there is preserved an element of responsibility and control on the 
part of those holding such a meeting, while at the same time extending 
the scope of the forces of public order. 
Even apart from that statute it must be noted that a breach of the 
peace may occur in a private place.b0 More important, however, is the 
question of the right of the police to attend such meetings. It has been 
held in England that the police have the right to enter when there are 
grounds for believing that a breach of the peace may be committed, 
or seditious speeches made.5' It must, however, be noted that in the 
particular case the meeting was advertised as open to the public, and 
that it was as members of the public that the police entered. The authority 
of this case -Thomas v. Sawkins -is doubtful. No general right of 
the police to enter private premises is admitted,ó2 and the principle of 
the case appears to be inconsistent with the theory of the Public Order 
Act, 1936. There is of course a right to enter in hot pursuit, and where 
it appears that offences are being committed which will otherwise go 
undetected the police may enter under the general law. They may also 
enter as members of the public, where an indiscriminate invitation has 
been given to the public. It is to be doubted how far Thomas v. Sawkins 
should be relied on beyond these circumstances. 
FREEDOM OF PROPERTY 
As has already been mentioned an assumption of the freedom of property 
appears in many branches of the law, though the courts will insist upon 
reasonableness in measures taken to defend property and in orders 
which will be made by courts in that defence.63 Perhaps the most common 
reflection of this recognition is in relation to the right of search. Cases 
of the taking of property against the payment of compensation are 
regulated by the ordinary law, and normally present no constitutional 
issues.M The inviolability of a man's house is maintained by both the 
b0 Young v. Heatly, 1959 J.C. 66; Dougall v. Dykes (1861) 4 Irv. 101, Hendry v. Ferguson 
(1883) 10 R.(J.) 63 but see 1959 S.L.T.(News) 229. 
ai Thomas v. Sawkins [1935] 2 K.B. 249; but see 6 C.L.J. 22. 
62 Davis v. Lisle [1936] 2 K.B. 434 denies it in England. It is denied universally in the 
Kingdom by the general insistence upon search warrants. 
53 Clark v. Syme, 1957 J.C. 1; Hay's Trs. v. Young (1877) 4 R. 398; and Winans v. Macrae 
(1885) 12 R. 1051. 
64 Cases such as Att.-Gen. v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel [1920] A.C. 508 or The Burmah Oil 
Case, 1963 S.L.T. 261 are exceptional. The absence of a specific constitutional protection 
of property undoubtedly excludes the possible considerable amount of litigation on the 
issue of what is " taking " as against " regulation." 
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criminal and the civil law, and again no constitutional issues arise. 
Conflict with the interests of the state does, however, arise in relation 
to the right of search. In basic principle there is no real difference 
between the law of Scotland and England. The principle of the right 
of property means in this context that (except with consent or in extra- 
ordinary circumstances) a warrant is required for entry into a man's 
property, and further that the invasion of property must be confined within 
necessary limits, which means in this context that the warrant shall 
be sufficiently specific. These principles were firmly established in 
England in Wilkes v. Wood,55 and Entick v. Carrington.56 In the former 
a warrant which was general as to the persons to be arrested and the 
papers to be seized was held invalid. In the latter Lord Camden C.J. 
emphasised that the legality of the warrant must be demonstrated, and 
strongly rejected a justification of state necessity which had been put 
forward " With respect to the argument of state necessity, or a distinction 
that has been aimed at between state offences and others, the common 
law does not understand that kind of reasoning." He also rejected the 
argument based on utility -that general searches were a means of 
detecting offenders by discovering evidence. Similar principles were 
affirmed in Scotland in Bell v. Black and Morrison 57 where a like 
" fishing " warrant for the seizure of papers, not as evidence, but in 
the hopes of finding traces of guilt, was as strongly condemned. Equally 
there is an insistence on specification or other like precautions in relation 
to the warrant.b8 More recently these cases were discussed in Stewart 
v. Roach.69 It appears from that case that apprehension or a charge is 
not a necessary preliminary to the grant of a warrant, provided that 
there is serious suspicion, and provided that the warrant is sufficiently 
specific. 
It is evident that there is here a question of balance, and so in excep- 
tional cases search without warrant is permissible. Thus, where after 
an arrest (which was without warrant) a search was made it was held 
justified, even though without warrant, on grounds of urgency.ó0 The 
issue remains a live one because of this conflict of ends, and because 
a right of search may itself be abused, stretching farther than is authorised 
by the warrant. It is at this point that a difference between the laws of 
England and Scotland becomes apparent. In England it has been held 
55 (1763) 9 St.Tr. 1153. 
66 (1765) 19 St.Tr. 1029; R. v. Rees (1963) S.J. 536. 
57 (1867) 5 Irv. 57, see too the later proceedings in (1865) 3 M. 1026, where views are ex- 
pressed even more strongly. See earlier Mackenzie v. Marchmont (1704) 2 Fount. 246. 
58 Nelson v. Black and Morrison (1866) 4 M. 328, where a balance is struck between the 
sanctity of property and the interest of the community in the suppression of crime by the 
insistence upon proper safeguards against oppression. 
59 1950 S.C. 318, before a court of seven judges. M'Lauchlan v. Renton, 1911 S.C.(J.) 12 
was also there discussed and disapproved. See, too, on the civil side, Rights of Entry 
(Gas and Electricity Boards) Act, 1954. 
66 H.M. Advocate v. M'Guigan, 1936 J.C. 16. Exceptions are also made under such statutes 
as the Official Secrets Act, 1911, s. 9, or the Incitement to Disaffection Act, 1934, s. 2, 
which are akin in cause to the special powers of arrest in the Public Order Act, 1936, s. 7. 
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that a wrongful search may be excused ex post facto by the discovery of 
evidence of a crime and that such evidence, albeit wrongfully obtained, 
is freely admissible.ó1 In Scotland a different rule prevails. Such evidence 
is not necessarily excluded, but account is taken of all the circumstances 
of the case including the seriousness of the charge.82 In these cases 
Lord Cooper brought out clearly in his opinions the interests which 
have to be balanced one against the other, and as a result the courts 
assume their proper (though arduous) role of maintaining that balance, 
a role which is abandoned in Elias v. Pasmore.83 The issue also appears 
in new forms. The practice of intercepting telephone conversations when 
authorised by a warrant was accepted and approved of in 1957 by a 
committee of Privy Councillors.84 It is, however, to be doubted whether 
such warrants, if challenged, could stand up to the earlier rules against 
general warrants. 
The protection of the accused. It is clear that in the cases just discussed 
there is a large element of " due process of law." That is to say that con- 
victions should be obtained by means which are fair to the accused. 
This element may produce inconvenience to the police, but it is essential 
to the liberty of individuals, and to the maintenance of the rule of law 
in any real sense. That concept spreads out into many rules evolved 
for the protection of the accused. While an arrested person may be 
searched, further tests upon him without his consent are excluded.66 
Much more rigid are the rules which protect the accused from questioning 
once he has been taken into custody or once suspicion has settled upon 
him, since then the dangers are all the greater.66 In effect any questioning 
is limited to an elucidation of what has already been said, and all the 
circumstances are considered from the aspect of fairness to the accused. 
A somewhat similar position in England exists under the Judges' Rules,87 
but the Scottish rules operate more stringently to protect the accused. 
In England a breach of the rules does not necessarily exclude statements 
61 Elias v. Pasmare [1934] 2 K.B. 164; and see Wade, " Police Search " (1934) 50 L.Q.R. 354. 
62 See Pringle v. Bremner & Stirling (1867) 5 M.(H.L.) 55; and particularly the restatement 
of principles in Lawrie v. Muir, 1950 J.C. 19; M'Govern v. H.M. Advocate, 1950 J.C. 
33, and their application in H.M. Advocate v. Turnbull, 1951 J.C. 96, which has similarities 
with Elias v. Pasmore and H.M. Advocate v. M' Kay, 1961 J.C. 47. For a good comparative 
study on " The admissibility of evidence procured through illegal searches and seizures " 
see Cowen and Carter, Essays on the Law of Evidence. 
63 Which is supported by Kuruma v. The Queen [1955] A.C. 197. 
64 See Cmnd. 283. A shift of emphasis is noticeable. Lord Camden and Lord Cooper 
were concerned with the protection of those who might well be guilty. The report 
comments that under its procedure there is no likelihood of the ordinary law -abiding 
citizen being affected (§ 143) (italics supplied). 
65 M'Govern v. H.M. Advocate, 1950 J.C. 33; and see Reid v. Nixon, 1948 J.C. 68 (and see 
now Road Traffic Act, 1962, s. 2). As to consents see M'Kie v. H.M. Advocate, 1958 
J.C. 24; and on the civil side, Whitehall v. Whitehall, 1958 S.C. 252; W. v. W. (No. 4) 
[1963] 2 All E.R. 841. 
66 Chalmers v. H.M. Advocate, 1954 J.C. 66; Wade v. Robertson, 1948 J.C. 117; H.M. 
Advocate v. Aitken, 1926 J.C. 83; Manuel v. H.M. Advocate, 1958 J.C. 41. 
67 As to which, and as to their force, see Archbold, Criminal Pleading and Evidence, § 1118. 
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made by the accused, but in Scotland the exclusion of statements improperly 
made is more rigorous than is the exclusion of real evidence. 
There remains, though, in Scotland, an element of judicial discretion, 
notably as to the point of time from which the rules are to apply. This 
discretionary element, and the somewhat similar discretion in relation 
to real evidence, is important. While it is true that an action can be 
raised for illegal searches, this may prove to be an inadequate deterrent, 
particularly having regard to the present difficulties in raising actions 
against the police. A more effective deterrent as far as the police are 
concerned is the fact that a conviction obtained by the use of such faulty 
evidence may not be upheld. Were rules to be laid down in general 
terms they would have to take account of extreme cases, and might well 
be inappropriate in others.ó8 Thus the discretionary element ensures 
that the police will, in their proper anxiety to secure a conviction, stop 
well short of the borderline. A firm rule might mean that in all cases 
they would go to that border, even when such conduct was not fully 
justifiable. 
FREEDOM OF THE PERSON 
The rules already discussed have an obvious bearing upon the freedom 
of the person, but that topic must be more generally treated. It falls to 
be considered from the aspect of the criminal law, and from that of 
the civil law. 
Arrest. On the criminal side, there is first the insistence, in normal 
circumstances, on a warrant to arrest, which must be issued by a magistrate. 
This insistence on a warrant here, as in the case of search, provides 
a safeguard attributable to the distribution of powers. Liberty in these 
respects is considered to be too precious to be watched over by one person 
or body alone. Thus those concerned with the investigation of crime 
have to go outside that particular machinery and justify their require- 
ments. The warrant must be specific, and not general, but if the name 
of the person to be arrested is unknown a description will suffice. The 
necessities of life require some modification; so, both in England and 
Scotland, arrest without warrant is justifiable in certain circumstances. 
In Scotland a constable may arrest without warrant if he sees a crime 
being committed and there are reasonable grounds for considering that 
otherwise the criminal will abscond, or where, subject to like conditions, 
he is credibly informed that a crime has been committed by a particular 
individual. Again all the circumstances must be taken into account, 
e.g., if the arrested person has no known abode, or the nature of the 
68 See the refusal to lay down absolute rules in Reid v. Nixon, supra, note 65. The aspect 
of fairness to the accused has many other aspects, see, e.g., H.M. Advocate v. Olsson, 
1941 J.C. 63. 
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possible punishment makes absconding likely.89 So, too, at common 
law, the police have (as has been seen) the right to arrest to prevent a 
breach of the peace. In addition to these common law powers statutory 
powers are also conferred.70 These powers may be exercised upon sus- 
picion, and it must be noted that the police are protected in that exercise 
by the fact that no action will lie for wrongous arrest against them unless 
malice or want of probable cause can be shown.71 
The police have the right to call for the aid of ordinary citizens. 
A private citizen himself has also a separate right to arrest with a view 
to handing over the arrested person to the police as soon as possible. 
This right is, however, much more hedged about, and is not so extensive 
as that of the police, since it is a right which is perhaps more open to 
abuse in the hands of a private citizen. So, arrest upon suspicion is 
not justified,72 and any delay in handing over to the police will give rise 
to liability.73 In principle the position in England is similar, but it seems 
that with the exception of breach of the peace arrest without warrant 
by the police is only justifiable in cases of felony.74 Similarly citizens 
may arrest, but not upon suspicion, and delay in handing over to the 
police will likewise create liability." 
Because of its dangers arrest without warrant is confined within 
narrow limits and when the power is exercised, the position must be 
regularised, as by bringing the arrested person before a magistrate without 
delay. Moreover he who arrests must at the time explain the reasons to 
the arrested person, unless they are sufficiently evident from the whole 
circumstances, and the explanation given must be a true one.7ó 
Bail. Assuming detention, the person detained has the right to apply 
for release on bail. There are two stages: first there is an application for 
release on bail before commitment for trial. Since this is the stage of 
investigation there is a weighting in favour of the views of the prose - 
cutor.77 In the second place there is bail after commitment for trial. 
69 See particularly Peggie v. Clark (1868) 7 M. 89; Leask y. Burt (1893) 21 R. 32; Melvin 
v. Wilson (1847) 9 D. 1129, where carrying a peacock in the early hours of the morning 
was held to be sufficiently suspicious to justify arrest. Cf. Harvey v. Sturgeon, 1912 
S.C. 974 (a respectable business man carrying an alarm clock at 5.30 p.m.), and see 
Hume, Criminal Law, II, 75; Alison, Criminal Law, II, 117. 
79 See, e.g., the Public Order Act, 1936, s. 7; Road Traffic Act, 1960, s. 6 (4); but such 
powers are narrowly construed. 
71 Robertson v. Keith, 1936 S.C. 29; Beaton v. Ivory (1887) 14 R. 1057. 
72 Hume, Criminal Law, II, 76. 
73 Mackenzie v. Young (1902) 10 S.L.T. 231. 
74 Archbold, Criminal Pleading, § 2809; 2 Co.Inst. 52; Dumbell v. Roberts [1944] 1 All 
E.R. 326; and on police powers see Glanville Williams, " Demanding Name and Address " 
(1950) 66 L.Q.R. 465. 
76 Walters v. W. H. Smith and Son Ltd. [1914] 1 K.B. 595; John Lewis & Co. v. Tims [1952] 
A.C. 676. 
76 Christie v. Leachinsky [1947] A.C. 573, the principles of which appear to be applicable 
in both jurisdictions. There Lord Simon emphasises the general background and (at 
p. 587) gives a detailed exposition. 
77 The Bail (Scotland) Act, 1888, gives a right to the prosecutor to appeal against a decision 
to grant bail, though it seems that an appeal by the accused to the power of the High 
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The issue is in Scotland regulated by the Bail (Scotland) Act, 1888, 
and the position has been summarised by saying that the applicant 
has a right to have his application heard and that bail should be granted 
unless there is good reason to the contrary.78 At this stage the accused 
(as well as the prosecution) may appeal from a decision as to bail. In 
England the principles on which bail is granted or refused are somewhat 
similar, the governing consideration being that the accused shall appear 
for trial, but it is possible that their application is somewhat less liberal 
than in Scotland.79 
Release. In Scotland the main rules for securing a speedy trial and 
the release of those held on criminal charges spring from the Act Anent 
Wrongous Imprisonment, 1701, an Act for which the later years of 
the Stuarts had shown the need.80 The position is now regulated by the 
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1887, s. 43. If a person has been 
committed for trial, and has not within sixty days been served with 
an indictment he may serve notice on the Lord Advocate that, if an 
indictment is not served within fourteen days, the prosecutor will be 
called on to show cause in the High Court why he should not be released. 
If no indictment is served and the court is not satisfied as to the reason 
for delay, the court orders release after three further days unless an 
indictment is served meanwhile. Release in such circumstances does 
not prevent a prosecutor raising a fresh indictment and obtaining a 
warrant for a fresh committal. The Act, however, provides, in that 
event, against the possibility of further delays. 
More importantly, section 43 also provides that if the accused has 
been imprisoned for eighty days then, unless he is brought to trial and 
the trial concluded within one hundred and ten days from his committal 
until liberated in due course of law he shall be released and be free of 
the crimes charged. The period may only be prolonged where it can 
be shown that delay was caused by the illness of the accused or of a witness 
or by some other circumstance for which the prosecutor is not respon- 
sible.81 It will be noted that the Act secures the early service of an indict- 
ment and an early trial, it does not of itself deal with the period between 
arrest and committal for trial but that period can be controlled by the 
Court akin to the nobile officium is competent; Milne v. M'Nicol, 1944 J.C. 151; and see 
in England R. v. Guest [1961] 3 All E.R. 1118. 
78 Mackintosh v. M'Glinchy, 1921 J.C. 75; and see H.M. Advocate v. Quinn & Macdonald, 
1921 J.C. 61; previous convictions may put the onus on the accused to show why bail 
should be allowed: Young v. H.M. Advocate, 1946 J.C. 5 and Renton and Brown, Criminal 
Procedure, 44 et seq. 
79 See Archbold, Criminal Pleading, § 201 et seq.; and see generally the essay in Smith, 
Studies Critical and Comparative. 
80 Sir George Mackenzie in his Vindication commenting on his part in detentions without 
trial says " these things may be accounted severe, but not illegal." Imprisonment without 
cause and delays in trial was one of the grievances in the Claim of Right. Nevertheless 
some power to secure release had existed, see the case of Janet Richmond (1661) and 
other remedies were available: Hume, Criminal Law, II, 96. 
81 See generally Renton and Brown, op. cit.; as to the running of time where detention 
for other reasons supervenes see Wallace v. H.M. Advocate, 1959 J.C. 71. 
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High Court of Justiciary in exercise of its special powers.82 Regulations 
to secure a speedy trial, though somewhat different in detail are to be 
found in England in the Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, and the Assizes Relief 
Act, 1884.83 The Habeas Corpus Acts go farther however.84 The Act 
of 1679 applicable to imprisonment on criminal matters enabled a writ 
of habeas corpus to issue, requiring the production of the prisoner, so 
that it covered cases of detention without legal warrant, and the period 
before committal for trial.85 The Act of 1679 was extended, by that 
of 1816, to detention other than on a criminal charge, and thus gave a 
much wider significance to the writ. By the Act of 1862 the application 
of these Acts was confined to colonies or foreign dominions of the Crown 
where no court existed capable of issuing it.86 Procedure in relation 
to applications for the writ has been reformed by the Administration of 
Justice Act, 1960, which, by section 14, provides that in a criminal 
matter it may only be refused by a Divisional Court of the Queen's 
Bench Division, and that no second criminal or civil application shall 
be made on the same grounds. That Act further by section 15 makes 
possible an appeal in criminal or civil matters. 
Civil cases. There is one possible advantage in the habeas corpus 
procedure. In principle, though modern practice varies, it requires the 
production of the person detained, and in certain circumstances that 
could be a considerable merit. It has also, in its modern form, the 
advantage that it is a universal remedy, in that it may be used no matter 
what the form or cause of detention. It may thus be used for a wide 
range of civil purposes, including such matters as the custody and guard- 
ianship of infants,87 or to challenge the validity of orders of extradition 
or deportation.88 It has in many cases been supplemented or effectively 
superseded under particular pieces of legislation which have provided 
particular remedies,S9 but even in such cases it remains a powerful residual 
weapon. 
The fact that on the criminal side the broad purposes of habeas corpus 
are achieved under the Criminal Procedure Act means that in Scotland 
something else has to be found for the protection of personal liberty 
82 And by civil courts in actions for wrongous imprisonment. 
83 Though they may be sometimes difficult to work in modern conditions, R. v. Campbell 
[1959] 1 W.L.R. 646. 
84 See Jenks, " The Story of Habeas Corpus " (1902) 18 L.Q.R. 64; Holdsworth, H.E.L. 
Vol. IX; (1949) 65 L.Q.R. 30; and (1950) 66 L.Q.R. 79. 
85 It cannot be granted where a person is serving a sentence imposed by a competent court: 
Ex p. Hinds [1961] 1 W.L.R. 325; Re Wring [1960] 1 W.L.R. 138; R. v. Board of Control, 
ex p. Rutty [1956] 2 Q.B. 109. 
86 In Re Mwenya [1960] 1 Q.B. 241 these terms were held to embrace a protectorate. 
87 Barnardo v. McHugh [1891] A.C. 388; and see Bromley, Family Law, Chap. XIV. 
88 R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex p. Schtraks [1963] 1 Q.B. 55; R. v. S. of S. for 
Home Affairs, ex p. Soblen [1962] 3 W.L.R. 1145; R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex p. 
Soblen [1963] 2 Q.B. 243. In the first Soblen case detention of an alien was challenged 
by habeas corpus proceedings. In the second the same procedure was used to challenge 
a subsequent deportation order. 
89 e.g., under the Mental Health Act, 1959. 
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in the civil sense.99 It is clear that the law had long recognised the 
gravity of wrongous imprisonment,91 even though there was not any 
consistency in that recognition. At times relief might be got by petition 
to the Privy Council, and after the abolition of the Privy Council, by 
petition to the Lords of Justiciary.92 In cases of civil arrest, a petition 
for suspension and liberation was appropriate to secure release. It 
seems that today that procedure is appropriate where detention follows 
upon the judgment of an inferior court. Where detention has some 
other basis, e.g., an order under the Mental Health Act,BS and there is 
some document which is capable of being attacked an action for reduction 
would appear to be appropriate. In other cases, such as those dealing 
with the detention of children it appears that the procedure by petition 
is both competent and effective 94 The nobile ofJ"icium of the Court of 
Session, and the equivalent power of the High Court of Justiciary (which 
is not excluded by a statute covering a portion of the ground 96) appear 
to afford sufficient residual powers to guarantee protection against any 
unauthorised detention. 
These differences in the procedure for securing release may have 
consequences upon the grounds upon which release may be obtained. 
The procedure by petition is clearly capable of bringing more of law 
and fact upon the record, and it remains to be determined, for example, 
whether an answer that an individual was detained for contempt of the 
House of Commons (which can be a good answer in habeas corpus pro- 
ceedings) would be a sufficient answer in Scotland, assuming that the 
aid of the courts is invoked before the Serjeant at Arms has carried the 
alleged contemnor out of the jurisdiction." 
Apart from these remedies to secure release, it must be remembered 
that in both jurisdictions infractions of the liberty of the individual 
are zealously watched by the civil law. " In cases of patrimonial damage," 
it has been said " excesses of error and bona fides have sometimes been 
admitted, but not in cases of false imprisonment. The liberty of the 
subject is so secured that it cannot be violated with impunity even by 
mistake." 97 Despite the changes in society, that, at least appears to 
be one of the principles to which the courts must adhere, though adherence 
may impose heavy burdens upon them. 
99 It is true that in Paterson v. Wright (1736) Mor. 17069 the penalties under the Act of 
1701 were applied equally to a private citizen who had wrongfully detained another, 
but see Fount. II, 267. 
91 Balfour's Prackticks -Of privie imprisonment of the King's lieges (Tit. Criminal Causes). 
92 See the case of Mackenzie of Assynt in Hume, Criminal Law, II, Chap. III. 
93 Or see earlier as to letters of impressment Smith v. Jeffrey, Jan. 24, 1817, F.C., or Napier 
v. Browning, Jan. 19, 1781, F.C. (whether the mates of smuggling ships enjoyed the 
same immunities as those of more normal trading ships). 
94 Leys v. Leys (1886) 13 R. 1223. 
96 Keith v. H.M. Advocate (1875) 3 Coup. 113. 
96 Preliminary questions about the United Kingdom character of that officer are also 
involved. 
97 Laing v. Watson and Mollison (1791) 3 Pat.App. 219; see too Kuchenmeister v. Home 
Office [1958] 1 Q.B. 496. 
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RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE 
It was, perhaps, inevitable that a revolutionary movement such as the 
Reformation should itself have had some authoritarian results, and that 
those who had achieved it should deny to others that religious freedom 
for which they themselves had fought. The Act for Securing the Protes- 
tant Religion (and the significant place which that had in the Union 
Compact) is but one mark of the depth of feeling which had been engen- 
dered, and which, coupled with other factors, delayed the legislative 
recognition of religious toleration which had, in fact, arrived considerably 
earlier. 
In the political world religious disabilities were steadily removed. 
The effective repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts in 1828, the 
Catholic Emancipation Act, 1829, the Jews Relief Act, 1858, the Oaths 
Act, 1888, had the combined effect of removing religious barriers from 
political life. The movement towards religious toleration spread into 
other branches of life. In the Scottish universities tests had not been 
applied to students, and those applied to professors were progressively 
abolished from the Universities (Scotland) Act, 1853.88 Elsewhere 
the establishment of such institutions as University College London 
helped to widen the doors to university education, and those doors 
were legally opened in Oxford and Cambridge by the University Tests 
Act, 1871. In schools, a like process of liberalising was operative, so 
that, both in England and in Scotland, the public system of education is 
freed from any religious discrimination.99 In relation to marriage laws 
(particularly as to the places of celebration of marriages) a like process 
has continued. In effect, therefore, the establishment of religious tolera- 
tion is virtually complete, subject to limitations imposed by the require- 
ments of public order,' and to the reservation to the state of the right 
of determining who is a minister, or what is a religion where issues of 
public order arise.2 It is arguable whether in this instance the achievement 
of this freedom has not been, in part at least, achieved because of the 
absence of any specific guarantee. The presence of such a guarantee 
may have the effect of affording the necessary handhold for a minority 
to force its views on a majority,3 and thus of frustrating arrangements 
such as those existing under the administrative schemes for the individual 
local education authorities in Scotland whereby members of the various 
churches are co -opted to the Education Committee. It may also be that 
the fact of the establishment of the Church of Scotland and of the Church 
98 Though this Act was prompted not so much by a general spirit of religious toleration 
as by the particular circumstances of the Disruption. In fact the test had earlier been 
often disregarded or evaded in relation to lay chairs. 
99 The provisions of the Education (Scotland) Act, 1946, may be said to be somewhat more 
liberal than those of the Education Act, 1944, but in practice there is no real distinction. 
R. v. Senior [1899] 1 Q.B. 283; and Glanville Williams, Criminal Law, The General Part, 
2nd ed., § 241. 
2 Walsh v. Lord Advocate, 1956 S.C.(H.L.) 126. 
3 Compare, Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421 8 L. ed. 2d, 601 (1962) and Sutherland, The law and 
the one man amongst the many. 
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of England may paradoxically have contributed something to this 
evolution. 
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND ECONOMIC LIBERTY 
Just as movements of thought and changes in society were reflected in 
the growth of religious toleration, so also, eventually, were the economic 
changes of the nineteenth century reflected in the recognition of a 
freedom of association, the right of masters or men to band together for 
the furtherance of their interests. These issues have long been treated 
as raising questions of individual liberty and of public policy. The 
Combination Act, 1801, can be said to look to the liberty of the individual 
master and, indeed, may be said to have guarded that liberty too well. 
The watch that the law has always kept upon exclusive privileges marks 
the abiding elements of public policy. The passing years and economic 
movements, made it clear that the concept of liberty embedded in the 
Act of 1801 was an inadequate one, and ultimately, by the Trade Union 
Act, 1871, trade unions (whether of employers or workmen) were accepted 
as lawful, despite the fact that their purposes might be in restraint of trade. 
Thereafter the ability of trade unions to act was increased, in particular 
by the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, allowing peaceful picketing, providing 
that inducing another to break a contract is not actionable if done in 
pursuance of a trade dispute, and conferring upon unions and their 
officials an immunity from tortious liability.' 
At the back of this legislation lay a series of what may be regarded 
as unfortunate decisions in the courts, each of which had to be rectified 
by legislation.' The legislation itself is piecemeal and exists against 
a general background of relevant law which is confused and difficult 
to understand.' In many respects the effect has been to recognise the 
existence of trade unions, but to exclude their activities from the purview 
of law.7 Thus there remain problems still to be determined. The limits 
of the right to strike (which is recognised) are uncertain. The Trade 
Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927, had declared illegal strikes which 
had any object beyond furthering a trade dispute within the trade or 
industry and were designed or calculated to coerce the government. This 
Act was repealed by the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1946, 
and uncertainties exist about the lawfulness of, for example, a general 
strike. It seems that in practice the only general limits set to the right 
to strike are those imposed by the law of sedition. though the actual conduct 
' Further protection is given, e.g., by Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, 
s. 3. See, generally, Citrine, Trade Union Law; Samuels, The Law of Trade Unions. ' R. v. Duffield (1851) 5 Cox C.C. 384; Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway 
Servants [1901] A C. 426 (as to tortious liability); Amalgamated Society of Railway 
Servants v. Osborne [1910] A.C. 87 (reversed by the Trade Union Act, 1913, permitting 
the use of union funds for certain political purposes). 
6 e.g.; as to conspiracy consider the Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch [1942] 
A.C. 435. 
7 Trade Union Act, 1871, s. 4. 
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of a strike may be affected by the rules governing public order. Under the 
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, breaches of contract 
which affect the supply of gas, water, or electricity may be criminal 
offences (though assuming due notice is given the Act in no way prevents 
a strike). Similarly acts done in furtherance of a dispute could be offences 
under regulations made after a declaration of an emergency under the 
Emergency Powers Act, 1920. That Act, however, recognises implicitly 
the right to strike. Section 2 (1) provides that no regulation made under 
that Act shall make it an offence for any person to take part in a strike, 
or peacefully to persuade any other person to take part in a strike, and 
also provides that no regulation shall impose any form of a compulsory 
military service or industrial conscription. In effect, therefore, it is 
only the manner in which a strike is conducted which can conflict with 
regulations, and not the strike itself. Thus no official balance between 
the interests of trade unions and those of the state has as yet been struck, 
and it seems improbable that any much greater precision of the law is 
to be expected. The invocation of the Emergency Powers Act, 1920, 
on any occasion may itself show changes in outlook. 
It may be noted that as respects combinations of employers, the law 
has of late become more direct in protecting the public interest, through 
the mechanism in particular of the Restrictive Practices Court and 
less forcefully through the Monopolies Commission. Under the Restric- 
tive Trade Practices Act, 1956, agreements restricting prices, conditions 
of supply, quantities to be produced, persons to whom goods are to 
be supplied or the processes of manufacture to be applied to goods are 
(with certain exceptions) to be registered. Under section 21 the restrictions 
are to be deemed contrary to the public interest unless the Restrictive 
Practices Court is satisfied, that one (or more) of the conditions set out 
in that section is fulfilled. These conditions are such as could justify 
the restriction on grounds of the public interest, but the restriction must 
not exceed what is reasonable for that purpose.8 Similarly under the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act, 1948 
(as amended), the Monopolies Commission must (particularly under 
section 14) have regard to the public interest in reaching any conclusion 
on a reference to it. 
Thus, questions of liberty in the economic field may be coming in- 
creasingly within the area of law, and again questions of balance between 
public and private interest are clearly posed, though they are as yet 
obscurely answered. Much of the town and country planning regulation 
and its extensions in the fields of the location of industry, under the 
Local Employment Act, 1960, illustrate the same development. The 
problems are, however, more difficult to solve than those of the traditional 
and more fundamental issues of individual liberty, and no consistent 
theory of law is yet apparent. Nevertheless the existence of these problems 
8 See Wilberforce and Campbell, Restrictive Trade Practices and Monopolies. 
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should be observed, they emphasise that problems of liberty falling within 
the traditional heads have not been finally solved, and that those tradi- 
tional heads are not themselves exhaustive. Indeed, these developments 
in the field of economic activity produce problems which are not all 
related to the conflicts of communal interests (in the sense of state interests) 
and individual interests, they also produce problems of the conflict of 
the interests of the individual as against those of a private group, and of 
those problems the law must take notice. On the one side there are 
questions of the legitimacy of the use by trade associations of devices 
such as stop -lists, fines, etc., to enforce their regulations.9 Some attempt 
has been made to meet some of these problems by section 24 of the 
Act of 1956 which outlaws certain forms of sanction, but again all that 
is clear is that the law has not yet reached a full development. Similar 
problems arise on the other side, when expulsion or exclusion from a 
trade union may have serious effects upon the ability of an individual 
to earn his livelihood, and attention has turned to these also. The courts 
have recently shown a greater readiness to intervene than was once the 
case.10 There is, however, a reluctance so to do. This reluctance springs 
partly from unhappy judicial intervention in the past, partly from the 
circumstance that, by reason of history, so much of labour law is outside 
the bounds of ordinary law and hence a feeling has grown up that it 
should be so,11 and partly because this is inherently an area in which 
law operates with difficulty. A like reluctance may be observed in 
the regulation of similar problems which arise in connection with 
bodies controlling professional organisations.12 There is then a residual 
judicial control, but its scope has not been firmly settled. 
Conclusion. Such uncertainties in the law are perhaps inevitable. In 
all questions relating to the liberties of the individual there can be observed 
a balancing or conflict of interests, particularly between the interests 
of the individual and the interests of the group which is the state. It 
was that problem of balance which prompted Lincoln's question, " Must 
a state be too strong for the liberty of its subjects, or too weak for its 
own protection ?" That question remains an important one. Yet, put in 
that form it conceals an important fact. The state itself exists simply 
for the fulfilment of the individual. The conflict is not between the 
interests of two rivals, the state and the individual, it is between the personal 
or localised interests of the individual and his communal or generalised 
interests. It is then clear that the balance that will be struck at any 
9 Thorne v. Motor Trades Association [1937] A.C. 797. 
12 Lee v. Showmen's Guild [1952] 2 Q.B. 329; Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board 
[1953] 2 Q.B. 18; Bonsor v. Musicians' Union [1956] A.C. 104, and see generally Rideout, 
Right to Membership of a Trade Union. 
11 To that feeling a long history, reaching back to the Tolpuddle Martyrs and the trial 
of Muir, contributes. Consider, e.g., the views expressed in cases such as Faramus v. 
Film Artistes' Association [1963] 2 W.L.R. 504. 
12 Lloyd, " The Disciplinary Powers of Professional Bodies " (1950) 13 M.L.R. 281. 
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND ECONOMIC LIBERTY 293 
one time will be dictated by a judgment of the respective values of those 
two groups of interests, a judgment which must vary according to the 
circumstances in which it is made. Thus the balance will change. The 
purpose in striking the balance does not. The purpose is the achievement 
of the dignity of man. 
The mechanism for achieving that balance is the law. The legal 
device which is used both to embody and to achieve the communal 
interests within a society is, at one level, that body which we call the 
state. Divorced from this connection with its members, for whom it 
exists, " the state " is either a meaningless or a dangerous concept. It is 
meaningful and acceptable only as a mechanism for attaining the liberty 
of man, his freedom of thought, speech, action and self -expression. This 
aim, in our society at least, must endure. It is as means to attaining that 
end that all constitutional rules and institutions must be judged. For 
themselves alone constitutional institutions have no value, they have 
value only as means to an end. Constitutional rules have in themselves 
no sanctity; they too are the means to an end, and must be judged not 
by their history alone but by their efficiency as such means (an efficiency 
which may either be aided or diminished by that history). Their study 
should then not be an arid one, and should the author have made it so, 
the fault is his. If then, at the end of a survey of some of those rules 
and institutions (a survey which may, perhaps, have obscured their 
purpose), the author is allowed to declare what he believes that ultimate 
purpose to be, let him roundly declare that, in his view, it is simply the 




Accession Declaration, 138 
accident inquiries, 244, 245 
Act of Settlement, 137, 222 
act of state, 149 
Act of Union with Ireland, 58 
actio popularis, 192; and see title to sue 
Acts of Parliament, see statutes 
Acts of sederunt, 33, 214 
Acts of Union 1707, 73-80 
appeals to the House of Lords, and, 220 
as constituent documents, 54 
effect on judicial decision, 17, 19, 222 
effect on legislation, 15 
effect on peerage of Scotland, 78, 87, 90 
entrenched provisions of, 56 et seq. 
equality provisions, 76-77 
institutional provisions, 77 -79 
legislative history, 79 
origin of, 75 
parliamentary character, 74 
public and private right in, 79 
sovereignty of Parliament and, 54 et 
seq. 
succession to the Crown, under, 137- 
138 
And see Union of 1707 
acts salvo jure, 66, 121 
adjournment debates, 131 
administrative decisions 
definition, 34 
significance of contrast with judicial 
decisions, 250, 268, 270 
And see judicial review and courts 
administrative law, 
compared to constitutional law, 2 
concepts of, 45-46 
need for, 256, 268 et seq. 
And see adminstrative tribunals, dele- 
gated legislation, public authorities, 
public law 
administrative tribunals, 43, 240 et seq. 
grounds for review of decisions, 251 -252 
institutional controls, 247 
problems of, 245 
range of, 242 
reasons for, 240 -241 
reforms of, 246 -250 
And see judicial review, Tribunals and 
Inquiries Act 
administrative tutelage, 211 -212, 258 
Air Force, 
regulation of, 173 
Air Transport Licensing Board, 189, 243, 
249; and see administrative tribunals 
aliens, 82, 149 
allegiance, 
importance of, 276 
oath of, 140 
ambassadors, recognition of, 148 
appeal for remeid of law, 220 
appeals, civil, 214, 220; and see House of 
Lords (as a court) and particular 
courts 
appeals, criminal, 112, 215, 220 
Appellate Committee, of House of Lords, 
113, 220 
appropriation, 126 
Appropriation Act, significance of, 127, 
129, 132, 173 
armed forces, 173 et seq.; and see Ministry 
of Defence 
Army, 
aid to civil power, 278 
authorisation of, 173 
regulation and control of, 173 -174 
seduction from duty, 274 
arrest, 
liability for wrongful, 285 
police, by, 284 -285 
private citizen, by, 285 
warrant for, 284 
Articles of Grievance, 272 
Atomic Energy Authority, 185 
Attorney -General, 13, 171, 211 
in Crown proceedings, 266 
And see Law Officers 
audi alteram partem rule, 251 
backbenchers, 
influence of, 130, 166, 167 
bail, 
right to, 285 
bailies, 198 
Bank of England, 179, 183, 185 
Bank of Scotland, 180 
Bill of Rights, 6, 40, 49, 101, 103, 111, 126, 
138, 150, 173, 272 
Bill of Rights, Canadian, 63, 65, 272 
billeting, 150 
Bills, classification of, 114; and see 
legislation, public Bills, etc. 
Bishops, in House of Lords, 91 
blasphemy, 274 
books of authority, see institutional 
writers 
borrowing, governmental, 127 
by local authorities, 205 
by public boards, 186, 187 
Boundary Commissioners (Parliamen- 
tary), 93 
breach of the peace, 
effects on public meetings, 279, 281 
failure to prevent, 278 
generally, 278 et seq. 
British Broadcasting Corporation, 179, 
182, 185, 188 
295 
296 INDEX 
British nationality, 18, 80-84 
acquisition of, 81 
Acts of Union and, 80 
basis of 1948 Act, 81 
Commonwealth citizenship, 81 
constitutional significance, 82 -83 
immigration and deportation of British 
subjects, 81 -83 
loss of, 82 
British protected persons, 84 
Buchanan, George, 4, 21, 32, 38, 39-40, 
143, 158 
budget, 
significance of, 127, 128 
And see financial legislation 
burgh courts, 218 
burghs, 
former classification of, 196 
modern classification of, 197 -198 
powers of, 199 et seq. 
And see local authorities 
by -laws, 201 -202; and see delegated 
legislation 
Cabinet, 158 et seq. 
composition of, 159 
conventional basis of, 23, 25, 165 
co- ordination of, 159 
machinery, 160 
meaning of, 156 
methods of operations, 160 
minutes, 161 
Prime Minister in relation to, 162 
relationship to government, 163 




Cabinet Secretariat, 161 
Cabinet, Secretary to, 161 
Cable and Wireless, Ltd., 179 
case law, 
Dicey's emphasis on, 42; and see 
precedent 
caucus system, 25, 157 
central government, 
contrasted to local government, 203 
relationship to local government, 207- 
208 
structure of, 169 et seq. 
And see Cabinet, machinery of 
government 
centralisation, pattern of, 156 
forces of, 168, 179 
Chairman of Ways and Means, 111, 117, 
119 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 171 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, 128, 159, 
171 
checks and balances, doctrine of, 32 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury, 159, 170, 
171 
Chiefs of Staff Committee, 173 
Chiltern Hundreds, and Manor of North - 
stead, Stewardship of, 99 
church courts, 
constitutional position of, 219 
origins of, 218 
present jurisdiction, 219 
And see Church of England, Church 
of Scotland 
Church of England, 
position of, 64 
representation in the House of Lords, 91 
Sovereign and, 138, 219 
Church of England Assembly, 219 
Church of Scotland, 
Acts of Union and, 64, 74 
position of, 56 et seq. 
representation in the House of Lords 
and, 91 
self government of, 219 
Sovereign and, 138 
And see church courts 
citizenship of the United Kingdom and 
Colonies, 81 et seq. 
acquisition of, 81 
significance of concept, 82 
And see British nationality 
civil law, as source of constitutional law, 
14 
Civil List, 141 
civil servants, 
personal responsibility of, 176 -177 
political activities of, 98, 177 
probity of, 25, 178 
recruitment and conditions of service, 
177 
relationship to Minister, 176 
And see Civil Service 
Civil Service, 130 
generally, 176 et seq. 
Head of, 24, 171 
relationship to Minister, 164, 176 
relationship to Treasury, 171 
security in, 176 
subordinate legislation and, 236 
And see civil servants 
Civil Service Commissioners, 177 
Claim of Right, 7, 39, 42, 49, 101, 103, 
111, 126, 138, 150, 173, 272 
closure, 117 
coalition governments, effect on general 
rules, 165 
Coke, 
on judicial review, 66 
on prerogative, 143 
on sovereignty of Parliament, 51, 53 
collective responsibility, 
relationship to ministerial responsibility, 
164 
scope of, 163 
College of Justice, 15 
foundation of, 213 
And see Court of Session 
Colliers and Salters, 273 
commissary courts, 213 
Commissioner of Wrecks, 244 
Commissioners for the Plantation of 
Kirks, etc., 241 
Commissioners of Supply, 197 
Committee, "1922," 167 
INDEX 297 
Committee for Privileges, 88, 110 
Committee of Imperial Defence, 161 
Committee of Privileges, 105; and see 
parliamentary privileges 
Committee of Supply, 126, 127, 128 
Committee of Ways and Means, 126, 127 
Committee of the Whole House, 113, 114, 
126 
Committee on Ministers' Powers, 34, 230, 
236, 241, 247 
Commonwealth citizenship, 
in relation to immigration and deporta- 
tion, 81 -82; and see British nationality 
Commonwealth of Nations, 2 
relationship of Sovereign to, 147 -148 
And see British nationality and 
Statute of Westminster 
Comptroller and Auditor -General, 132, 
187 
compulsory acquisition, 150, 181, 281 
confession of faith, 54; and see Church of 
Scotland 
Consolidated Fund, 127, 128, 132 
Consolidated Fund Services, 127 
Consolidation Bills, 117 
constituencies, parliamentary, 93 
constituent documents, interpretation of, 
58, 70 
Acts of Union as, 54 
constitutional law, 
definition, 1 -3 
nature of, 3 -7 
ultimate concern, 293 
constitutions, written and unwritten, 7 et 
seq. 
consultation in legislation, 52, 117 -118 
in delegated legislation, 229, 235 
contempt of court, 44, 223, 273 -274 
contempt of Parliament, see parliamentary 
privileges 
contracts of local and public authorities, 
210, 267; and see Crown contracts 
Convention of Royal Burghs, 196 
Conventions, 
advantages and dangers, 26 
as means of constitutional amendment, 
8, 22 
as source of constitutional law, 21 et 
seq. 
comparison with law, 27 et seq., 30 
Dicey's definition of, 22, 27 
distinguished from practices, 30 
Jennings, Sir Ivor, views of, 28 
nature of, 23 et seq. 
operation within government, 165 
operation within parties, 25 
origins of, 25 et seq. 
recognition by courts, 28 et seq., 165 
types of, 23 et seq. 
Coronation, 139 
Coronation Oath, 138 
Council for Wales and Monmouthshire, 
175 
Council on Prices, Productivity and In- 
comes, 168 
Council on Tribunals, 235, 248 -249, 253 
Counsel to the Speaker, 234 
Counsellors of State, 140 
counties of cities, 198 
functions of, 200 
And see local authorities 
county councils, 198 
functions of, 199 -200 
And see local authorities 
county courts, 
comparison with sheriff courts, 216 
Court of Admiralty, 77, 213 
Court of Criminal Appeal (Scotland), 215 
Court of the Lord Lyon, 216 
Court of Referees, 119 
Court of Session, 
Acts of Union and, 57, 77 
administrative functions, 33 
composition of, 214 
generality of jurisdiction, 210, 211, 213, 
251 
origins of, 32, 213 
courts, 
control of morality by, 275 
in relation to legislation, 65 
local government, 200, 210 -212 
Parliament, 168 
parliamentary privileges, 105, 288 
prerogative, 144 
private legislation, 121 -122 
public boards, 190 -193 
modern position of, 43, 195 
place of in modern constitution, 10-12, 
271 
role of in constitutional regulation 
10-12, 225 -226, 258 
structure, of, 213 et seq. 
And see judges and judi cial review 
Courts- Martial Appeal Court, 112, 221 
Craig, 126, 142 
crimes against the state, 276 et seq. 
Crofters Commission, 217, 242 
Crown, 
actions against, see Crown proceedings 
" demise " of, 139 
immunity from Statute, 151, 261 -262 
immunity from suit, 151, 259 -260 
immunity from tax, 152 
importance and disadvantages of the 
concept, 137, 147, 154 
privileges of, 45, 260 -262 
revenues of, 141 
title to under Acts of Union, 75 
unity of, 170, 262 
And see prerogative, Sovereign 
Crown contracts, 153, 261 -262 
Crown Estate Commissioners, 141, 179 
Crown proceedings, 259 et seq. 
effects of the Crown Proceedings Act, 
260 
evidence in, 261 
historical background in England and 
Scotland, 259 
procedural aspects, 265 
scope of, 262 -263 
298 INDEX 
Crown servants, 
civil servant as, 177 
judges as, 224 
police excluded, 209 
significance of, 153 
under the Crown Proceedings Act, 263 
who are, 153 
custom, in relation to convention, 21 
Dean of Guild Court, 33, 200, 240 
Dean of the Faculty of Advocates, 172, 
225 
decentralisation, 176 
Declaratory Order, 250 
defamation, 103, 273 
Defence Committee, 160 
delegated legislation, 227 et seq. 
constitutional merits, 229 
controls of, 232 et seq. 
gradations of, 227 
origins and development of, 228 
reasons for, 228 -229 
risks of, 230 
And see by -laws, Statutory Instru- 
ments 
Deputy Prime Minister, 26, 146, 163 
desuetude, 17, 67, 70, 72 
devolution in government, 175 -176 
Dicey, A. V., 
criticism of, 45 et seq., 195 
on conventions, 22 et seq. 
on delegated legislation, 229 
on prerogative, 143 
on rule of law, the, 41 et seq. 
on sovereignty of Parliament, 50 
diplomatic immunities, 144, 148 
diplomatic status, recognition of, 148 
disciplinary bodies, 245 
discretionary powers, 
of local authorities, 202 
prerogative and, 148 et seq. 
rule of law and, 43-45, 143 -144 
dismissal of a Ministry, 146 
dismissal of Ministers, 162 
disruption cases, 
Church courts and, 219 
nature of the Union and, 55 
dissolution, right to refuse, 146 
distribution of powers, 35, 36, 38, 43, 226, 
284 
district auditors, 206 
district councils, 198 
functions, 199 -200 
And see local authorities 
due process of law, 249, 269, 283 
education authorities, 197, 208, 289 
election petitions and election courts, 96, 
215 
Electricity Council and other Boards, 184 
consultative committees and, 189 
emergency powers, 149, 291 
enemy aliens, 149 
equivalent, the, 76 
Erskine, on sovereignty of Parliament, 59, 
60 
estimates, 126, 127 -129, 131 -132, 171 
estoppel, 170 
Exchequer and Audit Departments, 126, 
132 
Exchequer Court, 17, 77, 151, 155, 215 
executive discretion, freedom of, 152 
Figgis, 142 
finality clauses, 
in relation to administrative tribunals, 
253 
in relation to subordinate legislation, 
237, 238 
Finance Bill, 128 
financial legislation, 126 et seq. 
character of, 114, 126, 127 
origins of, 126 
significance of, 126 
First Lord of the Treasury, see Prime 
Minister 
foreign affairs, 
prerogative in, 148 
Foreign Secretary, 159, 163 
Forestry Commission, 182 
forms of action, significance of, 268 -269 
France, 12, 16, 50, 154, 229 
franchise, 
local government, 199 
parliamentary, 94 
Franks Report, 168, 241, 242 
and reform of administrative tribunals, 
247, 256 
freedom of association, 290 et seq. 
freedom of meeting, 279 et seq. 
in private places, 281 
limitations on, 280 
types of meeting, 279 
freedom of the person, 273, 284 et seq. 
arrest, 284 
bail, 285 
And see protection of accused persons 
freedom of the press, 273 
freedom of property, 281 et seq. 
general assumption of, 281 
freedom of religion, 289 
freedom of speech, 
generally, 273 et seq. 
limitations in the criminal law, 274 et 
seq. 
restrictions on, 273 
fugitive offenders, 83 
Full Court, 
meaning of, 214 
use of, 19, 214 
fundamental liberties, 8, 51 
assumption of, 273 
generally, 272 et seq. 
And see particular freedoms 
Gas Council and Gas Boards, 184 
Consultative Committees and, 189 
General Assembly of the Church of 
Scotland, 219 
INDEX 
General Post Office, 180 
general warrants, illegality of, 282, 283 
Government, 
collective responsibility of, 163 
Crown and, 137, 154, 170 
defeat of, 167 
distinguished from Cabinet, 156 
flexibility of, 169 
formation of, 162 
relationship to Cabinet, 156, 160, 163 
relationship to Opposition, 166 
relationship to Parliament, 157, 165 et 
seq. 
relationship to Sovereign, 157 
unity of, 170 
And see central government, local 
government, machinery of govern- 
ment 
Guillotine (Allocation of Time Order), 
117 
habeas corpus, 287 
Head of the Civil Service, 24, 171 
And see Treasury, Joint Secretaries of 
Head of the Commonwealth, 139, 147 
heritable jurisdictions, 77, 142, 213, 214, 
215, 218 
High Court of Justiciary, 77, 213 
jurisdiction, 215 
special powers as to officials, 215 
Home Secretary, 159 
House of Commons, 
administrative functions, 135 
committees, 115 
composition, 93 et seq., 117 
conflicts with House of Lords, see 
Parliament Acts 
control of membership, 96, 105 
disqualification from membership, 97 
non -technical character, 228 
privileges in relation to the Lords, 113, 
122 
privileges of, 100 et seq. 
House of Lords (as a court), 19, 112, 219 
et seq. 
Acts of Union and, 219 -220 
Appeal Committee, 113 
Appellate Committee, 113, 220 
composition of, 220 
consequences of, 19, 220, 221 
House of Lords (generally), 
Acts of Union and, 78 
administrative functions of, 135 
allowances to members, 93 
composition of, 86 et seq. 
conflicts with House of Commons, see 
Parliament Acts 
disqualification from, 88 et seq. 
effect of decisions of, 17, 19 
financial measures in, 113, 122 
general characteristics of, 92 et seq. 
leave of absence, 93 
legislative functions, 116 
legislative procedure in, 115 -116 
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House of Lords (generally) -cont. 
ministers in, 162, 163 
Parliament Acts and, 125 
powers of expulsion and exclusion, 89 
privileges of, 109 
reforms of, 93, 125 
hybrid Bills, 114 
impeachment, 112, 158 
impressment, 150, 276, 288 
incitement to disaffection, 274, 282 
Independent Television Authority, 185 
Inner Cabinet, 160 
Inner House; functions of, 214 
And see Court of Session 
inquiries, 241 
distinguished from tribunals, 242 
presiding officer, 245 
problems of, 246, 254 
rules for, 254 -255 
third party rights, 256 
types of, 244 
institutional controls, 35, 163, 225, 235, 
247 
institutional writers, as source of consti- 
tutional law, 20 
internal law, concept of, 11, 24-25, 29, 71, 
108 -109, 122, 127, 177, 209, 264 
Ireland, 
nationality in relation to, 83, 98 
Union with, 54, 58 
Ireland Act, 1949, 
nationality and, 82 
sovereignty of Parliament and, 64 
Ireland, Republic of, 82 -83, 98 
Irish peers, 86 
Jennings, Sir Ivor, 
convention and, 23, 28 
doctrine of the rule of law and, 42 
sovereignty of Parliament and, 50 
judges, 
attendance on House of Lords, 110 
exclusion from House of Commons, 98 
formative role of, 225 
immunity of, 224, 274 
in land court, 217 
in sheriff courts, 215 
independence of, 223 
law officers and, 172, 214 
of Court of Session, 214 
tenure of, 91, 113, 222 -223 
And see courts 
Judges' Rules (England), 283 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 
27, 99, 219, 221, 245 
Judicial decisions, 
as part of the legislative process, 230 
compared with administrative, 250, 
268, 270 
definition of, 34 
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judicial review, 
basis of in England and Scotland, 250 
in relation to administrative tribunals, 
249 et seq. 
by -laws, 200 
local government generally, 210 -212 
parliamentary controls, 168, 191, 226 
public boards, 190 -193 
remedies, 71 
subordinate legislation generally, 
236 -239 
of legislation, 65 et seq. 
written and unwritten constitutions 
under, 10-12, 58 -59 
And see courts 
jury court, 213 
justices of the peace, 197 
courts of, in Scotland, 218 
in England and Scotland, 197, 212 
removal of, 222 
kangaroo closure, 117 
Knox, John, 39-40 
land court, 43, 242 
composition, 217 
jurisdiction, 217 
position of, 217 
Lands Tribunal, 204, 242 
Lands Valuation Appeal Court, 204, 215 
large burghs, 198 
functions, 199 -200 
And see local government 
Law Lords, 220 
Law Officers, 34 
attendance on House of Lords, 110 
generally, 171 et seq. 
special position of, 164, 172 -173 
And see particular Law Officers 
Leader of the House of Commons, 112, 
129, 166 
role of, 166 
Leader of the Opposition, 24 
questions by, 129 
recognition of, 166 
Shadow Cabinet, and 157 
Legal Aid Scheme, 179 
legislation, 
administration and, 131 
Cabinet regulation, 117 
consultation on, 52, 117 -118 
definition of, 34 
drafting of, 117 
government control of, 123 
nature of the legislative process, 116 et 
seq. 
prerogative, 150, 151 
relation to prerogative, 143, 151, 154 
technical character of, 229 
And see public Bills, etc., private 
legislation and Scottish private 
legislation procedure, statutes 
licensing and censorship, 275 
life peers, 91 et seq. 
limitations, periods of, 267 
local authorities, 
audits of, 205 
finance of, 204 -205 
general characteristics, 209 -210 
judicial control of, 210 -212 
members of, 203, 207 
relationship to central government, 207- 
208, 258 
relationship to officers, 203, 209 
And see local government, burghs, etc. 
local government, 196 et seq. 
alteration of areas, 198 et seq., 207 
audits, 206 
distribution of functions, 211 -212 
finance, 205 -207 
general background in England and 
Scotland, 196 -197, 207 -208 
judicial control in, 201 
methods of operation, 202 -203 
modern structure, 198 
officers, 203, 207, 208 
relationship to central government, 207- 
208 
Local Government Commissioners, 207 
local government elections, 199 
Locke, 32 
London Passenger Transport Board, 181 
Lord Advocate, 13, 34, 171, 174, 211 
actions against, 265 
as head of the system of public prose- 
cution, 172, 275 
immunity of, 172, 225 
patronage of, 172 
And see Law Officers 
Lord Chancellor, 34, 112, 220, 232, 247 
Lord Justice -Clerk, 214 
Lord Justice General, 213 
Lord Lyon King of Arms, 216 
Lord President, 34, 213, 214, 247 
conjunction with Lord Justice General, 
213 
Lord President of the Council, 171 
Lord Privy Seal, 171 
Lords Auditors, 213 
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, 91, 113 
220 
Lords of Council and Session, 213 
Lords of the Articles, 158 
machinery of government, 
failure to adjust, 193 
generally, 156 et seq., 169 et seq. 
in Scotland, 175 
place of 
civil servants, 176 
local government in, 207 
public boards in, 179 et seq. 
unity of, 170, 262 
unreal dichotomy of, 137, 144, 153, 259, 
270 
Mackenzie, Sir George, 21, 33, 40, 41, 54, 
62, 67, 143 
Maitland, 
on delegated legislation, 229 
on the nature of modern government, 
142, 228 
mandate, doctrine of, 52 
INDEX 
martial law, 150 
Medical Disciplinary Committee of the 
G.M.C., 221, 245 
member status, conventions and, 23, 30 
nationality in relation to, 81, 82 
title of the Queen in, 138 
Members of Parliament, 
constituents and, 135 
disqualification, 97 et seq. 
privileges of, 103 et seq. 
resignation of, 99 
And see House of Commons, parlia- 
mentary elections, parliamentary 
privileges 
military law, 150, 173 
Minister for Welsh Affairs, 175 
Minister of Defence, 159, 169 
Minister of State for Scotland, 170, 174 
Minister of State for Wales, 170, 175 
ministerial responsibility, doctrine of, 23, 
129, 130 
effects as to civil servants, 176, 178 
positive and negative effects, 167, 247, 
257 
relationship to collective responsibility, 
164 
relationship to public boards, 187 
restrictive effects, 134, 167, 176, 188, 
271 
sanctions of, 164 
weakening of, 164, 168 
Ministers, 
appointment and dismissal, 162 
creation of, 169 
individual and collective responsibility, 
163 -164 
judges as, 208 
relationship to Cabinet, 159, 163 et seq. 
relationship to civil servants, 176 
relationship to public boards, 185, 191 
And see machinery of government 
Ministers of State, 159 
Ministries, 
creation of, 169 
relationship to public boards, 185 -186 
structure of, 169 
And see machinery of government 
Ministry of Defence, 159 
organisation of, 173 
mobbing and rioting, 277 
Money Bills, 
for Parliament Acts, 123 
for privilege of Commons, 114 
And see financial legislation 
monopolies, 242, 291 
Monopolies Commission, 242, 291 
Montesquieu, 31 
motives, control of, 
local government, in, 201, 211 
review of, 192, 264 
munus publicum, 14, 107, 177, 224 
murmuring of judges, 223, 273 
National Assistance Board, 182, 184 
National Coal Board, 179, 184 
Consumers Councils and, 189 
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National Economic Development Coun- 
cil, 168 
National Health Service, 179, 183, 191 
Tribunals in the service, 243 -244 
National Insurance Advisory Committee, 
235 
National Insurance Commissioner, 243 
National Insurance Tribunals, 240 
organisation of, 243, 250 
nationality, see British nationality 
natural justice, rules of, 251 et seq. 
natural or fundamental law, 49, 51 
naturalisation, 81 
Navy, regulation of, 151, 173 
necessity, defence of, 150 
New Towns Commission and Develop- 
ment Corporations, 183 
nobile officium, 33, 44, 214, 288 
North of Scotland Hydro -Electric Board, 
182, 184, 191 
Northern Ireland, 175 
obscenity, 274 
distinction between England and Scot- 
land, 275 
Ombudsman, proposals for, 257, 270 
criticism of, 271 
in New Zealand, 271 
Opposition, 
consultation with, 92 
relationship to Government, 24, 166 
use of Supply Days, 127 
And see Leader of the Opposition 
Outer House, functions of, 214; and see 
Court of Session 
" Overlords," 159, 160 
pardon, right of, 152 
Parliament, 
administrative functions, 129 et seq. 
as guardian of the Constitution, 10 
bicameral nature of, 85 
control of delegated legislation, 233 -235 
dominant place of, 49 et seq., 226 
duration, 111 
functioning of, 111 et seq. 
House of Commons and House of 
Lords 
in treaty- making process, 148 
influence of the domination, 226 
judicial functions, 112 -113 
legislative business, 113 et seq. 
Officers of, 111 
prorogation, 111 
redefinition of, 62 
relationship to Cabinet, 157 
relationship to Government, 165 
relationship to public boards, 186 -188 
structure of, 84 et seq. 
And see public Bills, etc., Parliament 
Acts, sovereignty of Parliament and 
other headings under Parliament 
and parliamentary 
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Parliament Acts, 122 et seq. 
constitutional significance, 125 
courts and finality provisions in, 124 
Money Bill under, 123 
origin of, 122 
procedure under, 123 et seq. 
purposes of, 124 
Speaker's certificates, 124 
Parliament of England, influence on that 
of the United Kingdom, 85 -86 
Parliament of Scotland, 
development before the Union, 85 
membership of, 97 
privileges in, 100 
sovereignty of, 54, 55, 60 
weakness of, 55 
Parliamentary Commissioner, see Om- 
budsman 
parliamentary draftsmen, 117, 122, 172 
parliamentary elections, 
absent voters, 95 
candidates, 96 
civil servants and, 177 
constituencies, 93 
franchise, 94 
postal voters, 95 
regulation of elections, 95 
Parliamentary Labour Party, 167 
parliamentary privileges, 85, 100 et seq. 
courts in relation to privilege, 105 et seq. 
nature of, 100, 106 
power to commit for contempt, 105, 
106 -108, 288 
privilege in the House of Lords, 109 et 
seq. 
punishment for breach, 105, 110 
relationship to separation of powers, 
101 
relationship to the sovereignty of 
Parliament, 109 
specific privileges, 
control over membership, 104 
exclusive jurisdiction, 105 
freedom from arrest, 102 
freedom of access, 102 
freedom of speech, 103 
most favourable construction, 102 
traditional claim, 101 
parliamentary questions, 
in the House of Lords, 130 
rules of, 129 
weight of, 130 
parties, 
choice of leader, 25 
controls over parliamentary parties, 
116, 117 
And see Opposition, whips 
Paymaster -General, 171 
peerage, 
descent of, 87 
determination of questions relating to, 
88 
surrender and disclaimer, 87 
And see peers 
peeresses in their own right, 88 
peers, 
conventional limitations on, 89 
leave of absence from House of Lords, 
93 
of Ireland, 86 
of Scotland, 78, 87, 89 
of the United Kingdom, 86 et seq. 
And see House of Lords, life peers 
Peers Spiritual, 91 
personal bar, 170 
picketing, 280, 290 
police, 
as Crown servants, 209, 263 
disciplinary bodies, 245 
interrogation by, 283 
protection of, 77, 267, 285 
regulation of, 200, 209 
rights in relation to public meetings, 
279 -280 
rights of arrest, 284 
rights of entry, 281 
rights of search, 282 -283 
seduction from duty, 274 
police burghs, 197 
" political " questions, 165, 226, 239, 268 
Ponsonby Rules, 25, 148 
Poor Law Commission (England), 180, 
228 
earlier Scottish Commissioners, 228 
prayers against Statutory Instruments, 233 
precedent, 
as source of constitutional law, 18 et seq. 
effect of Union of 1707 on, 19 
in Scotland, 19 
And see case law 
prerogative, 
Crown Proceedings Act and, 261 
detailed prerogatives, 152, 261 -262 
emergency powers under, 149 
essential nature of, 154 
foreign affairs, 143 
generally, 142 et seq. 
legislative powers, 50 
meanings of, 142 -144 
older Scottish view of, 142, 154 
personal prerogatives, 144 
political prerogatives, 148 et seq. 
relationship to statute, 143, 151, 154 
And see Crown 
prerogative orders, 210, 250 
press, 
freedom of, 273 et seq. 
public meetings and, 203 
Prime Minister, 
choice of, 147, 162 
conventions in relation to, 23, 30, 158, 
162 
dominance of, 156, 162 
powers of, 162 
relationship to Cabinet, 160, 161, 163 
right of independent action, 163 
Sovereign and, 145 
And see Cabinet 
Prince and Steward of Scotland, 140 
revenues of, 141 
Prince of Wales, 140 
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private legislation, 114, 118 et seq. 
courts and, 66-67, 121 
disadvantages, 118 
general procedure, 119 
in pre -Union Scotland, 66-67, 121 
main significance, 118 
promoted by public boards, 187 
scope of, 24, 118 
special significance in Scotland, 200,202 
treatment in law, 121 
And see Scottish private legislation 
procedure 
Private Members' Bills, 114, 116, 124 
Private Members' motions, 131 
Private Secretary to the Sovereign, 145- 
146 
Privy Council of Scotland, 
abolition of, 79 
controlling maladministration, 47, 211, 
288 
delegations to, 228 
former control over judges, 222 
processions, limitations on, 280; and see 
freedom of meeting 
professional tribunals, 245 
protection of accused persons, 283 et seq. 
interrogation, 283 -284 
right to speedy trial, 286 
rules of contempt and, 223, 274 
search, 282 
provisional orders, 
general, 121, 227 
under Scottish private legislation pro- 
cedure, 120 et seq. 
Provosts (and Lord Provosts), 198 
Public Accounts Committee, 126, 129, 
131, 134 
operation of, 132 
public boards and, 187 
public authorities, 
actions against, 266 et seq. 
special rules as to liability, 267 
treatment of, 46 et seq. 
And see judicial review, public law 
public authority, importance of the con- 
cept, 193 -194 
public Bills, 
introduction of, 114 
stages of, 115 
public Boards, 48, 174 
accounts of, 187 
as Crown Servants, 153 
criticisms of, 174, 182 
forms of, 179 
general administrative controls, 188-190 
general characteristics, 183 -185 
general constitutional position, 193- 
195 
general problems, 181 -183 
generally, 179 et seq. 
judicial control, 190 -193 
origins of, 179 -181 
relationship to Ministers, 184, 185 -186 
relationship to Parliament, 186 -188 
And see particular boards 
public contracts, 48, 153, 210, 261 -262, 
267 
public law, 
historical obstacles to development, 47 
importance of, 45, 193 -195 
need for, 256, 258, 268 -270 
public officers, 
civil servants as, 176 et seq. 
local government officers as, 203 
special rules for, 46 
Public Order Act, 280, 282; and see 
freedom of meeting 
public prosecution, system of, in Scotland, 
172, 209; and see Lord Advocate 
quarter sessions, 
comparison with sheriff courts, 216 
in local government, 197 
quasi-judicial functions, concept of, 34, 
241, 247, 250, 268, 270; and see 
natural justice, rules of 
Queen Consort, 140 
rating system, 204 -205 
recognition of foreign states, 144, 148 
reduction, remedy of, 210 
regalia, 
divisions of, 142 
modern significance of the idea, 141, 142 
Regent, 
conditions for appointment, 139 
powers of, 64, 140 
who may be, 140 
registration, as citizens of the U.K. and 
Colonies, 81 
registration, Court of Appeal, 94, 215 
relator actions, 211 
rent tribunals, 242, 247 
requisitioning, right of, 150 
res extra commercium, 142 
resolutions, as source of Bills, 116, 123, 
128 
Restrictive Practices Court, 217, 242, 291 
composition of, 218 
United Kingdom character, 217 
And see monopolies 
returning officers, 96 
Rights of Man, Declaration of, 32 
riot, 277 -278 
damages caused by, 278 
definition, 277 
Royal Assent, 124 
Royal Burghs, 142 
organisation of, 196 
rights under the Acts of Union, 56, 76, 
77, 200, 218 
And see local government 
Royal Marriages, 140 
Rule of Law, 38 et seq. 
Dicey's views on, 41 et seq. 
Jennings, Sir Ivor, on, 42 et seq. 
need for reformulation, 46 et seq., 259 
revolution of 1688 and, 40, 143 
sovereign and, 143, 145 
Rutherford, Samuel, on Parliament, 59 
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Scotland, devolution in, 175; and see 
separate heads with prefix Scottish 
Scottish Grand Committee, 115 
Scottish Office, 169, 170 
organisation and functions of, 174 -175 
relationship to local authorities, 207- 
208 
And see Secretary of State for 
Scotland 
Scottish private legislation procedure, 
120 -121 
advantages, 121 
Commissioners' panels, 120 
importance of, in local government, 202 
scope of, 120 
And see private legislation 
Scottish representative peers, 89 et seq. 
Scottish Standing Committee, 115 
search, right of, 
consequences of wrongful search, 283 
differences between England and Scot- 
land, 283 
limitations on as to persons, 283 
property, 281 
without warrant, 282 
Secretaries of State, 170 
Secretary of State for Scotland, 
actions against, 265 
as Scotland's Minister, 24 
Cabinet and, 159 
generally, 174 
local government and, 201, 207 -208 
police and, 209 
Scottish private legislation and, 120 
Secretary of State's Auditors, 203 
sedition, 274 
Select Committee on Estimates, 126, 129, 
131, 134 
membership and operation, 133 
Select Committee on National Expendi- 
ture, 133 
Select Committee on Nationalised In- 
dustries, 134, 188 
Select Committee on Statutory Instru- 
ments, 134 
operation of, 234 
origins of, 230 
terms of reference, 230 
Select Committees, 
in House of Lords, 116 
in legislation, 115 
value of, in administrative control, 
134 -135 
And see particular committees 
Senators of the College of Justice, 214; 
and see judges 
separation of powers, 31 et seq., 43 
continuing influence, 35 
difficulties and advantages, 34, 225 
disqualifications from Parliament and, 
89, 98 
doubtful modern position of the doc- 
trine, 226 
Montesquieu's views, 31 
specialisation in government, 32, 37 
Shadow Cabinet, 25, 157 
Sheriff courts, 33 
comparison with county courts, 216 
Crown proceedings in, 261, 266 
jurisdiction, 216 
modern origin, 214, 215 
Small Debt Court, 216 
And see courts 
sheriff principals, 215 
administrative functions, 244 
jurisdiction and functions, 216 
sheriff -substitutes, 215 
appeals from, 216 
jurisdiction, 216 
tenure of, 223 
sheriffs depute, see sheriff principals 
small burghs, 198 
functions, 199 -200 
And see local authorities 
Small Debt Court, 218, 240 
appeals from, 215 
Sheriffs Small Debt Court, 216 
Solicitor General, 171; and see Law 
Officers 
Solicitor General for Scotland, 171; and 
see Law Officers 
sources of constitutional law, 14 et seq. 
Sovereign, 
choice of Prime Minister and, 146 
death of, 139 
meaning of, 137 
minority or illness of, 139 
moral influences of, 147 
personal prerogatives, 144 et seq. 
political household, 145 
political role of, 143 -148 
private estates of, 141 
protection of, by law, 276 -277 
relationship to Church of England, 219 
relationship to government, 145 -147 
title, 138, 147 
sovereignty of Parliament, 49 et seq. 
apparent validity, 53 
background to the doctrine, 49 
conclusions, 72 -73 
effect of Acts of Union, 1707 ... 54 
effect of limiting statutes, 59 et seq. 
growth of, 55 
Ireland Act, 1949, and, 64 
meaning of, 50 
Regency Act and, 64 
Statute of Westminster and, 63 
Speaker, 111, 117, 119, 123, 131 
certificates of, under Parliament Acts, 
124 
certificates of, under Statutory Instru- 
ments Act, 232 
Special Commissioners of Income Tax, 
243 
special districts, 198 
Special Orders Committee (House of 
Lords), 231, 234 
Special Procedure Orders, 121, 227 
Stair, 20, 144 
on liberty, 273 




in House of Commons, 115 
in House of Lords, 116 
Statute of Westminster, 
as codification of conventions, 23 
doctrine of sovereignty of Parliament 
and, 63 
effect of, 64 
title to the Crown and, 138 
statutes 
as source of constitutional law, 15 -18 
courts and, 65 et seq. 
effects of Union of 1707 on, 15 
presumptions in interpretation, 51 
Scots Acts, 17 -18 
And see legislation, public Bills, etc. 
statutory duties, enforcement of, 
against local authorities, 210 -212 
against public boards, 191 -193 
against the Crown, 264 
Statutory Instruments, 18, 227 et seq. 
definition of, 231 
institutional controls, 235 
parliamentary controls, 233 -235 
prayers against, 133, 233 
publication, 232 
And see Statutory Instruments Act 
Statutory Instruments Act 
consequences of applicability, 232 et 
seq. 
scope and application, 231 
strikes, 290 
subdelegated legislation, 231 
subordinate legislation, 227 et seq.; and 
see delegated legislation 
Supplementary Estimates, 127, 128, 133; 
and see appropriation, financial legis- 
lation 
supply, 128 et seq. 
Supply Days, 127, 128, 131 
Supply Services, 127 
Suspending and dispending power, 151 
Suspension, 215 
suspension and liberation, petition for, 
288 
taxes, 
collection of, 128 
imposition of, 126, 128 
variation of, 128 
title to sue, importance of in public law, 
13, 27, 192, 211, 268 ; and see actio 
popularis 
town planning, 240, 248, 291 
trade associations, 292 
trade unions, 290 
expulsion from, 292 
Transport Boards, 185 
consultative committees and, 189, 190 
Transport Tribunal and, 190 
Transport Tribunal, 190 
composition and functions, 243 
treachery, 277 
treason, 276 
treason- felony, 277 
treasure trove, 142 
Treasury, 128, 132, 134, 175 
First Lord of, see Prime Minister 
functions of, 171 
Junior Lords of, see whips 
relationship to Cabinet Secretariat, 161 
relationship to Civil Service, 171, 177 
relationship to public boards, 186, 188 
And see civil servants, Civil Service 
Treasury, Joint Secretaries of, 24, 161, 171 
trial, right to speedy, 286 
Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 247, et seq., 
270 
appeals from tribunals and, 250 
judicial review and, 250 
membership of tribunals and, 247 
procedural reforms and, 253 
And see administrative tribunals, 
Council on Tribunals 
ultra vires 
in relation to by -laws, 201 
central departments, 170, 264 
delegated legislation, 238 
local authorities generally, 210 -212 
public boards, 192 
And see judicial review 
Union of 1707 
disqualification from Parliament and, 
97 
effect on case law, 18 -20, 112 
parliamentary privilege, 100 
prerogative rules, 151, 155 
statutes, 15 -16 
And see Acts of Union 
United States of America, 8, 22, 36, 68, 
101, 143, 154, 161, 180, 229, 289 
university tests, 57, 289 
" urgency " motions, 130 
virement, 127, 132 
voluntary churches, 
jurisdiction of, 219 
Wales, 93, 115 
devolution in, 175 
Minister of State for, 170, 175 
War Cabinet, 159 
Welsh Grand Committee, 115 
Whips, Parliamentary, 104, 117 
functioning of, 166 
White Paper on Public Investment, 128 
White Papers, 
in legislative process, 116, 166 
Whitley Councils, 177 
wire -tapping, 143, 144, 283 
wrongous imprisonment, 
relief from, civil, 287 -288 
criminal, 286 
And see freedom of the person, 
protection of accused persons 
